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and all the wonderful people
I met along the way
‘I come from one of the richest countries on
the planet. Yet the people of my country are
among the poorest of the world. The
troubling reality is that the abundance of
our natural resources – gold, coltan, cobalt
and other strategic minerals – is the root
cause of war, extreme violence and abject
poverty. We love nice cars, jewellery and
gadgets. I have a smartphone myself. These
items contain minerals found in our
country. Often mined in inhuman
conditions by young children, victims of
intimidation and sexual violence. When you
drive your electric car; when you use your
smart phone or admire your jewellery, take
a minute to reflect on the human cost of
manufacturing these objects. As consumers,
let us at least insist that these products are
manufactured with respect for human
dignity. Turning a blind eye to this tragedy
is being complicit.’—Dr. Denis Mukwege,
2018 Nobel Peace Prize Laureate1
1Nobel Lecture given by 2018 Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Denis Mukwege, 10 December 2018,
Oslo. The full speech is available at The Nobel Prize (2021) Denis Mukwege – Nobel lecture,
https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2018/mukwege/55721-denis-mukwege-nobel-lecture-2/
(last accessed 14 May 2021).
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Human development would not have been possible without the materials, which
nature provides. Mindful of their crucial role, historians have named entire eras after
the minerals that were being sourced at that time—be it the Neolithic Age, Bronze
Age, or the Iron Age.1
Today, we are living in a world of globalised markets. Close to no value creation
would be possible without the use of natural resources, more precisely primary
commodities.2 The Sustainable Development (SD) agenda has become the univer-
sally accepted political agenda of our time.3 In view of the important challenges for
global resource management, which will be elucidated throughout the course of this
book, the field of Global Commodity Governance (GCG) has emerged over the past
two decades. It describes a new turn in human history: towards a coordinated,
transnational approach to regulating the complexities of commodity activity.
Now more than ever, global commodity management is subject to a large variety
of multi-stakeholder initiatives and standards, which exhibit a conscious consider-
ation of the particularities of commodity industries and share one goal: making the
commodity sector work for SD. However, one can easily get lost in the complex net
of international agreements, principles, transnational standards and domestic regu-
lation, which govern commodity activity.4
Therefore, the present book investigates the following question: How effective is
the current legal framework in ensuring a functional commodity sector? For the
1Ruddiman et al. (2015), pp. 38–39.
2On exact definitions of these central terms, cf. Chap. 2 below.
3UN GA (2015) Resolution A/RES/70/1, 25 September 2015, Transforming our world: the 2030
Agenda for Sustainable Development. http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol¼A/
RES/70/1&Lang¼E (last accessed 14 May 2021); cf. instead of many Cordonier Segger and
Weeramantry (2017). The core concept of SD ‘can be defined as the consolidation of socio-
economic development and environmental protection’, Oehl (2019), p. 12; cf. Sects. 4.1 and 5.1
below.
4On the definition of commodity activity, cf. Sect. 3.2.2.1 below.
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purpose of this investigation, the commodity sector will be characterised as func-
tional where it exhibits a balance between the five major interests associated with
commodity activity: economic gain; development; preservation; control; and partic-
ipation. These interests as well as the policy trade-offs that arise in between them
delineate the commodity governance matrix. In order to identify the legal framework
applicable to commodity activities, we will conceptualise the field of Transnational
Commodity Law (TCL).
As we shall learn, the principle of sustainable use not only constitutes one of the
few balancing norms, which foster the effectiveness of TCL. Given the universal
nature of the SD agenda, the specific normative quality of SD as a legal concept, and
its status within a sizable series of international treaties, sustainable use can be
defined as the regulatory objective of TCL. As our discussion will illustrate, it thus
spearheads and coheres the legal framework applicable to commodity activities.
Certainly, one may critically ask whether the scope of this book, which covers
commodities per se, is not too broad. An alternative approach would have been more
specific, designed to portray the regulatory environment for specific commodity
subsectors, such as agriculture or mining, or even singular commodities like cocoa or
coal. The intention of this book, however, is to identify the commonalities of
commodity governance in general—as well as its distinctiveness from related fields,
such as natural resource or environmental governance.
Consequently, this treatise deliberately renounces a comprehensive display of the
law regulating sustainable commodity use. Instead, it focuses on providing com-
modity governance and law with more definitional and conceptual clarity. This
approach serves the purpose of intensifying the understanding of the normative
patterns, regulatory challenges, and gaps associated with transnational commodity
activity—which, in turn, shall inspire more targeted future research and lawmaking.
In order to provide the reader with an overview of the considerable substance of
TCL, however, a corresponding table has been annexed to this work. The agree-
ments, standards, and guidance documents referenced therein display the normative
foundation on which the conceptualisations of GCG and TCL, as its legal frame-
work, have been performed.
The investigation proceeds in six incremental steps:
First, it identifies, defines, and describes GCG as the transnational mode of
governing commodity activities.
Second, it defines ensuring a functional commodity sector as the principal task
of GCG.
Third, it defines a functional commodity sector by referring to the five major
interests associated with commodity activity and the ‘matrix’ of policy trade-offs
they create.
Fourth, in order to identify the current legal framework of GCG, it conceptualises
Transnational Commodity Law (TCL).
Fifth, it assesses several normative patterns of TCL, which are instructive regard-
ing its effectiveness.
Sixth, it provides suggestions on how the effectiveness of TCL in fostering a
functional commodity sector may be improved.
2 1 Introduction
These steps feature in the subsequent four chapters according to the following
outline:
Chapter 2 describes the emergence of GCG as the governing mode of the
commodity sector. It first defines the term ‘commodity’, portrays the political and
economic circumstances of commodity activity, and determines what constitutes a
functional commodity sector. Second, it exhibits the historical emergence of GCG
and contours its balanced approach as a disruptive feature. Third, it addresses the
role of the law for GCG, particularly in creating a ‘balanced’ commodity sector, and
therefore establishes a basis for our discussions of the legal framework of GCG.
Chapter 3 is concerned with the conceptualisation of TCL as the legal framework
of GCG. It first discusses the purpose of this undertaking. Second, it expounds some
methodological underpinnings that have guided the conceptualisation. Third, it
presents the organisational framework of TCL. Fourth and last, it displays sources
and structure of the normative substance of TCL as well as its operation against the
backdrop of the commodity governance matrix.
Chapter 4 expounds several patterns of TCL, which are instructive regarding its
limited effectiveness in ensuring a functional commodity sector. It first demonstrates
that the principle of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources (PSNR) consti-
tutes its central normative cornerstone. Subsequently, it highlights the fact that
PSNR entails the central balancing norm of TCL—the sustainable use principle—
and that, therefore, the effectiveness of TCL relates to the operationalisation of the
latter. Moreover, it sets forth that TCL is largely ‘indirect’ in the sense that it does not
reflect a conscious consideration of commodity interests and trade-offs—and that
where it does, it is not balancing commodity interests comprehensively. In addition,
it displays that ‘direct’ TCL is largely of ‘soft’ character or stems from private
standards respectively. Furthermore, it portrays that the instruments of TCL are
hardly integrated. Lastly, it unveils that the TCL framework is imbalanced in favour
of economic objectives and exhibits several regulatory gaps.
To conclude this book, Chap. 5 provides suggestions on how to foster the
effectiveness of TCL in ensuring a functional commodity sector. In this connection,
it discusses the legal nature of SD and suggests defining sustainable use as the object
and purpose of TCL. In addition, it advocates for using the technique of full
integration in order to specify the normative contents of the sustainable use principle.
Moreover, it analyses current International Commodity Agreements (ICAs) with a
view to their quality as regulatory instruments de lege ferenda fostering the effec-
tiveness of TCL. In doing so, it demonstrates how ICAs could serve to codify
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The Emergence of Global Commodity
Governance
Whereas the challenges of GCG are manifold, its principal task lies in ensuring a
functional commodity sector (Sect. 2.1). The ‘balanced’ mode through which it
pursues this objective constitutes a departure from historical approaches to regulat-
ing transnational commodity activity (Sect. 2.2). The remainder of this treatise will
be concerned with the role of the law in fostering the effectiveness of GCG
(Sect. 2.3).
2.1 The Task: Ensuring a Functional Commodity Sector
International legal scholarship to date has brought about little clarity regarding the
scope of the term ‘commodity’—a status that we shall first remedy (Sect. 2.1.1)
before approaching the political and economic circumstances of commodity activity
(Sect. 2.1.2), which need to be borne in mind when defining what constitutes a
functional commodity sector (Sect. 2.1.3) as well as GCG (Sect. 2.1.4).
2.1.1 Defining the Term ‘Commodity’
In international law dealing with the extraction and/or trade of resources, the term
‘commodity’ is quite widely applied. This is not last portrayed by the established
term ‘international commodity agreement’,1 which refers to i.a., agreements covering
coffee, sugar, or tropical timber.2
1Cf. the numerous treatises on ICAs, e.g. Reynolds (1978); Law (1975); Khan (1982); Chimni
(1987). My emphasis.
2Cf. Sect. 5.2 below.
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Considering the enormous significance of international commodity trade,3 it is
remarkable that the definition of the term ‘commodity’ in much of academic
literature either consists of the denomination of a series of commodities4 or is simply
presumed as clear;5 in many cases, an abstract definition is not provided. Further-
more, in order to address a material that originates in the environment, one will
mostly make use of the terms ‘commodity’, ‘raw material’ or ‘natural resource’, not
uncommonly applying these notions synonymously.6 Many publications establish
their own definition of the term ‘commodity’ in order to define their objects of
investigation. This phenomenon leads to an unclear definitional state of the word
‘commodity’. In order to resolve this ambiguity, hereafter an abstract definition of
the notion shall be developed.
2.1.1.1 General Meaning
Standard dictionaries generally define ‘commodity’ as a ‘substance that can be
traded, bought or sold’7 or ‘any article of commerce’,8 whilst some glossaries are
more specific by requiring a certain origin of the material, e.g. ‘a raw material or
primary agricultural product that can be bought and sold’9 or ‘basic items or staple
products, as of agriculture or mining’.10 The latter definitions thus limit the term
‘commodity’ to agricultural and mining products. The Merriam Webster dictionary
is providing the perhaps clearest definition. Accordingly, a ‘commodity’ is to be
defined as ‘an economic good’ that exhibits one of the following qualities: (a) ‘a
product of agriculture or mining’, (b) ‘an article of commerce especially when
delivered for shipment’, (c) ‘a mass-produced unspecialized product’.11
Against the backdrop of the objective of this book to specifically deal with legal
and governance issues related to certain materials that are first removed from nature
and later—typically—subjected to trade, such as coffee, coal, oil, rare earths or the
3In 2011, world commodity trade accounted for 33% of overall merchandise trade,
UNCTAD (2013).
4Gale and Haward (2011), p. 1 for instance refrain from stating a definition and instead name a list
of commodities, such as oil, iron, gold etc.
5Cf. e.g. Weiss (2009), paras. 6–25.
6Cf. e.g. OECD (2014), pp. 9–11.
7Cambridge dictionary (2021) Entry ‘commodity’, http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/
british/commodity (last accessed 14 May 2021).
8Collins dictionary (2021) Entry ‘commodity’, http://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/
american/commodity (last accessed 14 May 2021).
9Oxford dictionary (2021) Entry ‘commodity’, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/
english/commodity (last accessed 14 May 2021).
10Collins dictionary (2021) Entry ‘commodity’, http://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/
american/commodity (last accessed 14 May 2021).
11Merriam Webster dictionary (2021) Entry ‘commodity’, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/commodity (last accessed 14 May 2021).
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like,12 the term ‘commodity’ cannot be defined as simply referring to ‘any article of
commerce.’ Otherwise GCG would be more or less synonymous to world trade
governance.
For the purpose of this book, it would seem more adequate to for instance refer to
commodities as ‘raw materials or primary agricultural products that can be bought or
sold’ or ‘products of agriculture or mining’. However, these descriptions lack the
necessary precision in order to serve as a legal definition. The former, for example,
requires another definition—the one of the term ‘raw material’; the latter arbitrarily
excludes items of forestry and fishery as well as mineral products.
Also, it would seem methodologically unsound to simply choose a definition
provided by a standard dictionary and employ it as a legal definition, especially
given their ambiguity. It appears natural to define a legal term according to the
purpose it is intended to serve, thus teleologically.13 Its definition, furthermore,
should respect the historical development of the legal notion (Sect. 2.1.1.2) and
their contemporary use (Sect. 2.1.1.3).
Yet, the displayed standard definitions cast the foundation of a practical legal
definition by fairly marking the boundaries of the notion. Based on this foundation,
we shall now further specify ‘commodity’ as a legal term.
2.1.1.2 Definition According to the Havana Charter
One of the first international law definitions of the term ‘commodity’ had been
elaborated in the Article 56(1) of the 1948 Havana Charter (HC). Accordingly, a
‘primary commodity’ was defined as
any product of farm, forest or fishery or any mineral, in its natural form or which has
undergone such processing as is customarily required to prepare it for marketing in substan-
tial volume in international trade.
According to Article 56(2) HC this definition is expanded to
cover a group of commodities, of which one is a primary commodity as defined in paragraph
1 and the others are commodities, which are so closely related, as regards conditions of
production or utilization, to the other commodities in the group, that it is appropriate to deal
with them in a single agreement.
Just as some of the displayed definitions by general dictionaries, the Havana
Charter, by applying the term ‘primary commodity’, refers to the state of processing
12Cf. the definition of ‘commodity activity’, which is provided in Sect. 3.2.2.1 below. Where this
study speaks of ‘extraction’, it—depending on the context—may at times also refer to the removal
or rather harvesting of e.g. agricultural commodities, thus somewhat not being entirely in line with
the general meaning of the term. On mining, cf. n 68 below.
13Similarly, for instance the WTO DSB (2004) US–Softwood Lumber IV, Report of the Appellate
Body, 19 January 2004, para. 59, which states that ‘the treaty interpreter should seek the meaning
that gives effect, simultaneously, to all the terms of the treaty, as they are used in each authentic
language.’
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that a certain material has undergone. Only such materials that do not dispose of a
degree of manufacturing, which goes beyond one that is necessary for international
trade, are meant to fall within the scope of the notion.
Consequently, a tree trunk is as much a ‘primary commodity’ as wood parts that
have been debarked and cut into pieces from the original trunk for shipment. To stick
with this example, planks treated with a wood preservative in order to reach higher
sales prices would presumably already constitute regular ‘commodities’, thus normal
articles of merchandise just like even more processed goods such as wooden tables,
chairs etc.
Distinguishing between ‘primary commodities’ as defined by Article 56(1) HC
and other regular articles of commerce is a compelling approach. It allows narrowing
down the term ‘primary commodity’ to such items that are, in their shape and degree
of processing, still close to their natural origin; it thus excludes end products, which
are the outcome of a more intense manufacturing process.14
Confining the term ‘commodity’ to these items appears to be indicated when one
bears in mind what has been described as ‘commodification’—the observation that
today more items than ever are being classified as commodities.15 Once categorised
as such, these items are typically being perceived as economic goods and thus
subjected to market forces. As a consequence, their availability is strongly regulated
by prices—which potentially may exclude market participants that cannot afford
them. This is particularly problematic, where actors are seeking to qualify such items
that are indispensable for human survival—like water, or even air—as economic
goods.16
Notably, Article 56(1) HC excludes both of these vital substances from the scope
of the notion ‘commodity’.17 Against this backdrop as well as given that Article
56(1) HC describes the historic origins of coordinated commodity regulation on the
global level, its approach in defining the term ‘commodity’ appears to be an apt
starting point for our definition.
14This also resolves potential terminological issues particularly with regard to the German transla-
tion of ‘commodity’ as either ‘Grund-‘ or ‘Rohstoff’, cf. Weiss (2009), paras. 2–4.
15Weiss (2009), paras. 2–4.; Bakker (2007), p. 442; Gunderson (2017).
16Bakker (2007), p. 432. Such endeavours have i.a. been criticised as the ‘neoliberalisation of
nature’, yet more accurately consist of measures such as ‘privatization, marketization, [. . .] com-
mercialization, and corporatization. . .’, p. 433. With regard to water, it corresponds with the debate
whether there is a HR to water, pp. 436–440. Cf. moreover Riedel (2005), pp. 585–606; moving on
and focusing particularly on the implementation of the HR to water Singh (2016).
17While it would go beyond the scope of this book to enter the debate on ‘commodities versus
commons’ in more detail—extensively, however, Bakker (2007)—we shall bear in mind the great
significance of classifying a certain item as one or the other. Regardless of this debate, as well as
corresponding classifications of items and resource management approaches, what shall guide our
further discussion, is the ultimate objective of utilising resources in a way that creates the greatest
possible benefit for the global community. Balancing the diverging interests and community-based
or market-oriented approaches on how this goal can be achieved, is one of the major challenges of
GCG and its legal framework, TCL—both of which will be described in more detail throughout the
subsequent chapters of this book.
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Further, we need to reflect whether the expansion of the definition along the lines
of Article 56(2) HC is conducive to the purposes of our investigation. The norm
constitutes a teleological extension of Article 56(1) HC that aims to provide inter-
national actors with a comprehensive governance tool, which is not limited to
covering only ‘primary commodities’, but also goods that are subject to like eco-
nomic and political—or governance—circumstances.
This approach is also compelling. The aim of GCG is to address specific
challenges that generally occur in connection with the trade of ‘primary commod-
ities’. If one can witness the same issues with regard to other, strongly related items,
there is no evident reason, why the same governance strategies and tools should not
be applied to these goods as well. By introducing the legal concept of ‘appropriate-
ness’, Article 56(2) HC also delivers a parameter for determining whether or not
there is a sufficient comparability of the governance challenges faced. Thus, the
definition becomes more and more of a normative concept.
This normativity is also displayed in Article 56(3) HC,18 which seeks to still
further expand the scope of chapter VI of the Havana Charter. Accordingly, the
provisions shall in ‘exceptional circumstances’ also apply to agreements that con-
cern items that are not covered by the notion according to Article 56(1), (2) HC.
This, however, leaves the definition pursuant to Article 56(1), (2) HC untouched.
Article 56(3) HC uses the expression ‘inter-governmental agreements regarding that
commodity’ and not the term usually employed in chapter 6 ‘inter-governmental
commodity agreements’, thus not expanding the definition of a commodity. Also,
the applicability of the provisions was made dependent upon a decision of the ITO
that recognises the conditions set forth in Article 62 HC.19 Article 56(3) HC
therefore concerns case-by-case applicability and does not affect the definition
provided for in Article 56(1), (2) HC.
2.1.1.3 Use by WTO and UNCTAD
International publications on commodities often employ diverging notions to iden-
tify their object of reference. This leads to rather inconsistent usage of the term
‘commodity’ and its neighbouring notions ‘raw material’ and ‘natural resource’
respectively.
For instance, in its 2014 World Trade Report, the WTO defines ‘commodities’ as
referring to both
18Article 56(3) HC reads as follows: ‘If, in exceptional circumstances, the Organization finds that
the conditions set forth in Article 62 exist in the case of a commodity which does not fall precisely
under paragraphs 1 or 2 of this Article, the Organization may decide that the provisions of this
Chapter, together with any other requirements it may establish, shall apply to inter-governmental
agreements regarding that commodity.’
19The ITO, however, never came into being not least due to a lack of political support and
consequently denial to ratify the Havana Charter by the US congress, cf. Stoll (2014), para. 2.
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“soft commodities” (predominantly agriculture) and to (. . .) “hard commodities” (predom-
inantly mining) and “energy commodities” (predominantly oil and gas). Mineral products
(including metals) and energy products (coal, oil and natural gas) will fall under the
designation of “natural resources”. Agricultural products, in turn, will include traditional
products, fresh fruit and vegetables, specialty products and processed products. . .20
Hence, in this report the WTO provides definitions by naming groups of com-
modities. In refraining from establishing abstract definitions of the applied terms,
this approach is quite exemplary for the practice exhibited in many publications on
commodity governance that either presume the existence of a universal definition
without (re)stating it or merely describe commodities by referring to various food,
mining etc. items. Neither approach is satisfactory from a legal perspective.
The inconsistencies of this approach are being acknowledged by WTO authors in
the 2010 World Trade Report, which describes a ‘commodity’ as
a homogeneous product which can be exchanged among consumers and producers. The term
“commodities” is often used in the relevant literature to refer to agricultural goods, but it also
includes a number of other products that are classified as natural resources in this report.
Examples are fuels, forestry products, minerals and metals.21
UNCTAD, in its 2012 Commodities and Development Report, defines ‘com-
modity’ as ‘any homogenous good traded in bulk.’22 This abstract definition is quite
vast. It would include e.g. microchips, screws, golf balls etc.23 Evidently, such a
definition does not serve the purpose of addressing specific governance challenges
that occur concerning materials, which are being extracted from nature. In the same
report, however, UNCTAD presents a clear overview of what it perceives as
commodities, whereas industrially processed goods are not mentioned.24 Yet
again, the term ‘commodity’ is thus primarily defined by stating a catalogue of items.
The fact that there is no established definition of the term ‘commodity’ at this
point, again, demonstrates that the legal coverage of related economic activities and
corresponding governance challenges has thus far been quite sparse. The following
section is going to fill this gap by formulating an abstract, legal definition of the
notion ‘commodity’.
20WTO (2014) World Trade Report 2014, https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/world_
trade_report14_e.pdf (last accessed 14 May 2021), p. 130.
21WTO (2010) World Trade Report 2010, https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/
world_trade_report10_e.pdf (last accessed 14 May 2021), pp. 59–60; cf. Bürgi Bonanomi et al.
(2015) The Commodity Sector and Related Governance Challenges from a Sustainable Develop-
ment Perspective: The Example of Switzerland, WTI Bern Working Paper 7/2015, https://boris.
unibe.ch/71327/1/WTI_CDE_IWE%20Working%20paper%20July%202015_The%20Commod
ity%20Sector%20and%20Related%20Gov....pdf (last accessed 14 May 2021), p. 2.
22UNCTAD (2012) Commodities and Development Report, April 2012, UNCTAD/SUC/2011/9,
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/suc2011d9_en.pdf (last accessed 14 May 2021), p. x.
23Cf. Weiss (2009), para. 3.
24UNCTAD (2012), p. xi, table A; cf. Bürgi Bonanomi et al. (2015), p. 2.
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2.1.1.4 Definition for the Purpose of This Book
In this book, we shall establish a definition of the term ‘commodity’ that is largely
based on the one provided by Article 56(1), (2) HC.25 This approach is advantageous
in that it establishes a methodologically consistent scope, which is grounded on a
historically established notion, for GCG and transnational commodity law respec-
tively. Although the Havana Charter never came into effect, it nevertheless repre-
sents a multilaterally negotiated document that largely foreshadowed the world
economic order after WWII and, moreover, served as one of the main documents
of reference during the emergence of theWTO. The authoritative potential of chapter
VI of the Havana Charter is illustrated in particular by the fact that, by means of
ECOSOC Resolution 30 (IV), the world community in 1947 decided to establish the
provisions set forth therein as guidelines for the conclusion of ICAs.26
Consequently, the following abstract definition of the term ‘commodity’ is
proposed:
Any product of agriculture, forest, fishery or mining27 and any mineral product in its natural
(¼raw) form and in such forms that are customarily required for its international trade,
especially shipment, in substantial volumes.
This abstract definition is to be supplemented with a ‘normative clause’:
Any item that does not constitute a commodity according to the abstract definition of the
term can nevertheless be considered a ‘commodity’ where appropriate (‘normative com-
modity’). Appropriateness prevails in principle, where the relevant item is similar to a
‘commodity’ as regards conditions of exploitation or utilisation and subject to identical
governance challenges.
This understanding of the term ‘commodity’ in the (modified) sense of a ‘primary
commodity’ according to Article 56(1) HC clearly contours the field of GCG as the
governance frame addressing the exploitation and trade of raw, as well as cultivated,
materials and respective materials in a slightly processed state that is necessary for
international trade. Hereby, GCG is sufficiently specified in its scope and differen-
tiated from international trade governance.
In elaborating our abstract definition of ‘commodity’, the following changes
introduced to the definition provided by Article 56(1) HC deserve further mention:
First, products of ‘mining’ were explicitly included. The term is to be understood in
25Proceeding in the same vein, cf. e.g. Pelikahn (1990), p. 32, n 12 with numerous further
references to other authors.
26ECOSOC (1947) Resolution 30 (IV) of 28 March 1947 recommended i.a that ‘pending the
establishment of the International Trade Organization, Members of the United Nations adopt as a
general guide in inter-governmental consultation or action with respect to commodity problems the
principles laid down in Chapter [VI] as a whole’; Weiss (2009), para. 15.
27To be understood in the widest sense of the word, thus also including the exploitation of mineral/
crude oil, natural gas and every other material that is being extracted from Earth. Water, which is
especially being pumped, does not constitute a commodity, cf. Sect. 2.1.1.2 above as well as n
33 below.
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its widest possible meaning and was introduced to also cover natural gas. Neither
crude oil nor natural gas constitute minerals in a geological sense and thus generally
do not fall within the scope of Article 56(1) HC.28 Second, the notion ‘natural’ has
been equated with the term ‘raw’, thus identifying ‘raw materials’ as a sub-category
of ‘commodities’.29 Third, the definition was supplemented by the phrase ‘especially
shipment’. This refers to the practice of international trade that largely relies on
shipping.30 The addendum is supposed to establish an additional parameter for the
assessment whether an item has been processed only for the purpose of its interna-
tional trade or whether it already constitutes a more sophisticated product—thus no
longer a ‘commodity’, but an ordinary commercial good.31
Thus, according to our definition, energy does not qualify as a ‘commodity’.
Rather, it is the product of either the combustion of a primary commodity (in most
cases of a raw material like oil, coal etc.) or the harnessing of a natural resource (sun,
water, wind etc.). Only the trade of energy commodities, not the one of electrical
energy itself thus falls within the scope of this book.32
Concerning the definition of a ‘normative commodity’, the term is quite self-
explanatory. This additional clause allows approaching governance challenges that
do not concern ‘commodities’ in the actual sense of the term, but items that are
highly comparable to them within the framework of and with the instruments
provided by GCG.33
28On the geological definition of the term ‘mineral’, cf. Nickel (1995); on the distinction between
the geological notion of what constitutes a mineral and the legal definition, cf. the judgment of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court (2014) in Butler v. Charles Powers Estate, discussed by
Wilhelm (2014).
29Cf. Sect. 2.1.1.6 below.
30On the crucial role of shipping and corresponding effects of exercise of market power on trade and
development Hummels et al. (2009).
31The qualifications of ‘economic usefulness’ and ‘scarcity’, on the other hand, were not intro-
duced. These terms serve the purpose of excluding natural resources like seawater and air, WTO
(2010), p. 46. However, the latter do not fall within the scope of the definition in any case. The
qualification would thus have been redundant.
32Cf. the differentiation between energy and commodities in European Commission (2011), p. 6.
Annex EM to Article 1(5) of the Energy Charter Treaty lists ‘electrical energy’ in line with a set of
commodities. This list, however, is used to define the term ‘energy materials and products’, whereas
‘electrical energy’ is undoubtedly a product, thus the outcome of e.g. the combustion or other use of
a commodity. Cf. Sect. 5.2.1.3 in more detail below.
33In accordance with Article 56(1) HC, however, water and air shall under no circumstances be
considered to constitute ‘commodities’. While the further realms of this debate lie beyond the scope
of this treatise, it is the opinion of the author that both elements constitute public goods, which are
indispensable for human life, belong to humankind overall and therefore should not be subjected to
market forces. On the corresponding debate on a HR to water, cf. already Riedel (2005) as well as
Singh (2016) above. Likewise excluding water from its scope, Article 1.9(1) CETA.
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2.1.1.5 Types of Commodities
International literature frequently distinguishes between different types of
commodities.
To begin with, a differentiation can especially be made according to the origin
(agricultural, fishery, forestry, mining, mineral) or the intended usage (food, indus-
trial, energy) of a commodity.
Further, the distinction according to the ‘texture’ of a commodity, thus between
‘soft’ (livestock, grains, agricultural and industrial crops and fisheries) and ‘hard’
(petroleum products, metals and minerals) commodities, has become more and more
popular.34 This is most likely due to the fact that they are subject to at times
substantially different production processes (farming or fishing on the one hand,
mining or drilling on the other) and therefore may relate to diverging governance
challenges.
UNCTAD employs yet another differentiation according to the intended use of a
commodity, namely between energy (petroleum products, gas, coal, but also nuclear
products and renewables) and non-energy commodities (metals, agricultural and
fishery products).35 A succinct overview of the different commodity categories
mentioned is displayed in the 2012 UNCTAD Commodities and Development
Report (Fig. 2.1).36
Yet another distinction that has a double meaning is the one between ‘primary’
and ‘secondary’ commodities. The differentiation can refer to either the degree of
processing that the commodity has experienced, as in Article 56(1) HC, or to the
usage of the commodity for original production (‘primary’) or recycling (‘second-
ary’), an example for the latter especially being scrap.37
From an economic point of view, commodities constitute factors of production as
well as goods in themselves.38 Which of these perspectives one employs can have an
effect on the governance strategies she proposes.39
34UNCTAD (2012), p. xi. Cf. Bürgi Bonanomi et al. (2015), p. 2.
35UNCTAD (2012), p. ix.
36UNCTAD (2012), p. ix. Cf. also the original work by Farooki and Kaplinsky (2012),
Table 3.1; NB: the classification displayed in the chart of plutonium as a non-energy commodity
appears to be incorrect since its contemporary main use is to produce electrical energy, cf. World
Nuclear Association (2018) Plutonium, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Nuclear-Fuel-Cycle/
Fuel-Recycling/Plutonium/ (last accessed 14 May 2021).
37The latter distinction is especially employed in European Commission (2008) as well as European
Commission (2011).
38WTO (2010), p. 46.
39More detailed discussions of these matters of natural resource economics naturally lie beyond the
scope of this book. It goes without saying that the economics behind GCG, which are being
peripherally touched upon throughout our subsequent discussions, are a decisive factor when it
comes to the challenge of developing a sustainable, equitable global commodity sector. On the
origins of (exhaustible) NR economics Hotelling (1931); cf. also comprehensively Perman et al.
(2011); expertly Radetzki and Warrell (2016).
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A highly detailed classification of different commodities is provided by the
‘multipurpose international product nomenclature’ elaborated by theWorld Customs
Organisation under the title Harmonised System (HS), which naturally also contains
a comprehensive itemisation of commodities.40 Also the EU’s Combined Nomen-
clature is based on the HS.41
Fig. 2.1 Primary commodities classification by categories, UNCTAD (2012), p. ix. (Source:
adapted from Farooki and Kaplinsky 2012)
40World Customs Organisation (2019) Overview, http://www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/nomencla
ture/overview.aspx (last accessed 14 May 2021).
41The Combined Nomenclature is contained in Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87
on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff and can be accessed at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri¼OJ:L:2014:312:FULL&from¼EN (last
accessed 14 May 2021). Cf. further Schorkopf (2011), para. 8 with reflections on the nomencla-
ture’s sections applicable to commodities.
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2.1.1.6 Neighbouring Terms
‘Raw material’ is generally defined as a ‘basic material from which a product is
made.’42 More precisely, it is being described as ‘material still in its natural or
original state, before processing or manufacture.’43 In the context of Article
56(1) HC, the notion ‘raw material’ delivers a sub-definition of the term ‘primary
commodity’.44 It depicts materials in their ‘natural form’. As soon as the materials
undergo any form of processing, even as limited as e.g. the debarking and cutting of
a tree trunk, they become ‘primary commodities’ but no longer constitute ‘raw
materials’. The term ‘raw material’ thus constitutes one of the elements of and
complements the definition of Article 56(1) HC of ‘primary commodity’.
‘Natural resources’ are commonly defined as ‘materials or substances occurring
in nature which can be exploited for economic gain.’45 In more exact terms, Collins
Dictionary speaks of ‘an actual or potential form of wealth supplied by nature, as
coal, oil, water power, arable land etc.’46 Accordingly, the notion ‘natural resource’
also refers to such entities that can be used for economic gain, e.g. the generation of
energy, but are at the same time immovable like rivers, forests or the sunlight.
The term thus only refers to the very sources of renewable energy and not to their
methods of production or products. In this connection, solar panels do not constitute
a ‘natural resource’ since they are a processed good and thus not supplied by nature.
Solar energy collected through photovoltaic systems neither is a ‘natural resource’
since it does not occur in nature but is a result of the sun’s radiant light and heat being
harnessed as electrical energy by human technology. Only the sunlight or the sun
itself is a ‘natural resource’.
The notion is thus both wider and narrower than the term ‘primary commodity’
since on the one hand it also includes non-tradable, immovable entities and on the
other excludes processed materials.47 The term, consequently, is more strongly
42Oxford dictionaries (2021) Entry ‘raw material’, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/
english/raw-material (last accessed 14 May 2021).
43Collins dictionary (2021) Entry ‘raw material’, http://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/
american/raw-material (last accessed 14 May 2021). An OECD paper titled Export Restrictions in
Raw Materials Trade ‘for the purpose of this publication’ defines raw materials as ‘the minerals and
metals that are crucial for the capital and consumer goods industries around the world, and the
agricultural commodities that supplement domestic food supplies in many countries and sustain the
global food processing industry’, cf. OECD (2014), p. 9, thus proceeding in a manner paradigmatic
for the varying ad hoc definitions being employed in many international publications on commodity
(-related) matters.
44Cf. already Sect. 2.1.1.4 above.
45Oxford dictionaries (2021) Entry ‘natural resources’, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/
definition/english/natural-resources (last accessed 14 May 2021).
46Collins dictionary (2021) Entry ‘natural resource’, http://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/
american/natural-resource (last accessed 14 May 2021).
47In the same vein also Clark et al. (2001), p. 3.
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related to issues of environmental governance, whereas the term commodity exhibits
a stronger economic connotation.48
Nevertheless, several authors use the term ‘natural resources’ particularly also in
the context of trade.49 For instance, WTO authors have defined the term as
stocks of materials that exist in the natural environment that are both scarce and econom-
ically useful in production or consumption, either in their raw state or after a minimal amount
of processing.50
‘Natural resource’ here is used almost synonymously to ‘primary commodity’,
except for the qualifications of scarcity and economic usefulness. However, the
authors exclude agricultural goods and foods from the scope of the definition,
which are items covered by Article 56(1) HC. Fish and forestry products, to the
contrary, are defined as ‘natural resources’.51
Given that verbatim natural resources include immovable entities, it is to my
mind more precise and thus preferable to employ the term ‘commodity’ whenever
we seek to address challenges that arise from the removal of objects from nature,
which are later being employed for economic purposes, particularly trade.52
2.1.2 Economic, Political and Technical Circumstances
of Commodity Activity
Commodity activity constitutes the precondition for economic production—without
a primary commodity, no goods can be produced.53 Where exhaustible commodity
deposits are concerned,54 they frequently constitute important economic assets for
the state that owns them.55 Taken together, these factors raise important issues of
48See already Oehl (2019), p. 6, n 20.
49Cf. Schrijver (1997), pp. 14–15; Oehl (2019), p. 6, n 20.
50WTO (2010), p. 46. This is not surprising given that Article XX(g) GATT refers to ‘natural
resources’, thus departing from the terminology introduced by Article 56(1) HC.
51The fact that the definition exhibits the mentioned inconsistencies yet again shows that it was
mainly created in order to economically assess effects to items that are subject to like circumstances.
The qualifications of scarcity and economic usefulness here, however, are compelling since they
allow excluding such ‘natural resources’ that are not traded in markets, e.g. air and seawater, from
the scope of the notion, WTO (2010), p. 46. On the definition of ‘commodity’ in the same report,
cf. already Sect. 2.1.1.4 above.
52Oehl (2019), p. 6, n 20; cf. in more detail Sect. 5.1.1.3 below.
53On the so-called Commodity Value Chain, cf. Sect. 3.2.2.1 below.
54As has been pointed out, the notion of sustainability has to be different for exhaustible commod-
ities compared to renewables since the balancing exercise regarding economic, social and environ-
mental concerns may differ, Bellmann (2016); cf. also the distinction between non-renewable
‘stock’ and renewable ‘flow’ resources portrayed i.a. by Schrijver (1997), pp. 13–4.
55Calder (2014), p. 2. In the case of exhaustible commodities, ‘a key opportunity cost of extracting
today is the future extraction foregone’, which can be particularly problematic, where the extraction
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global economic equity between an economic centre, in which commodities are
being turned into end products, and a commodity-exporting periphery that seeks to
make use of its commodity export revenues for its own industrialisation, which
naturally requires corresponding technology.56
From the perspective of CDDCs, commodity governance is a crucial develop-
ment factor: Commodity export revenue for some of these countries may be the only
opportunity to grow and industrialise their national economies.57 Their needs appear
to frequently clash with the paradigm of trade liberalisation, which is dominant in the
global trade system still today. Whereas for instance the US developed their own
economy relying i.a. on infant industry protection measures,58 the paradigm of
liberalised trade today substantially limits countries’ policy space to implement
such measures, including ones e.g. fostering so-called Import Substitution
Industrialisation.59 The same holds true for the ‘structural adjustment’ programs
(SAPs) maintained by the World Bank.60
Furthermore, several factors, including high capital intensity, high sunk costs,
long development and operating periods, need for imports of expertise and technol-
ogy, volatile markets, and overall economic uncertainty and risks, particularly in the
extractive industries, contribute to the significant dominance of large TNCs—most
of them headquartered in the economic centre—in the commodity sector.61
and corresponding economic benefits cannot be turned into SD. On the various efforts UNCTAD is
undertaking in order to tackle pervasive commodity dependence—a key challenge to the SD of the
Global South, UNCTAD (2018), pp. 6–8.
56On his ‘centre-periphery analytics’, which ‘open[] a window onto the structures of power and
hierarchy in a larger system and onto the continuation of war in times of peace through the dynamics
of domination and reciprocal influence among unequal actors in such a system[]’, fundamentally
Kennedy (2013), pp. 77–86. On the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis, for instance, cf. Sect. 2.2.3 below;
Toye and Toye (2003), pp. 437–438; cf. also Arezki et al. (2013). Furthermore, the need for CDDCs
to industrialise relates to the challenges of creating sufficient linkages between commodity opera-
tions and the respective host economy, such as capacity building, technology transfer, and other
local content measures.
57Instead of many, Morris and Fessehaie (2014).
58Tickner (1990), pp. 69–70.
59Gale and Haward (2011), p. 5; cf. Hirschman (1968) with a comprehensive account of the origins
of ISI and respective policies in Latin America.
60On ‘[t]he IMF’s neo-classical emphasis on liberalization and macroeconomic stabilization’ as
well as the ensuing repercussions for borrowers, Schlemmer-Schulte (2014), paras. 4–5. It may be
due not least to these liberalisation requirements that resource-endowed states, particularly in
Sub-Saharan Africa are increasingly relying on so-called resources for investments (RFI) deals.
On the latter, focusing on the DRC-Sicomines deal, Landry (2018).
61Calder (2014), pp. 2, 6, who points to the fact that ‘risk is not unique to natural resources, but the
magnitude and pervasiveness of natural resource risks are exceptional’; IMF (2012), p. 10; cf. also
AU (2009), p. 8; on the challenge of regulating TNCs instructively Muchlinski (2007). Apart from
private TNCs, also state-owned commodity enterprises have evolved as major players, notably in
the oil and gas sector. The governance of SOEs can pose particular challenges, especially where
these entities manage large flows of public revenue and/or assume multiple government functions
(e.g. project financing, operation, oversight, accounting) at once, thus often conferring a
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Correspondingly, much of commodity activity occurs transnationally, thus giving
rise to additional governance challenges, such as benefit sharing62 as well as
information asymmetries between the commodity-endowed state and the foreign
corporate.63 Also, in view of the pervasive economic risks associated with commod-
ity projects, maintaining a stable fiscal regime including reliable legal underpinnings
may be of particular importance for attracting foreign investment.64
Apart from the great economic risks associated with commodity activity, it also
entails significant environmental and social risks and can potentially cause i.a., air,
water and land pollution, energy and water waste, land alteration and deforestation,
public health risks, the disruption of existing ecosystems, the displacement of local
communities and exploitative labour practices affecting vulnerable population seg-
ments such as children.65 Moreover, where commodity extraction is taking place in
areas that had hitherto been used for farming, hunting or fishing, commodity
activities not only concern land rights, but also a variety of HR, including cultural
rights of indigenous peoples in view of role the natural environment can play in their
rites and beliefs.66 Due to the high social sensitivity of commodity activities,
commodity companies are said to require a social license to operate—in addition
to the formal license issued by the state government—in order to carry out their
desired projects.67
Many of the risks caused are particular to the type of commodity activity, such as
mining, oil and gas exploitation, or agriculture.68 The detrimental effects on the
disproportionately strong position onto the SOE within the government apparatus, which may
jeopardise constitutional checks and balances and therefore make the entire governance system
prone to corruption, cf. e.g. EITI (2019) Role of state-owned enterprises, https://eiti.org/role-of-
stateowned-enterprises (last accessed 14 May 2021).
62IMF (2012), p. 10. From a government perspective, a non-standard, commodity-directed fiscal
regime is generally advised in order adequately capture commodity profits and rents, cf. Calder
(2014). In view of their large volumes, managing financial flows resulting from commodity activity
and maintaining respective transparency are two equally important and intricate challenges of
commodity governance. On EITI, PWYP, and other transparency standards, cf. Sect. 4.2.2.2.1.1
below.
63Especially Commodity-Dependent Developing Countries (CDDCs), on their definition
cf. UNCTAD (2017), p. x, often do not dispose of the necessary funds to carry out exploration
activities—which can be very capital-intensive, particularly in the mining sector—and correspond-
ingly determine relevant geological data themselves. Instead, they need to rely on the information
that commodity companies gather, which may put them at a disadvantage when negotiating the
economic terms of the exploitation of a respective deposit, cf. AU (2009), pp. 15–17.
64On stabilisation clauses in the commodity sector, see instructively Hauert (2016); on investment
protection in the commodity sector, cf. Sect. 4.3.1 below.
65Espa and Oehl (2018), p. 5; Bellmann (2016); Bürgi Bonanomi et al. (2015).
66Cf. Sects. 4.2.1.1 and 4.2.2.1.1 below.
67NRGI (2014), p. 11; cf. Moffat and Zhang (2014).
68Mining for instance can cause severe environmental repercussions. Since minerals are contained
in a matrix, it typically requires the unearthing of huge volumes of rock. Once these have been
brought to the surface, the ore is being separated from waste rock and treated i.a. with leaches such
as alkaline cyanide solutions or sulphuric acid solutions in order to liberate the desired metal from
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environment that are specifically caused by commodity exploitation can potentially
affect all spaces of planet Earth, including mining in the Deep Sea as well as drilling
activities in the Arctic. Again the risks associated with commodity activity may be
similar to the risks associated with other economic activity, yet they are exceptional
in their ‘magnitude and pervasiveness’.69 In fact these risks may at times be of such
overwhelming nature that states fail to adequately manage them—a scenario, which
has become known under the notion ‘resource curse’.70
2.1.3 Defining a Functional Commodity Sector
These economic, political and technical realities in which commodity activity occurs
need to be borne in mind when considering what constitutes a well-governed or
‘functional’ commodity sector. While there are naturally many ways to approach the
definition of a complex term such as ‘functional commodity sector’, we shall
characterise the latter by identifying its central policy trade-offs.
In order to identify these policy trade-offs, I first analysed the political objectives
associated with commodity activity by studying a considerable volume of inter-,
the gangue, Spohr (2016), p. 48. The gangue material that is left behind is usually being deposited
into tailings, which are often retained by dams or embankments consisting of waste rock. Due to the
prior chemical treatment, gangue often exhibits residual concentrations of leaches. As a conse-
quence, many tailings contain significant concentrations of these chemicals. Their seepage can lead
to ground and surface water contamination as well as other environmental damage. Tailings dam
failures can lead to a further proliferation of chemicals in the surrounding environment and,
depending on the size of the tailings, destroy entire ecosystems, Spohr (2016), pp. 48–49; cf. the
Fundao tailings dam-burst, which caused 19 casualties and polluted a nearby river in Brazil, BBC
(2016) Samarco dam failure in Brazil ‘caused by design flaws’, 30 August 2016, http://www.bbc.
com/news/business-37218145 (last accessed 14 May 2021), as well as the dam-burst in
Brumadinho and Lewis (2019) Second Vale dam burst in Brazil likely to curb mining risk appetite.
Reuters, 26 January 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-vale-sa-disaster-risks/second-vale-
dam-burst-in-brazil-likely-to-curb-mining-risk-appetite-idUSKCN1PK0N1 (last accessed
14 May 2021).
69Calder (2014), p. 6. While this claim by Calder is being made with regard to extractive industries,
it is also fair to employ it with regard to other commodity sectors, including agriculture and
fisheries. In all sectors, large-scale, intensive intrusions into the natural environment are not
uncommon, as reflected in for example incidents of large-scale land grabbing and illegal,
unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, cf. e.g. Bürgi Bonanomi et al. (2015), pp. 46–47 as
well as FAO (2016). On the endeavour of this treatise to identify, instead of focusing on individual
commodities, commonalities of governance challenges related to commodities in general and its
corresponding conceptualisation of TCL, cf. Chap. 2 below.
70On empirical evidence for the phenomenon that resource rich states often do not number among
developed nations, Sachs and Warner (2001), p. 828; cf. Hauert (2016), p. 33. Cf. also NRGI
(2015), p. 1. Comprehensively Frankel (2012); Bonnitcha (2016), p. 43; critically Desai and Jarvis
(2012), p. 104. The decrease of productivity in other industrial sectors that commodity exports can
bring about has been described as the related phenomenon of ‘Dutch disease’, cf. Davis (1995),
likewise with a critical view on the ‘resource curse thesis’.
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supra-, and national strategic guidance documents; the regulatory objectives of
various inter-, trans-, and national instruments applicable to commodity activity; as
well as the central individual legal norms governing commodity activity on a
transnational level. As a second step, I clustered the objectives expressed in these
sources according to five major interests they are associated with—economic gain,
development, preservation, control, and participation:
First, many, if not most, actors involved in commodity activity are pursuing the
objective of economic gain. The commodity company, which may be involved in
exploration, extraction and perhaps processing as well as shipping or trading activ-
ities, will typically be looking for profits. The host government, which disposes of
natural resources, will generally attempt to capture sufficient resource rents through
taxes or royalties. As commonly the case in the oil and gas sector, the host
government may also pursue profit-oriented activities itself, usually through state-
owned enterprises (SOEs). In addition, various actors along the commodity value
chain may be seeking profits, be it suppliers, subcontractors or third-party service
providers of any kind. The services and goods they offer may range from highly
technical expertise and products, such as the refinement of precious minerals, to
services fulfilling the basic needs of e.g., the personnel of the commodity company
carrying out the removal process, such as grocers and food suppliers.71
A second interest, which occurs frequently in connection with commodity activ-
ity, is the one of development. For many countries, commodities constitute a major
or even the only significant source of income. This is particularly the case for
so-called CDDCs.72 Frequently, the revenues generated through commodity activity
will be the only substantial means available for those states to develop. As a
consequence, the respective governments will typically seek to implement policies,
which foster the development contribution of the commodity sector to the greatest
possible extent. Their actions will oftentimes be monitored and potentially criticised
by civil society groups, which likewise demand a ‘fair share’ in commodity export
earnings for the respective host population. On the part of industrialised states,
security of commodity supply constitutes a central element of continued
development.
Both interests introduced so far frequently conflict with the third interest of
preservation. Ideally host governments, and typically especially local populations
and civil society groups will advocate for an adequate protection of the natural
wealth of their country or municipality. This advocacy can be particularly vigorous
where local populations, especially indigenous peoples, rely on a particular part of
the natural environment for their livelihoods or identify with it culturally e.g., as
‘ancestral land’. The preservation of nature is a challenge, which applies along the
entire commodity value chain and involves diverse subject matters, such as the
71Cf. insofar the policy challenge of creating sufficient linkages between the commodity activity,
particularly the removal activity, and the host economy—an issue, which depicts potential policy
trade-offs between economic gain and development.
72Cf. definition provided by UNCTAD (2017), p. x.
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protection of watercourses against waste materials from extraction works, adequate
restoration of the natural environment after a removal process has ceased or limiting
the emission of greenhouse gas during a refinement or shipping process.
A fourth interest, which is pursued mainly by government actors, is controlling
the commodity activity in various respects. The respective authorities on national
and subnational levels typically strive to maintain control over what resources are
being extracted by whom and under what conditions. This interest can correlate with
the one of economic gain but is still separate from it. Control may also relate to
enforcing particular labour, anti-corruption or shipping standards, i.e. upholding the
general rule of law in regard to commodity activity. Consequently, internal conflicts
within the government or between government branches may occur, for instance
over the award of exploration or extraction rights to a particular actor by the
executive branch, which the judiciary may deem to be a violation of due process.
In situations of armed conflict, maintaining the overall control over, and thus
security of, commodity operations constitutes a central objective that adversarial
actors may be striving for.
Fifthly and lastly, all of the interests outlined so far may conflict with the interest
of participation. This interest typically concerns respective host state populations, in
particular civil society organisations on national and local levels.73 Given the often
large-scale nature of commodity activities,74 a removal process may bear on the
daily lives and interests of many residents. As a consequence, their proponents
frequently voice their demand to participate in decision-making processes at the
various levels of government. They want to be involved in the decision, what
resources are being exploited by what actor and under what conditions. Potentially,
they may claim compensation for temporary or permanent loss of their livelihoods.
The demand for participation may also relate to specific activities carried out by
commodity companies, such as for instance ways to remedy detrimental side effects
of extraction activities. Likewise, commodity companies may seek participation in
governmental decision-making.
While each of these five interests can conflict with one another, and thus create
various policy trade-offs, some evidently clash more severely than others. For
instance, the quest for economic gain, no matter pursued by which actor, frequently
creates trade-offs with the objective of preservation and potentially development.
Likewise, it will often conflict with the concern for participation. Participation, in
turn will typically influence the degree of control that an actor can exercise over a
specific activity.
This list of interests creating commodity-specific policy trade-offs is not meant to
be conclusive. Yet, it depicts an analytical framework, which helps to aptly
73Today, several civil society organisations/NGOs are active transnationally, thus demonstrating
what can be termed the emergence of a ‘transnational civil society’. Cf. generally on the challenge
of sufficiently involving these transnational actors in the continuously intensifying global regula-
tory cooperation and related matters of democratic legitimacy, e.g. Buszewski et al. (2016). On
globally active commodity initiatives and organisations, cf. Sect. 2.2.5 below.
74Cf. Calder (2014), p. 10; also, Sect. 2.1.2 above.
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categorise the majority of trade-offs that typically occur in relation to commodity
activity. Evidently, the remarks made above can only give a rough, exemplary idea
of what kind of scenarios may be categorised as conflicts of the five diverging
interests; and oftentimes, these scenarios will comprise several trade-offs, not just
one. Still, one should generally be able to subsume large parts of the factual
scenarios occurring in the commodity sector under the analytical framework
presented above.
Moreover, it shall be noted here that qualitative statements about for instance the
degree to which the global commodity sector is factually being governed in a
functional manner lie beyond the scope of this book. What we can approximate,
however, is an answer to our principal research question—how the current legal
framework relates to the goal of ensuring a functional commodity sector. In that
connection, what shall accompany us throughout the remainder of this book is the
analytical parameter of balance between the five major interests associated with
commodity activity.
Therefore, for the purposes of this book,
the global commodity sector shall be deemed to be functional when and where it exhibits a
balance between the five major interests associated with commodity activity.
2.1.4 Defining Global Commodity Governance (GCG)
It ought to appear relatively clear what the term ‘global’ refers to within the meaning
of GCG. Generally, the word is defined as ‘relating to the whole world’ or ‘world-
wide’.75 Speaking of GCG, it is this exact meaning that the term depicts: commodity
governance is to be looked at from a global perspective, thus inspecting its world-
wide structures and rules.76 ‘Governance’ is generally defined as ‘the exercise of
political power to manage a nation’s affair’77 or ‘the action, manner, or system of
governing’.78 More specifically, it is defined as ‘the way that organizations or
countries are managed at the highest level, and the systems for doing this’79 or
75Oxford Dictionaries (2021) Entry ‘global’, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/
english/global (last accessed 14 May 2021).
76Insofar, regional, national and local-level issues as a general rule will only feature in this book
where, e.g. because of their pervasiveness, they are pertinent to governance on the global level.
77Dann (2013), p. 115 pointing to a respective entry in Webster’s dictionary as well as to World
Bank (1989), p. 60.
78Collins dictionary (2021) Entry ‘governance’, http://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/
english/governance (last accessed 14 May 2021).
79Cambridge dictionary (2021) Entry ‘governance’, http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/
british/governance (last accessed 14 May 2021).
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‘the way that a city, company, etc., is controlled by the people who run it’.80 It thus
refers to the modality of the exercise of governing power.
Within the context of international law, it was the World Bank that originally
developed the concept of ‘governance’, when it realised the deficient structures in
many of the recipient countries of its programs.81 No later than in the second half of
the 1990s, the governance discourse was taken up by international scholars outside
of the World Bank.82 Over the course of the years, the notion of governance was
elaborated towards a more normative concept, the one of good governance.83 This
development is best illustrated by the 2002 Monterrey consensus, which states i.a.:
Good governance is essential for sustainable development. Sound economic policies, solid
democratic institutions responsive to the needs of the people [. . .] are the basis for sustained
economic growth, poverty eradication and employment creation.84
This book will address issues of good governance. However, its emphasis lies on
the conceptualisation of the legal framework of GCG. For these purposes, it employs
the rather descriptive notion of governance developed by the Brandt commission as
the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their
common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may
be accommodated and co-operative action may be taken. It includes formal institutions and
regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well as informal arrangements that people and
institutions either have agreed to or perceive to be in their interest.85
Apart from the normative concept of ‘good governance’, also the concept of
governance thus in itself bears a whole set of ‘revolutionary’ approaches that
challenge the doctrine of state sovereignty and with it the ‘classical’ system of
international law. According to Ladeur, it describes a flexible decision-making
process, represents a heterarchical philosophy, and constitutes a product and symbol
of transnationalism or transnational law.86 It is emblematic of the increasing perme-
ability of legal regimes and challenges the homogeneity and unity of the ‘old system’
of international law.87 Furthermore, governance is more comprehensive than
80Merriam Webster dictionary (2021) Entry ‘governance’, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/governance (last accessed 14 May 2021).
81Dann (2013), p. 115, pointing to Killinger (2003), pp. 20–30. These programs in many cases were
not or only little successful due to a lack of institutions and structures (‘fragile statehood’) that could
provide the effective implementation of the policies demanded, Dann (2013), p. 85 with reference to
Van de Walle (2001), p. 51, n 80. The concept of governance in this connection is, therefore, to be
understood not in the sense of political reform but of ‘technocratic consolidation’ and thus aims at
an amelioration of the functioning and the efficiency of the government apparatus, but does not
necessarily involve democratic reform or other normative policy changes, Dann (2013), p. 116.
82Dann (2013), p. 116.
83Dann (2013), pp. 116–118.
84UN (2002) Report of the International Conference on Financing for Development, ‘Monterrey
Consensus’, UN Doc. A/CONF.198/11, para. 11; cf. Dann (2013), p. 117.
85Commission on Global Governance (1995), p. 2; cf. Brown Weiss and Somarajah (2013), para 2.
86Ladeur (2010), i.a. at paras. 6, 14, 15, and 33.
87Ladeur (2010), paras. 20, 22.
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‘government’ as it comprises the ‘informal underpinnings of political decision-
making that have always supplemented formal procedures’.88 As such, it includes
the actions, policies and contributions of other actors of society, such as NGOs etc.89
Governance thus constitutes
an open mode of co-ordination of both actors and rules, which presupposes a dynamic and
experimental mode of decision-making with “entangled” hierarchies and the reciprocal
interference of national and international regulatory structures.90
Bearing this in mind, we shall define GCG as follows:
The sum of the ways that public and private institutions and individuals within the world-
wide multi-level system manage commodity activities.
2.2 The Historical Emergence of GCG
Before illustrating the disruptive features of GCG (Sect. 2.2.5), we shall briefly
revisit historical approaches to governing the global commodity sector, which were
motivated primarily by economic objectives and are characterised by five phases: the
‘Anglo-Dutch phase’, the ‘League phase’ (both Sect. 2.2.1), the ‘Havana phase’
(Sect. 2.2.2), the ‘NIEO-UNCTAD phase’ (Sect. 2.2.3), and the ‘phase of post-
interventionism’ (Sect. 2.2.4).91
2.2.1 Commodity Policy Before 1945: The ‘Anglo-Dutch’
and ‘League’ Phases
Global commodity policy before 1945 was dominated by the logics of colonialism.92
The exploitation and trade of commodities in colonised states was regulated and
controlled by the colonial powers or their associated private producing companies,
such as the (British) East India Company and the Dutch East India Company.93
88Ladeur (2010), para 1.
89Cf. Menkel-Meadow (2011), p. 103.
90Ladeur (2010), para 35.
91Cf. Khan (1982), pp. 52–76; for a concise account see especially Weiss (2009), paras. 6–25.
Hereinafter, the brief historical outline of global commodity policy shall be limited to aspects
expedient to this monograph. For more detailed historical remarks, one may, as far as the first four
historical phases of commodity policy are concerned, be referred to Khan (1982), pp. 52–80;
Chimni (1987), pp. 16–32; and Pelikahn (1990), pp. 87–149.
92Cf. Gale and Haward (2011), p. 4; the authors—probably somewhat sarcastically—describe past
Imperialism a then ‘well-established form’ of GCG, Gale and Haward (2011), p. 4.
93Khan (1982), pp. 52–53; Pelikahn (1990), p. 89; Weiss (2009), para. 7; cf. e.g. Prakash (1985),
pp. 7583, on the trade rivalry of the Dutch and the English in Bengal in the seventeenth century.
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Therefore, regulatory approaches in that era employed the perspective of the colo-
nizers—which then effectively were commodity producers reaping the benefits of
their international sale. The international law regulating commodity activity was
mainly shaped by ICAs seeking to stabilize prices.
In the Anglo-Dutch phase the two colonial superpowers and great trading nations
United Kingdom and the Netherlands introduced a number of agreements, which
concerned their principal trade goods, such as sugar, rubber, tin and tea.94 They were
concluded between producing states and/or their producing companies and thus
constituted mere ‘producer agreements’, such as the International Sugar Agreement
of 1864 and its succeeding treaties, the 1902 Sugar Convention and the 1937 Sugar
Agreement; the 1931 Tin agreement; or the 1933 International Tea Agreement.95
Furthermore, similar agreements on petroleum, lead, zinc, copper and wheat were
concluded.96 Consumers did not participate.97 These agreements were different from
ordinary producer cartels between private corporations to the extent that public
authority was involved.98 This government participation was aspired as a ‘corollary’
of economic regulation, and was i.a. supposed to render implementation of the
agreements more effective.99 All of these treaties were, mostly by the introduction
of buffer stocks or quotas,100 aimed at hindering an overproduction of the commod-
ity concerned and thus at stabilising global market prices101—a vital economic
interest for both the UK and the Netherlands.102 The mechanisms put in place by
these early ICAs were, however, only rudimentary and thus proved not to be too
effective.103
The League phase brought substantial developments in international commodity
policy. Although already founded in 1919, it was only under the influence of the
Great Depression, which started in 1929 that the League of Nations became a central
forum for ‘co-ordination of the production and marketing of certain
94Khan (1982), p. 52.
95Weiss (2009), para. 7; Chimni (1987), pp. 1719. The original texts of the agreements are
provided in ILO (1943).
96Weiss (2009), para. 7; Chimni (1987), p. 17; ILO (1943).
97Weiss (2009), para 7; Chimni (1987), pp. 1719.
98Khan (1982), p. 55.
99Khan (1982), p. 55.
100A buffer stock is ‘a large supply of a commodity [. . .] that is bought and stored when extra is
available, and sold when there is not enough, in order to control its price and quantity in the
economy’, Cambridge Dictionary (2021) Entry ‘buffer stock’, http://dictionary.cambridge.org/
dictionary/business-english/buffer-stock (last accessed 14 May 2021); Weiss (2009), para. 7; Khan
(1982), p. 52.
101Weiss (2009), para. 7.
102Khan (1982), pp. 52–54. The UK was especially dependent on commodity trade revenues given
their debts owed to the USA, see Khan (1982), p. 53. As far as the Netherlands are concerned, tin
production in the Dutch East Indies back then was state-owned, the trade revenues thus accruing
directly to the national budget, see Khan (1982), p. 52.
103Weiss (2009), para. 7.
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commodities’.104 The most crucial changes for international commodity markets and
their legal regulation were discussed and later formulated at the 1933 London World
Monetary and Economic Conference.105 In response to the great economic chal-
lenges of the 1930s, international commodity policy left the spheres of mere national
interest considerations and for the first time evolved to a more global approach. Key
to this new approach was the involvement not only of producers, but also of
consumer states.106 Furthermore, in order to build confidence in commodity
schemes, the role of governments in these agreements was substantially increased,
basically introducing the intergovernmental commodity agreement type that would
later dominate the 1970s and 80s. During the conference, the League formulated
nine pioneering principles for ICAs, advocated for the conclusion of such treaties
and created a link between ICAs and its bureau.107 Major developments that the
League phase brought about include that ICAs were seen as a legitimate exception to
the MFN clause and that they evolved to become ‘dual-interest’ rather than ‘single-
interest phenomena’.108 Thus, the League phase cast important foundations for the
objective of ICAs to come: creating a ‘win-win’ situation for producers and con-
sumers alike.109
2.2.2 The Havana Phase
After a devastating WWII, the global community, under the guidance especially of
the new Western superpower USA was seeking to restructure the world economy.
The innovations this would bring to global commodity policy were already
foreshadowed in the 1941 Atlantic Charter. Driven by the liberal idea of free
markets, access to commodities worldwide should generally be open for all; pro-
ducers should renounce protectionism.110
Although the Havana Charter was never ratified, the discussions in Cuba were
nevertheless groundbreaking for the new world economic order, including global
commodity trade.111 This is not least due to the fact that the GATT was separated
104Khan (1982), p. 57 with reference to League of Nations (1933) Report of the conference, LoN
Doc. C.435.M.220 (1933).
105Khan (1982), pp. 57–58.
106Cf. Chimni (1987), p. 19.
107Khan (1982), pp. 58–59 lists all nine principles, which touched upon what types of commodities
should be regulated by ICAs (only significant ones), and moreover envisaged i.a. that also related
and substituted products should be included; that the agreements should be fair to both consumers
and producers, including the maintenance of fair and remunerative price levels; and that there
should be no discrimination of third countries.
108Khan (1982), p. 66.
109Cf. Weiss (2009), para. 10.
110Weiss (2009), para. 11; Krappel (1975), p. 18.
111Cf. extensively Krappel (1975).
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from the general negotiations on the establishment of an International Trade Orga-
nisation, concluded on 30 October 1947 and entered into force on 1 January 1948.
The GATT generally also applies to international commodity trade, however
without specifically addressing commodities—apart from a few exceptions.112
Article XX:h GATT constitutes one of these exceptions. Accordingly, a measure
that meets the requirements of the ‘chapeau’ of Article XX GATT and is
undertaken in pursuance of obligations under any intergovernmental commodity agreement
which conforms to criteria submitted to the CONTRACTING PARTIES and not
disapproved by them or which is itself so submitted and not so disapproved
shall not constitute an infringement of the GATT.
In Annex I to the GATT an addendum clarifies concerning Article XX:h GATT:
The exception provided for in this sub-paragraph extends to any commodity agreement
which conforms to the principles approved by the Economic and Social Council in its
resolution 30 (IV) of 28 March 1947.
The principles put forward by ECOSOC Resolution 30 (IV) concerning com-
modity agreements are thus included in the GATT. This Resolution
[r]ecommends that [. . .] Members of the United Nations adopt as a general guide in
intergovernmental consultation or action with respect to commodity problems the principles
laid down in Chapter [VI] as a whole – i.e. the chapter on intergovernmental commodity
arrangements of the draft Charter appended to the Report of the First Session of the
Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment. . . .113
Accordingly, and pursuant especially to Article 62 HC, the introduction of
market-interventionist ICAs is permitted only in a state of emergency. The GATT
Contracting Parties, however, were at all times mandated to renegotiate general
parameters for ICAs but refrained from doing so. Never has an ICA been presented
to the GATT parties for approval—the criteria set forth by Articles 55 ff. HC have
thus never been applied in connection with the GATT.114
Developing countries, however, began to raise the issue of price stability in global
commodity trade.115 Many former colonies were—and still are today—highly
112Relevant provisions of the GATT and their application to commodity activities will be discussed
in Chap. 4 below.
113ECOSOC (1947) Resolution 30 (IV), 28 March 1947, reprinted in WTO (2019) GATT Doc.
TRE/W/17 of 7 September 1993, annex, https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/
91720248.pdf (last accessed 14 May 2021), original emphasis; cf. Khan (1982), p. 67. The ‘draft
Charter’ referred to by Resolution 30 (IV) represents the so-called ‘London version’ of the Havana
Charter, which is in its relevant parts identical to the final version of the HC as concluded on
28 March 1948, Weiss (2009), para. 15 and n 23.
114Weiss (2009), para. 16.
115Further central issues and claims included ‘[c]ompensation for shortfalls in export proceeds’, and
‘long-run downward trends in the prices of primary commodities in relation to the prices of
manufactured goods, or of declining or stagnating export proceeds from traditional exports of
low income countries over long periods of time’, Mikesell (1963), pp. 297–298; on the Prebisch-
Singer hypothesis cf. shortly below.
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dependent on commodity export revenues. The GATT reacted to the criticism from
its developing country members by introducing a new part IV titled ‘trade and
development’ to GATT, with its Article XXXVII:1:a obliging the contracting parties
to facilitate market access to ‘products currently or potentially of particular export
interest to less-developed contracting parties.’ Article XXXVIII:2:a GATT, more-
over, sets the parameter that ICAs should benefit developing countries in helping
them with global market access. In practical terms, however, also the introduction of
its new part IV brought—apart from a few exceptions116—no big turn in GATT’s
passive attitude towards ICAs.117
2.2.3 The NIEO-UNCTAD Phase
Not least due to the GATT parties’ passive stance regarding the called-for market
stabilisation measures,118 developing countries pushed for the creation of UNCTAD
in 1964.119 Not only the emergence of the NIEO movement120 and the principle of
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources can be perceived as a backlash from
former colonies against the free trade doctrine,121 but also the creation of UNCTAD
itself. As such, the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis, according to which ‘commodity
prices decline[] over time relative to industrial goods due to the interaction of supply
and demand’,122 constituted one of the central philosophical pillars of the organisa-
tion’s activities from the outset.123 Consequently, UNCTAD became the central
actor pursuing commodity price stabilisation measures, i.a. through ICAs.124 The
116Weiss (2009), para. 18 refers to the milk product and the beef agreement respectively.
117Weiss (2009), para 18. Concerning today’s role of the WTO as the organisation succeeding the
GATT secretariat, Stoll (2014), para. 3; see also Sect. 4.3.2 below.
118Cf. also e.g. Mikesell (1963), p. 310 who advocated for the creation of ‘a committee on
commodity problems of low income countries’, composed of representatives of i.a. IMF, IBRD,
GATT and ECOSOC.
119Weiss (2009), para. 17; cf. UNCTAD (2021), history, http://unctad.org/en/Pages/About%
20UNCTAD/A-Brief-History-of-UNCTAD.aspx (last accessed 14 May 2021).
120Sacerdoti (2015); UN GA (1974), Resolution A/RES/S-6/3201, 1 May 1974, https://iow.eui.eu/
wp-content/uploads/sites/28/2018/01/Reading-1-GA-Res-3201.pdf (last accessed 14 May 2021).
121The origins and content of PSNR will be discussed in detail in Sect. 4.1 below.
122Gale and Haward (2011), p. 5. Consequently, ‘poor countries [are] locked in a long-term
‘secular’ decline in their terms of trade’ and therefore ‘constantly [need to] produce a greater
volume of commodities to secure the same volume of industrialised imports’, Gale and Haward
(2011), p. 5.
123Raúl Prebisch was UNCTAD’s founding Secretary-General. In 1982, the Raúl Prebisch lectures
were instituted by UNCTAD, depicting the continued thought leadership of the Argentine econo-
mist, https://unctad.org/en/pages/publications/Ra%C3%BAl-Prebisch-Lectures.aspx (last accessed
14 May 2021). On the legacy of Prebisch already during his lifetime, Hirschman (1968).
124The latter had already been recognised as workable price stabilisation instruments in a UN study
in 1951, Weiss (2009), para. 19 with reference to UN (1951).
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latter ‘were considered an important part of the [. . .] [NIEO] in the 1960s and
1970s.’125
Paradigmatically, the 1974 ‘Economic Rights Charter’ (ERC) according to its
Article 5 particularly emphasises the right for states to form associations of primary
commodity producers, i.a. in order to ‘achieve stable financing for their develop-
ment’.126 Moreover, Article 6 ERC touches upon states’ duty to develop interna-
tional goods trade, i.a. by concluding multilateral commodity agreements and at the
same time emphasises that all states ‘share the responsibility to promote the regular
flow and access of all commercial goods traded at stable, remunerative and equitable
prices. . .’ Article 14 ERC reflects the complex scenario at the time of a free trade
doctrine, which was increasingly faced with price stabilisation measures. On the one
hand, it emphasises a duty for states to ‘co-operate in promoting a steady and
increasing expansion and liberalization of world trade’ while on the other hand
mentioning ‘measures designed to attain stable, equitable and remunerative prices
for primary products’.
This normative backdrop quite tangibly describes the situation, in which devel-
oping countries—more precisely the ‘Group of 77’ or ‘G77’127—mandated
UNCTAD with the task of elaborating commodity control agreements.128 The
efforts to create more balanced world markets by means of ICAs that were supposed
to stabilise profits for developing countries eventually paid off, when a breakthrough
in the difficult negotiations between global North and global South finally led to the
adoption of Resolution 93 and with it to the creation of the Integrated Programme
for Commodities (IPC) at UNCTAD’s fourth session in 1976.129 The IPC’s objective
was mainly to ensure market stabilisation for a group of 18 ‘core commodities’. This
objective was to be achieved for one through the comprehensive Common Fund for
Commodities (CFC) and by the negotiation of single commodity agreements for the
other.
The CFC provided two main ‘accounts’: buffer stocks on the one hand and loans
for commodity-specific development projects on the other. The negotiations on the
CFC, however, proved to be difficult and therefore lasted until March 1979. Due to
many states’ hesitation in ratifying the respective agreement, it was not before
19 June 1989 that the CFC entered into force.130 By this point in time, developing
countries had already considerably lost faith in the new Fund not least given that
most Western states refused to provide an amount of ‘directly contributed capital’
125Desta (2010), para. 22.
126UN GA (1974) Res. 3281 (XXIX), 12 December 1974, https://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.
asp?symbol¼a/res/3281(XXIX) (last accessed 14 May 2021).
127The G77 was created at the end of the first UNCTAD session in 1964, G77 (2019) About, http://
www.g77.org/doc/ (last accessed 14 May 2021).
128Gale and Haward (2011), p. 6.
129Cf. Weiss (2009), paras. 19–21.
130Ohler (2013), para. 2.
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that would allow the CFC to fulfil its mandate.131 A further reason why the CFC
never reached its potential was the lack of dynamics concerning the conclusion of
single agreements, the IPC’s second strand. Given i.a. a lack of interest to enter into
binding commodity agreements on the part of industrialised nations, only few new
ICAs had been negotiated since the beginning of the 1980s.132 Yet it came even
worse for those that favoured market-interventionist approaches to commodity
policy: Due i.a. to falling market prices, several ICAs had to seize the operations
of their buffer stocks.133 The International Tin Council (ITC), for instance, collapsed
financially in 1985.134 This was due for one to tin producers increasingly leaving or
refraining from joining the agreement, which resulted in a decrease in the ITC’s
market share from 71% in 1981 to 57% by 1985.135 Furthermore, several states such
as the UK developed techniques on how to circumvent the ITC’s rules and quotas,
further weakening the functioning of the scheme.136
Additionally—and this applied to almost all buffer stocks—problems originated
from the invention of synthetic substitutes such as plastics and aluminium that lead
to a further downswing in global market prices.137 In order to balance out these
developments, the stock manager bought more and more tin—hoping for an increase
in tin prices, which would mark the moment to sell the merchandise. However, due
to the increased availability of cheap substitutes and the overall increase of global tin
production, prices simply would not rise sufficiently.138 As a consequence, on
24 October 1985, the ITC declared ‘that it could no longer meet its financial
obligations.’139 For similar reasons effectively all operating buffer stocks were
eliminated by the end of the 1990s.140 Given that it was especially due to low
commodity prices, on their part caused by technological progress and the develop-
ment of substitute materials, as well as comportment of ICA member states that was
undermining the operation of buffer stock that the seizure of their operations
131Cf. Pelikahn (1990), pp. 659661.
132Weiss (2009), para. 23.
133Weiss (2009), para 23.
134Hartwig (2011), para. 7; Chandrasekhar (1989), pp. 309, 315.
135Chandrasekhar (1989), p. 313.
136Chandrasekhar (1989), p. 313 pointing to Chimni (1987), p. 200.
137Chandrasekhar (1989), p. 314; Hartwig (2011), para. 6.
138Chandrasekhar (1989), p. 315.
139Chandrasekhar (1989), p. 315, n 44.
140The buffer stock of the International Cocoa Organisation was eliminated in 1990; its accumu-
lated stock sold until 1998: the buffer stock for rubber was eliminated in 1999, Weiss (2009), para.
23 n 34. See also UNCTAD (2016), p. 2: ‘However, historically, only three ICAs (on coffee, on
cocoa, and on natural rubber) were reasonably successful over limited periods of time. In the first
two cases, international prices were maintained at “an adequate level” through retention schemes,
while in the third one, the buffer stock was in place. In October 1999, the International Agreement
on Natural Rubber, the last remaining by that time ICA with price-regulating mechanism, termi-
nated its activities.’
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occurred, it would, however, be premature to argue that market interventionist
approaches as such are ‘out-dated’.141
From their collapse, one cannot infer that market-interventionist mechanisms
would be obsolete. In fact, the continued need for CDDCs to stabilise market prices
today demonstrates the contrary:142 the debate on how to adequately control com-
modity trade is still essential. What the collapse of the buffer stocks between 1985
and the new millennium illustrated instead, was the advent or reoccurrence—and
continued dominance today—of the doctrine of (neo)liberalism. The reinforcement
of the free trade agenda during the respective eras of ‘Thatcherism’ in the UK and
‘Reaganomics’ in the US,143 may well constitute the aggregate root cause for the
failure of the commodity policies advocated for by UNCTAD.144 Under the free
trade doctrine, ICAs were seen as improper interference with market forces.145
Paradigmatically, the world would soon witness the emergence of a new institutional
powerhouse of global trade substantially representing the neoliberal economic order:
the GATT Uruguay round, which was launched in 1986 eventually lead to the
creation of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1995.146
2.2.4 The Phase of ‘Post-Interventionism’: Shift Towards
Cooperative Agreements
As a consequence of abandoning their market-interventionist mechanisms, numer-
ous International Commodity Organisations (ICOs)—the IOs administering respec-
tive ICAs—lost their main field of activity. Instead of abolishing these
organisations—which over time had gathered substantial commodity-specific
expertise–, their respective member states largely decided to keep the ICOs as fora
for the exchange of information between producers and consumers. Some ICOs
additionally provide services to their members, such as commodity-specific research.
The originally market-interventionist ICAs have thus largely been transformed into
141To the contrary Schorkopf (2011), para. 46.
142On the desirability of market-interventionist mechanisms, cf. Gilbert (1996). Moreover, raising
commodity prices can at all times bring about a strengthened negotiation position for these countries
and therefore greater respect for potential price stabilisation measures. In this respect remarkable is
the regulatory attention that the commodity sector has experienced since supply shortages with
regard to non-energy minerals impended in view of Chinese export restrictions, cf. also Sect. 5.2.1.
2.3.1 below.
143Margaret Thatcher was appointed as UK Prime Minister on 4 May 1979, US president Ronald
Reagan was elected on the 4 November 1980. On ‘Reaganomics’ and their effect on developing
countries, cf. i.a. Tickner (1990).
144Cf. in the same vein also Desta (2010), para. 27: ‘. . .none of these market-intervention devices
survived the ideological shift that took place in the 1980s[]’; Gale and Haward (2011), p. 6.
145Gale and Haward (2011), p. 6.
146Stoll (2014), para. 3.
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what might most aptly be described as cooperation agreements.147 As such, they
exhibit more or less exclusively soft obligations and have largely lost their legally
binding dimension.148
It seems obvious that commodity policy-making has shifted largely to other fora
and mechanisms, such as the EU-ACP agreements or the WTO.149 With the ‘ideo-
logical shift’ in the 1980s and the ensuing emergence of the WTO, ICOs today have
largely become minor, commodity-specific fora that appear to play a rather periph-
eral role in GCG.150 At the beginning of the new millennium, the proponents of
NIEO thus had to clearly concede defeat in the face of the vigorous reawakening and
ensuing institutionalisation of neoliberalism. However, not least due to the history of
its emergence, developing countries remained suspicious of the new free trade
agenda and the WTO as its primary organ:
. . .not only had industrialised countries presented them with take-it-or-leave-it positions on
agriculture and intellectual property rights but the promised benefits that were to flow from
the agreement failed to materialise, perpetuating the organisation’s legitimacy crisis.151
This scepticism on the part of developing countries as well as the continued
insistence on trade liberalization by industrialized nations, i.a. while maintaining
subsidies for their agricultural commodities, led to what is generally being referred to
as the ‘deadlock’ of the Doha Round of negotiations, which was initiated in 2001.152
Whereas ‘obituary notices’ for the DDA may have been a little premature,153 the fate
of the talks still remains unclear despite recent advancements with regard to the
crucial issue of export subsidies for agricultural commodities.154 Overall, it appears
147Weiss (2009), para 24; Desta (2010), para. 27.
148On the current state of ICAs, cf. in detail Sect. 5.2.1 below.
149Weiss (2009), para. 25. However, on the hesitant stance of the WTO cf. shortly below.
150The function of ICOs and ICAs in GCG today will be subject to a detailed discussion in Sect. 5.
2.1; how ICAs could be ‘revived’ to play a more substantial role in regulating commodity activity
will be discussed in Sect. 5.2.2 below.
151Gale and Haward (2011), p. 6.
152Given its emphasis on securing trade liberalisation benefits for developing countries, the Doha
Round is also being termed Doha Development Agenda (DDA), Gale and Haward (2011), p. 6.
153Cf., however, Kleimann and Guinan (2011).
154WTO (2015) Ministerial Decision of 19 December 2015, ‘Nairobi package’, WT/MIN(15)/45,
cf. https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news15_e/mc10_19dec15_e.htm accessed 24 February
2019; cf. already WTO (2013) Bali Ministerial Declaration of 7 December 2013, https://www.
wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/mc9_e/balideclaration_e.htm; see also Strubenhoff H (2016)
The WTO’s decision to end agricultural export subsidies is good news for farmers and consumers.
Brookings, 8 February 2016, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2016/02/08/the-
wtos-decision-to-end-agricultural-export-subsidies-is-good-news-for-farmers-and-consumers/.
However, as Bardoneschi R (2017) Accelerating the elimination of export subsidies in agriculture.
ICTSD, 30 October 2017, https://www.ictsd.org/opinion/accelerating-the-elimination-of-export-
subsidies-in-agriculture (all last accessed 14 May 2021) highlights, almost no effective concessions
by member states have thus far been made. He also refers to the ‘soft law’ nature of the Nairobi
decision and suggests that states should include the provisions of the Nairobi package also in their
schedule of concessions.
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nebulous still today whether and to what extent the WTO will in the future make use
of its mandate to actively shape commodity governance.155
Reluctance from states to openly pursue commodity governance along the legal-
istic lines of the WTO system may be due to a general perception of commodities
being of too great strategic importance.156 It is not least against this backdrop that the
emergence of GCG, which was driven i.a. by a variety of multi-stakeholder initia-
tives, can be perceived.
2.2.5 The Appearance of GCG
As the examination of historical approaches to regulating international commodity
activity has demonstrated, prior regulation was driven and shaped largely by motives
of raising the economic benefits for the actors involved. GCG constitutes a funda-
mental departure from these approaches. Its disruptive feature lies in perceiving
commodity activity not exclusively as an economic issue, but as a comprehensive
regulatory challenge, which requires the consideration of its social and ecological
prerequisites as well as effects.
Already Principle 2 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration recognised the need for
natural resources to be safeguarded for future generations through ‘careful manage-
ment or planning’. Gro Harlem Brundtland, who led the efforts of the World
Commission on Environment and Development, which had been instituted by the
UN General Assembly and mandated with the task to rethink the interrelatedness of
the environment and development, already in 1991 pointed to the importance of
‘strengthening commodity markets’ in favour of developing countries in order to
boost their SD.157 In the same publication, then-president of the World Bank, Barber
Conable, ‘ushers in the era of sustainable development’ by pointing to the signifi-
cance of the management of natural resources for that purpose.158
Based on these developments and not least in view of a lack of comprehensive
commodity policies being pursued by global institutions, starting in the 1990s more
and more initiatives emerged that were seeking to standardise the commodity
sector.159 These so-called ‘new governance’ arrangements included particularly
certification schemes and other voluntary initiatives created by business associations
as well as civil society organisations, and partly also involved IOs.160 Examples of
155Weiss (2009), para. 18 sees the WTO following in the—passive—footsteps of the GATT in this
respect.
156Cf. with regard to the oil and gas sector Desta (2003), p. 529.
157Brundtland (1991), p. 30.
158Conable (1991), p. 32.
159Gale and Haward (2011), p. 3.
160Gale and Haward (2011), p. 3; on the emergence of today’s understanding of what constitutes
global governance and its objectives in general Commission on Global Governance (1995).
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these early initiatives include the Forest Stewardship Council founded in 1993, the
Marine Stewardship Council founded in 1996,161 the Kimberley Process established
in 2000 or the EITI, which was launched at the World Summit on Sustainable
Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg in 2002.162
This trend continues until today, with now numerous standards, certification
schemes, and other initiatives in place worldwide that are each tackling the com-
modity sector specifically. One of its most prominent proponents is the Natural
Resource Governance Institute, which together with partner institutions in academia
as well as civil society advocates vigorously for greater attention to the regulatory
necessities in the commodity sector. Paradigmatic for the comprehensive policy
approach it postulates, is its signature publication, the Natural Resource Charter,
which was first launched in 2010. The Charter sets forth twelve precepts on how the
development potential of resource wealth can best be harnessed.163
Moreover, in the past decade, one could also witness an increased attention to
commodity activities from states and supranational organisations. Given the contin-
ued antagonisms between consumers in the global North and producers in the global
South, reflected in the deadlock of the WTO negotiations, several Western nations
took action on developing new, comprehensive commodity policy programs when
China started to introduce restrictions on its commodity exports in 2008.164 For
instance, in 2008 the European Commission launched its Raw Materials Initiative,
which is largely based on the three pillars of ensuring access to raw materials; setting
the right framework in order to foster sustainable commodity supply from European
sources; and boosting overall resource efficiency, i.a. through recycling and there-
fore decreasing import dependence.165 The German government introduced its new
commodity strategy, which is likewise particularly concerned with supply security
regarding non-energetic mineral commodities, in 2010.166 An update was presented
in January 2020.167 In Switzerland, several government branches joined forces in
2013 in order to compile a comprehensive report on the manifold economic, social,
ecological, as well as financial implications of commodity policy.168
In 2012, the United Nations adopted its Report The Future We Want, in which it
recognises sustainable natural resource management i.a. as an ‘overarching
161Cf. Gale and Haward (2011), who discuss the emergence of GCG in light of these two schemes.
162On these and many more standards and guidelines, cf. Chap. 4 as well as the extensive TCL
outline in the annex.
163NRGI (2014), p. 4.
164Cf. the US request for consultations, G/L/888, WT/DS394/1 of 25 June 2009, which lists the
respective measures in detail. On the entire topic expertly Espa (2015). For a succinct account of the
arising WTO disputes, cf. Sect. 4.3.2 below.
165European Raw Materials Initiative, European Commission (2008, 2011, 2013, 2014).
166BMWi (2010).
167Cf. BMWi (2020) Rohstoffstrategie der Bundesregierung, https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/
Publikationen/Industrie/rohstoffstrategie-der-bundesregierung.pdf?__blob¼publicationFile&v¼4
(last accessed 14 May 2021).
168FDFA, FDF, EAER (2013).
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objective’ and ‘essential requirement’ for SD.169 Following these statements the
world community in its 2015 resolution titled Transforming Our World: the 2030
Agenda for Sustainable Development envisions
[a] world in which consumption and production patterns and use of all natural resources –
from air to land, from rivers, lakes and aquifers to oceans and seas – are sustainable.170
According to SDG 12.2, the international community has committed to ‘achiev
[ing] the sustainable management and efficient use of natural resources’ by 2030.
The special advisor to the UN Secretary-General on the SDGs, Jeffrey Sachs, has
alluded to the management of the planetary boundaries that exist with regard to
commodity activity, and therefore the overall management of the sector, as being at
the ‘heart’ of SD.171 The EU has now linked all of its efforts in the context of the
Raw Materials Initiative to the SDGs.172
Therefore, to my mind GCG can best be perceived as a commodity-directed
emanation of the global SD agenda. Thus, it aims to integrate social and ecological
challenges associated with economic objectives. This correlates with its principal
task of ensuring a functional commodity sector—a task, which requires GCG to
balance the interests associated with commodity activity.
2.3 Role of the Law
From a legal perspective, this imposes the question what the law can contribute to
mastering the challenge of achieving this balance and thus ensuring a functional
commodity sector?
169UN GA (2012) Resolution A/RES/66/288, 27 July 2012, The future we want. http://www.un.
org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol¼A/RES/66/288&Lang¼E (last accessed 14 May 2021),
para. 4.
170UN GA (2015) Resolution A/RES/70/1, 25 September 2015, Transforming our world: the 2030
Agenda for Sustainable Development. http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol¼A/
RES/70/1&Lang¼E (last accessed 14 May 2021), para. 9.
171Sachs (2015), p. 181.
172European Commission (2019), Policy and strategy for raw materials, https://ec.europa.eu/
growth/sectors/raw-materials/policy-strategy_en (last accessed 14 May 2021); cf. likewise UNDP
(2016), as well as the commission’s contribution to implementing the SDGs regarding measures
derived from the Raw Materials Initiative, European Commission (2019), https://ec.europa.eu/
docsroom/documents/25401/attachments/1/translations/en/renditions/native (last accessed 14 May
2021). Measures include i.a. support for the FORAM project, which intends to set up ‘an EU-based
platform of international experts’ that makes ‘the current complex maze of existing raw material
related initiatives more effective. As such, the FORAM project will be the largest collaborative
effort for raw materials strategy cooperation on a global level so far’, FORAM, project, http://www.
foramproject.net/index.php/project/ (last accessed 14 May 2021).
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2.3.1 Purpose of the Law
According to Jhering, it is the purpose, which is responsible for the creation of all
law. Without purpose, there would be no law. He defines the ultimate purpose of law
in its role to safeguard living conditions for human society.173 As Green points out,
many traditional thinkers formulate constitutive aims of the law—only if a norm
pursues such aims, it can be qualified as law. He points to Thomas Aquinas who
defined the overall purpose of law, as ‘an ordinance of reason made for the common
good’. More recent views define the purpose of law as ‘guiding conduct’, ‘coordi-
nating activity for the common good’, ‘doing justice’ or ‘licensing coercion’.174
Hart states that he deems ‘it quite vain to seek any more specific purpose which
law as such serves beyond providing guides to human conduct and standards of
criticism of such conduct.’175 He thus describes the purpose of the law by pointing to
one of its major functions—the provision of guidelines for human behaviour.
According to Lauterpacht,
[t]he function of law is to regulate the conduct of persons, natural or juridical, by reference to
rules whose formal – as distinguished from their historical – source of validity lies, in the last
resort, in a command imposed from outside.176
It is by this externalisation through law of what is legitimate and what is wrongful
that we typically seek to ensure greater discipline of the addressees in their respect
for rules. We create law in order to regulate behaviour in the most effective way
possible.177
2.3.2 Law as the Catalyst of a Functional Commodity Sector
As we have learned, in the context of commodity activity human behaviour can be
said to be regulated in the most effective way possible, where the five interests
associated with it are balanced. This status describes the task—or constitutive aim—
of GCG to ensure a functional commodity sector. The law can be a catalyst in this
quest if and when it contributes to the balancing of the various interests of the
diverse stakeholders of GCG. Thus, in order to be effective towards ensuring a
functional commodity sector, the law needs to address the specific policy trade-
offs that arise from commodity activity.
173Cf. Penski (2004), p. 406 pointing to von Jhering (1904), p. V.
174Green (2012), p. xxxiv.
175Hart (2012), p. 249.
176Lauterpacht (2011), p. 3.
177Cf. Vos (2013), p. 7, pointing to Lauterpacht; cf. Lauterpacht (2011), p. 3. On the interrelation
between consensus and the effectiveness of the law Allott (1981).
36 2 The Emergence of Global Commodity Governance
The law is effective in contributing to a reasonably managed and thus functional
commodity sector, where it provides answers to questions such as: How much to
extract? Where to extract? How to extract? How to process or trade? How to make a
decision to extract? How much to trade? How much and what to tax? What resources
to protect? What land rights to protect? Where it cannot provide these answers, for
instance since the privilege of ultimately answering them falls within the political
domain, it is effective where it provides guidelines on how these questions should be
answered. The type of norms that is required for the law to be a catalyst of GCG and
thus of a functional commodity sector are ‘balancing norms’, which guide the
balancing decisions in view of the policy trade-offs that arise from the five major
interests associated with commodity activity.
2.3.3 The Effectiveness of the Legal Framework of GCG
In order to understand the contribution of the current legal framework of GCG to the
goal of ensuring a functional commodity sector, we first need to clarify its scope and
content. This will be the subject of our conceptualisation of TCL in Chap. 3 below—
which thus shall be in itself a first contribution to fostering the effectiveness of the
current framework.178
In Chap. 4 we will analyse in more detail what can be said about the effectiveness
of the current TCL framework overall. A word of caution in this respect shall be
shared. While our analysis is based on a comprehensive appraisal of the regulatory
instruments and standards applicable to commodity activity, a well-founded quality
assessment of this vast body of law would require extensive analysis, e.g. based on
the possibilities provided by computational text analysis.179 The statements on the
effectiveness of the TCL framework we provide in Chap. 4 below therefore do not
claim to be absolute, but rather constitute an approximation to this complex question.
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Chapter 3
Conceptualising TCL
This chapter first shares additional thoughts on the purpose and legitimacy (Sect.
3.1) of our conceptualisation of TCL before presenting the organisational framework
of TCL (Sect. 3.2) as well as the sources, structure, and application of its normative
substance (Sect. 3.3).
3.1 The Purpose of TCL
As we have discussed above, we are conceptualising TCL as the field of law
governing commodity activities in order to gain a better understanding of the
applicable framework and to ultimately assess its effectiveness. This approach
may raise questions regarding the legitimacy of our undertaking: Is it necessary to
conceptualise a new field of law?
A look in the literature reveals that conceptualising fields of law is a compara-
tively ‘free’ discipline, meaning that there is little to no dogmatic guidance on why or
how it should be performed. In fact, some nineteenth century scholars have argued
that the search for the ‘true scientific division of the legal field’ is tantamount to
attempting to find the philosopher’s stone because just like this item steeped in
legend—it does not exist.1 Based on this observation, Mariner states that it ‘appears
that the division of legal principles into fields of law remains a function of the
purpose for which division is useful.’2 Thus, within the literature one can discern
roughly four different—strongly interlinked—purposes for conceptualisations of
new fields of law, namely accessibility, coherence, effectiveness and political cause.
1Mariner (2009), p. 80 quoting Bishop (1868), p. 221: ‘Still, as a matter of practical convenience,
we may divide off the legal field in various ways, as may best suit the particular purpose of the
division, or our tastes.’
2Mariner (2009), p. 81 goes on to state: ‘Or perhaps it’s just a matter of taste’.
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Sherwin sees the purpose of a classification scheme in its function to ‘provide a
vocabulary and grammar that can make law more accessible and understandable to
those who must use and apply it. . .’3 Mariner insofar highlights how frequent
treatises were in nineteenth century US scholarship that arranged norms according
to the subject matter they were applicable to e.g., the law of highways, of railways,
and of telegraphs.4 The fact that repeatedly in the past scholars have sought to
conceptualise fields of law in such manner may well be understood as an indication
of the usefulness of even these, conceptually speaking, rather simple approaches.
Even in instances where such taxonomy may lack any apparent doctrinal value, it
may still render the rules, which apply to the respective subject matter clearer and
more comprehensible. One of the aims of conceptualising TCL is to display the
current legal framework of GCG, including its deficits and regulatory gaps.5 Thus, it
aims to render the inter- and transnational norms regulating the commodity sector
more accessible for academics, practitioners, government officials, and other stake-
holders dealing with the regulation of commodity activities.
As Aagaard puts it, ‘[t]axonomy inevitably and inherently is a quest for coher-
ence’.6 In respect to a legal field, he defines ‘coherence as the strength, simplicity,
and predominance of the field’s patterns’.7 Ruger speaks of the ‘dramatic potential
for explanation and illumination’, which coherence entails.8 Given the ‘unified,
predictable and rational’ account of the law that it promises,9 it facilitates the
study and application of the respective legal field,10 thus contributing also to the
purpose of accessibility discussed above. Yet, Ruger also questions the ‘orthodox
conception’ of coherence, which he defines as consisting of
3Sherwin (2008), p. 119; emphasis added. Cf. Tai (2015), p. 123.
4Mariner (2009), p. 79.
5It shall be mentioned here that this endeavour is not entirely new. In fact, a group of German
researchers in the 1970s launched a 10-year research project on ‘International Commodity Law’
(Internationales Rohstoffrecht), which was aimed at analysing the legal frameworks applicable to
various commodity activity-related challenges, including investment and fiscal law regime. The
project was led by the hypothesis ‘daß die systematische und detaillierte Erforschung eines
wichtigen Teilbereichs des Internationalen Wirtschaftsrechts gehaltvollere Aussagen über diesen
zunehmend wichtigeren Rechtsbereich erlauben könnte als die bis dahin herrschende Diskussion
über allgemeine Thesen und Gegenthesen zur “Neuen Weltwirtschafsordnung”[]’, Mertens and
Spindler (1989), p. 526; on the results of the research project overall, cf. Jaenicke et al.
(1977–1986); likewise resulting from this research project and a corresponding conference volume,
notably taking a transnational perspective Buxbaum (1988).
6Aagaard (2010), p. 229. Emphasis added.
7Aagaard (2010), p. 231.
8Ruger (2008), p. 96; cf. Aagaard (2010), p. 230.
9Saiman (2007), p. 511; cf. Aagaard (2010), p. 230.
10Aagaard (2010), p. 230 notes additionally that the ‘archetypal common law fields’, which
constitute the central fields of study in the respective legal education ‘are often characterized by
strongly coherent, even essentialist, models’.
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(1) a reductionist focus on internal logic; (2) a focus on essential legal form; (3) an emphasis
on linear historical development; and (4) a high level of institutional specification and
centralization.11
He emphasises that the dominant conception of coherence is itself the result of
methodological choices that have been made by legal scholars in the past century.
Therefore, he advocates for relativising the conventional account of coherence in
favour of a more flexible understanding.12 Moreover, the ‘quest for coherence’ may
also cause disadvantages in view of the final taxonomy of the field. It can namely
lead to oversimplification i.e., the creation of an ‘appearance of coherence’ where no
coherence actually exists.13 Furthermore, given that incoherence illustrates a lack of
consensus among lawmakers, the attempt to create coherence through ‘internal
logic’ may only cause the law-making institutions to push the coherence to other
areas of law.14 Finally, it may also discourage experimentation in law-making.15
The aim of coherence often corresponds to the purpose of effectiveness.
According to Ruhl and Salzmann, the creation of a new field of law can ‘ensure
effectiveness by reorienting laws and policies in a more productive structure.’16
Sherwin states that classifications can ‘make[] it easier for lawyers to argue effec-
tively about the normative aspects of law, for judges to explain their decisions, and
for actors to coordinate their activities in response to law.’17 In the event that
specialised technical or deep knowledge arises, creating a new field of law, instead
of ‘forc[ing] an existing field to morph itself to absorb the topic whole’, may further
contribute to regulatory efficiency—and thus ultimately effectiveness.18 Our
conceptualisation of TCL seeks to inspire subsequent international scholarship as
well as regulatory endeavours, which aim to elaborate the existing regulatory
framework. It therefore is intended to ultimately foster the effectiveness of the law
regulating the commodity sector. This holds true in regard to all transnational,
domestic or any other norms, which together form the overall legal framework of
particularly transnational commodity activities. In this connection, the standards that
TCL comprises could later be integrated in e.g. domestic legal orders. Instead of
‘forcing’ established fields of international law to ‘absorb the topic whole’, TCL
adverts to alternative regulatory options. The organisational framework we provide
11Ruger (2008), p. 629.
12Ruger (2008), p. 648 concludes that ‘[h]ealth law unquestionably falls short of many of the
attributes of field coherence that comprise the conventional account, and in my view will continue to
do so given the basic attributes of the field. But to say as much ought not to also implicate a
normative judgment about the field’s intelligibility or ultimate status within the legal academy.’
13Aagaard (2010), p. 233.
14Aagaard (2010), p. 235.
15Aagaard (2010), p. 235.
16Ruhl and Salzman (2013), p. 989.
17Sherwin (2008), p. 119; cf. Tai (2015), p. 123.
18Ruhl and Salzman (2013), p. 989.
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may serve as a guide in logically arranging the norms of TCL, thus fostering its
coherence and therefore further contributing to its effectiveness.
The call for redefining the canonically accepted fields of law in the interest of a
greater degree of effectiveness, can also be witnessed in Meessen’s work. In his
view, instead of maintaining the traditional arrangement of norms according to, first,
the level of sources (international, supranational, transnational, domestic law), and
second to their legal tradition (e.g. HR or environmental law), we should more
strongly emphasise the factual social behaviour that these norms are governing in
our classifications of the law.19 Meessen, referring to economic law, thus advocates
for the conceptualisation of fields of law, which correspond to day-to-day issues in
human interactions, such as franchise law or the law governing the closing times of
businesses.20 On an ‘intermediary level’, he proposes ‘globalized market law’,
which ought to comprise trade liberalisation law, transnational capital and labour
law, transnational investment and establishment law, as well as domestic competi-
tion, privatisation and deregulation laws.21 He concludes that for fields of law to be
more relevant—and thus effective—they need to be designed with sufficient, for
one, reference to the factual problem at hand and,22 for the other, closeness to
reality.23
With Meessen, the taxonomer deems the conceptualisation of this field of law
around the specific factual context, policy trade-offs, interests and legal doctrine of
commodity activities as a legal taxonomy, which meets these requirements. The
factual governance challenges that arise in the commodity sector occur in connection
with a distinguishable social behaviour—commodity activity. Whereas these chal-
lenges involve various subject matters that are being addressed by separate branches
of international law, such as Human Rights, international environmental law, world
trade law and international investment law, none of these branches exhibit sufficient
closeness to the factual context, interests and policy trade-offs of the commodity
sector. Moreover, they are lacking the necessary coherence and consistency to
effectively address policy trade-offs. Whereas the established fields of international
19Meessen (2001).
20Meessen (2001), pp. 44–45.
21Meessen (2001), pp. 43–44 also points to the fact that the need to be aware of the legal traditions
and dogmatics underlying the norms, which we are reconceptualising, still persists; corresponding
methodology in e.g., the interpretation of international agreements on the one hand and EU law on
the other, needs to be respected. Restructuring legal fields therefore not only requires a rigorous
research of the relevant legal sources but also needs to be mindful of the dogmatic origins of the
respective rules. Meessen (2001), p. 47 in this connection alludes to the necessity of cultivating
‘international and comparative legal theory’—a legal theory that is mindful of and therefore
reconciles comparative, international, supranational, and transnational law and which needs to be
‘prefixed’ to newly arranged legal fields. Elaborating such legal theory constitutes a challenge for
legal scholarship, which Meessen (2001), p. 47 describes as ‘enormous’.
22Meessen (2001), p. 44: ‘Recht muss daher so ausgelegt und angewandt werden, dass es seine
Fähigkeit zur Regelung und Steuerung sozialen Verhaltens durch seinen inhaltlichen Problembezug
unter Beweis stellt.’
23Meessen (2001), p. 47.
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law may serve to adequately balance some of these trade-offs, they fail to do so with
regard to others.24 TCL is intended to fill this gap by emphasising the importance of
introducing commodity-directed rules. Insofar, while the conceptualisation of TCL
is primarily descriptive in nature in that it portrays direct as well as unintentional
TCL,25 the taxonomy presented here naturally also bears a prescriptive element.26
As such, for the purposes of effectiveness, our conceptualisation of TCL will not be
limited to a display of the current legal framework, but—again in the tradition of
prescriptive legal taxonomies—provide suggestions for creating greater coherence
of the law applicable to commodity activities.27
Finally, the conceptualisation of a new field of law can ‘provide a forceful
political statement’ regarding the importance of the respective area.28 Ruhl and
Salzmann highlight how several social movements were accompanied or eventually
resulted in the emergence of new fields of law, such as environmental law or
LGBTIQ law, a current example being the one of disaster law.29 Likewise,
Tannenbaum emphasises the activist origins of animal law.30 Understood in this
way, the creation of a new field of law is meant to pave the way towards greater
academic, practical and political attention to the particular topic at hand. In acade-
mia, apart from the intensified scholarly analysis of the issue it is supposed to
generate, the conceptualisation is particularly also meant to have an educational
effect—through the integration of respective courses in law school curricula, future
generations of lawyers shall be trained to think of the field as an important, legitimate
area of practice.31
Again, political reasons for the conceptualisation of a field of law often cross-
fertilise other purposes, such as accessibility, effectiveness and coherence. It may be
true that to some degree, every definition of a legal field bears political motives.
Whereas they may typically be less dominant with regard to fields, which exhibit
conventional doctrinal coherence, such as torts or contract law, the emergence of
other fields is more clearly lead by political motives.32 Yet, this does not imply that
one can infer a lack of methodological legitimacy—or coherence—from a strong
political motivation or vice versa. To the contrary, where the political will to regulate
is particularly strong, it is more likely that lawmakers are going to establish a
comprehensive, coherent legal framework.
24On direct and unintentional TCL as well as the regulatory gaps that remain, cf. Chap. 4 below.
25On this distinction, see Sect. 4.2 below.
26Cf. Aagaard (2010), p. 240.
27Cf. in detail Chap. 5 below.
28Ruhl and Salzman (2013), p. 988. Emphasis added.
29Ruhl and Salzman (2013), p. 988.
30Tannenbaum (2013), pp. 899–906.
31Ruhl and Salzman (2013), p. 988.
32Cf. however on the origins of e.g. the German Civil Code, which naturally need to be perceived
also against the backdrop of conflicting political interests, Riegert (1970), pp. 54–58.
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Beyond the examples already mentioned above, many other legal fields have been
established in the past roughly half century for more or less political reasons.33 In the
1960s, international investment law was developed out of a set of norms dealing with
the so-called ‘diplomatic protection’ of the properties of nationals living and/or
exercising business activities abroad.34 Initially due to efforts by mainly Western
governments, a net of bilateral investment treaties was created, which in turn
emerged to a proper field of international law. Other examples on a rather domestic
level, yet with relevance globally, include the law of internet technology or
cyberlaw,35 which seeks to increase scholarly, political and overall attention to the
effects of IT on the law and vice versa;36 as well as consumer protection law, which,
given systemic information and economic asymmetries between consumers and
producer companies seeks to implement specific protection mechanisms in favour
of the former.37
A further example is the one of International Development Law (IDL).38 The
reasons for its creation were expressly ‘politically committed’. IDL is supposed to
challenge classical international law in order ‘to work towards the reduction of
inequalities and the realization of a new order.’39 This new order would measure
all norms and institutions of international law according to their contribution to the
alleviation of poverty and underdevelopment.40 As such, the ‘particular merit’ of
IDL is said to relate to the introduction of ‘the economic factor and level of
development into the legal analysis and evaluation of the relations between States.’41
As a consequence, IDL seeks to shift the focus away from a purely ‘formalistic’
analysis of the norms in place and towards a perception, which appreciates the power
33On a potential ‘law of globalization’ Koh (2007), p. 572: ‘While sometimes derided as the
proverbial “Law of the Horse,” one of the analytic challenges facing the law of globalization is
asking whether there is “in fact a distinctive, emerging law of which topics like human rights and
international business transaction are a part.”’
34Cf. e.g. Vandevelde (2005), pp. 158–161; comprehensively Hobe (2015).
35Cf. already the famous debate on its nature as a ‘law of the horse’ spurred by the remarks by
Easterbrook (1996).
36Cf. Lessig (1999), explicitly replying to Easterbrook (1996).
37Cf. Rösler (2007), pp. 497501; on the origins of EU consumer protection law, cf. Weatherill
(2013), pp. 5–15.
38It is, in fact, debated whether IDL constitutes a separate branch of IL. While some categorise it
either as a sub-branch of public international law or international economic law, others speak of its
‘singularity’ given its distinct objective, Mahiou (2013), para. 8.
39Mahiou (2013), para. 9; cf. in this respect also the TWAIL movement e.g., the strong stance by
Mutua and Anghie (2000). Both schools of thought can be perceived in context with the struggle for
a NIEO, cf. Sect. 2.2.3 above.
40Mahiou (2013), para. 12.
41Mahiou (2013), para. 13. Furthermore, IDL also challenges international legal scholarship, which
it deems to be ‘only neutral in appearance’ since the discussion and analysis of international norms
would automatically entail a ‘siding with the status quo’ given that these rules have generally been
elaborated primarily by the dominant centre and therefore imposed onto a dominated periphery,
Mahiou (2013), para. 9.
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imbalances between states with more and those with less influence on the design of
international norms:
The question of whether international law succeeds in creating a balance between the formal
legal equality of all States and the de facto inequality of their relative power is fully
addressed by international development law, which takes the equity factor into account
while endeavouring to give content to an overall strategy of development.42
The taxonomer does not seek to obscure that the overall purpose of our updated
conceptualisation of TCL is, in the tradition of i.a. IDL, and in view of the pivotal
challenge of GCG to establish a functional commodity sector,43 also ‘politically
committed’. TCL shall translate the rapidly intensifying efforts in national, suprana-
tional, and global governance to subject commodity activities to a more vigorous
regulatory framework into concrete implications for international legal doctrine.44
Moreover, it intends to inspire academics as well as future generations of lawyers to
consider TCL as an important area of research and practice.45
3.2 The Organisational Framework of Commodity Law
Now how do we move from identifying the purpose of our conceptualisation to
actually organising the field of TCL? This relates to the question how fields of law
emerge—and what our role, as taxonomers, is therein.
In the literature on the emergence of new fields of law, which notably largely
stems from scholarship focusing on US and European domestic law, this process has
been described as a ‘narration’. Accordingly, three actors—legislators, courts and
academia—are predominantly shaping the narrative on whether or not an area of
legal inquiry is to be qualified as a proper field of law. This ‘process of narration’ is
said to consist of three elements:
(a) The ‘articulation of distinctive principles and themes’,
(b) The expression of the emerging field of law as ‘structurally coherent’, and
(c) The understanding of the respective body of law as ‘special and distinctive’.46
Mariner ascertains that ‘[l]egal fields arise and fade away, expand and contract
according to the problems and possibilities of contemporary society and com-
merce.’47 She observes that fields of law typically grow up ‘according to quite
different principles of organization, principles that are neither mutually exclusive
42Mahiou (2013), para. 15.
43Cf. Sect. 2.1 above.
44On these efforts, cf. Sect. 2.2.5 on the emergence of GCG above.
45Ruhl and Salzman (2013), p. 988.
46Hervey (2016), p. 357.
47Mariner (2009), p. 80.
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nor internally consistent.’48 In the end, she contends that there is ‘no ultimate
authority’ competent to define what constitutes a field of law and what does not.
Consequently, she argues, ‘a field may be defined by its own practitioners for their
purposes or tastes. The test of its validity lies in whether others accept it.’49
One remark shall be added to these observations. The emergence of fields of law
differs in its degree of coordination. At times a new field of law is deliberately being
created through an act or a series of acts of law. This scenario describes the
coordinated, planned approach of conscious lawmakers that have identified the
particular need to regulate specific behaviour not merely through a (few) norm(s),
but through an entire rule system consisting of a series of interconnected norms. In
the international law context, such is typically the case when the international
community is adopting a novel international agreement, or series of agreements.
One example for such a rather deliberate, coordinated creation of a field of law is
WTO law.50
Another pathway for a field of law to emerge is a more gradual one. Under such a
scenario, the three actors shaping the ‘narrative’ identified by Hervey interact in a
disorganised, somewhat incidental manner. A court ruling may touch upon a not yet
established ‘field x’, which in turn is being discussed in academic literature. Grad-
ually, this trend may accrete and, in the end, elicit actions by national or suprana-
tional lawmakers. Despite still not fully conceptualised as such, more and more
scholars and practitioners will reference the ‘field x’, eventually giving rise to the
question, what exactly constitutes this legal field. What frequently follows are
scholarly attempts to conceptualise the organisational framework of the respective
field of law. It is this latter pathway, which can be observed (supra)nationally in the
cases of e.g., environmental and (EU) health law. On the international level, one
field, which emerged rather gradually is international investment law.51
Whenever we, as taxonomers, decide to create organisational frameworks of
fields of law, we can choose between descriptive/observational approaches on the
48Mariner (2009), p. 81.
49Mariner (2009), p. 82.
50Of course, the distinction made here is ideal-typical. Generally speaking, the emergence of every
field of law exhibits coordinated and random elements. Yet, despite the somewhat ‘turbulent’
origins of world trade law in the late 1940s, the GATT paved the way towards the creation of a field
of world trade law, which is now clearly spelled out in the various WTO agreements (GATS,
TRIPS, TRIMS, SPS, TBT agreements etc. in addition to the GATT). Naturally, WTO law, like any
other field of law, constantly evolves based on the decisions of the WTO DSB as well as due to the
large volumes of scholarship in the field. However, and this is the entire point I am making here, this
evolution occurs based on a legal framework, which was deliberately, systematically established
through the WTO agreements.
51Contrary to WTO law, international investment law evolved gradually through a net of bilateral
investment treaties, cf. Brown (2015). By the time the dispute settlement mechanisms of these
treaties produced more and more arbitral awards, the academic analysis of the field intensified,
eventually giving rise to the discipline of international investment law. Despite the fact that attempts
to negotiate multilateral investment agreement failed, IIL now appears to possess canonical status in
international law.
50 3 Conceptualising TCL
one hand and more normative approaches on the other.52 Descriptive approaches
typically lead to conceptualisations of fields of law according to a specific subject
matter they are addressing, such as the ‘law of highways, the law of railways, the law
of telegraphs, and the law of building associations . . .’53 or the famous ‘law of the
horse’.54 Many of those fields of law have evolved ‘as a matter of historical accident
or practical need’.55 They stand for a taxonomy that ‘does not attribute meaning to
legal categories’.56 Such classifications generally pursue the mere purpose of
presenting the law in an orderly way, thus making it more comprehensible and as
a consequence more accessible for legal practitioners and scholars alike.57
While some of these classifications depict fields of law that have long been
established in legal doctrine and education, such as tort law,58 merely descriptive
conceptualisations of legal areas have been repeatedly ridiculed for their lack of
coherence and normative value. Easterbrook established the term of the ‘law of the
horse’ problem, which stands paradigmatically for a conceptualisation of the law,
which appears to be devoid of any usefulness.59 In his opinion, ‘“Law and . . .”
courses should be limited to subjects that could illuminate the entire law’, all other
combinations are said to run the risk of ‘multidisciplinary dilettantism’ or the ‘cross-
sterilization of ideas’.60
More normative approaches to legal taxonomy pay greater attention to develop-
ing a proper methodology for the definition of a field of law ‘beyond historical
accident or subject matter’.61 Under the functional approach, ‘legal rules are
classified according to the roles they perform within the legal system or society at
large’62 e.g., according to their functions as ‘responses to wrongs’ or as interpreta-
tion rules regarding private contracts.63 The formalist approach emphasises the
‘logical relations among categories of law’ and is concerned rather with internal
logic than social functions as a classification criterion.64 However, as Sherwin
highlights, no taxonomy can be purely formal in that it needs to rely on previously
established categories of the law, which typically have evolved based on doctrinal
52Tai (2015), p. 118.
53Mariner (2009), p. 79; cf. also Tai (2015), p. 118.
54Easterbrook (1996).
55Mariner (2009), p. 79; cf. also Tai (2015), p. 118.
56Sherwin (2011), p. 237. My emphasis.
57Sherwin (2011), p. 237.
58Sherwin (2011), p. 237 submits that ‘categories such as tort law are simply historical facts, taken
at face value and displayed in an orderly way.’
59Easterbrook (1996), p. 207.
60Easterbrook (1996), p. 207.
61Tai (2015), p. 118. Easterbrook (1996), p. 207 insofar briefly speaks of ‘unifying principles’,
which may justify the conceptualisation of a field of law.
62Sherwin (2009), p. 34.
63Sherwin (2009), p. 35.
64Sherwin (2009), p. 33.
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traditions. Based on these categories the formal taxonomer aims to elaborate the
most ‘logically coherent classificatory scheme’.65
Despite these rough categorisations of the approaches to legal taxonomy, the
literature on corresponding methodology until not long ago has been said to be
‘notable for the absence of an epistemology or meta theory for positively defining the
essential characteristics of a “field of law”.’66 As a consequence, nearly every
somewhat logical arrangement of norms could potentially claim to depict a
conceptualisation of a field of law. However, in the past decade, some scholars
have attempted to fill this methodological gap by providing abstract reflections on
the key elements of organisational frameworks of fields of law, particularly
Aagaard.67 In his 2010 article, he elaborates a comprehensive theoretical framework
for the conceptualisation of fields of law.68 Subsequently, the central elements of his
approach will be outlined in brief. They have substantially guided the
conceptualisation of TCL in this book.69
3.2.1 Definition of Commodity Law
As a first step in creating the organisational framework of a field of law, one needs to
‘start with some understanding of what [one thinks] falls within the category of
situations that comprise that field.’70 Sherwin expounds that the first task of the
taxonomer is to find a definition, which is ‘sufficiently tailored and determinate to
provide a comprehensible description of the instances that fall within [the
organisational framework].’71 Aagaard points out that the challenge is to define
the field in a way that, for one, yields a coherent concept and, for the other, employs
concepts, which assist us in analysing and understanding the field. As a
65Sherwin (2009), p. 33. Formalist approaches are normative in the sense that the taxonomer
elaborates her logically coherent classification along legal rules as the ‘characteristic features that
should normatively configure fields of law’, cf. Tai (2015), p. 119; however, the classification
scheme itself is not normative, cf. Sherwin (2009), p. 34.
66Mariner (2009), p. 79; cf. also Tai (2015), p. 118.
67Aagaard (2010).
68Cf. the later works by Tannenbaum (2013), who employs a similar approach (yet without
explicitly referring to Aagaard), as well as by Tai (2015), p. 121 who extensively relies on
Aagaard’s finding, describing his approach as ‘appealing due to its express attempt at balance
between descriptive and prescriptive considerations’. Cf. also the prior works Aagaard references
by Sherwin (2008); Ruger (2008); and Mariner (2009).
69Apart from the methodology on how to conceptualise fields of law, Aagaard’s findings on i.a. the
‘explanatory power’ of and coherence in legal fields will also inform further analyses regarding the
normative force of the current legal framework of TCL in Chaps. 4 and 5 below.
70Aagaard (2010), p. 237.
71Sherwin (2008), p. 110; cf. Aagaard (2010), p. 237.
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consequence, the taxonomer may have to revisit her initial definition once she has
gained a more thorough understanding of the organisational framework of the
field.72
Legal fields are frequently being defined around a substantive topic or specific
subject matter.73 As stated above, also a taxonomy, which merely distinguishes itself
from other arrangements of the law through the factual context to which it applies
may serve material purposes, such as rendering the law more accessible or increasing
the scholarly and political attention to an important issue.74 In order to conceptualise
a field of law, which, in addition, displays coherence, one needs to identify features
that are legally relevant and at the same time exhibit sufficient commonality as well
as distinctiveness in comparison to other fields of law.75
Our conceptualisation of TCL will naturally first require a definition of the term
commodity. Whereas there may typically be many ways to define such notion, our
taxonomy insofar disposes of somewhat favourable starting conditions in that there
already exists a definition of the term in the context of international law.76 The
decision to employ this historical notion of ‘commodity’, in essence contained in
Article 56(1) HC, ensures doctrinal consistency with already existing norms and
treatises addressing transnational commodity activities. Insofar, our
conceptualisation of TCL is rather an updated outline of the transnational legal
framework addressing GCG than the creation of an entirely novel field of law. It
draws on the earlier undertakings aimed at an international regulation of commodity
activities and seeks to carve out in more detail the specific requirements and
circumstances of such an endeavour.77 Put differently, and borrowing Aagaard’s
expression, we are ‘interested in how the legal classification of [commodity] law
illuminates the functioning of the’ remainder of inter- and transnational law that
commodity activities are already subjected to.78
This leads us to the task of defining commodity law. A useful definition needs to
master the challenge of balancing over-inclusiveness and under-inclusiveness.79 As
the definition of the term commodity indicates, commodity law is supposed to cover
a distinct, primarily economic activity, which relates to the depletion of natural
72Aagaard (2010), p. 237. Naturally obscured from the reader, the taxonomer may thus be ‘going
back and forth’ between her definition and the elaboration of the organisational framework.
73Mariner (2009), p. 82; Tannenbaum (2013); Aagaard (2010), p. 237; Ruger (2008);
Hervey (2016).
74Cf. Sect. 3.1 above.
75Aagaard (2010), pp. 242–244; Tannenbaum (2013), p. 906.
76Cf. the definition of the term based on Article 56(1) HC in Chap. 1 above: ‘Any product of
agriculture, forest, fishery or mining and any mineral product in its natural (¼raw) form and in such
forms that are customarily required for its international trade, especially shipment, in substantial
volumes.’
77Cf. especially Jaenicke et al. (1977–1986); also, the summary i.a. by Weiss (2009) and Khan
(1982); for a recent corresponding endeavour focusing on Germany, cf. Sanden et al. (2012).
78Aagaard (2010), p. 261.
79Aagaard (2010), p. 261.
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resources for secondary purposes. Thus, it does not mean to comprise all laws, which
are relevant with regard to commodities in any way. Rather, it purports to focus on
this precise human activity, which will be spelled out in greater detail in the
subsequent sections. For now, and for the purpose of the elaboration of its
organisational framework, commodity law shall be defined as
all law that regulates commodity-related human activity and its impacts.
This definition is evidently still quite broad. It will be narrowed down further in
the following section, which introduces the core conceptual characteristics of
commodity law.
3.2.2 Core Conceptual Characteristics of Commodity Law
Aagaard conceptualises ‘a legal field as the interaction among four underlying
constitutive dimensions of the field: factual context, policy trade-offs, values and
interests, and legal doctrine’:80
Every area of the law operates within a factual context, a set of factual characteristics shared
in common by situations that arise within the field. These factual characteristics create
certain policy trade-offs, which dictate the range of options available to lawmaking institu-
tions such as courts, legislatures, executive branch agencies, and the public. The lawmaking
institutions apply values and interests to choose among the available options dictated by the
trade-offs. Legal doctrine – the law of the field – arises as the product of the lawmaking
institutions’ choices among available options – that is, the application of values and interests
to policy trade-offs.81
Therefore, he claims that factual context should only be relevant for taxonomy
where it either creates policy trade-offs that matter to decision-making institutions or
influences the values and interests these institutions are basing their decisions
on. Hence, when the taxonomer conceptualizes a field of law, she should draw on
factual characteristics only where they give rise to policy trade-offs that, by
restricting the available legal options, have an effect on legal doctrine.82
Legal scholarship exhibits examples for conceptualisations of fields of law based
on each of the four dimensions.83 However, only an imaginary ‘perfect’ model of a
field of law would display cohesive patterns throughout all dimensions—thus,
conceptualisations of fields of law can be based on only one or the combination of
two or more dimensions.84
80Aagaard (2010), p. 238. Emphasis added.
81Aagaard (2010), p. 238. Internal footnotes omitted.
82Aagaard (2010), p. 239.
83Feinman (1989); Bell and Parchomovsky (2005); Gostin (2007); Williams (1991); cf. Aagaard
(2010), p. 239.
84Aagaard (2010), p. 240.
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Moreover, Aagaard defines two minimum requirements for conceptualisations of
a field of law to depict a useful taxonomy. The first element is commonality, which
refers to certain individual or aggregated features being common to the scenarios
arising in the legal area. These commonalities can arise in any of the four constitutive
dimensions of the field of law. One important requirement consists of the common-
alities being legally relevant i.e., ‘they must make a difference in how the law
applies. [. . .] Otherwise, an area of law appears to be merely an amorphous amal-
gamation of portions of other, existing fields.’85 Some proponents in the literature
have questioned, whether a legal field must necessarily exhibit ‘strict commonal-
ity’.86 Instead, they deem it sufficient for a field of law to be cohered by ‘a common
pool of characteristics’, which forms ‘“a complicated network of similarities
overlapping and crisscrossing” that defines the concept.’87
The second minimum requirement for a field of law according to Aagaard is its
distinctiveness—the ‘idea that some features of a field are distinct to that field and
not present in other fields.’88 A distinct identity of the field legitimises its
conceptualisation and isolated study. Consequently, the ‘organizing feature’ needs
to be ‘distinctive to the area’, which can be due either to ‘unique features of the field’
or because of a ‘unique interplay of otherwise nonunique features’.89
Ibrahim and Smith specify that
distinctiveness may manifest itself in the creation of a unique set of legal rules or legal
practices, in the unique expression or interaction of more generally applicable legal rules, or
in unique insights about law.90
While this statement suggests that distinctiveness needs to relate to legal doctrine,
Aagaard claims that sufficient distinctiveness of fields of law can arise also from
other characteristics, such as factual context.91 Epstein contends that instead of
looking at doctrinal content, it is more reasonable to look at how lawyers apply
doctrinal principles given that these principles frequently operate in more than one
traditional field of law.92 Therefore, doctrine itself cannot constitute the only
85Aagaard (2010), p. 242. The talk is of the proverbial ‘Law of the Horse’: since the horse as a
common element is ‘legally irrelevant’, the corresponding field of law is deemed to be a ‘joke rather
than a legitimate field of legal study because the various laws that govern activities related to horses
have nothing legally important in common’, ibid.
86Green (2004), pp. 28–29; Millon (1992), p. 18, n 54; Penner (1996), pp. 779–799; Solove (2002),
p. 1096; cf. Aagaard (2010), p. 243.
87Aagaard (2010), p. 242 quoting Solove, pp. 1095–1098.
88Aagaard (2010), pp. 243–244; cf. also Tannenbaum (2013), p. 906.
89Aagaard (2010), p. 244 with reference to Ibrahim and Smith (2008), p. 85.
90Ibrahim and Smith (2008), p. 76; cf. Aagaard (2010), p. 244.
91Cf. Aagaard (2010), p. 275, who ascertains the distinctiveness of environmental law in view of its
two characteristic elements of physical public resources and pervasive interrelatedness, which he
defines as elements of factual context; cf. also Tannenbaum (2013), p. 907.
92Epstein (2007), pp. 560–563; cf. Tannenbaum (2013), p. 946, n 180.
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determinant of the distinctiveness of a legal field.93 In fact, the distinctive identity of
various other legal fields has been confirmed due to characteristic features beyond
doctrinal content.94 Distinctiveness thus can arise from any constitutive dimension
of a field of law. Besides, Aagaard highlights that distinctiveness shall not be
confused with uniqueness. In his view, it is sufficient for a field of law, which merits
unified consideration to be ‘unified by sufficient similarity and distinctiveness—
even if not perfect uniqueness. . .’95
Subsequently, two different constitutive dimensions of the organisational frame-
work of commodity law will be analysed. For one, its core conceptual characteristics
arise from the factual context in which commodity-related human activity occurs
(Sect. 3.2.2.1). For the other, as we have seen commodity law exhibits policy trade-
offs, which are distinct to its field (Sect. 3.2.2.2).
3.2.2.1 Factual
Two factual elements can in the simplest terms specify what constitutes ‘commodity-
related human activity’, or in short ‘commodity activity’. Such activity typically
occurs in connection with, for one,
the removal of an item from earth and, for the other,
a specific purpose that relates to the removed item.
93Cf. Tannenbaum (2013), p. 946, n 180.
94Hamilton (1990), p. 503: ‘One feature that separates agricultural law from such conceptual topics
as property law, torts, or evidence is of special significance. As a sectoral analysis, agricultural law
starts with the economic activity of agriculture and then confronts the unique legal issues associated
with agriculture[]’, cf. Tannenbaum (2013), p. 946, n 180. Very frank also Mariner (2009), p. 82:
‘Defining a field by the subject matter around which legal principles are gathered has as credible a
pedigree as any other approach.’ In fact, also to me it appears to be an over-interpretation of the
statement by Easterbrook (1996), p. 207 to perceive it as requiring a comprehensive search for a
‘unifying principle’ whenever one is to conceptualise a field of law, cf. however e.g., Hall (2002),
p. 464 as quoted by Ruger (2008), pp. 630–631. In what appears to have been more of a side-remark
in an oral speech that was later published, Judge Easterbrook merely stated that law school courses,
which focus on specific subject matters, such as the ‘law of the horse’ may run the risk of missing
‘unifying principles’—an objective certainly essential in teaching law school students. To interpret
his remarks as requiring doctrinal distinctiveness of a new field of law, however, to my mind puts
those out of context and moreover misconceives his speech as a methodological foundational work,
which it clearly is not. Besides, I concur with Mariner (2009), p. 82: ‘Complaints that “law and . . .”
fields are necessarily illegitimate overstate the case.’ Given the purpose that even subject matter-
oriented classifications of legal fields can serve, cf. only e.g. sports law, the entire argument relating
to the ‘law of the horse’ may in fact constitute a pseudo problem created by proponents seeking to
conserve a certain methodological arrangement of norms that they have become acquainted with
over the years. However, such comprehensible positions should not discourage efforts to concep-
tualise new fields of law, whenever there are compelling reasons to do so.
95Aagaard (2010), p. 245.
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This evidently requires a few explanations. We shall begin with the first element
of commodity activity, the removal of an item from earth. Human beings are using
natural resources in various ways. Watercourses may be used for navigation pur-
poses or in order to generate electricity, forests can serve as recreational areas; the
sunlight and wind can likewise serve as sources of renewable energies. All these uses
of natural resources are, however, distinct from commodity activity. None of them
necessitates the removal of anything from the natural environment or, simply
speaking, earth.96 Consequently, commodity law can be classified as a distinct
sub-branch of natural resources law (NRL).97
Both terms removal and item have deliberately been chosen for their broadness.
While significant portions of these removal activities may aptly be characterised as
‘extraction’—in particular in mining—the usage of this latter notion would generally
exclude especially food commodities that are rather being ‘harvested’, ‘farmed’ or
‘fished’ as well as forestry products, which are usually being ‘logged’.98 The
respective item becomes a ‘commodity’ at the latest once it has been removed
from the natural environment, depending on the kind of item. The seeds of a
cocoa plant, for instance, according to our definition of ‘commodity’ may already
be considered as such, when the plant is still rooted in the ground on a plantation.
Except for the harvesting process, the seeds have already acquired their natural or
raw form, which suffices for them to constitute a commodity. A precious metal, to
the contrary, will typically still be contained in an ore, which in turn is still incident
to gangue material and waste rock. It becomes a commodity once it has been
separated (extracted) from the natural environment in a way, which allows for its
differentiated identification as a raw and/or tradable item. However, since
96Minor ‘removals’, such as the ones that may occur for instance when a river is being used for
navigation and some water may spill on a respective ship’s deck, which in turn may evaporate over
time, shall for our purposes be ignored. We are thus focusing on the intentional removal of
something from earth. The term ‘earth’ is being used in order to underline that also cultivated
(food) commodities as well as livestock are being included. The notion ‘natural environment’,
‘nature’ or ‘natural wealth’ could suggest an exclusion of all items, which have been cultivated by
humankind.
97Cf. already the definition provided by Oehl (2019), p. 6, as well as the additional reflections in n
20. On the undertakings in Germany aimed at elaborating a national resource protection law regime,
cf. Sanden et al. (2012), Herrmann et al. (2012); Domke (2013); as well as Umweltbundesamt,
https://www.umweltbundesamt.de/themen/abfall-ressourcen/oekonomische-rechtliche-aspekte-
der/ressourcenschutzrecht (last accessed 14 May 2021). This resource protection law is intended to
reduce the economic costs of resource use, as well as Germany’s dependency on commodity
exporting countries. In addition, it shall reduce negative environmental effects of resource use,
Herrmann et al. (2012), p. 524. While it thus significantly converges with TCL, it is closer to NRL
given that it defines resources as ‘biotic and abiotic raw materials [‘Rohstoffe’] (biomass and
minerals) as well as water, air and surface [‘Fläche’]’ (my translation), Herrmann et al. (2012),
p. 524 referring to the definition by Schütz and Bringezu (2008), pp. 45–46.
98As I have already stated in Chap. 2 above, nothing in this book is meant to relativize the specific
governance challenges of individual types of commodities, hard or soft, mineral or food. However,
this conceptualisation deliberately seeks to emphasise the commonalities between all commodities
and their related governance challenges.
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commodity law, as will become clear subsequently, covers a broad range of activ-
ities also before and after the ‘removal’ has taken place, this distinction is rather less
relevant.
Everything that is being removed from earth can potentially be considered a
commodity—provided, it meets the second factual element of a specific purpose that
relates to the removed item.99 The specific purpose, which relates to the removed
item, distinguishes commodity activity from other human activity, which involves
the removal of natural resources, such as construction projects, particularly large
infrastructure projects. When it comes to such projects, the removed matter, how-
ever, is typically not of (primary) interest for the actors concerned. It rather consti-
tutes an impediment to the operations, which focus on the implementation of an aim
that is unrelated to the removed item.
The specific purpose of commodity activity related to the removed item will
naturally lie in using it for economic gain, i.e. selling or trading it, including various
intermediary steps, such as processing and shipment. Therefore, one could also
define an economic purpose related to the removed item as a core conceptual
characteristic of commodity law. However, the kind of purpose that one pursues in
relation to an item removed from earth does not at all alter the activity itself—which
would remain the same also in the unlikely event that one should extract or harvest
commodities with the end goal in mind to later donate them. In order to keep the
organisational framework of commodity law as simple and abstract as possible, it
shall therefore be defined regardless of an economic purpose that the ‘remover’ may
be pursuing with regard to the removed item.100
These remarks already shed more light as to what can be understood as ‘com-
modity activity’. Nevertheless, some further clarifications are necessary regarding
the scope of activities, which occur in connection with the removal and still qualify
as commodity activity. Naturally, the removal process itself, whether it involves
harvesting, logging, fishing, or extraction constitutes a commodity activity. How-
ever, the commodity sector exhibits a whole range of different activities, which all
relate to this removal process. These activities have most vividly been portrayed
along the so-called Commodity Value Chain.101 For our purposes, we shall use the
commodity value chain to elucidate the range of activities, which occur in connec-
tion with the removal of an item from earth for a specific purpose that relates to this
item. For instance, with regard to extractive industries, one can distinguish between
the exploration, extraction, processing, storage and shipping, sale and trading as well
as the post-extraction phases.102 For other industries, the commodity value chain
99Naturally, this claim is only valid within the scope of our definition of the term ‘commodity’
established in Chap. 2 above, which notably excludes air and water.
100On the ‘commodification of nature’, cf. Sect. 2.1.1.2 above.
101It is typically being used as an analytical tool i.a., to illustrate the distribution of returns of a
specific product at the different stages of its life cycle as well as to clarify related business and
governance challenges, Midgley (2016); Kaplinsky (2000).
102Cf. NRGI (2018).
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will be designed differently, notably using different terminology for the terms
‘exploration’, ‘extraction’ and potentially ‘processing’, and usually extending from
producer to end-consumer.103
On a more abstract level, commodity activities can be said to range from
pre-removal activities, which include exploration, but also cultivation, plantation
and related undertakings, such as the clearance of a specific area in preparation of a
‘removal’ activity, to the ultimate post-removal activity of selling and/or trading the
respective commodity. The intermediary steps are, of course speaking on a very
abstract level, similar regardless of the type of commodity and involve processing,
storage and shipping, sale and trading. Once a removal activity has been abandoned
permanently, additional post-removal activities are required, such as a proper closing
of the removal site (e.g. mine closure) including a restoration of the natural envi-
ronment that may have been affected by the removal activities.
The manufacture of secondary or end products from commodities does not
constitute commodity activity. While of course the removal activity is a necessary
precondition for such manufacture to be possible, it does not shape these processes to
the same extent as those activities, which occur in closer connection to
it. Commodity activity constitutes a preliminary stage within the global value
chain, which is followed by the ensuing, yet separate stage of manufacture.104
Also, typically the governance challenges and policy trade-offs, which occur in
connection with removal-related activities, are distinct from the ones to ensure a
well-governed manufacture process.105
3.2.2.2 Policy Trade-Offs
The specific commodity policy trade-offs, which have been already elaborated
above, constitute further commonalities of commodity law, which at the same time
illustrate its distinctiveness from other fields. The existence of one or several of the
policy trade-offs described above can thus be characterised as an additional common
feature of commodity law. These policy trade-offs ‘limit legal choice’ in that the
elaboration of the law regulating commodity activities should be guided by an
awareness of their existence.106 They thus ‘reflect the analytical and instrumental
103Cf. IFAD (2014), p. 2; on the cocoa value chain cf. for instance UNCTAD (2016); on the
commodity value chain of apples Midgley (2016).
104Cf. on the analytical significance of this differentiation Daviron and Gibbon (2002),
pp. 141143; cf. also Grilli and Yang (1988).
105On the policy trade-offs in the commodity sector, cf. the subsequent Sect. 3.2.2.2 as well as Sect.
2.1.3 above. This is further underlined by the established differentiation between the primary sector,
which largely coincides with the commodity sector, on the one hand, and the secondary,
manufacturing, sector on the other, cf. Alfaro and Charlton (2007), p. 2; cf. also the distinction
employed by UNCTAD (2018), p. 8 between the primary, manufacturing, and services sector.
106Cf. Aagaard (2010), p. 239; Sect. 3.2.2 above.
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aims’ of the conceptualisation of TCL;107 they ‘make a difference in how the law
applies’—or rather, in the many incidents where they are covered by indirect
TCL,108 should apply.109
This is furthermore underlined by the fact that many states have adopted specific
regulatory and fiscal frameworks for the commodity sector, which are ‘distinctly
different’ from the ones that apply to other industries.110 States as the legislators of
international law have thus repeatedly expressed their perception of commodity law
as a distinct subject matter, which is i.a. reflected in chapter VI of the Havana
Charter, several GATT provisions,111 the various ICAs, which have been introduced
and/or are still in existence today, as well as the Integrated Programme for Com-
modities (IPC), the Common Fund for Commodities (CFC), International Commod-
ity Organisations (ICOs) and other commodity-directed governance programs of
UNCTAD.112 All of these examples thus support the contention that commodity
activity as well as its associated policy trade-offs from the perspective of legal
taxonomy constitute legally relevant commonalities, which should be governed by
what one conceptualises as a distinct field of law.
Regarding its distinctiveness from other fields, the set of trade-offs discussed
above may generally also be relevant in relation to other economic activities, such as
large-scale infrastructure projects. However, the respective interests would be rele-
vant to a different degree, i.e. their ratio to one another would differ. For instance,
commodities are typically being considered as a form of ‘national wealth’. Conse-
quently, the demand for participation and adequate development effects of com-
modity activity will often be comparatively greater than in the case of infrastructure
construction. Likewise, the great significance that commodity exports can have for
the national economy of an individual state is typically not mirrored in a comparable
significance of an infrastructure project.113 There is thus a commodity-specific
layout of these policy trade-offs. Since the threshold here is distinctiveness and not
uniqueness,114 the fact that other layouts, such as the construction-specific layout, of
these trade-offs may be somewhat similar does not rebut the claim regarding the
distinctiveness of commodity law also in this respect.
107Cf. Feinman (1989), p. 680.
108On the distinction between direct and indirect TCL, cf. Sect. 4.2 below.
109Cf. Aagaard (2010), p. 242; Sect. 3.2.2 above.
110Cf. UN (2002) Berlin II Guidelines, https://commdev.org/userfiles/files/903_file_Berlin_II_
Guidelines.pdf (last accessed 14 May 2021), p. 8.
111Cf. Sects. 4.2.2.1.4.2 and 4.3.2 below as well as the TCL outline in the annex.
112Cf. Sect. 5.2.1 below.
113Cf. again Calder (2014), p. 10, according to whom ‘risk is not unique to natural resources, but the
magnitude and pervasiveness of natural resource risks are exceptional’.
114Aagaard (2010), p. 245; cf. above.
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3.3 The Norms of TCL
After having delineated the organisational framework of commodity law, this
section briefly outlines how the normative substance of TCL operates within the
organisational framework we have presented above. The purpose of this exercise is
to expound the transnational rules that are governing commodity activities. This
approach corresponds with the overall aim of this book to first provide a
conceptualised account of the transnational law regulating commodity activities
and to then, as a second step, suggest specific instruments for reinforcing this
existing regulatory framework. Rather than delivering a comprehensive account of
all the norms governing commodity activities, the overview provided below there-
fore seeks to display the central types of norms as well as corresponding factual
scenarios they apply to.115
As mentioned repeatedly, TCL is a transnational legal framework. This property
relates to the concept of GCG.116 First and foremost, its transnational nature
constitutes an analytical category from which the normative framework applicable
to commodity activity is being assessed.117 Instead of exclusively focusing on rules
of inter-national law—an approach that would relate to the classical concept of
government118—our conceptualisation will be based on international rules, and
additionally comprise private standards and select domestic norms that exhibit a
transnational scope.119 This approach appears particularly natural in light of the
transnational nature of commodity activity, especially whenever extracted materials
are being traded, as well as given the pivotal role of TNCs and multi-stakeholder
standard-setting institutions therein.120
115For a more comprehensive account, see the TCL outline in the annex, our discussions in Chap. 4
below as well as the work by Rüttinger and Scholl (2017). Their ‘governance map’, Rüttinger and
Scholl (2017), p. 21, has decisively informed our subsequent examination.
116Cf. Sect. 2.1.4 above.
117Menkel-Meadow (2011), pp. 106–107; as many have ascertained, the classical model of inter-
national law based on the sovereign nation state as the sole authoritative lawmaker ‘fails to describe
our world as we know it’, Szablowski (2007), p. 5; Twining (2000), p. 51.
118Menkel-Meadow (2011), p. 103.
119Transnational law has been introduced prominently by Jessup (1956); it depicts a shift away
from the conventional legal framework of international law and represents ‘an expanded under-
standing of law in light of globalisation’, Szablowski (2007), p. 6; cf. his n 18 for an account of
literature exhibiting this expanded understanding. Szablowski (2007), p. 4 defines transnational law
as referring to ‘legal regimes which operate across national borders or which regulate actions or
events that transcend national borders.’ This book follows this definition. On the theoretical
challenges and underpinnings of transnational perceptions of the law, cf. Szablowski (2007).
Given this expanded, flexible understanding of what constitutes the law regulating transnational
activity, it is not convincing to squeeze corresponding norms into the boxes of classical interna-
tional law, see already Oehl (2019), p. 22. Instead, the concept, which we used to define as
international law may sooner or later well be replaced with the one of transnational law. With a
different approach, however, Ong (2010).
120Cf. in more detail Sect. 4.2.2.2 below.
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3.3.1 Sources of TCL
The diverse legal sources that this conceptualisation is based on can be categorised
as follows:
The first category, the classical inter-national framework can roughly be divided
into international agreements, principles of international law, UN soft law, and
standards issued or adopted by other international organisations, such as OECD or
International Finance Corporation (IFC).
The second category consists of either industry, corporate, or civil society
standards, which typically are elaborated through multi-stakeholder or broad indus-
try or civil society processes. Frequently, these processes are either initiated or
facilitated by international organisations.
A third category of sources used in the conceptualisation of TCL is the domestic
legal framework. It includes the constitutional framework as well as domestic
legislation and regulation, particularly in the fields of labour, environment, public
accountability, taxation, fiscal terms, customs, non-discrimination, transparency,
privacy, anti-corruption and licensing. This book, however, makes reference exclu-
sively to those sources of domestic law, which exhibit transnational effects, and are
of particular importance in the commodity sector.121
A fourth category is composed of transnational contract law insofar as it pro-
vides for rules, which proliferate beyond the application of contractual terms inter
partes. This category plays a comparatively smaller role in our conceptualisation of
TCL. Given that most rules, which can be abstracted as common, potentially
customary elements from transnational contract law will typically already feature
in at least the domestic legal order as a general principle of law, their analysis would
presumably bring about only few new insights. This observation, however, does not
in any way diminish the potentially great normative force that transnational contracts
may exhibit, particularly in the commodity sector.122
All four types of sources are naturally subject to judicial application and inter-
pretation, as well as to scholarly analysis—as a consequence, relevant inter-,
transnational and domestic case law as well as international legal scholarship
constitute additional sources, which informed our conceptualisation of TCL.
This categorisation of the sources of TCL, of course, can only be ideal-typical.
For instance, the lines between soft law and civil society standards may often be
blurred given the diverging roles that international organisations tend to play in
multi-stakeholder processes as either mere facilitators or owners. In the latter case,
the process of elaborating a new standard is typically followed by its formal adoption
through the respective governing bodies of the international organisation in question.
121Apart from the fact that an analysis of more than these prominent transnational laws would go
beyond the scope of this book, such an enterprise would rather fall under the category of
comparative commodity law, which has witnessed relatively greater attention by legal scholarship
in the past, cf. Bastida et al. (2005).
122Cf. Cotula (2010).
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In the former case, the outcome may be a civil society or industry standard. While the
differentiation between UN soft law as well as international organisation
(IO) standards on the one hand and corporate as well as civil society standards on
the other based on whether or not they have been formally adopted according to the
internal procedures of the respective IO is of course logical from a formalist point of
view, it makes a compelling case for perceiving the legal framework as a ‘transna-
tional whole’, and thus abandoning the classical boxes of international law as spelled
out in Article 38 ICJ statute.123
3.3.2 Structure of TCL
It would go beyond the realms of this treatise to portray the entire substance of TCL
including its normative content. However, our subsequent analysis of normative
patterns of TCL draws on a comprehensive study of the applicable instruments and
standards. Consequently, Chap. 4 will discuss a variety of concrete normative
content of the substance of TCL; a brief overview of its structure shall be provided
here. In addition, an overview of the relevant instruments and provisions, which
form the substance of TCL, can be found in the annex below.
While there are numerous possibilities to logically arrange the diverse sources
outlined above and therefore expound the architecture of TCL they are revealing,
Dederer in my opinion has provided the most clear, convincing structure.124 The
subsequent portrayal of TCL follows a version of his ‘limited sovereignty’ structure,
which has been significantly modified and extended. However, as notably Schrijver
has emphasised, instead of limiting it, norms of international law often rather tend to
qualify the principle of PSNR in the sense of detailing how the sovereignty of states
needs to be exercised.125 Thus we shall employ the perspective of ‘qualified sover-
eignty’ for the remainder of our investigation.
According to this outline, first of all, international law declares the nation state—
or more precisely its respective population—as being principally competent to
regulate the use of natural resources. This holds generally true with regard to those
resources that are located on its territory or under its sovereign command. However,
one can discern a certain tension with more recent concepts of international law,
which emphasise the fact that commodities may be a ‘common concern’ of all of
humankind. The corresponding principles of permanent sovereignty over natural
resources and common concern will be subject to our analysis in Sect. 4.1 below.
Secondly, even where the nation state or its population respectively disposes of
sovereignty over its commodity reserves, several fields of transnational, especially
123See already Oehl (2019), p. 22.
124Dederer (2012), pp. 37–56.
125On this question, see Sect. 4.1 in more detail below.
3.3 The Norms of TCL 63
inter-national law qualify this sovereignty.126 According to their subject matter, one
can distinguish eight categories of these, largely self-imposed, qualifications: Human
Rights; environmental protection; liberalised trade; shared resources; good gover-
nance; fiscal framework; financial regulation; and armed conflict. Several of these
qualifications of a state’s sovereignty over commodity resources will feature in our
analysis in Chap. 4 below. For an overview see also the TCL outline contained in the
annex.
Thirdly, sovereignty over resources typically comprises the competence to trans-
fer commodity-related rights onto third parties, particularly from the private sector.
The transfer of these rights is usually being performed through specific agreements
between the state party and the transferee. The transfer process, as well as the arising
obligations for transferees, is governed by various inter- and transnational standards,
most of which qualify as either soft law or private industry standards. Once a state
has transferred rights onto a third party, its sovereignty is further qualified by various
obligations to protect these rights under international investment law.127 The norms
and standards regulating the transfer of commodity rights are illustrated in the TCL
outline in the annex and will also inform our subsequent analysis in Chap. 4.
Besides, all qualifications of a state’s sovereignty are typically being accompa-
nied by ‘secondary qualifications’, which provide for procedures to regulate exter-
nalities or dispute settlement respectively. Corresponding mechanisms can also arise
from private industry standards or investor-state agreements.
3.3.3 TCL in the Commodity Governance Matrix
While we have just learned about the abstract structure of TCL, we shall now
examine how its norm subsets apply within the commodity governance matrix. As
we have seen, commodity activities occur in a matrix of largely five interests and
corresponding trade-offs, which arise between the different stakeholders: economic
gain, development, preservation, control, and participation.128 In this section we will
126On the remaining challenges to clarify the interrelation of inter- and transnational law Cotterrell
(2012). Transnational law can qualify PSNR i.a. through ‘bottom-up lawmaking’, cf. Levit (2008),
or wherever respective standards are being used as benchmarks in e.g. international or domestic
legislation or jurisprudence. On the role of ICAs de lege ferenda in this respect see Sect. 5.2.2
below.
127This structure does not mean to obscure that, of course, international investment agreements can
also entail a state’s duty to admit foreign investments. However, since the focus will generally lie on
protecting investments that have already been made, questions related to international investment
law will typically be discussed in context with respective rights that have already been transferred
onto third parties.
128Cf. Sect. 2.1.3 above.
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give a brief account of which one of these five interests a selection of the various
norm subsets of TCL are seeking to foster primarily.129
Naturally, all norms are serving multiple purposes. For instance, every norm will
ultimately serve the purpose of controlling a commodity activity, i.e. upholding the
rule of law. Moreover, as I have argued elsewhere, one can maintain that every legal
norm ultimately is intended to foster the development of society.130 Here, however,
we shall roughly categorise the norm subsets of TCL according to their primary
regulatory objective. The goal here is thus less to paint a dogmatic picture, which is
entirely consistent, but rather to sketch an overview that exposes normative conflict
lines between various norm subsets of TCL. For that purpose, we shall employ those
understandings of the terms, which we have already developed in Chap. 2 above.
When it comes to reaping the economic benefits of commodity activities, the rules
that come to mind first and foremost are the ones featuring in the applicable fiscal
regime. Through these rules, the respective host government ensures that it receives
financial benefits from the respective commodity business, i.a. through taxes and
royalties. Not least in order to attract foreign investment in the commodity sector, the
investment protection rules in place guarantee foreign investors certain safeguards
against regulatory or other activities by the host state. Once the host government has
decided to transfer—e.g. exploration or exploitation—rights onto private third
parties, their right to property as well as potentially their ‘legitimate expectations’
are being protected under these rules.131 Particularly so-called stabilisation clauses
that are seeking to prevent unexpected changes in the regulatory environment,
especially with regard to the fiscal regime, can serve to safeguard the economic
expectations of the investor.132 As a result, what may conflict here are the economic
interests of investors on the one hand and host states on the other. Such conflicts arise
for instance, when host states are of the view that they do not sufficiently benefit
from commodity activities e.g., through so-called resource rents. Consequently, the
host state may introduce changes in the fiscal regime for instance regarding the
taxation of commodity corporations. This, in turn, may cause investors to seek
compensation due to a frustration of their economic expectations.
Further provisions that primarily seek to promote the economic benefits from
commodity activities are the ones liberalising international trade, particularly Arti-
cles I, II, III and XI:1 GATT.133 By removing obstacles, such as duties and
quantitative restrictions, in cross-border trade these rules are intended to facilitate
trade and thus promote economic growth. Yet again, issues may arise with regard to
the policy space that is left to states, which are for instance aiming to promote infant
129For a more comprehensive overview of how TCL operates within the commodity matrix, see the
outline in the annex.
130Oehl (2019), pp. 25–28; cf. Sect. 5.1.1.2.2.2 below.
131On the diverging interpretations of the FET standard with regard to the protection of investors’
‘legitimate expectations’, see Sect. 4.3.1 below.
132Comprehensively Hauert (2016).
133Cf. Sect. 4.3.2 below.
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industries or price stability in their commodity markets. Such measures may be
interpreted by the WTO DSB as trade distortions, and therefore held to be unlawful
under WTO discipline. In essence, this conflict demonstrates diverging perceptions
of what economic policies bring about the most beneficial results. While consumer
states typically favour liberalising commodity trade, as well as trade in manufac-
tures, to the greatest extent possible, producer states, especially Commodity Depen-
dent Developing Countries (CDDCs), may seek to pursue import substitution
industrialisation measures and therefore put in place safeguards for emerging domes-
tic industries.134 Furthermore, also the norms covering the use of shared resources
are seeking to foster the economic benefits of both—or all—parties concerned
through cooperation and equitable utilisation. Joint development agreements are
likewise serving this purpose.
In order to promote the development benefits of commodity activities, again
particularly the fiscal rules that are applicable in the respective host state ensure
the capture of an adequate share of resource rents. In an ideal state, these financial
resources are being used in the most effective way for the society’s development.135
Further development benefits can be sought i.a. through local content provisions or
other rules seeking to promote economic linkages between commodity activity and
the host state’s economy. Such clauses are often included in or annexed to invest-
ment contracts, concession or production-sharing agreements. However, applicable
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) as well as the Trade-Related Aspects of Intel-
lectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS)
agreements may significantly limit states’ policy space when it comes to introducing
such measures.
At the same time, WTO disciplines also contain a few provisions allowing for
development policies, such as infant-industry promotion according to Article XVIII
GATT or the special provisions for Commodity Dependent Developing Countries
e.g. contained in Article XXXVI:4 GATT. However, these provisions are of limited
effectiveness.136 Moreover, while Part IV of the GATT—the chapter on trade and
development—seeks to foster economic and social advancement, it does not refer to
environmental protection in that connection, therefore leaving out the third pillar of
134The perceptions may differ not only between consumer and producer states, but also depending
on what economic philosophy the respective country is being governed upon. More market-oriented
governments will typically favour trade liberalisation, whereas governments operating from a more
state-centric perspective will prefer maintaining control over trade. Not least the fact that this debate
has not settled, yet still WTO discipline clearly takes sides in favour of the ‘liberalisation doctrine’
led to the ‘deadlock’ of the world trade regime, see already Sect. 2.2.4 above. Instead of assuming
that with liberalisation, one has reached the ‘end of history’ as regards global economic policy, only
revisiting these discussions appears to be the promising approach to remedying this stalemate.
135Unfortunately, however, especially many CDDCs witness challenges of corruption and
mismanagement of resource revenues, in the most severe cases described as ‘resource curse’,
cf. Sect. 2.1.3 above. To what degree these challenges persist will generally depend on the degree
of control a state is able to exercise regarding commodity activities, see below.
136In more detail, cf. Sect. 4.2.2.1.4.2 below.
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SD.137 The Enabling Clause and the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) open
further possibilities to promote special treatment for developing countries. However,
trade and development provisions—as opposed to the liberalisation provisions of the
GATT—are said to be ‘declaratory rather than obligatory’, and therefore appear to
be of little ‘bite’ when it comes to creating a trade environment that is cognisant of
the imperatives of the developing world.138 One major obstacle in that connection
consists of ever rising SPS standards in the developed world, which effectively bar
many products from developing countries from entering their markets.139
A state’s competence to decide in what way and to what extent it develops its
commodity deposits is further qualified by the internal dimension of the right to
freely dispose over natural resources. Particularly where commodity activities have
effects on the right to subsistence of local populations or indigenous peoples, such
exploitation may be unlawful. Moreover, the right to development calls for the ‘fair
distribution of [the] benefits of development.’140 Also standards addressing corpo-
rate behaviour, such as the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises
(OECDG), are seeking to increase the SD benefits of business operations.
The objective of preservation is particularly being pursued by the various norms
aimed at environmental protection, such as the precautionary principle as well as the
principle of preventive action. Furthermore, the natural environment may also be
protected under indigenous peoples’ rights, especially where their cultural identities
are deeply influenced by or comprise lands, territories, waters, or the like. Again, the
right to freely dispose over natural resources (RFD) may require states to refrain
from conducting or authorising commodity activities where those threaten the means
of subsistence of local populations—and therefore effectively operate as a safeguard
for the territories or waters concerned. With regard to shared resources, particularly
the principle of equitable utilisation requires states to control, prevent, reduce, or
eliminate any adverse environmental effects that may originate from shared resource
use.141 The more sophisticated joint development agreements are, the more likely
they may be to also foster environmental protection.142 In scenarios of armed
conflict, several rules of international humanitarian law (IHL) are protecting com-
modity deposits from being harmed or unlawfully exploited.
The objective of controlling commodity activities is a subsidiary category to the
objectives of economic gain, development and preservation described above. It
relates to the general interest especially of host governments to maintain
137See, however, principle 10 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration, which reconciles the objectives
of price stability, adequate resource rents as well as environmental management.
138Lee (2011), p. 114; cf. Sect. 4.2.2.1.4.2 below.
139Desta and Hirsch (2012), p. 159.
140Marong (2010), para. 2; cf. Sect. 4.2.1.1 below.
141Moreover, the principle of sustainable use has been said to dispose of ‘particular normative
precision’ as a rule of customary international law with regard to shared and common natural
resources, ILA (2012), p. 36, statement #3.
142Cf. Sect. 4.2.2.1.4.1 below.
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administrative power and the rule of law respectively over what commodity opera-
tions are being carried out where, when, by whom, and how. Governments in this
respect particularly make use of licenses, concessions, and other public-private
contracts that detail the obligations which private actors need to observe when
conducting commodity activity. Ideally, and as is frequently the case, these contracts
intertwine with a broader legal framework that comprises international labour rights,
provides for land tenure rights, and other pertinent HR. For the objective of uphold-
ing the rule of law, especially with regard to compensation for wrongs suffered, the
right to remedy, according to Articles 8 UDHR, 2(3) ICCPR, 6 CERD, and 2
(c) CEDAW bears particular significance.
Moreover, the objective of control is being fostered by the various good gover-
nance standards, such as the anti-corruption provisions as e.g. set forth in the UN
Convention Against Corruption (CAC), the Berlin II Guidelines for Mining and
Sustainable Development or the AMV. Transparency initiatives like the Extractive
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) often constitute the first step towards
regulating various aspects of commodity activity in a targeted manner. Under the
UN Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights (UN GP) framework, states
are obliged to protect against HR violations by third parties, including corpora-
tions—and thus to especially regulate or legislate accordingly.143
Fifth and last, several norms of TCL are seeking to ensure the participation of
various stakeholders in decision-making processes related to commodity activity.
The right of the freedom of expression, the right to access to information and
particularly the right to free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) are serving this
purpose. Article 1(2) ICESCR obliges states to administer public resources in a
transparent manner. Through the freedom of assembly as well as association,
particularly private citizens, workers and civil society organisations have the right
to actively voice their opinion regarding commodity policy. Again, also the internal
dimension of the RFD may be relevant in this respect.
FPIC particularly requires states to obtain consent from indigenous and local
populations prior to authorising or conducting a commodity operation. This duty
evidently may conflict with the economic interests of host governments and inves-
tors. Where it has been violated, again the right to remedy plays a key role in
addressing matters of compensation and reparation. In this respect, UN GP #22
sets forth that corporations should provide legitimate remediation processes for HR
violations they have caused or contributed to. Similarly, the OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises require states to maintain National Contact Points, which
i.a. serve to address enquiries resulting from conflicts over the implementation of the
guidelines, e.g. between Multinational Enterprises and civil society. The latter’s
ability to publicly advocate their interests has not least been fostered significantly by
143Naturally, also the trade, investment, or environmental protection norms touched upon above,
serve the ultimate purpose of controlling commodity activity. This objective here constitutes a
subsidiary analytical category, which comprises norms fostering primary objectives other than the
ones of economic gain, development and preservation. On the UN GP framework, cf. Sect. 4.2.2.2.
2.1 below.
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the resource transparency movement leading to the publication of commodity
activity documentation.
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Chapter 4
The Effectiveness of TCL
The challenge for TCL lies in balancing the five interests associated with commodity
activity—control, participation, preservation, development, and economic gain.
Whereas our account of the application of TCL within the commodity governance
matrix above has demonstrated which of these objectives the individual norm sub-
sets are seeking to foster primarily, the subsequent assessment will focus on the
balancing quality of TCL. Where it strikes a balance, it can be deemed to be effective
in ensuring a functional commodity sector.
4.1 The Principle of PSNR as Normative Corner Stone
As the structure of TCL reveals, the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural
resources (PSNR) plays a pivotal role therein. In fact, the development of PSNR
itself mirrors the evolution of international regulatory approaches towards GCG.
The PSNR principle evolved mainly as a product of discussions among member
states within the UN system, particularly in the UN General Assembly (UN GA),
ECOSOC, Human Rights Committee (HRC) and UNCTAD,1 before being incor-
porated and eventually codified in international treaty law.2 First referred to in UN
1Schrijver (2008), para. 5. The principle’s legal underpinnings already feature in the UN Charter.
Article 1(2) UNC provides for the right of self-determination of peoples; the sovereign equality
principle is stipulated in Article 2(1) UNC. Moreover, PSNR relates to two main concerns of the UN
as outlined in the preamble of the UN Charter: the economic development of developing countries
(para. 4) and the self-determination of colonial peoples (para. 2). As such, PSNR also bears on
Article 55 UNC, which calls for economic and social progress, development, respect for HR and
fundamental freedoms ‘based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples’; cf. Schrijver (2008), para. 3.
2Cf. Schrijver (2008), para. 3.
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GA Resolution 523 and UN GA Resolution 626 respectively,3 the principle, from
the very outset, developed in the context of decolonisation.4 In the process of newly
formed independent governments taking control over their territories from former
colonisers, the ‘new nations’ were seeking international legal guarantees, which
would ensure them and their peoples sovereign rights over their national resource
wealth.5 The initial objective behind PSNR thus mainly related to gaining and
maintaining control over national commodity deposits, which had formerly been
controlled by colonial rulers—not least in order to prevent Western Transnational
Corporations (TNCs) from gaining undue influence over extraction decisions and
activities.6
In addition, from the outset, PSNR emerged in the context of development,7
which is particularly reflected in the ‘landmark’ Declaration on PSNR, UN GA
Resolution 1803.8 Accordingly, PSNR ‘must be exercised in the interest of [. . .]
national development and of the well-being of the people of the State concerned’.9
Notably UNCTAD and also the UN GA later fortified this link between resource
exploitation and development in the context of PSNR. The two bodies increasingly
used the principle to advocate for heightened attention to the development needs and
entitlements of the developing world with the ultimate goal of achieving a redistri-
bution of wealth more favourable to the ‘Global South’.10 These desires culminated
in the formulation by the G77 of a New International Economic Order (NIEO).11 In
the relevant Resolution 3201 of 1974, states are being accorded ‘[f]ull permanent
3UN GA (1952) Resolution 523 (VI), 12 January 1952, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/
RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/067/78/IMG/NR006778.pdf?OpenElement, preamble, para. 1; UN GA
(1952) Resolution 626 (VII), 21 December 1952, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLU
TION/GEN/NR0/079/69/IMG/NR007969.pdf?OpenElement (both last accessed 14 May 2021),
para. 1.
4Schrijver (2008), para. 7.
5Schrijver (2008), para. 7.
6Cf. Schrijver (2008), paras. 1, 7.
7Cf. already UN GA (1952) Resolution 523 (VI), 12 January 1952, preamble, para. 1, according to
which ‘the under-developed countries [. . .] must utilize [their] resources in order to be in a better
position to further the realization of their plans of economic development in accordance with their
national interests and to further the expansion of the world economy’.
8UN GA (1962) Resolution 1803 (XVII), 14 December 1962, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_
doc.asp?symbol¼A/RES/1803(XVII) (last accessed 14 May 2021); cf. Schrijver (2008), para. 9.
9UN GA (1962) Resolution 1803 (XVII), 14 December 1962, para. 1.
10Reflected in, e.g., UNCTAD (1964) Final Act and Report, 15 June 1964, UN Doc. E/CONF.46/
141, Vol. I, https://unctad.org/en/Docs/econf46d141vol1_en.pdf, p. 10, general principle three and
UN GA (1966) Resolution 2158 (XXI) of 25 November 1966, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/
doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/004/61/IMG/NR000461.pdf?OpenElement (both last accessed
14 May 2021). For instance, Resolution 2158, preamble, para. 5 demands that the ‘exploitation
and marketing [of NR] should be aimed at securing the highest possible rate of growth of the
developing countries’. Cf. Schrijver (2008), para. 11.
11Cf. Sect. 2.2.3 above; cf. Schrijver (2008), para. 12.
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sovereignty [. . .] over [their] natural resources and all economic activities.’12 PSNR
is said to entail the respective state’s effective control over its natural resources as
well as its right to nationalise and/or transfer any property or entitlements related to
them to its nationals.13
The objectives of the developing world were further spelled out in the Economic
Rights Charter (ERC; UN GA Resolution 3281).14 Again, a major emphasis was put
on PSNR, according to Article 2(1) ERC.15 Moreover, the regulation of activities
performed by transnational corporations was emphasised, according to Article 2(2)
(b) ERC.16 In fact, the Charter demonstrates a strong focus on national law and
regulatory powers of the nation state respectively—Schrijver thus describes the
period as one of ‘resource confrontationism’.17
This stance, however, in turn gave way to a more cooperative approach, notably
in the context of environmental protection.18 Especially the Stockholm (1972) and
Rio (1992) Declarations called for international cooperation for the sake of
protecting the planet and ultimately SD.19 Principle 21 Stockholm, which has been
repeated in Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration, places PSNR in the context of
environmental protection, notably as provided for in the applicable national legisla-
tion as well as the obligation not to cause transboundary harm.20 Most importantly, it
postulates that PSNR shall only be exercised ‘in accordance with the [UN Charter]
and the principles of international law’, thus implicitly referring to i.a. the principles
of diligence, due care, good-neighbourliness, and state responsibility (regarding
transboundary harm).21 This cooperative dimension of PSNR is also reflected in
the UNCLOS, where it is not limited to environmental protection. According to its
Article 56(1)(a) UNCLOS, in the EEZ the coastal state has
sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the
natural resources [. . .] of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its
subsoil. . .
According to Article 74(3) UNCLOS, states with opposite or adjacent coasts ‘in a
spirit of understanding and cooperation, shall make every effort’ to assure smooth
12UN GA (1974) Resolution 3201 (S-VI), 1 May 1974, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/218450/
files/A_RES_3201%28S-VI%29-EN.pdf, para. 4(e) (last accessed 14 May 2021).
13Ibid.; cf. Schrijver (2008), para. 12.
14UN GA (1974) Resolution 3281 (XXIX), 12 December 1974, http://www.un.org/ga/search/
view_doc.asp?symbol¼a/res/3281(XXIX) (last accessed 14 May 2021); cf. Schrijver (2008),
para. 13.
15Ibid.; cf. Schrijver (2008), para. 13.
16Cf. Schrijver (2008), para. 13.
17Schrijver (2008), para. 13. Emphasis added.
18Schrijver (2008), para. 14.
19Schrijver (2008), para. 14.
20Cf. Schrijver (2008), para. 14.
21Schrijver (2008), para. 14.
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delimitation of their EEZs between them, and consequently also trouble-free assign-
ment of their respective PSNR.22
Despite the widespread scepticism within classical legal scholarship towards
norms that have evolved through UN bodies as described above, PSNR by now,
besides the UNCLOS, is also incorporated or reflected in various other international
agreements, including the Human Rights Covenants.23 Correspondingly, it has been
proclaimed to be of customary character by the arbitral tribunal in the Texaco
v. Libya case as well as most prominently by the ICJ in the Armed Activities
case;24 also the legal doctrine nowadays accepts its customary character.25
Accordingly, states—as well as their respective people—are generally competent
to control and exploit the commodities located on their territory, which includes the
territorial sea according to Article 2 UNCLOS. However, over time the principle of
PSNR has increasingly become associated with not only entitlements of the respec-
tive state, but also duties. In the following we shall add clarity to its normative
evolution from a competence allocation norm (Sect. 4.1.1) to a comprehensive
principle aimed at fostering SD by envisaging rights (Sect. 4.1.2) as well as duties,
especially the sustainable use principle (Sect. 4.1.3), thus decisively
underpinning GCG.
4.1.1 Competence Norm
The somewhat ‘traditional’ function of the principle of PSNR lies in its quality as an
allocation norm, which confers sovereignty over natural resources onto respective
legal subjects. What is less obvious, however, is what legal subject it entitles.
The perhaps most prominent provision expressing PSNR can be found in com-
mon Article 1(2) of the HR Covenants. Accordingly,
[a]ll peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources
without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation,
based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law.
22On the ‘the significance of maritime delimitation for the orderly conduct of maritime activities’,
cf. recent case law as summarised by Ioannides (2019).
23On common Article 1(2) HR Covenants cf. Sect. 4.1.1 shortly below; cf. moreover Schrijver
(2015), pp. 24–25, who in addition points to Article 21 AfCHR; various ICAs (cf. extensively Sect.
5.2.1 below); Article 18 ECT; preamble and Article 15 CBD; preamble of the UNFCCC; as well as
Article 1 of the ICGLR Protocol Against the Illicit Exploitation of Natural Resources of
30 November 2006.
24Texaco arbitral tribunal (1977) Texaco v. Libya, Award of 19 January 1977, para. 87; ICJ (2005)
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, Judgment of 19 December 2005, para. 244;
cf. Schrijver (2008), para. 23; cf. Hobe (2015), pp. 10–12.
25Schrijver (2008), para. 23, who also contends that PSNR is not a peremptory norm (ius cogens)
but has acquired a ‘firm status within IL’; Dederer (2012), p. 39; Weiss and Scherzer (2015),
pp. 45, 54.
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The legal subject entitled here thus are the people.26 Yet, as Schrijver has
repeatedly emphasised,27 PSNR exhibits two distinct normative roots: the principle
of self-determination of peoples and the principle of sovereign equality of states.28
In the context of decolonisation, PSNR was thus intended to benefit both sub-
jects: peoples that were seeking to free themselves from foreign rule; as well as
newly formed states that were striving for economic independence from the
industrialised economic ‘centre’,29 i.a. their former colonisers.30 This is illustrated
i.a. in the 1962 Declaration on PSNR, which underlines that
the right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and
resources must be exercised in the interest of their national development and of the wellbeing
of the people of the State concerned.31
Whereas states’ PSNR, in light of the rather speedily emergence of the ‘new
nations’, dominated respective debates for much of the 1960s and 1970s, PSNR as
an aspect of the self-determination of peoples has increasingly witnessed attention
particularly with regard to indigenous peoples in the past two decades.32 As Dederer
highlights, this illustrates that also peoples within a state—that do not constitute the
state’s people, i.e. the ‘nation’—can be the bearers of PSNR.33 As a consequence,
the exercise of PSNR and territorial sovereignty do not necessarily converge.34
4.1.2 Rights Associated with PSNR
Next, naturally the question arises what rights PSNR entails. Sovereignty has been
defined in the context of international law i.a. as ‘ultimate power’ or ‘supreme
authority’—that is ‘alternatively or cumulatively’.35 The following rights, as listed
in Article 2 UNC and the Friendly Relations Declaration, are typically being
associated with sovereignty:
26On the debate whether peoples constitute subjects of international law, see the overview provided
by Walter (2007), paras. 8–9, 12; fundamentally, arguing for a new jus gentium as the international
law for humankind, Cançado Trindade (2010).
27I.a. Schrijver (1997); Schrijver (2008); Schrijver (2015).
28Schrijver (2015), pp. 16–17.
29On centre–periphery, cf. Sect. 2.1.2 above.
30Schrijver (2015), pp. 16–17.
31UN GA (1962) Resolution 1803 (XVII), 14 December 1962, para. 1. Emphasis added.
Cf. Schrijver (2015), p. 17.
32Schrijver (2015), pp. 22–23.
33Dederer (2012), p. 40, n 15.
34Dederer (2012), p. 40, n 15. Extensively with the hypothesis that states have transferred sovereign
rights over NR onto non-state actors, Pereira and Gough (2013).
35Besson (2011), para. 114.
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[P]lenary territorial and personal jurisdiction within one’s territorial boundaries; the pre-
sumption of legality of one’s sovereign acts; constitutional and organizational autonomy
including self-determination; and the protection of one’s domaine réservé.36
With regard to PSNR, Schrijver specifies the rights that have become associated
with it since its inception in the decolonisation era. He first refers to a number of
‘basic rights’, which include the ‘rights to possess, use, freely dispose of, explore,
exploit, market, manage, and conserve the natural resources.’37 A second category
he introduces, comprises ‘related rights’, which are
the rights to regulate foreign investment, including the right to tax foreign investment and
under certain specific circumstances and meeting international law requirements the right to
take foreign property.38
The third and last category that Schrijver alludes to, consists of rights that he
describes as ‘controversial’.39 It includes the right to demand ‘a share in the
management of local subsidiaries of multinational companies, or to withdraw from
unequal treaties or to revise unilaterally terms of agreed arrangements’;40 as well as
‘the right to determine unilaterally the amount of compensation, and to settle
international investment disputes solely upon the basis of national law.’41
4.1.3 The Sustainable Use Principle
Perhaps the most significant development in the dynamic emergence of the principle
of PSNR relates to its quality as a norm conferring not only rights, but also duties
upon its respective bearer.42 As we have seen above, already UN GA Resolution
1803 required states and/or peoples entitled to PSNR to exercise their sovereignty ‘in
the interest of their national development and of the wellbeing of the people of the
State concerned.’43 In connection with the emergence of international environmental
law, these duties were supplemented with an obligation to avoid harm to the
environment.44
An early provision on sustainable use can be found in Article 2 of the 1958
Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas,
according to which enabling ‘the optimum sustainable yield’ is defined as the
36Besson (2011), para. 118.
37Schrijver (2015), p. 26. Emphasis added.
38Schrijver (2015), p. 26. Emphasis added.
39Schrijver (2015), p. 26. Emphasis added.
40Schrijver (2015), p. 26.
41Schrijver (2015), p. 26.
42Cf. e.g. Schrijver (2015), p. 27.
43Schrijver (2015), p. 27 contends that this obligation ‘can be viewed as a good governance
requirement avant la lettre.’ Original emphasis.
44Cf. introduction to Sect. 4.1 above.
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objective of resource conservation.45 Article 2 of the Convention on Biological
Diversity defines sustainable use as
the use of components of biological diversity in a way and at a rate that does not lead to the
long-term decline of biological diversity, thereby maintaining its potential to meet the needs
and aspirations of present and future generations.
It has generally been said to put states
under a duty to manage natural resources, including natural resources within their own
territory or jurisdiction, in a rational, sustainable and safe way so as to contribute to the
development of their peoples, with particular regard for the rights of indigenous peoples, and
to the conservation and sustainable use of natural resources and the protection of the
environment, including ecosystems. States must take into account the needs of future
generations in determining the rate of use of natural resources. All relevant actors (including
States, industrial concerns and other components of civil society) are under a duty to avoid
wasteful use of natural resources and promote waste minimization policies.46
While the exact obligation it entails will typically differ depending on the
concrete subject matter to which it applies, the principle has become more and
more widely accepted, particularly with regard to
established treaty regimes on such matters as fisheries, marine living resources and specific
ecosystems (eg wetlands), [. . .] cooperative arrangements concerning transboundary and
shared natural resources, especially watercourses, and [. . .] the increasingly specific guid-
ance on [. . .] the rights of indigenous peoples and their management of local natural
resources.47
Moreover, the principle is now also rooted in target 12.2 of the SDGs (‘sustain-
able management and efficient use of natural resources’).48 It has been identified as a
rule of customary international law, at a minimum with regard to common or shared
resources.49 As such, it substantially qualifies the respective legal subject’s PSNR.50
In fact, this very principle gives further pivotal indications regarding the effec-
tiveness of TCL. That is, the sustainable use principle constitutes a balancing
45Schrijver (2008), para. 16. On its historical evolution, cf. also Sect. 4.1 above. The sustainable use
principle later developed to become part of the principle of SD, as contained in the ‘Brundtland
report’ of 1987 and principle 2 of the 1992 Rio Declaration, cf. Beyerlin (2013), para. 21 as well as
Sect. 5.1 below.
46ILA (2002), para. 1.2.; cf. also ILA (2012), p. 14.
47ILA (2012), p. 14. Cf. particularly with regard to fisheries also Article 2 1995 Straddling Stocks
Agreement as well as the 1995 FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries.
48Cf. Schrijver (2008), para. 16. On the functioning of SD as the regulatory objective of TCL,
cf. Sect. 5.1 below.
49Cf. ILA (2012), Annex, p. 36, Sofia Guiding Statement #3; Oehl (2019), p. 35 with further
references.
50According to Beyerlin (2013), para. 20, the sustainable use principle embodies the ideas of
distributive justice as well as of international solidarity in a common struggle to preserve the
planetary ecosystem.
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norm.51 Sustainable use reconciles all five commodity interests of control (1),
participation (2), development (3), preservation (4), and economic gain (5) in that
it obliges states
to manage natural resources in a rational [1;5], sustainable and safe [4] way so as to
contribute to the development [3;5] of their peoples [2], with particular regard for the rights
of indigenous peoples [2;3], and to the conservation and sustainable use of natural resources
and the protection of the environment, including ecosystems [4]. States must take into
account the needs of future generations in determining the rate of use of natural resources
[2;3;4;5].52
4.1.4 TCL Is Effective Where It Fosters Sustainable Use
This observation allows the following conclusions: The sustainable use principle
exhibits the normative contents needed in order to achieve a functional commodity
sector. Thus, the TCL framework would be effective where it concretises what
sustainable use requires. This would involve providing balancing norms, which
further detail how the commodity interests need to be balanced in respective
commodity scenarios, e.g. depending on the subsector, actors, or individual com-
modity concerned.
4.2 The Contribution of TCL to a ‘Balanced’ Commodity
Sector
To what extent the current TCL framework lives up to these requirements shall be
investigated in the subsequent section. For that purpose, we are going to discuss
several normative patterns, which TCL exhibits, including its largely ‘indirect’
nature (4.2.1) as well as the limited effectiveness of incidents of ‘direct’ TCL
(4.2.2), which is i.a. caused by a lack of integration and ‘hard’ legal obligations
respectively.
51Another approach, which however does not appear to have acquired the status of a legal concept,
yet appears to cover all commodity interests, is the shared value perspective. It aims to reconcile
market potential and societal development and is reflected i.a. in the UN GC’s SDG Natural
Resource industry matrix as well as the OECD Framework for Extractive Projects titled Collabo-
rative Strategies for In-Country Shared Value Creation, which through its five-step framework
i.a. addresses long-term strategies for the generation of shared value from commodity extraction.
52ILA (2002), para. 1.2. Reference numbers added.
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4.2.1 TCL Is Largely Indirect
In analysing the substance of TCL, one can differentiate between direct TCL, on the
one hand, and indirect TCL, on the other.53 Direct TCL can be described as those
norms of inter- and transnational law, which ‘reflect a conscious consideration of’
commodity activities and their implications for diverging stakeholder interests and
corresponding policy trade-offs.54 Thus, direct, or intentional, TCL demonstrates
commonalities of TCL relating to legal doctrine, which are distinct from other fields
of law.55 Indirect TCL consists of rules that are unintentionally regulating commod-
ity activities, and thus without exhibiting a conscious consideration for their
particularities.
The ‘indirect’ nature of a norm of TCL may not be perceived as an indication of
its (in)effectiveness per se. Instead, also rules formulated for a different purpose,
such as investment protection, naturally contribute to the regulatory picture. How-
ever, in most instances, those rules, which have been introduced for objectives that
are distinct from the overall objective of good commodity governance or fostering
the SD of the commodity sector, are not suited to specifically address the policy
trade-offs that typically result from commodity activities.
As we shall see by way of example, the ‘indirect’ norm subsets of TCL addressing
Human Rights (Sect. 4.2.1.1), environmental protection (Sect. 4.2.1.2), the fiscal
framework applicable to commodity operations (Sect. 4.2.1.3), scenarios of armed
conflict (Sect. 4.2.1.4) as well as anti-corruption (Sect. 4.2.1.5) build ‘regulatory
circles’ around individual interests. Yet, they largely do not provide answers to
questions that relate to the legitimacy of the decision to extract. Apart from demand-
ing conformity with the regime protecting or fostering the individual legal good they
have been designed for, they do not spell out guidelines on how commodity policy
trade-offs could be remedied. As a consequence, these answers, beyond the quali-
fication of a state’s sovereignty for the purposes of the individual regime, are left
unregulated and thus widely subject to the discretion of the respective state.
53See insofar the references to ‘commodity-directed’ norms throughout this book.
54Cf. Aagaard’s differentiation between ‘laws that reflect a conscious consideration of the environ-
ment’ and ‘laws enacted without any conscious consideration of the environment’, Aagaard
(2010), p. 262.
55Again, the norms portrayed subsequently contribute to the distinctive identity of TCL; yet, their
applicability is in many instances not unique to TCL. Instead, they may also feature in i.a., the
broader, superordinate field of natural resources law or in legal fields, which have evolved around
specific subject matters, such as the law of international watercourses or world trade law, cf. Sects.
3.1 and 3.2 above.
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4.2.1.1 Human Rights
International Human Rights (HR) are widely applicable to commodity activities.56 In
fact, the pervasiveness of HR-related scenarios is thus great that international HR
law has been deemed to sufficiently regulate distribution conflicts in the commodity
sector.57 Indirect HR, which are particularly pertinent in a commodity context, are
the right to life, labour rights, land rights, rights to basic needs, the right to a clean
environment, rights of indigenous peoples, rights in situations of violence, the right
to remedy, and the right to development.58
The right to life is rooted in Article 6(1) ICCPR.59 In connection with commodity
activities, loss of life can naturally occur under circumstances such as the handling of
toxic substances,60 underground mining, or mudslides.61
Many HR violations in the commodity sector are occurring in a labour context.62
For example, the displacement of fishers, farmers or artisanal miners, e.g. due to the
implementation of an industrial commodity operation, may constitute a violation of
the right to work provided for in Article 6(1) ICESCR.63 Another labour right that is
of great significance in the commodity sector is the prohibition of forced or com-
pulsory labour, which is primarily being regulated by ILO Convention 29 (‘Forced
Labour Convention’). With regard to commodity activities, forced labour occurs
most frequently in the mining or agricultural sector.64 Sadly, it often appears in
combination with child labour, particularly in small-scale mining contexts, where it
is considered the ‘worst form of child labour’.65 Children are generally protected
against child labour, according to Article 32 of the Convention on the Rights of the
Child (CRC). Moreover, also Article 10(3) ICESCR seeks to protect children from
56Cf. only the long list of cases brought before US-American courts based on the Alien Tort Claim




59Cf. Spohr (2016), p. 61.
60For example, mercury poising in small-scale mining can pose a particular threat to children,
cf. Bürgi Bonanomi et al. (2015), p. 29.
61Extensively on the risk of tailings dam failures including several case studies, Spohr (2016),
pp. 59–61.
62Bürgi Bonanomi et al. (2015), p. 29.
63Spohr (2016), pp. 88–89.
64Bürgi Bonanomi et al. (2015), p. 29.
65Bürgi Bonanomi et al. (2015), p. 29. In 2013, more than one million children were said to be
working in artisanal or small-scale mining operations in Africa, Latin America and Asia, Diallo
et al. (2013), p. vii; cf. Spohr (2016), p. 104; the latter describes the following reality: ‘Children start
washing gold from 3 years on; from 6 years on they can be seen breaking rocks with hammers or
washing ore; at the age of 9 they can be observed underground, and at 12 boys are working
underground in many countries and do the same work as adults (see e.g. Bolivia, Cerro Rico /
Potosi)’, Spohr (2016), p. 105 with reference to M. Hansson (2006), p. 2; cf. also various case
studies collected by Spohr (2016), pp. 106–109.
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economic and social exploitation. Insofar as child labour causes detrimental effects
to the health of a child, Article 12(2)(a) ICESCR and the obligation it entails with
regard to fulfilling the preconditions for a healthy development of the child may be
relevant.66 The prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child labour also
features in the SDGs as target 8.7.
Further specific protection to vulnerable groups in labour contexts typically
applies to women, indigenous peoples, migrants as well as disabled and older
people. Ending the discrimination of women is enshrined in SDG target 8.5. In the
commodity sector, women are still said to frequently ‘hold little power,
[be] ill-informed, and earn less than men’—a situation, which creates major obsta-
cles in the pursuit of sustainability.67
Further HR violations in the commodity sector can occur with regard to land
tenure, which is defined as ‘the relationship, whether legally or customarily defined,
among people, as individuals or groups, with respect to land.’68 In a commodity
context, land rights are typically concerned whenever a certain local or indigenous
population needs to be relocated in connection with the creation of e.g. a plantation
or mining site.69 The granting of respective licenses by the state can constitute a
breach of land tenure rights, whenever the acting authorities do not sufficiently
respect existing land titles, including ones of customary nature. However, even
forced evictions and resettlements can theoretically be justified under specific
circumstances.70 Such generally requires, i.a., ‘appropriate resettlement’ to areas,
which provide adequate housing as well as access to water, food and work.71
Tenure rights are particularly recognised under international law with regard to
indigenous peoples, such as by Articles 11, 12 ILO Convention 107 (Protection and
Integration of Indigenous and other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Indepen-
dent Countries), the preamble to the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity as
well as Articles 13 (general provision) and 14 (informal tenure rights) ILO conven-
tion 169. Article 15(1) ILO Convention 169 insofar constitutes an exception to the
‘indirect’ nature of HR, as it sets out that ‘[t]he rights of the peoples concerned to the
natural resources pertaining to their lands shall be specially safeguarded. These
rights include the right of these peoples to participate in the use, management and
conservation of these resources.’72
66Cf. Spohr (2016), p. 111. It also constitutes a violation of the childrens’ rights to education
pursuant to Articles 13, 28 CRC, cf. Spohr (2016), p. 110.
67Hinton et al. (2003); cf. Bürgi Bonanomi et al. (2015), p. 29.
68FAO (2002), para. 3.1.
69On the scenario of area clearing, cf. Spohr (2016), pp. 34–36, including various case studies.
70Spohr (2016), p. 34; cf. also the case study of the village of Horno in Germany, as an example for
a justified forced eviction, Spohr (2016), p. 35; in such scenarios, the right to privacy according to
Article 17 ICCPR may be relevant, cf. Spohr (2016), pp. 136–137.
71Spohr (2016), p. 34; cf. in this respect also our discussion of the RFD in Sect. 4.2.2.1.1 below.
72Emphasis added. Generally, indigenous people are entitled to also profit from e.g. mineral
resources, which are located on their ‘lands’. The term is thus to be understood in broad terms, so
as to comprise ‘the whole territory they use, including forests, rivers, mountains, coastal sea, the
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Given the great meaning that the natural environment can bear upon the cultural
identities of indigenous peoples, issues relating to tenure have repeatedly been
treated by the Human Rights Committee as a matter of Article 27 ICCPR.73 Also
Article 13(1) ILO convention 169 expressly provides that ‘governments shall respect
the special importance for the cultures and spiritual values of the peoples concerned
of their relationship with the lands or territories, [. . .] which they occupy or other-
wise use. . .’
Rights to basic needs can be concerned also where commodity activities nega-
tively impact the environment, such as contaminations of groundwater or soil, water
depletion, air pollution, devastation of the environment due to tailings dam failures
or mudslides, acid mine drainage etc.74 The right to an adequate standard of living,
which includes the right to water, food and adequate housing is provided for in
Article 11(1) ICESCR;75 Article 12(1) ICESCR protects the physical and mental
health. The latter provisions are frequently also employed in the context of environ-
mental quality.76 Thus, Article 12(1) ICESCR has been raised also regarding issues
such as adequate supply of safe and potable water, basic sanitation, prevention and
reduction of exposure to harmful substances ‘or other detrimental environmental
conditions that directly or indirectly impact upon human health.’77
surface, and the sub-surface’, Spohr (2016), p. 45 with reference to ILO (2009), p. 91. Cf. also
Dederer (2012), p. 48, n 66 who raises the question what resources the rights of indigenous peoples
comprise. On this question moreover IACtHR (2001) Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community
v. Nicaragua, IACtHR Series C no. 79, judgment of 31 August 2001. The IACtHR qualified
logging concessions as the cause of potentially long-term, irreversible damage to the natural
environment, which the petitioners depended on economically—and therefore a violation of Article
21 ACHR, paras. 153–155; Boyle (2009), para. 22; see also para. 149 of the court ruling: ‘Given the
characteristics of the instant case, some specifications are required on the concept of property in
indigenous communities. Among indigenous peoples there is a communitarian tradition regarding a
communal form of collective property of the land, in the sense that ownership of the land is not
centred on an individual but rather on the group and its community. Indigenous groups, by the fact
of their very existence, have the right to live freely in their own territory; the close ties of indigenous
people with the land must be recognised and understood as the fundamental basis of their cultures,
their spiritual life, their integrity, and their economic survival. For indigenous communities,
relations to the land are not merely a matter of possession and production but a material and
spiritual element which they must fully enjoy, even to preserve their cultural legacy and transmit it
to future generations.’
73Strydom (2013), para. 6 with reference to i.a. UN HRC (1990) Ominayak, Chief of the Lubicon
Lake Band v. Canada; UN HRC (1994) Länsman v. Finland; cf. also Spohr (2016), p. 46: ‘Some
aspects of these rights protected under that article may consist in a way of life that is closely
associated with territory and use of its resources, which is particularly true of members of
indigenous communities.’; UN HRC (1994), paras. 3.2, 7; cf. also the Awas Tingni case mentioned
above.
74Cf. Spohr (2016), pp. 49–54, 62.
75On the right to water UN CESCR (2003) ‘General Comment No 15: The Right to Water (Arts
11 and 12)’, 20 January 2003, https://www.refworld.org/docid/4538838d11.html (last accessed
14 May 2021); cf. Boyle (2009), para. 14.
76Boyle (2009), para. 14.
77UN CESCR (2000), para. 15; cf. Boyle (2009), para. 13.
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Moreover, Articles 11(1) and 12(1) ICESCR respectively have repeatedly been
interpreted so as to include a right to access to basic energy given that access to
energy will typically be a precondition to the fulfilment of many socioeconomic
HR.78 SDG 7 aims ‘to ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern
energy for all’. In a commodity context, this right can be relevant with regard to the
sourcing of energy commodities, which needs to be conducted in the most sustain-
able way possible. Also, commencing commodity activities, particularly in the
extractive industries, can create opportunities to at the same time e.g. electrify
adjacent local communities.79 Furthermore, it may have implications for the ‘energy
mix’—of renewable and non-renewable sources—that a government chooses and
thus for the types of commodities that the state is deciding to grant exploitation rights
for.80
Given the great impact commodity activities can have on local populations,
participatory rights are crucial to ensure their interests are being adequately
represented in corresponding governmental decisions.81 Three components of
public participation law are typically being distinguished: access to information,
public participation in decision-making, and access to justice.82 While the law of
public participation has primarily evolved in the context of international environ-
mental law, and is most notably enshrined in principle 10 Rio Declaration as well as
the Aarhus Convention,83 it is also partly rooted in international HR law. The right to
information is based on Article 19 ICCPR as a part of the freedom to expression as
well as Article 25(b) ICCPR, which entails the right to participate in public affairs.84
Article 19(2) ICCPR provides for the right to access to information, thus ‘the
freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds’, which
encompasses public interest information as well as information that is relevant for
potential violations of individual rights.85 Moreover, Article 1(2) ICESCR com-
prises the continued obligation of a state to ensure transparency when it regulates or
administers public resources.86
Failure to adequately respect participatory—or other—HR can result in particu-
larly infamous HR violations, which exhibit a rather indirect connection to com-
modity activities. The talk is of situations of violence, such as armed conflict or
78Bradbrook and Gardam (2006), p. 409; cf. also Ottinger (2014).
79On these linkages, cf. already Sect. 2.1.2 above.
80While typical non-renewable energy commodities include oil, gas and coal, also the so-called
renewable energies require specific commodities, such as bauxite (for aluminium) or Rare Earths
(e.g. for permanent magnets in wind turbines). Cf. comprehensively on the various uses of minerals
in new technologies Espa and Oehl (2018).
81Cf. Sect. 2.1.3 above, which identifies ‘participation’ as one of the fundamental interests
associated with commodity activity.
82Pring and Noé (2002), p. 28.
83Cf. extensively, Pring and Noé (2002), pp. 28–50; cf. also Sect. 4.2.1.2 below.
84Ebbesson (2009b), para. 30; Ebbesson (2009a), para. 26; Spohr (2016), p. 32.
85Spohr (2016), p. 32.
86Spohr (2016), p. 32.
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violent clashes over distribution of benefits, tenure rights, or cultural impact.87 Both
resource dependence and abundance, particularly of precious minerals, have been
found to conduce violence, armed conflict and, at times, civil war.88 The state’s
obligation to refrain from encroachments on HR here relates to its own duty to
respect HR as well as to protect everyone under its jurisdiction against HR viola-
tions, e.g. committed by security forces employed by private commodity compa-
nies.89 Relevant rights that may be harmed in situations of violence include
Articles 6 (right to life), 7 (freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment), 9(1) (right to security of the person), and 21 (freedom of
assembly) ICCPR as well as the prohibition of torture contained in Articles 1(1),
2(1) Convention Against Torture.90
Furthermore, the right to remedy, which is set out in Article 8 UDHR, Article 2
(3) ICCPR as well as Article 6 CERD and Article 2(c) CEDAW, ensures adequate
enforcement of states’ HR obligations. It is composed of the two duties to provide
access to justice as well as to take substantive measures to prevent or redress rights
violations.91
An HR that is relevant for GCG rather from a ‘big picture’ perspective, which has
not yet been legally codified as such, is the right to development as defined in
Article 1 of the Declaration on the Right to Development.92 Given the great
economic significance of the commodity sector for many developing countries,
particularly CDDCs, the right to development oftentimes features in policy debates
on terms of trade, technology transfer, or detrimental effects of commodity activities
on development.93
4.2.1.2 Environmental Protection Norms
Commodity activities can have major impacts on the natural environment. For
instance, the conversion of primary forests into plantations may have problematic
effects for soil fertility, biodiversity, water quality and availability as well as the
existence of organic carbon stocks.94 Timber logging may have similar effects and,
87Cf. Spohr (2016), pp. 117–130.
88Bürgi Bonanomi et al. (2015), pp. 27–28; Spohr (2016), p. 125.
89Cf. Bürgi Bonanomi et al. (2015), p. 28.
90Cf. Spohr (2016), pp. 130–133. In extreme cases, even a violation of Articles 2, 3 UN Genocide
Convention may become relevant.
91Shelton (2006), para. 2; the former includes the duty to provide access to relevant information
concerning violations and reparation mechanisms, UN GA (2005) Basic Principles and Guidelines
on the Right to a Remedy, Resolution 60/147, 16 December 2005, para. 11; cf. Spohr (2016), p. 57.
92On the historical underpinnings of the right to development and its relationship to the NIEO,
Marong (2010), paras. 4–5.
93Cf. Marks (2004), p. 141.
94Bürgi Bonanomi et al. (2015), p. 33.
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by reducing carbon stocks, may accelerate climate change.95 The mining of com-
modities frequently causes water pollution or contamination, for instance from mine
tailings, which result from copper, iron, coal, or gold production.96 Moreover,
surface contaminants may be spread by water and wind, which can lead to increased
concentration of metal sediments that can damage aquifers and other water ecosys-
tems.97 A particular environmental problem, which occurs in connection with gold
extraction, is the contamination of soils and waters with mercury.98 Surface mining
of commodities such as copper, iron, coal and gold particularly causes air pollution,
with coal extraction exhibiting detrimental effects on biodiversity regeneration.99 As
Bürgi Bonanomi and others point out, particularly on the African continent, mining
appears to elicit extensive deforestation of rainforests.100
These environmental effects need to be taken into account whenever a govern-
ment considers extracting commodities. They are being addressed by today’s inter-
national environmental protection regime, which began to emerge in the 1970s.
Notably the 1972 Stockholm Declaration represents the first document addressing
environmental protection, which witnessed quasi-universal support from the inter-
national community.101 From the beginning, safeguarding natural resources for
present and future generations constituted one of the central objectives of the
environmental protection regime.102
However, international environmental law as an established branch of interna-
tional law, including its somewhat coherent doctrine and substance,103 only in some
incidents reflects a conscious consideration of the particularities of commodity
activity. It is characterised by a set of central rules and principles,104 which have
been concretised in the context of specific protection regimes provided for in various
international legal instruments,105 which are undeniably again quite close to
95Cf. Bürgi Bonanomi et al. (2015), p. 34; on the negative impacts of cocoa and coffee intensifi-
cation on biodiversity likewise Bürgi Bonanomi et al. (2015), pp. 33–34 with further evidence.
96Bürgi Bonanomi et al. (2015), p. 36.
97Bürgi Bonanomi et al. (2015), p. 36.
98Cf. Espa and Oehl (2018). On the guidance provided by the Minamata Convention in this respect,
cf. Sect. 5.2.1.2.3.1 below.
99Bürgi Bonanomi et al. (2015), pp. 36–37.
100Bürgi Bonanomi et al. (2015), p. 37.
101Beyerlin and Grote Stoutenberg (2013), para. 9. Prior to Stockholm, environmental protection
efforts were mainly led by FAO, UNESCO and ECOSOC, yet the UN’s competence to do so had
still been disputed, cf. Beyerlin and Grote Stoutenberg (2013), para. 7.
102Cf. Principles 2, 3 and 5 Stockholm Declaration.
103Cf. Beyerlin and Grote Stoutenberg (2013), para. 3.
104Most of these central principles have been elaborated in legal language in either the Stockholm or
Rio Declaration; cf. Barral (2012), p. 379.
105Cf. e.g. Sands and Peel (2018), pp. 101–106 on the emergence of international environmental
agreements.
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commodity activities, such as the ones regulating the protection of the atmo-
sphere,106 air,107 freshwater,108 wetlands,109 oceans, seas and marine living
resources,110 flora and fauna,111 forests and soils,112 biological diversity,113 and
the Polar regions.114 Further regimes address climate change115 as well as wastes
and hazardous substances.116 Yet, most rules and principles do not reflect a con-
scious consideration of commodity policy trade-offs.
106Especially 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer; Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer; cf. Beyerlin and Grote Stoutenberg (2013), para. 33.
107Especially Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution; as well as the ASEAN
Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution; cf. Beyerlin and Grote Stoutenberg (2013), para. 32.
108Especially UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Water-
courses; cf. Beyerlin and Grote Stoutenberg (2013), paras. 64–65.
109Especially Convention onWetlands of International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat
(Ramsar Convention); Revised African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural
Resources (Maputo Convention), cf. also Sect. 5.2.1.2.3.3 below; cf. Beyerlin and Grote
Stoutenberg (2013), paras. 42–3.
110Especially 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement (global scope), as well as several fisheries agreements
with a regional scope; UNCLOS; International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from
Ships; International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation; 1996
Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other
Matter. For an account of further regional marine environmental protection conventions, cf. Baker
and Share (2013). On all of the above, cf. Beyerlin and Grote Stoutenberg (2013), paras. 52–62.
111Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES),
Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (CMS).
112As Beyerlin and Grote Stoutenberg (2013), para. 49 contend, ‘[a] comprehensive system of
forest protection is still missing in [IEL].’ On the International Tropical Timber Agreement—and
other ICAs—cf. especially Sect. 5.2.1.2 below. In the climate change context, Beyerlin and Grote
Stoutenberg (2013), para. 50 are pointing to REDD+, cf. UNFCCC (2019), REDD+, web platform,
https://redd.unfccc.int/ (last accessed 14 May 2021). With regard to soil protection, note the 1998
Protocol on the Implementation of the Alpine Convention of 1991 in the Field of Soil Conservation,
as well as the UN Desertification Convention; cf. Beyerlin and Grote Stoutenberg (2013), para. 51.
113Convention on Biological Diversity; Bonn Guidelines; Nagoya Protocol; cf. in more detail Sect.
5.2.1.2.3.3 below. Moreover, cf. also the Aichi Biodiversity Targets; the Cartagena Protocol; as
well as the FAO International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture;
cf. Beyerlin and Grote Stoutenberg (2013), paras. 45–48.
114On CRAMRA, cf. Sect. 5.2.1.2.3.2 below.
115Cf. especially the UNFCCC; Kyoto Protocol; as well as the Paris Agreement; cf. Beyerlin and
Grote Stoutenberg (2013), paras. 35–40.
116Especially 1989 Basel Convention; 1991 Bamako Convention; the 2001 Stockholm Convention
on Persistent Organic Pollutants, which i.a. regulates several pesticides that have been used in the
production of agricultural commodities, such as Chlordane, Dieldrin, DDT, or Endosulfans,
cf. UNEP (2019) All POPs listed in the Stockholm convention, http://www.pops.int/
TheConvention/ThePOPs/AllPOPs/tabid/2509/Default.aspx (last accessed 14 May 2021); as well
as the Minamata Convention, which applies to mercury-containing waste, cf. its Article 5(1).
Cf. also the overview of relevant instruments on international waste managements provided by
Sands and Peel (2018), pp. 619–626; as well as Beyerlin and Grote Stoutenberg (2013), paras.
69–77.
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The obligation not to cause transboundary harm, in short ‘no harm’ rule, had first
been pronounced by the arbitral tribunal in the Trail Smelter case in 1941. It features
in Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration and has been recognised as a rule of
customary international law by the ICJ in its advisory opinion on the Legality of the
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons.117 In the commodity context, the no harm rule
can be particularly significant with regard to dispersion of contaminants resulting
from commodity activities via air or water to areas under the sovereignty of another
nation state or constituting the common concern of humankind.118
According to Principle 15 Rio Declaration, states shall apply the precautionary
approach in order to protect the environment.119 In scenarios, in which the precau-
tionary principle applies, states are obliged to take adequate measures to prevent the
respective potential harm; however, the choice of what kind of measures exactly they
are taking, remains their own.120 The precautionary approach also applies to the
sustainable utilisation of natural resources.121 It is said to belong to the category of
emerging customary international law, with some authors arguing that this status has
already been consolidated.122
The duty to carry out Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs), contained in
Principle 17 Rio Declaration, relates to the concept of precaution.123 It is further
specified by the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a
Transboundary Context (‘Espoo Convention’), particularly its Article 2(3). The
provision is somewhat directly applicable to commodity activities given that
appendix I, which it refers to, lists several commodity scenarios, such as crude oil
117ICJ (1996) Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, para. 29;
Beyerlin and Grote Stoutenberg (2013), para. 23.
118Despite its categorisation, here, as ‘indirect’ TCL, the ‘no harm’ rule has also been put in context
with the sustainable use principle, see ILA (2002), para. 1.1.
119Cf. also ILA (2002), principle #4.
120Beyerlin and Grote Stoutenberg (2013), para. 25 with reference to ITLOS (2011) Advisory
opinion, 1 February 2011, paras. 131–132; cf. also Chen (2016).
121ILA (2002), para. 4.2.
122Beyerlin and Grote Stoutenberg (2013), para. 25; Sands and Peel (2018), p. 240 see ‘reluctance
to embrace a clear view’ regarding the principle’s customary status, which ‘is no doubt informed by
doubts and differences as to what the practical consequences of the precautionary principle or
approach will be in a particular field or in a specific case.’
123Cf. ILA (2002), para. 4.2.c. The EIA obligation has been confirmed as customary international
law by the ICJ (2010a) Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, Judgment of 20 April 2010, paras.
204–205. Accordingly, it ‘may now be considered a requirement under general international law to
undertake an environmental impact assessment where there is a risk that the proposed industrial
activity may have a significant adverse impact in a transboundary context, in particular, on a shared
resource’; however, general international law does not specify how exactly an EIA needs to be
carried out: ‘it is for each State to determine in its domestic legislation or in the authorization
process for the project, the specific content of the environmental impact assessment required in each
case, having regard to the nature and magnitude of the proposed development and its likely adverse
impact on the environment as well as to the need to exercise due diligence in conducting such an
assessment[]’; cf. also ITLOS (2011), para. 145; on both cf. Beyerlin and Grote Stoutenberg (2013),
para. 24.
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refineries, major installations for the initial smelting of cast iron and steel and for the
production of nonferrous metals, installations for the extraction of asbestos, large-
diameter pipelines for the transport of oil, gas or chemicals, major quarries, mining,
on-site extraction and processing of metal ores or coal or deforestation of large areas.
This provision thus displays the particular significance in the context of commodity
activities of the obligation to carry out an EIA.124
Further guidance on how to conduct environmental—but also cultural and
social—impact assessments is provided by the Akwé: Kon Voluntary Guidelines
for the Conduct of Cultural, Environmental and Social Impact Assessment, which
have been adopted by the Conference of the Parties of the CBD in May 2000.
Moreover, the principle of preventive action constitutes a key element of inter-
national environmental law (IEL). While it is frequently referred to in the context of
precaution, the principle of prevention needs to be differentiated from the former.125
While the precautionary approach is relevant, whenever the risks of environmental
damage are uncertain, the prevention principle applies for risks, which are cer-
tain.126 Given that many commodity activities entail risks, which are certain, the
principle of prevention needs to be observed during the planning and implementa-
tion of such activities whenever a transboundary context is concerned. The arbitral
tribunal in the proceedings between the Philippines and China regarding the South
China Sea held China’s obligation to prevent damage to the marine environment, as
rooted in Articles 192 and 194 UNCLOS, to be breached given that it had not
prevented i.a., the harvesting of endangered sea turtles.127
Furthermore, the polluter pays principle (PPP) as enshrined in Principle 16 Rio
Declaration numbers among the central elements of IEL. The same holds true for the
principle of common but differentiated responsibility (CBDR), which may at times
conflict with the PPP. The CBDR principle is closely linked to the concepts of SD as
124Note, however, that the Espoo Convention has been ratified in the framework of UNECE by
45 countries, thus mainly European states as well as the US and Canada, cf. UN treaty collection
(2019) Espoo convention, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src¼TREATY&mtdsg_
no¼XXVII-4&chapter¼27&clang¼_en (last accessed 14 May 2021). Yet, ‘like the Water Con-
vention, the Espoo and Aarhus Conventions both envision the broadening of their geographical
scope by enabling the accession of States not members of the UNECE. While this is already
possible under the Aarhus Convention ([Article] 19 (3)), the respective amendment to the Espoo
Convention of 2001 has yet to enter into force[]’, Beyerlin and Grote Stoutenberg (2013), para. 84.
125Cançado Trindade (2015), pp. 422–423, who points to the fact that given the ‘overlap’ of both
principles they are frequently used interchangeably; cf. however on ongoing debates regarding the
exact scope and status of principles of international environmental law even within the ICJ the
separate opinions by judges Owada, Donoghue, Dugard, and Cançado Trindade to the ICJ (2015)
Certain Activities Carried out by Nicaragua case as succinctly summarised by Yotova (2016),
pp. 445–448. Dugard, in his Separate Opinion, speaks of ‘[t]he duty of due diligence [being] the
standard of conduct required to implement the principle of prevention[]’, ICJ (2015b), para. 7.
126Cançado Trindade (2015), p. 422; cf. ICJ (2010b) Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, Separate
Opinion Judge Cançado Trindade, para. 62; cf. moreover Viñuales (2012).
127PCA (2016) The South China Sea Arbitration, Award of 12 July 2016, para. 964.
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well as intra-generational equity.128 In a commodity context, CBDR can play a role
particularly when it comes to the protection of shared resources.129
The CBDR principle also relates to the last principle of IEL, which shall be
touched upon here: the duty to cooperate.130 As already stated above, it is likewise
expressly contained in Principle 7 Rio Declaration.131 It moreover features in a series
of international environmental agreements, including the UNFCCC as well as
Articles 11.3 and 12 of the Paris Agreement.132 Regarding commodity activities,
the duty to cooperate is again of particular relevance when it comes to administering
shared resources or also remedying transboundary harm. Apart from the duty to
cooperate with one another, IEL also calls for public participation.133 Besides the
participation of a broad range of actors based on multi-stakeholder approaches on the
global level, principle 10 of the Rio Declaration explicitly emphasises the obligation
for states to provide appropriate access to environmental information also on the
national level.134 In addition, effective access to justice shall be provided. With
regard to Europe, these obligations are further spelled out in the 1998 UNECE
Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (‘Aarhus Convention’).
4.2.1.3 Fiscal Framework
The degree to which a commodity-endowed state benefits from extraction depends
substantially on its fiscal law framework. This relates not only to its interest of
economic gain, but also the one of development—as an objective ideally shared
between state and population. International instruments and standards provide some
guidance on how to design the fiscal conditions under which commodity operations
128Hey (2011), para. 5 defines the CBDR principle as ‘a means of translating the concept of intra-
generational equity to the inter-State level, and the South-North context in particular, with a view to
attaining sustainable development.’
129Oehl (2019), p. 34.
130Cf. Hey (2011), para. 5; ILA (2002) para. 3.1.
131Accordingly, ‘[s]tates shall co-operate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect and
restore the health and integrity of the Earth’s ecosystem[]’, cf. Wolfrum (2010), para. 28.
132Cf. Wolfrum (2010), paras. 29–30 moreover pointing i.a. to Article 1 of the 1993 North
American Agreement on Environmental Co-operation as well as the 1985 Vienna Convention for
the Protection of the Ozone Layer (cf. e.g. Article 2(2)(a)). Cf. also ITLOS (2001) MOX Plant,
Order of 3 December 2011, para. 26, according to which the UK ‘breached its obligations under
Articles 123 and 197 of UNCLOS in relation to the authorisation of the MOX plant, and has failed
to cooperate with Ireland in the protection of the marine environment of the Irish Sea inter alia by
refusing to share information with Ireland and/or refusing to carry out a proper environmental
assessment of the impacts on the marine environment of the MOX plant and associated activities
and/or proceeding to authorise the operation of the MOX plant whilst proceedings relating to the
settlement of a dispute on access to information were still pending[.]’
133Beyerlin and Grote Stoutenberg (2013), para. 82.
134Beyerlin and Grote Stoutenberg (2013), para. 82.
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are taking place, such as double taxation agreements (DTAs). The general challenge
for the host state of commodity activity consists of finding the right balance between
capturing sufficient resource rents while maintaining an attractive business and
investment environment.135 Again, most guidance provided in international stan-
dards and instruments does not consciously consider commodity policy trade-offs.
The Model United Nations Double Taxation Convention between Developed and
Developing Nations (UNDTC) and the OECD Model Tax Convention
(OECDMTC) on Income and on Capital constitute two central instruments of
transnational fiscal law.136 Both conventions are primarily concerned with
preventing double taxation (DT).137 They have found wide acceptance today, with
many states having effectively translated particularly the OECDMTC into their
national tax laws.138 In addition, both conventions have inspired the conclusion of
more than 3000 bilateral DTAs.139
In the context of commodity operations, both conventions are relevant particu-
larly with regard to corporate income taxation. According to Article 7 of the
OECDMTC, corporate profits shall generally only be taxable in the state of corporate
residency.140 However, where the company maintains business through a so-called
permanent establishment (PE) in another contracting state, the profits that are
attributable to the PE may be taxed in that state—the state of source. Article 5
(1) OECDMTC generally defines a PE as ‘a fixed place of business through which
the business of an enterprise is wholly or partly carried on.’According to Article 5(2)
(f) OECDMTC, the term PE includes especially ‘a mine, an oil or gas well, a quarry
or any other place of extraction of natural resources.’ The UNDTC contains identical
provisions. Consequently, the host state to a multinational commodity enterprise,
which is headquartered elsewhere, may generally tax those profits of the corporation
that have been generated through a commodity extraction site on its territory.
However, Article 5(2)(f) OECDMTC is only indicative of the existence of a
PE. As the commentary to the UNDTC with regard to the identical provision
contained in the latter states, ‘it does not provide that [a PE] necessarily does
exist.’141
Despite this explicit reference to commodity activity in Article 5(2)
(f) OECDMTC, some authors have highlighted that the PE clauses provided by
135Cf. UN (2017a), pp. 3–4.
136See also the USModel Income Tax Convention, available at US Treasury, https://www.treasury.
gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/Treaty-US%20Model-2016.pdf (last accessed
14 May 2021).
137Margalioth (2011b)—comparing it to the OECDMTC—describes the UNDTC as being ‘bent in
favour of developing countries, imposing fewer restrictions on the tax jurisdiction of the source
country’, para. 88.
138Margalioth (2011b), para. 5.
139Margalioth (2011a), para. 6.
140On the corresponding formal and substantive tests that states are typically carrying out in order to
determine corporate residency, Margalioth (2011b), paras. 18–28.
141UN (2017b), p. 153; Almeida and Toledano (2018), p. 16.
92 4 The Effectiveness of TCL
the model conventions do not sufficiently cover the specificities of extractive
industries.142 Apart from the physical presence of the corporation, DTAs typically
require business operations to be carried out for a certain period of time and to be of a
particular character, especially not to be merely auxiliary activities.143 In this respect,
what can cause difficulties for source states is the intricate net of contracts, joint
ventures, subcontractors, and consortia frequently surrounding commodity opera-
tions—particularly given that they may each be considered separately for tax
purposes.144 Especially operations carried out by subcontractors may be structured
in a way so as to avoid the thresholds regarding time and type of activity under
the applicable DTA.145 As a result, the state concerned may be unable to tax the
commodity activity.146 In order to counter such trends and therefore increase the tax
revenue of the respective source states, Almeida and Toledano i.a. propose a specific
PE clause for resource-rich countries.147
Apart from the issue of what constitutes a PE—i.e. under what conditions the
state in which the commodity activity occurs may levy a respective source tax –,
both model conventions also set forth rules on how profits, which are attributable to a
PE, shall be calculated. According to Article 7(2) OECDMTC, profits attributable to
a PE
. . .are the profits it might be expected to make, in particular in its dealings with other parts of
the enterprise, if it were a separate and independent enterprise engaged in the same or similar
activities under the same or similar conditions . . .
This provision, which is contained with similar wording also in Article 7
(2) UNDTC, is being generally referred to as the arm’s length principle.148 The
main objective of this principle is to prevent the practice of so-called transfer
pricing, which has been deemed to be ‘one of the most important issues’ in
international taxation.149 The arm’s length principle counters this practice by
allowing tax administrations to adjust the prices of intra-group transactions to
142Almeida and Toledano (2018), p. 1; cf. especially the corresponding ‘Proposed Guidance on
Permanent Establishment in the Extractive Industries’ presented by the Committee of Experts on
International Cooperation in Tax Matters, UN Doc. E/C.18/2016/CRP.22, https://www.un.org/esa/
ffd/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/13STM_CRP22_Extractives_PEs.pdf (last accessed 14 May
2021) that the authors have built their deliberations on.
143Almeida and Toledano (2018), p. 13.
144Almeida and Toledano (2018), p. 13.
145Almeida and Toledano (2018), p. 14. The OECDMTC is less favourable for source states in this
respect, for instance requiring a minimum period of 12 months for a construction activity to qualify
as a PE according to its Article 5(3), whereas the UNDTC sets a respective threshold of only
6 months according to its Article 5(3)(a).
146Cf. Almeida and Toledano (2018), p. 14.
147Almeida and Toledano (2018), pp. 41–44.
148These provisions apply to intra-group transactions between different branches of the same
corporation. Article 9(1) OECDMTC and Article 9(1) UNDTC constitute the respective provisions
for subsidiaries or associated enterprises; Margalioth (2011b), para. 69.
149Tian (2018), p. 36.
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usual market prices. Corresponding methods to approximate the ‘arm’s length price’
are the Comparable Uncontrolled Price Method, the Cost Plus Method, the Resale
Price Method, the Transactional Net Margin Method, as well as the Profit Split
Method.150 Not least given that a large share of commodity transactions is being
conducted by TNCs,151 transfer pricing constitutes a major issue also in our sector
under investigation.152
Fiscal transparency and exchange of information between tax authorities are
playing a key role in financial regulation. When it comes to cross-border collabora-
tion of tax administrations and respective exchange of information, particularly the
OECD Model Agreement on Exchange of Information on Tax Matters is providing
important guidance. Pivotal international standards are so-called exchange of infor-
mation requests (EOIR) as well as the automatic exchange of financial account
information (AEOI), which feature in Articles 5 and 6 of the authoritative Conven-
tion on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters respectively.153
4.2.1.4 Armed Conflict
Commodity activities in scenarios of armed conflict are particularly sensitive.
Resource dependencies have proven to correlate with an increased risk of armed
conflict.154 Commodity deposits can i.a. play key roles in (attempted) coups d’état,
the financing of warlordism, secession movements, mass rebellions, and foreign
interventions in armed conflicts.155 Generally speaking, one can distinguish between
three core issues that are associated with armed conflicts, which occur in connection
with natural resources: ‘resource supply conflicts’, ‘conflict resources’, and ‘com-
munity-level resource conflicts’.156 However, most of the applicable rules still
constitute indirect TCL.
First and foremost international humanitarian law (IHL) qualifies a state’s sover-
eignty in armed conflict.157 With regard to the protection of commodities, one can
roughly distinguish three ‘indirect’ legal avenues, which serve this very purpose and
shall be considered subsequently: commodities can be protected as civilian objects,
150For a more detailed account of these methods, see Margalioth (2011b), paras. 71–78. On the
so-called ‘sixth method’, Grondona (2018).
151Cf. e.g. UNCTAD (2016), p. 8.
152Cf. also Carbonnier and Zweynert de Cadena (2015), paras. 2–5.
153Cf. OECD (2017a), p. 2.
154Le Billion (2005), p. 13.
155Le Billion (2005), pp. 37–43.
156Le Billion et al. (2016), p. 2. Mostly original emphasis.
157With an elaborate account, Dam-de Jong (2010), pp. 37–52. However, also norms of interna-
tional criminal law, particularly of the Rome Statute, will feature in the subsequent section wherever
they are relevant for our discussion of commodity-related issues arising in armed conflict.
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via environmental protection provisions, and through the prohibition to destroy or
seize property, which includes the prohibition to pillage.
According to Article 52(1) of Additional Protocol I (AP-I),158 civilian objects
shall not be the object of attack or reprisals. They are being defined as all objects,
which are not subject to military objectives, according to Article 52(1) AP-I. Arti-
cle 52(2) AP-I specifies these objects to ones, which i.a. ‘make an effective contri-
bution to military action’ and ‘offer[] a definite military advantage.’159 While the
threshold of ‘military advantage’ set here does not seem to be very hard to over-
come,160 Article 54(2) AP-I provides specific protection for objects that are ‘indis-
pensable to the survival of the civilian population’, including i.a. foodstuffs, crops,
and livestock.
According to Article 54(2) AP-I, such objects may not be attacked, destroyed,
removed, or rendered useless, thus not be damaged in any way.161 The same
obligation exists with regard to NIACs, according to Article 14 of Additional
Protocol II (AP-II).162 As Dam-de Jong points out, the list of indispensable objects
provided by Articles 54(2) AP-I and 14 (AP-II) is not meant to be exhaustive, but
rather may also include forests, lakes and rivers, and even mineral oil.163
Commodities may also fall under the general protection, which is being accorded
to the environment.164 Articles 35(3) and 55 AP-I set forth a prohibition to cause
widespread, long-term, and severe damage to the environment. They entail a pre-
cautionary approach and may thus serve to prevent environmental damage resulting
from the exploitation of commodity deposits, i.a. through impact assessments.165
This basic protection of the overall environment however only applies during
international armed conflict.166 However, again the threshold of these protection
158The Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (AP-I), of 8 June 1977, available at ICRC,
https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0321.pdf (last accessed 14 May 2021).
159Dam-de Jong (2010), p. 37.
160Dam-de Jong (2010), pp. 37–38.
161According to Article 54(3) AP-I, this obligation does not apply in cases where the objects in
question are used exclusively for the sustenance of the adverse party’s military forces or in direct
support of military action.
162Dam-de Jong (2010), p. 38. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (AP-II), of 8 June
1977, available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%201125/volume-1125-i-
17513-english.pdf (last accessed 14 May 2021).
163Dam-de Jong (2010), p. 39. While according to Article 54(2) AP-I, the damage done to
indispensable objects needs to be carried out ‘for the specific purpose of denying them for their
sustenance value to the civilian population’, this provision is generally not understood as requiring a
specific corresponding intent. It may thus ‘be interpreted broadly so as to encompass all instances in
which parties to an armed conflict deprive the population of objects indispensable to their survival,
regardless of the motive’, Dam-de Jong (2010), p. 40.
164Dam-de Jong (2010), p. 40.
165Dam-de Jong (2010), p. 42.
166Dam-de Jong (2010), p. 41.
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provisions is set at a very high level, which as a consequence grants wide margins of
discretion to states performing military operations.167 Incidental damage resulting
from commodity exploitation or plundering alone arguably does not suffice to
constitute a violation of Articles 35(3), 55 AP-I since the damage generally must
last several decades.168
In terms of soft law instruments, principle 24 Rio Declaration recognises that ‘[w]
arfare is inherently destructive of sustainable development.’ As a consequence,
states are held to ‘respect international law providing protection for the environment
in times of armed conflict and cooperate in its further development, as necessary.’
The UN General Assembly Resolution on the Protection of the Environment in
Times of Armed Conflict i.a., ‘[u]rges States to take all measures to ensure compli-
ance with the existing international law applicable to the protection of the environ-
ment in times of armed conflict.’169 The fact that depletion of natural resources can
cause the liability of the acting state, is being demonstrated by UN SC Resolution
687, which
reaffirms that Iraq [. . .] is liable under international law for any direct loss, damage –
including environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources – or injury to foreign
Governments, nationals and corporations as a result of its unlawful invasion and occupation
of Kuwait.170
Within the realms of classical IHL, finally also the so-called ‘Martens clause’ has
been said to provide environmental protection.171 The clause was first incorporated
in the 1899 Hague Convention (II) With Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, and also features in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the two 1977 additional
protocols thereto.172
Moreover, the environment is also protected under international criminal law.
According to Article 8(2)(b)(iv) Rome Statute, knowingly launching an attack that
167Dam-de Jong (2010), pp. 42–43.
168Dam-de Jong (2010), p. 43, who also highlights that ‘[t]he understandings that states have
adopted concerning certain provisions of the ENMOD Convention have defined “widespread” as
“encompassing an area on the scale of several hundred square kilometers” and “severe” to involve
“serious or significant disruption or harm to human life, natural and economic resources or other
assets’, pointing to UN GA (1976) Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament,
volume I, 31st Session, Supplement no. 27, Doc. A/31/27, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.
asp?symbol¼A/31/27[VOL.I](SUPP) (last accessed 14 May 2021), at 91–92; cf. also Vöneky and
Wolfrum (2016), para. 36.
169UN GA (1992) Resolution 47/37 of 25 November 1992, http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/
47/a47r037.htm (last accessed 14 May 2021), para. 1. On the resolution cf. ICJ (1996) Legality of
the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996, para. 32; cf. Vöneky and
Wolfrum (2016), para. 1.
170UN SC (1991) Resolution 687 of 3 April 1991, https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/
FAB11BBFEA7E0B6585256C3F0065AEAE (last accessed 10 February 2019), para. 16; Vöneky
and Wolfrum (2016), para. 49, who, however, contend that ‘[f]rom a realistic point of view, such a
decision will not easily be taken again.’
171Vöneky and Wolfrum (2016), para. 48.
172Ticehurst (1997), pp. 125–126.
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brings about ‘damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe
damage to the natural environment’ that is disproportionate ‘to the concrete and
direct overall military advantage anticipated’ constitutes a war crime.173
Apart from these rules, natural resources are also protected by the prohibition to
destroy or seize property.174 According to Article 23(g) of the 1907 Hague Regu-
lations, it is ‘forbidden [t]o destroy or seize the enemy’s property, unless such
destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war[.]’
According to Article 53 of Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, in times of occupation any destruction of private or
public property is prohibited, unless it is absolutely necessary for military opera-
tions.175 In addition, Article 28 Hague Regulations prohibits pillaging a village or
town, ‘even when taken by assault’; Article 33(2) Geneva Convention IV prohibits
pillage altogether.176 Pillage is likewise illegal in times of occupation according to
Article 47 of the Hague Regulations, as well as in a NIAC, according to Article 4(2)
(g) AP-II.177
Again, the unnecessary destruction or seizure of property, according to Articles 8
(2)(b)(xiii) and 8(2)(e)(xii) Rome Statute,178 as well as ‘pillaging a town or place,
even when taken by assault’, according to Articles 8(2)(b)(xvi) and 8(2)(e)(v) Rome
Statute constitute a war crime in both IACs and NIACs.179 Furthermore, Article 147
Geneva Convention IV defines the ‘extensive destruction and appropriation of
property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly’
as a grave breach under the Convention; such act constitutes a war crime according
to Article 8(2)(a)(iv) Rome Statute.180 The term ‘property’ within the relevant IHL
conventions was always meant to include the natural environment, and thus with it
the commodities, which form part of it.181
4.2.1.5 Anti-corruption
Despite the fact that corruption still constitutes a major impediment to harnessing the
full potential of the commodity sector,182 most of the rules addressing issues of
173Vöneky and Wolfrum (2016), paras. 1, 44.
174Dam-de Jong (2010), p. 44.
175Cf. Dam-de Jong (2010), p. 44.
176Dam-de Jong (2010), p. 48.
177Dam-de Jong (2010), p. 48.
178Dam-de Jong (2010), p. 46.
179Dam-de Jong (2010), p. 48, n 90.
180Dam-de Jong (2010), p. 48, n 90.
181Dam-de Jong (2010), p. 44.
182Extensively, including a typology of corruption risks OECD (2016b). With respect to e.g. the
livestock sector in the Horn of Africa, cf. Desta and Hirsch (2012), pp. 131, 133. On the types of
both demand- and supply-side corruption in the mining sector, Marshall (2001). On corruption in
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corruption are ‘indirect’. Corruption constitutes the ‘abuse of public or private office
for personal gain.’183
Corrupt practices may occur at every stage of the commodity value chain and are
particularly proliferate when it comes to the award of mineral rights as well as the
regulation of commodity operations.184 Frequently, corruption in the commodity
sector occurs due to wide discretionary powers and inadequate governance mecha-
nisms, which result from the high politicisation of the sector and lead to clientelism
and favouritism.185 It may also be caused by gaps in the anti-corruption legal and
judicial system.186 Large-scale corruption has been observed particularly also in the
‘procurement of goods and services, commodity trading, revenue management
through natural resource funds, and public spending.’187 Local actors as well as
transnational corporations may ‘act indistinctly as instigators or beneficiaries of the
corruptive behaviour.’188 State-owned enterprises (SOEs) seem to be particularly
prone to corruption when it comes to awarding of rights, procurement, trading, and
social expenditures.189 This risk arises in particular, where SOEs function as both
administrators and regulators of the commodity sector.190 Typical offences include
bribery of foreign officials, embezzlement, misappropriation and diversion of public funds,
abuse of office, trading in influence, favouritism and extortion, bribery of domestic officials
and facilitation payments.191
Bribery, trading in influence and collusion are used for instance in order to
manipulate a state’s decision to extract. These corrupt practices may lead to envi-
ronmental law or HR being ignored in favour of allowing commodity extraction.
They may occur within administrative, e.g. licensing procedures, on national as well
as local levels or be applied to influence policies and legislation in the corporate
interest or interests of the private elite. Oftentimes, the practices involve high-level
commodity trading Chêne (2016), who describes the commodity trading sector as ‘notoriously
opaque and poorly regulated, with low levels of transparency and accountability’, p. 4. Cf. also
Article 62(1) CAC, which recognises the negative effects of corruption on SD.
183OECD (2016b), p. 13 referring to OECD (2008).
184OECD (2016b), p. 9.
185OECD (2016b), p. 18.
186OECD (2016b), pp. 18–19.
187OECD (2016b), p. 9.
188Cf. also OECD (2016b), p. 10: ‘At the local level, corruption may be favoured by a culture of
clientelism and patronage as well as informal structured networks of local public officials, civil
servants, community leaders and local business elite. It may also result from a hasty decentralisation
process carried out without proper assessment of the capacity of the local economy and of the
human, technical and administrative capabilities of subnational authorities to absorb new respon-
sibilities and large inflows of resource revenues.’
189OECD (2016b), p. 9.
190OECD (2016b), p. 19.
191OECD (2016b), p. 9. Specific issues in commodity trading include trade mispricing, money
laundering and ‘bad deals’, cf. Chêne (2016), pp. 5–7.
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public officials, such as parliamentarians or ministers.192 What contributes signifi-
cantly to such corruption, is a lack of information and resources on the part of the
host state of the commodity activity, which is thus unable to adequately assess its
own resource wealth.193 As a consequence, states often rely on research reports,
which have been elaborated and paid for by extractive companies.194
Furthermore, specific risks occur with regard to social and environmental impact
assessments, which are often subject to a highly politicised approval process and
lack adequate participation of local communities. Also, ‘ambiguous, outdated or
unenforced legislation on the protection of socio-environmental rights’may increase
the risk of corruption during the decision to extract, particularly where ‘unclear and
opaque land tenure systems’, e.g. based on local customs, exist.195
After somewhat ignoring corruption-related issues until the 1970s, the interna-
tional community in the past three decades has adopted several legal instruments
dealing specifically with corruption. Typically, international anti-corruption agree-
ments contain provisions regarding the scope of offences they are applicable to,
preventive measures, law enforcement issues, international cooperation, and imple-
mentation mechanisms.196 None of them, however, are directly aimed at tackling
corruption in the commodity sector.
The arguably most prominent, almost universally ratified international agreement
is the 2003 UN Convention Against Corruption (CAC).197 The CAC in its preamble
explicitly recognises that corruption constitutes ‘no longer a local matter but a
transnational phenomenon that affects all societies and economies, making interna-
tional cooperation to prevent and control it essential’. According to Article 5
(1) CAC,
[e]ach State Party shall, in accordance with the fundamental principles of its legal system,
develop and implement or maintain effective, coordinated anti-corruption policies that
promote the participation of society and reflect the principles of the rule of law, proper
management of public affairs and public property, integrity, transparency and accountability.
192OECD (2016b), p. 32.
193OECD (2016b), p. 33 reports from countries, in which the competent department is making
hydrocarbon reserve calculations manually and documents them in an Excel sheet. On these
‘information asymmetries’, cf. already Sect. 2.1.2 above.
194OECD (2016b), p. 33.
195OECD (2016b), p. 34. This finding further underlines the benefit of TCL as a transnational
framework promoting corresponding standards for the protection of socio-environmental rights.
196Abbott (2009), paras. 23–29.
197UN GA (2003) Resolution 58/4 of 31 October 2003, https://www.unodc.org/documents/
brussels/UN_Convention_Against_Corruption.pdf (last accessed 14 May 2021). The CAC is said
to complement the 2000 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime,
Annan K, Foreword to the UN CAC, https://www.unodc.org/documents/brussels/UN_Conven
tion_Against_Corruption.pdf, p. iii. Transnational Organized Crime, UN GA (2000) Resolution
55/25 of 15 November 2000, https://www.unodc.org/documents/middleeastandnorthafrica/
organised-crime/UNITED_NATIONS_CONVENTION_AGAINST_TRANSNATIONAL_
ORGANIZED_CRIME_AND_THE_PROTOCOLS_THERETO.pdf (last accessed 14 May 2021).
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Article 5(2) CAC mandates states to take preventive measures for this purpose,
while Article 5(3) CAC postulates that states ‘shall endeavour’ to evaluate the
adequacy of their legal instruments and administrative measures on a regular basis.
According to Article 5(4) CAC states are held to collaborate with one another as well
as international organisations in their fight against corruption. Article 6 CAC
requires states to establish and maintain independent anti-corruption bodies, which
ensure the implementation of policies pursuant to Article 5 CAC. According to
Article 7(1)(a) CAC civil servants as well as non-elected public officials shall be
recruited, hired and promoted ‘based on principles of efficiency, transparency and
objective criteria such as merit, equity and aptitude.’ Furthermore, states shall
provide them with adequate remuneration and equitable pay and offer training
programmes, which promote awareness of the risks of corruption, according to
Article 7(1) (c) and (d) CAC respectively. Article 8(3) CAC specifically refers to
the International Code of Conduct for Public Officials, which may provide guidance
for the elaboration of further national standards.
According to Article 9(1) CAC states shall ‘establish appropriate systems of
procurement, based on transparency, competition and objective criteria’ in order to
effectively prevent corruption. These systems shall address, i.a., the public distribu-
tion of information, conditions for participation in a tender, ‘objective and
predetermined criteria for public procurement decisions’, an effective mechanism
of domestic review, as well as measures addressing the behaviour of personnel, such
as screening procedures and trainings. Article 12 CAC addresses prevention of
corruption with regard to the private sector and i.a. sets forth that states ‘shall
provide effective, proportionate and dissuasive civil, administrative or criminal
penalties’ for violations of accounting and auditing standards. Article 12(2) CAC
suggests specific measures, which states may take to achieve these ends, including
the promotion of cooperation between law enforcement authorities and private
actors, business standards and codes of conduct, transparency between private
entities particularly regarding the ‘identity of legal and natural persons involved in
the establishment and management of corporate entities’, the prevention of misuse of
procedural rules with regard to subsidies and licences, as well as of conflicts of
interest, i.a. by restricting the professional activities of former public officials, and
ensuring sufficient auditing of private entities.198
According to Article 13 CAC, states shall ‘promote the active participation of
individuals and groups outside the public sector’, particularly of NGOs and local
communities, i.a. by ensuring effective access to information by the public, as well
as ‘[r]especting, promoting and protecting the freedom to seek, receive, publish and
disseminate information concerning corruption.’ Article 14 sets forth specific mea-
sures to prevent money laundering.199 Bribery of national and foreign public
198These measures naturally go hand in hand with the standards and guidelines designed for
corporations, some of them specifically for the commodity sector, which will be discussed in
more detail in Sect. 4.2.2.2 below.
199For more specific guidance on how to tackle the issue of money laundering, cf. FATF
(2012–2018).
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officials, embezzlement, trading in influence, and other abuses shall all be
established as criminal offences, according to Articles 15–25 CAC. Article
26 CAC postulates that the liability of legal persons for the participation in these
offences be established. According to Article 40 CAC bank secrecy laws must not
hinder criminal investigations into potential corruption offences. Articles 43–50
CAC set forth several forms of international cooperation in order to tackle the
increasingly transnational phenomenon of corruption, including extraditions, trans-
fer of sentenced persons, mutual legal assistance, law enforcement cooperation and
joint investigations.
Further regulatory instruments in the fight against corruption include the Interna-
tional Code of Conduct for Public Officials, the Convention on Combating Bribery
of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions,200 as well as, on
the regional level, respective anti-corruption Conventions in the Americas, Africa as
well as Europe.201
The CoE Civil Law Convention on Corruption (ECLC) has been described as an
‘innovative’ instrument in the fight against corruption in that it,202 according to its
Article 1, mandates every state party to
provide in its internal law for effective remedies for persons who have suffered damage as a
result of acts of corruption, to enable them to defend their rights and interests, including the
possibility of obtaining compensation for damage.
Article 3(1) ECLC further spells out that states shall adopt legislation, which
grants all persons that have suffered damage from corruption ‘the right to initiate an
action in order to obtain full compensation for such damage.’ According to Article
4(1) ECLC domestic legislation shall generally entitle victims of corruption to
compensation if certain criteria are fulfilled. Article 5 ECLC requires states to
establish respective procedures also in cases, in which the damage resulted from
acts of corruption committed by public officials, thus directed against the state itself.
Article 13 ECLC mandates states to ‘co-operate effectively in matters relating to
civil proceedings in cases of corruption’.
200Preceding recommendations: Recommendation of the Council on Bribery in International
Business Transactions, 27 May 1994, https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-
briberyconvention/1952622.pdf; Recommendation of the Council on the Tax Deductibility of
Bribes to Foreign Public Officials, 11 April 1996, http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/
publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?doclanguage¼en&cote¼c(96)27/final; Revised Recommendation of
the Council on Combating Bribery in International Business Transactions, 23 May 1997, http://
www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote¼C(97)123/FINAL&
docLanguage¼En (all last accessed 14 May 2021); Abbott (2009), para. 7.
2011996 Inter-American Convention against Corruption; 2003 African Union Convention on
Preventing and Combating Corruption; CoE Criminal Law Convention on Corruption; CoE Civil
Law Convention on Corruption; 1997 Convention on the Fight against Corruption Involving
Officials of the European Communities or Officials of Member States.
202Abbott (2009), para. 12.
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4.2.1.6 Interim Conclusion
As our brief examination has indicated, indirect TCL generally does not provide
guidelines on how potential conflicts between e.g., social development and environ-
mental protection imperatives should be remedied. Thus, the current ‘hard law’
framework largely falls short of effectively tackling the factual problem at hand—
which in the case of commodity activities typically lies in the value decision, which
is to be translated into law, what commodity-related interest should prevail. This is
the result of a legal framework, which gives effect to several, yet isolated individual
interests instead of creating a coherent regulatory picture.203
With Meessen,204 one therefore can contend that the current framework is not
sufficiently close to reality. It is remote from the factual reality that the relevant
human activity lies in handling commodities—which only secondarily may or may
not constitute a corrupt practice, harm the environment or violate Human Rights.
The latter categories are more abstract, theoretical legal ‘boxes’, which appear to
serve the principal purpose of dogmatically clustering legal norms. The ‘isolation’ of
the subsets of indirect TCL, which they bring about, however i.a. does not live up to
the fact ‘that the commodity sector’s social and environmental impacts are inextri-
cably intertwined.’205 As a consequence, indirect TCL is little effective in creating
the equilibrium necessary for a functional commodity sector.
4.2.2 The Limited Effectiveness of Incidents of Direct TCL
While not all of TCL qualifies as ‘indirect’, those incidents, which exhibit a
conscious consideration of commodity policy trade-offs, are limited in their effec-
tiveness due to various normative patterns. First, current examples of ‘hard’, direct
TCL are not designed to comprehensively balance commodity interests (Sect.
4.2.2.1). Second, most of direct TCL constitutes soft law and/or is of private
normative nature (Sect. 4.2.2.2). Third, whereas large parts of TCL spell out rather
abstract rules and guidelines, those incidents of direct TCL, which exhibit a suffi-
cient degree of specificity, largely address private actors (Sect. 4.2.2.3).
203On the purpose of fields of law, cf. Sect. 2.3 as well as Chap. 3 above.
204Meessen (2001), cf. Sect. 3.1.
205Bürgi Bonanomi et al. (2015), p. 47. ‘Key areas of concern can be clustered as: (1) air, soil, and
water pollution, natural hazards and related harmful effects on natural habitats, biodiversity, and the
climate; (2) noise and visual impacts on landscapes; (3) destruction of sites of cultural, recreational,
and social value; and (4) impairment of public health, safety, and the livelihoods of local (indig-
enous) communities’, Bürgi Bonanomi et al. (2015), p. 47.
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4.2.2.1 Hard, Direct TCL Does Not Balance Commodity Interests
Comprehensively
Where rules have been created with a conscious consideration of commodity-related
scenarios, they are typically not comprehensively addressing corresponding policy
trade-offs. The respective rules generally foster individual commodity interests and
at a maximum seek to strike a balance between two of them—economic gain and
development (Sect. 4.2.2.1.1); economic gain and participation (Sect. 4.2.2.1.2);
economic gain and environmental protection (Sect. 4.2.2.1.3); or between the
economic interests of states (Sect. 4.2.2.1.4) respectively. Whereas integrating
respective norm sets with one another may bring about legal rules that are more
comprehensively balancing commodity interests, the current degree of integration in
the TCL framework falls short of achieving this aim (Sect. 4.2.2.1.5).
4.2.2.1.1 Norms Balancing Economic Gain and Development
The right to freely dispose over natural resources (RFD) as provided for in common
Articles 1(2) of the ICCPR and the ICESCR, seeks to strike a balance between the
state’s interest in exploiting natural resources, which will mostly consist of its
endeavour to reap economic benefits, and development objectives, which local
communities carry. It has been operationalized mainly in two contexts: regarding
the RFD of indigenous peoples over their lands and territories and in situations
where a people’s right to subsistence is threatened.206 With regard to the latter,
common Article 1(2) Human Rights Covenants has been interpreted so as to oblige
states
to take measures to ensure that its own people are not in any case deprived of its own means
of subsistence, including food [and water] [. . .] and to investigate any situation where such
deprivation is alleged to be occurring.207
Article 21(2) AfCHR applies specifically to commodity scenarios and sets out
that, ‘[i]n case of spoliation, the dispossessed people shall have the right to the lawful
recovery of its property as well as to an adequate compensation.’ Article 15(2) ILO
206Gilbert (2013), pp. 326–333; on the right to subsistence also UN CESCR (2003), para. 7:
‘Taking note of the duty in [article 1(2) ICESCR], which provides that a people may not “be
deprived of its means of subsistence”, States parties should ensure that there is adequate access to
water for subsistence farming and for securing the livelihoods of indigenous peoples’; cf. Gilbert
(2013), p. 332.
207Alston (1984), pp. 39–40; cf. Gilbert (2013), p. 330. Cf. also ACHPR (2001) The Social and
Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria
(Ogoniland case), 155/96, decision of 27 October 2001, http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/30th/
comunications/155.96/achpr30_155_96_eng.pdf (last accessed 14 May 2021), para. 52, which
ascertained a violation of the RFD enshrined in Article 21 AfCHR. On the notion of ‘food
sovereignty’, which beyond universal access demands democratic control over food, cf. Shattuck
and Holt-Giménez (2010), pp. 431434.
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Convention 169 obliges states to pay fair compensation to indigenous peoples for
damages resulting from commodity activities. For cases, in which relocations cannot
be prevented, Article 16(5) ILO Convention 169 equally requires the full compen-
sation for any loss or injury. Article 8(2)(b) UNDRIP obliges states to provide
effective mechanisms for prevention and redress of ‘[a]ny action which has the
aim or effect of dispossessing [indigenous people] of their lands, territories or
resources’. Article 40 UNDRIP lays down a general right ‘to effective remedies
for all infringements of their individual and collective rights.’208
In the context of armed conflict, the PSNR principle seeks to balance the
occupant’s interest of economic gain with the respective people’s interest of devel-
opment.209 It has been repeatedly emphasised with regard restitution rights of the
respective states and peoples under occupation. UN GA Resolution 3336 (XXIX)
reaffirms the right [. . .] to the restitution of and full compensation for the exploitation,
depletion and loss of, and damages to, the natural and all other resources and wealth of
[occupied] States, territories and peoples[.]210
Likewise, according to Resolution 62/181, the UN GA
[r]ecognizes the right [. . .] to claim restitution as a result of any exploitation, damage, loss or
depletion, or endangerment of [. . .] natural resources resulting from illegal measures taken
by [. . .] the occupying Power. . .211
This claim has been repeated constantly since in the ensuing UN GA resolu-
tions,212 with the most recent one explicitly reaffirming
208It has been argued that the right to remedy constitutes customary international law, cf. Shelton
(2006), para. 24.
209Cf. Schrijver (2008), para. 21.
210UN GA (1974) Resolution 3336 (XXIX) of 17 December 1974, https://unispal.un.org/DPA/
DPR/unispal.nsf/0/610F6BBB6C6BDC9D852568CB006E71A5 (last accessed 14 May 2021),
para. 3; Schrijver (2008), para. 21.
211UN GA (2007) Resolution 62/181 of 19 December 2007, https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/
unispal.nsf/0/1BFD3798C7567B4F852573FE005B8494 (last accessed 14 May 2021), para. 3;
Schrijver (2008), para. 21.
212UN GA (2016) Resolution 71/247 of 21 December 2016; UN GA (2015) Resolution 70/225 of
22 December 2015; UN GA (2014) Resolution 69/241 of 19 December 2014; UN GA (2013)
Resolution 68/235 of 20 December 2013; UN GA (2012) Resolution 67/229 of 21 December 2012;
UN GA (2011) Resolution 66/225 of 22 December 2011; UN GA (2010) Resolution 65/179 of
20 December 2010; UN GA (2009) Resolution 64/185 of 21 December 2009; UN GA Resolution
63/201 of 19 December 2008, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol¼A/RES/63/
201 (last accessed 14 May 2021), which already explicitly ‘[r]eaffirms the inalienable rights of the
Palestinian people and the population of the occupied Syrian Golan over their natural resources,
including land and water’, para. 1. Cf. also UN GA (1983) Report of the Secretary-General on the
Implications, under International Law, of the United Nations Resolutions on Permanent Sover-
eignty over Natural Resources, on the Occupied Palestinian and Other Arab Territories and on the
Obligations of Israel Concerning Its Conduct in These Territories, UN Doc. A/38/265, 21 June
1983, https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/6D55C7F840E6DA06052567C9004B75DE
(last accessed 14 May 2021); Dam-de Jong (2010), p. 30.
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the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people and of the population of the occupied Syrian
Golan over their natural resources, including land, water and energy resources.213
Generally, under international humanitarian law, the occupying state acts as
administrator of immovable public property, according to Article 55 Hague Regu-
lations.214 The provision moreover establishes that the occupant must administer
natural resources in accordance with the rules of usufruct215—it thus constitutes a
‘direct’ normative element. At the same time, the occupant notably is required to
‘safeguard the capital of these properties.’216 As Schrijver notes, this raises the
question, what constitutes a violation of this obligation—particularly with regard
to non-renewable resources.217 Thus, every extraction of non-renewable commod-
ities could be classified as a form of reducing their capital.218 However, others
contend that only ‘wanton dissipation or destruction or abusive exploitation of
public resources’ constitutes a violation of Article 55 Hague Regulations.219
4.2.2.1.2 Norms Balancing Economic Gain and Participation
The right to free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) addresses the participation of
indigenous peoples in particular.220 The general right is rooted in Article 6 ILO
Convention 169. Articles 15(2) and 16(2) ILO Convention 169 deal specifically with
FPIC in scenarios of commodity activities, and corresponding relocations respec-
tively. Moreover, Article 19 UNDRIP borrows the wording of the general FPIC right
in Article 6 ILO Convention 169; Article 32 UNDRIP draws on Article 15(2) ILO
Convention 169 and sets out that
States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned
through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free and informed
213UN GA (2017) Resolution 72/240, 20 December 2017, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_
doc.asp?symbol¼A/RES/72/240 (last accessed 14 May 2021), para. 1.
214Dam-de Jong (2010), p. 50.
215Dam-de Jong (2010), pp. 50–51.
216Dam-de Jong (2010), p. 51.
217Schrijver (2008), para. 20.
218Schrijver (2008), para. 20.
219Schrijver (2008), para. 20.
220‘Free implies that there is no coercion, intimidation or manipulation. Prior implies that consent
is to be sought sufficiently in advance of any authorization or commencement of activities and
respect is shown to time requirements of indigenous consultation/consensus processes. Informed
implies that information is provided that covers a range of aspects, including the nature, size, pace,
reversibility and scope of any proposed project or activity; the purpose of the project as well as its
duration; locality and areas affected; a preliminary assessment of the likely economic, social,
cultural and environmental impact, including potential risks; personnel likely to be involved in
the execution of the project; and procedures the project may entail. This process may include the
option of withholding consent. Consultation and participation are crucial components of a consent
process[]’, UN OHCHR (2013), p. 2; cf. also Spohr (2016), p. 23.
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consent prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands or territories and other
resources, particularly in connection with the development, utilization or exploitation of
mineral, water or other resources.221
While ILO Convention 169 has thus far only been ratified by 22 countries and the
UNDRIP constitutes a soft law instrument,222 FPIC rights have also been recognised
in the jurisprudence of human rights bodies, i.a. based on Article 27 ICCPR, Articles
1(2) and 15(1) ICESCR respectively as well as Article 5(d)(v), (e)(vi) ICERD.223
Thus, FPIC does not (yet) possess the status of ‘hard’ law, yet it certainly creates a
‘strong political obligation’ at least for those 144 states, which voted in favour of the
UNDRIP.224 This perception corresponds to the general observation that there is a
‘clear trend [. . .] toward increased public participation in laws and practice’, partic-
ularly with regard to commodity activities.225 Here, FPIC is frequently concerned
throughout the entire life cycle of commodity operations and should generally be
sought already during the pre-removal/exploration phase.226
Besides, the right to economic self-determination has been interpreted by the
CESCR to require states to seek free and informed consent of the people concerned
prior to concluding contracts with foreign mining companies.227 A right to partici-
pate in development decisions, which concern respective local communities, has
also been seen as enshrined in Article 24 AfCHR.228
4.2.2.1.3 Norms Balancing Economic Gain and Environmental Protection
Article 4(2) Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities
(CRAMRA) aims to ensure that mineral resource activities are conducted in a
221FPIC is further referred to in Articles 10, 11(2), 28(1) and 29(2) UNDRIP.
222ILO (2019) Normlex, Ratifications of C169—Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989
(No. 169) , h t tp : / /www.i lo .org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p¼1000:11300:0: :NO:11300:
P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:312314 (last accessed 14 May 2021).
223Cf. Spohr (2016), pp. 28–29; Pring and Noé (2002), pp. 62–63.
224Spohr (2016), p. 30.
225Pring and Noé (2002), p. 76. The authors further expect that many of the soft law provisions
related to public participation will gradually ‘harden’ to become legally binding law, Pring and Noé
(2002), p. 72.
226Spohr (2016), pp. 22–23; as Articles 15(2), 16(2) ILO Convention as well as Article 32 UNDRIP
illustrate, FPIC is of great significance in the commodity sector and especially concerned whenever
removal activities necessitate a modification of nature, which provides for the livelihood of local or
indigenous populations. Cf. also Bürgi Bonanomi et al. (2015), p. 29.
227Spohr (2016), p. 32.
228ACHPR (2001) The Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic
and Social Rights v. Nigeria (Ogoniland case), 155/96, decision of 27 October 2001, http://www.
achpr.org/files/sessions/30th/comunications/155.96/achpr30_155_96_eng.pdf; cf. also ECtHR
(2005) Taşkin and others v. Turkey, application no. 46117/99, judgment of 30 March 2005,
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/webservices/content/pdf/001-67401?TID¼soudeazyxk (both last
accessed 14 May 2021); cf. Ebbesson (2009b), para. 30.
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manner that does not significantly harm the environment—thus giving effect to the
general no harm rule with regard to the Antarctic.229 The CRAMRA, however,
lacking the required number of ratifications never entered into force.230
Moreover, environmental norms dealing with mineral commodities in particular
can be found in the special regimes regulating international wastes and recycling,
such as the Basel Convention or the Minamata Convention on Mercury. The latter
aims to reduce releases, usage and emissions of mercury, which is particularly used
in gold production.231 Also the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) Guide-
lines and Standards for the Removal of Offshore Installations and Structures on the
Continental Shelf and in the Exclusive Economic Zone emphasise the objective of
preventing and controlling marine pollution.232
4.2.2.1.4 Norms Balancing Economic Interests of States
Lastly, we shall discuss two additional normative patterns, which limit the balancing
effect of direct TCL addressing states. As the example of the norms covering shared
resource use illustrate, where hard, direct TCL ‘bites’, it will frequently concern an
inter-state balance rather than being aimed at equilibrium within the commodity
governance matrix (Sect. 4.2.2.1.4.1). Moreover, the commodity-directed norms
within the liberalised trade regime despite their ‘hard’ law nature are rather ‘declar-
atory’ than legally binding (Sect. 4.2.2.1.4.2).
4.2.2.1.4.1 Aiming at Inter-State Balance: Shared Resources
Commodity deposits can stretch across national boundaries and thus fall under the
sovereignty of more than one state.233 For such scenarios, a distinct set of rules has
evolved over time, mostly originating from bi- and at times plurilateral treaty law.234
While some regimes are covering specific resources, such as water, migratory species,
transboundary ecosystems or oil and gas deposits,235 some general rules and principles
are applicable to the exploitation of shared resources in general. Whereas the termi-
nology in use here refers to ‘resources’—and not ‘commodities’, the respective rules
can still be deemed to constitute ‘direct’ TCL in the sense that they reflect a conscious
consideration of the particularities of commodity exploitation.236
229Cf. Espa and Oehl (2018), p. 8.
230Cf. Espa and Oehl (2018), p. 8.
231Espa and Oehl (2018), pp. 8–9.
232IMO (1989) Resolution A.672(16), 19 October 1989, IMO. http://www.imo.org/blast/
mainframe.asp?topic_id¼1026 (last accessed 14 May 2021).
233Cf. del Castillo-Laborde (2010), para. 5.
234On transboundary agreements, cf. Rummel-Bulska (2008).
235Cf. del Castillo-Laborde (2010), para. 6.
236On the overlap between TCL and NRL, see already Sect. 3.2.2.1 above.
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Shared resources law is aimed at balancing the interests of the respective states
involved in the exploitation of the shared deposit. Two general rules, which are at the
heart of this field of law, are the duty to co-operate on the one hand and the principle
of equitable utilisation on the other.
The former is provided for in Article 3 of the Charter of Economic Rights and
Duties of States. The cooperation of states when it comes to making use of a shared
resource constitutes a major prerequisite towards achieving this aim.237 The princi-
ple of equitable utilisation of shared resources has evolved from the general rule of
equity and encompasses equitable principles such as good faith and good
neighbourliness.238 Although like the term cooperation, the principle of equitable
utilisation has so far not yet been defined uniformly by international law, it can be
identified as obliging states to manage shared resources equitably ‘in order to
balance the different demands of States’.239 In addition, the result produced by this
process must be equitable in itself.240 Equitable utilisation is thus ‘both the target and
the process of its implementation’ and rather a result to be achieved in view of the
specific circumstances of the case at hand than an abstract rule.241
With regard to those shared resources that are located in or under the sea, the
UNCLOS provides specific rules.242 When it comes to living resources, particularly
fisheries, Articles 61–64 UNCLOS set forth the principle of optimum utilisation as
well as the duty to cooperate for this end. The latter applies according to Article
61(2) UNCLOS to measures meant to prevent the risk of over-exploitation in a
coastal state’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which shall be taken in cooperation
with international organisations ‘as appropriate’. Article 64(1) UNCLOS mandates
coastal states to cooperate with states whose nationals fish the highly migratory
species contained in Annex I either directly or through IOs in order to ensure
conservation and promote ‘the objective optimum utilization’. Further UNCLOS
237Shelton (2008), p. 1.
238del Castillo-Laborde (2010), para. 10.
239del Castillo-Laborde (2010), para. 25.
240del Castillo-Laborde (2010), para. 25.
241del Castillo-Laborde (2010), para. 29. On the wide range of circumstances that may have to be
taken into account, cf. e.g. Article 5(1) of the ILC Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary
Aquifers: ‘Utilization of a transboundary aquifer or aquifer system in an equitable and reasonable
manner within the meaning of draft article 4 requires taking into account all relevant factors,
including: (a) the population dependent on the aquifer or aquifer system in each aquifer State;
(b) the social, economic and other needs, present and future, of the aquifer States concerned; (c) the
natural characteristics of the aquifer or aquifer system; (d) the contribution to the formation and
recharge of the aquifer or aquifer system; (e) the existing and potential utilization of the aquifer or
aquifer system; (f) the actual and potential effects of the utilization of the aquifer or aquifer system
in one aquifer State on other aquifer States concerned; (g) the availability of alternatives to a
particular existing and planned utilization of the aquifer or aquifer system; (h) the development,
protection and conservation of the aquifer or aquifer system and the costs of measures to be taken to
that effect; (i) the role of the aquifer or aquifer system in the related ecosystem.’
242Ong (2011), para. 1 indicates that most joint development agreements concern ‘overlapping
sea-bed claims’; only few agreements have been concluded regarding resources located on land.
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provisions touching upon shared resources address the specific scenarios of enclosed
or semi-enclosed seas (Article 123 UNCLOS) and resource deposits in the Area,
which stretch across national boundaries (Article 142 UNCLOS).
Whereas the general rules applicable to shared resource use do not extend to
shared management, ‘but rather end[] at the threshold of co-operation for the
implementation of equitable utilization’,243 more intensified forms of cooperation
are generally implemented through bilateral instruments.244
One area in which such joint management systems are quite prevalent is the joint
development of hydrocarbon fields.245 In this connection, the general principles of
cooperation and equitable utilisation establish the framework for individual state
parties to seek a negotiated solution on a (mostly) bilateral basis.246 Ong insofar
differentiates between three models of intergovernmental joint development agree-
ments:247 ‘Model I’ agreements provide for the exploitation right of one state as well
as a corresponding duty to transfer an agreed upon share of the revenues to the other
state; ‘Model II’ agreements arrange the establishment of a legal framework for a
system of joint ventures; and ‘Model III’ agreements require the creation of a
common agency that grants licences for exploitation and creates regulatory
norms.248
More recent ‘model III’-type agreements exhibit a ‘clear trend’ of including
environmental protection provisions.249 According to Article 10(a) of the 2001
Timor Sea Arrangement, East Timor and Australia were obliged to cooperate in
order to ‘prevent and minimise pollution and other environmental harm.’250 The
most recent successor of this agreement, the 2018 Australia–Timor Leste Maritime
Boundary Treaty,251 requires parties, through a ‘designated authority’ to ‘regulate
the [Greater Sunrise] Special Regime Area according to Good Oilfield Practice’,
according to Article 6(2)(b) of Annex B, which includes ‘environmental protection’
243del Castillo-Laborde (2010), para. 15.
244This intensified form of collaboration may also take the form of ‘establishing commissions for
the exchange of information, programmes for joint research, [or] common environmental stan-
dards’, cf. del Castillo-Laborde (2010), para. 15 pointing to Articles 14 and 18WCED Final Report.
‘In sum, equitable utilization of shared resources is the process of implementing uses with an
equitable approach in order to avoid harm to and to reach consensus with interested States’, del
Castillo-Laborde (2010), para. 15.
245Ong (2011), paras. 4–5.
246Cf. del Castillo-Laborde (2010), para. 15.
247Ong (2011), paras. 6–15; Ong (1999), pp. 788–792. The focus here lies on intergovernmental
agreements.
248Ong (1999), pp. 788–792; Ong (2011), paras. 7–15.
249Ong (2003), p. 140; also, Ong (2011), para. 17.
250Ong (2003), p. 132.
251Treaty Between Australia and the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste Establishing Their
Maritime Boundaries in the Timor Sea, signed on 6 March 2018, available at https://dfat.gov.au/
geo/timor-leste/Documents/treaty-maritime-arrangements-australia-timor-leste.pdf (last accessed
14 May 2021).
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and ‘calls for the adoption of methods and processes that minimise the impact of the
Petroleum operations on the environment’. These clauses put the shared economic
endeavour of the exploiting states in context with a joint objective of protecting the
environment. Therefore, they are balancing two commodity interests, yet without
providing any more concrete guidance on how to achieve this balance.
4.2.2.1.4.2 Commodity Trade and Development: Hard, Yet ‘Declaratory’
Provisions
The rules of Part IV of the GATT addressing the particularities of commodity trade
are intended to balance the economic interests of developing states on the one hand
and developed states on the other. As such, they are seeking to strike a balance also
between development interests on both sides and to reconcile them with the
liberalised trade regime.
The provisions rooted in Articles XXXVI-XXXVIII GATT have been included
in the GATT only subsequently by amendment.252 Article XXXVI:4 GATT pursues
the overall aim of fostering the economic development of those less-developed
contracting parties that continue to depend ‘on the exportation of a limited range
of primary products.’ It basically lays out a roadmap with three causal conditions,
which need to be fulfilled in order for commodity-dependent states to attain this goal:
access to world markets for commodities; stabilized, improved conditions in world
commodity markets, including ‘stable, equitable and remunerative prices’; as well as
‘steady growth of the real export earnings of these countries’.253 However, measures
designed to stabilise world commodity markets, shall be taken ‘wherever appropri-
ate’. Historically, ICAs were designed to pursue these exact objectives, with
Article XX:h GATT granting justification for their implementation. Yet, as will be
discussed in more detail below,254 ICAs have been largely abandoned, and conse-
quently Article XXXVI:4 GATT has been said to have become ‘a dead letter’
following the ‘ideological shift’ in the late 1980s.255
Article XXXVI:5 GATT further highlights that diversification of the economies
of less-developed contracting parties—and thus ‘avoidance of an excessive depen-
dence on the export of primary products’—will facilitate the ‘rapid expansion’ of
their economies. As a consequence, it recognises the ‘need for increased access in
the largest possible measure to markets under favourable conditions for processed
and manufactured products currently or potentially of particular export interest to
252Stoll (2014), para. 83.
253Emphases added.
254Cf. Sect. 5.2.1 below.
255Desta (2010), paras. 23 and 30 respectively. The ‘ideological shift’ he refers to presumably
relates to the liberalisation doctrine ensuing as a consequence of so-called Reaganomics, cf. already
Chap. 2 above.
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less-developed contracting parties.’256 While Article XXXVI:7 GATT calls for
collaboration between the contracting parties, intergovernmental bodies and relevant
UN organisations in order to foster the development benefits of international trade,
Article XXXVI:8 GATT clarifies that
developed contracting parties do not expect reciprocity for commitments made by them in
trade negotiations to reduce or remove tariffs and other barriers to the trade of less-developed
contracting parties.257
Article XXXVII GATT spells out concrete commitments for developed countries
in the context of trade and development, which include efforts in reducing and
eliminating trade barriers to products, which are particularly important to developing
country members; refraining from introducing customs duties or non-tariff barriers
on such products; or maintaining ‘trade margins at equitable levels’. Article
XXXVIII GATT provides for joint action and collaboration between the contracting
parties within the GATT framework as well as in other fora. Article XXXVIII:2:a
GATT corresponds to the objective set forth in Article XXXVI:4 GATT and calls for
corresponding international arrangements, which stabilise market conditions.
The trade and development provisions of the GATT have been criticized as being
‘declaratory rather than obligatory’ given the lack of effective sanctions.258 Article
XXXVII:1 GATT explicitly frees developed countries from their commitments if
and where ‘compelling reasons’ make it impossible for them to implement the
provisions of Article XXXVII GATT. These compelling reasons may—contrary to
the general rule contained in Article 27 VCLT according to which a party may not
invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a
treaty—include domestic legal reasons.259 Consequently, states seeking to justify
deviation from their obligations under Part IV of the GATT may simply legislate
against them.260
As such, the trade and development provisions of the GATT illustrate what holds
true for much of hard law directly addressing commodity activity: It is of little
binding effect for states and thus of little significance when it comes to the balancing
of the interests associated with commodity activity.
256See note ad Article XXXVIII:5 GATT in the annex to the GATT: ‘A diversification programme
would generally include the intensification of activities for the processing of primary products and
the development of manufacturing industries, taking into account the situation of the particular
contracting party and the world outlook for production and consumption of different commodities.’
257Emphasis added. See also note ad Article XXXVIII:8 GATT in the annex to the GATT: ‘It is
understood that the phrase “do not expect reciprocity” means, in accordance with the objectives set
forth in this Article, that the less-developed contracting parties should not be expected, in the course
of trade negotiations, to make contributions which are inconsistent with their individual develop-
ment, financial and trade needs, taking into consideration past trade developments.’
258Lee (2011), p. 114.
259Lee (2011), p. 114.
260Lee (2011), p. 114.
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4.2.2.1.5 Integration Between Norm Subsets of TCL
As the sustainable use principle reflects, integration can create balancing norms,
which cover more than two commodity interests.
Integration can also be observed between different norm subsets, which have
brought about incidents of direct TCL. For instance, as far as commodity-related
violations result from environmental causes, the UN Human Rights Committee
(HRC) has held that duties of states under international environmental law inform
the contents of Article 6(1) ICCPR and vice versa.261 Thus, in these scenarios the
implementation of the right to life will depend on the actions that states are taking
with regard to the protection of the environment, such as protecting it against harm or
pollution as well as ensuring sustainable use of natural resources or carrying out
EIAs.262 In order to fulfil their obligation of implementing the right of life, states
should therefore act in conformity with applicable international environmental
law.263 In Portillo Caceres v. Paraguay a state violating its duty to protect the
environment has been said to also be in violation of its duty to protect citizens
against human rights violations.264
This form of integration thus combines two protection mechanisms: international
environmental law (IEL) and Human Rights (HR) respectively are being used as
benchmarks to assess whether or not a rule of IEL or international HR has been
breached. From the perspective of the commodity matrix, the interests of environ-
mental protection and of development are being combined into one clearer, perhaps
more effective protection mechanism. Therefore, one can argue that it will contain
objectives of economic gain and control more vigorously. What it does not achieve,
however, is to provide more concrete guidelines how all five commodity interests
should be brought into a state of equilibrium.
A further prominent example of integration is provided by the WTO Appellate
Body’s interpretation in US–Shrimp of the notion ‘natural resources’ in Article XX
(g) GATT in light of IEL, particularly SD.265 Taking this observation several steps
further, this form of integration can be interpreted as an attempt to essentially limit
the reach of trade liberalisation measures to the boundaries of IEL. By ways of
oversimplification, one could argue that where they interfere with environmental
protection, they should be held to be unlawful. However, despite the integration of
the fields of IEL and world trade law, we are again left without guidelines how we
should balance all interests associated with commodity activity.
It seems natural that these guidelines could only be brought about by a norm set—
or legal field—which is being created in order to integrate norms fostering all
261UN HRC (2018), para. 62.
262UN HRC (2018), para. 62.
263UN HRC (2018), para. 62.
264UN HRC (2019) Portillo Caceres vs. Paraguay, decision of 25 July 2019, as discussed by Reeh
(2019).
265WTO DSB (1998) US – Shrimps, Report of the Appellate Body, 12 October 1998, para. 129.
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commodity interests. The level of integration that the legal order currently exhibits is
insufficient to achieve this aim.
4.2.2.2 Direct TCL Is Largely of ‘Soft’ or Private Nature
Another pattern, which can be discerned within the body of TCL is that commodity-
directed rules, i.e. direct TCL tends to be either of soft law character, thus primarily
addressing states (Sect. 4.2.2.2.1); or to consist of standards that apply to private
actors (Sect. 4.2.2.2.2).
4.2.2.2.1 Incidents of Soft, Direct TCL
Examples of soft, direct TCL are provided within the norm subsets covering good
governance (Sect. 4.2.2.2.1.1) as well as the fiscal framework applicable to com-
modity activities (Sect. 4.2.2.2.1.2).
4.2.2.2.1.1 Good Governance
Good governance here is understood as a classificatory category, which comprises
those rules that are primarily aiming to ensure smooth functioning of governance
systems, thus especially rules addressing accountability, transparency and public
participation.266
Increasing transparency is particularly important in a sector, which historically
has often remained in great secrecy and still today is frequently being described as
‘opaque’.267 Against the backdrop of this lack of information, which has long been
available on the commodity sector, its actors, financial flows and governance
mechanisms, several international organisations, instruments and initiatives have
evolved over the past decade, which seek to increase transparency, i.e. ‘the flow of
relevant, timely and reliable economic, financial, social, institutional and political
information, which is accessible to all relevant stakeholders.’268
Presumably the most prominent international effort in this respect with regard to
oil, gas and mineral resources is the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
(EITI). Being of the view ‘that a public understanding of government revenues and
expenditure over time could help public debate and inform choice of appropriate and
266Despite the established interconnection of good governance and HR based approaches, this
section insofar primarily focuses on norms, which do not originate from HR law—for those,
cf. Sects. 4.2.1.1 and 4.2.2.1 above. On the degree to which corresponding good governance duties,
such as transparency and accountability can be seen as already being incorporated in the PSNR
principle, cf. Sect. 4.1 above.
267NRGI (2016), p. 1.
268Mooslechner et al. (2004), p. 217, referring to Kaufmann (2002); cf. also Vishwanath and
Kaufmann (1999), p. 3.
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realistic options for sustainable development’, the multi-stakeholder participants of
the founding 2003 Lancaster House conference ‘underline[d] the importance of
transparency by governments and companies in the extractive industries and the
need to enhance public financial management and accountability.’269 According to
EITI principle 6, the ‘achievement of greater transparency must be set in the context
of respect for contracts and laws.’270
In Article 2(1) of its Articles of Association (AoA), EITI describes itself as
an international multi-stakeholder initiative with participation of representatives from gov-
ernments and their agencies; oil, gas and mining companies; asset management companies
and pension funds [. . .] [;] and local civil society groups and international non-governmental
organisations.271
As of this writing, 51 countries were implementing the 2019 EITI standard.272 In
order to be recognised as ‘implementing country’, so-called ‘candidate countries’
need to demonstrate that they meet the eight EITI requirements, which i.a. include
effective oversight by a national multi-stakeholder group, disclosure of the legal and
institutional framework applicable to commodity activities as well as compiling and
reconciling company payments and government revenues. In this way, missing
payments and corresponding corruption can be detected, as has been the case for
instance with regard to Nigeria’s national oil company in 2012.273 Therefore, states
are obliged to comprehensively disclose their taxes and revenues, including produc-
tion entitlements, profits taxes, royalties, dividends, bonuses and licensing fees, their
sale of potential shares of production or other revenues collected in kind, eventual
infrastructure provisions and barter arrangements, particularly resource-for-infra-
structure (RFI) programmes,274 transportation revenues, transactions related to
SOEs, and subnational payments.275 The data provided must be sufficiently
disaggregated, timely, and of adequate quality.276
Despite its considerable success in attracting implementing countries over the
past decade,277 EITI has also been criticised for various shortcomings. One point of
criticism relates to the EITI’s focus on transparency. While the latter may have
improved in many implementing countries, this is not the case with regard to
269Principles #4 and #5, EITI (2019), p. 6.
270EITI (2019), p. 6.
271EITI (2019) EITI Articles of Association, https://eiti.org/document/eiti-articles-of-association
(last accessed 14 May 2021).
272EITI (2019) Countries, https://eiti.org/countries (last accessed 14 May 2021).
273Lehmann (2015), p. 9.
274On these ‘deals’ extensively Landry (2018), who focuses on the DRC-Sicomines deal; on the
definition, cf. also CCSI (2019) Resource for Infrastructure Deals, http://ccsi.columbia.edu/work/
projects/resource-for-infrastructure-deals/ (last accessed 14 May 2021).
275EITI (2019), pp. 22–5.
276EITI (2019), pp. 256.
277Scanteam (2011), pp. 1–2.
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accountability of relevant actors. As the EITI’s official evaluators concluded in
2011,
[t]here are thus few indications that EITI programmes are so far having impact on dimen-
sions such as governance, corruption, poverty reduction or other objectives stated in EITI’s
Articles of Association.278
However, as the EITI’s chairman Frederik Reinfeldt, points out, the initiative
should not be misunderstood ‘as the one-stop-shop for reversing the resource curse.’
Instead, he argues that EITI ‘must be mainstreamed and combined with other tools to
ensure that natural resources are more prudently managed and better deployed
towards both economic growth and sustainable human development.’279
Further transparency initiatives that are explicitly directed at the commodity
sector, include the Publish What You Pay (PWYP) coalition, which consists of
over 800 members worldwide, some of them NGOs that were created particularly for
the purpose of addressing commodity governance issues, such as Global Witness or
Revenue Watch, others long standing NGOs that increasingly devote resources to
commodity governance-related programmes, such as Oxfam or Transparency Inter-
national.280 The Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI) seeks to foster ‘the
governance of natural resources to promote sustainable and inclusive develop-
ment’,281 by providing ‘policy advice, advocacy, and capacity development’—all
based on ‘[o]riginal data, analysis, and applied research’.282 The Africa Mining
Vision, an intergovernmental effort, which emerged within the framework of the
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) and the African Union
(AU) respectively, seeks to foster i.a. contract transparency, accession to transpar-
ency initiatives, such as EITI, as well as transparency in the overall ‘management of
revenue paid to various governmental authorities’, which it recognises as ‘an
important part of the mineral policy agenda.’283 Other players and initiatives
e.g. include the Open Government Partnership, programmes launched within the
framework of the G7 and G20, the World Bank, or the IMF.284
278Scanteam (2011), p. 3; cf. Lehmann (2015), p. 9.
279EITI (2018), p. 2. Reinfeldt is quoting the Nigerian Vice-President Yemi Osinbajo here.
280NRGI (2015), p. 1; PWYP closely collaborates with the EITI and coordinates the nominations of
civil society representatives on the EITI Board, EITI (2017) Civil society seeks representatives for
the EITI International Board, https://eiti.org/news/civil-society-seeks-representatives-for-eiti-
international-board-0 (last accessed 14 May 2021).
281NRGI (2015–2019), p. 1.
282NRGI (2015–2019), p. 5; the NRGI publishes i.a. the annual Resource Governance Index as well
as the Natural Resource Charter—‘a set of principles for governments and societies on how to best
harness the opportunities created by extractive resources for development’, NRGI (2014),
cf. already Chap. 2 above.
283AU (2009), pp. 18, 19, 38. The Africa Mining Vision will subsequently be discussed in more
detail.
284Open Government Partnership (2019) About OGP, https://www.opengovpartnership.org/about/
about-ogp (last accessed 14 May 2021); cf. moreover the G7 Alliance on Resource Efficiency,
BMU (2019) Resource efficiency in the G7, https://www.bmu.de/en/topics/economy-products-
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Some incidents of soft, direct TCL are covering commodity activities in a
particularly comprehensive manner. For instance, the FAO Voluntary Guidelines
on the Responsible Governance on Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the
Context of National Food Security (VGGT) provide specific guidance on how to
improve the governance of tenure.285 Their general principles require states to
[r]ecognize and respect all legitimate tenure right holders and their rights [. . .,] [s]afeguard
legitimate tenure rights against threats and infringements [. . .,] [p]romote and facilitate the
enjoyment of legitimate tenure rights [. . .,] [p]rovide access to justice to deal with infringe-
ments of legitimate tenure rights [. . ., and] [p]revent tenure disputes, violent conflicts and
corruption.286
The VGGT moreover set forth ten principles, which shall guide the implementa-
tion of the guidelines: human dignity, non-discrimination, equity and justice, gender
equality, holistic and sustainable approach, consultation and participation, rule of
law, transparency, accountability, and continuous improvement.287
Specifically addressing governance challenges that occur in the context of min-
ing, the 2002 Berlin Guidelines II for Mining and Sustainable Development are
‘intended to provide general guidance for sound and sustainable management’ of
mining(-related) activities.288 Based on their 1991 predecessors, the Berlin Guide-
lines stipulate 15 ‘Fundamental Principles for the Mining Sector’.289
Accordingly, states and mining corporations shall i.a. recognise environmental
management, including impact assessments, as a ‘high priority’; equally recognise
‘the importance of socio-economic impact assessments and social planning’; ‘[e]
stablish environmental accountability [. . .] at the highest levels of management and
resources-tourism/resource-efficiency/resource-efficiency-in-the-g-7/, or the G7 CONNEX
programme, CONNEX history, http://connex-unit.org/connex-history/; the G20 Anti-Corruption
Action Plan, which i.a. addresses beneficial ownership transparency, available https://www.mofa.
go.jp/files/000185882.pdf; the commitments by the World Bank Group in the fight against corrup-
tion, i.a. its Stolen Asset Recovery (StAR) initiative, World Bank (2016) Statement, http://www.
worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/update-on-world-bank-group-commitments-following-
the-uk-anti-corruption-summit-may-2016 as well as the IMF’s Fiscal Transparency Code, IMF
(2019) Fiscal transparency, https://www.imf.org/external/np/fad/trans/, which includes one pillar
on resource revenue management. A ‘Handbook on Fiscal Transparency relating to natural
resources’, is scheduled to be published in October 2019 and supposed to integrate the IMF
(2007) Guide on Resource Revenue Transparency, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Policy-
Papers/Issues/2016/12/31/Revised-Guide-on-Resource-Revenue-Transparency-PP4176 (all last
accessed 14 May 2021). These initiatives illustrate the reality of continuously proliferating concepts
of GCG, cf. Sect. 2.2.5 above.
285FAO (2012), para. 1.1.
286FAO (2012), para. 3.1. According to para. 3.2 non-state actors, particularly businesses, are held
to observe their ‘responsibility to respect human rights and legitimate land tenure rights’, which
appears to allude to the UN GP on Business and HR that will be discussed in more detail in Sect.
4.2.2.2.2 below.
287FAO (2012), para. 3B. On guidance regarding the conduct of social and cultural impact
assessments, cf. Secretariat of the CBD (2004) Akwé: Kon guidelines.
288UN (2002), p. 2.
289UN (2002), p. 4.
116 4 The Effectiveness of TCL
policy-making’; ensure participation of affected communities, including full partic-
ipation of women and other marginalised groups; ‘[a]dopt risk analysis and risk
management in the regulation, ‘design, operation and decommissioning of mining
activities’; avoid environmental regulation, which may have the effect to unneces-
sarily restrict trade and investment; ‘[r]ecognize the linkages between ecology,
socio-cultural conditions and human health and safety, the local community and
the natural environment’; ‘[e]valuate and adopt [. . .] economic and administrative
instruments’, which ‘encourage the reduction of pollutant emissions and the intro-
duction of innovative technology’; as well as ‘[e]ncourage long-term mining invest-
ment [through] environmental standard with stable and predictable environmental
criteria and procedures’.290
Moreover, the Berlin II Guidelines provide suggestions for the design of domestic
legal frameworks, which apply to mining activities and thus seek to support gov-
ernments in their task ‘to provide a well-designed legislative framework for the
mining industry that includes all aspects of the environment, both physical and
social.’291 In terms of instruments for the implementation of mining-related rules,
the guidelines advocate for a ‘mixture of regulatory instruments’, which, apart from
prescriptive systems, may also include ‘performance targets’, ‘economic instru-
ments’, ‘negotiated or voluntary agreements’, or ‘environmental management
systems’.292
The Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals, Metals and Sustainable
Development (IGF) is a voluntary initiative of over 60 states that are ‘committed
to leveraging mining for [SD]’.293 Its Mining Policy Framework (MPF) provides
comprehensive policy guidance that, if ‘progressively implemented, will allow
mining to make its maximum contribution to the sustainable development of devel-
oping countries.’294 The MPF provides guidance on how to implement a legal and
policy environment conducive to sustainable mining; how to optimise financial as
well as socio-economic benefits arising from mining; how to sustainably manage the
natural resource base; how to manage post-mining transition; and how to foster the
SD benefits of artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM).295
290All of the above as summarised at UN (2002), p. 4.
291UN (2002), p. 7. Accordingly, respective domestic legal frameworks typically consist of specific
mining legislation, environmental legislation and other legislation, which may include diverse sets
of rules, such as land law, conservation law, forest law, water resources law, air quality law,
hazardous substances law, or radioactive substances law, UN (2002), pp. 8–10. On comparative
commodity law, cf. Bastida et al. (2005).
292UN (2002), p. 11.
293IGF (2019) About, https://www.igfmining.org/about/ (last accessed 14 May 2021). The IISD
currently serves as the IGF secretariat, cf. ibid.
294IGF (2013), p. 6.
295IGF (2013), pp. 6–16. The IGF is supported also by UNCTAD and as such somewhat reconciles
comparable commodity-specific fora, such as the International Lead and Zinc Study Group
(ILZSG), the International Nickel Study Group (INSG), or the International Copper Study Group
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Pursuing a regional approach, the Africa Mining Vision (AMV) provides com-
prehensive guidance on how to harness Africa’s resource endowments as a ‘key’ to
the continent’s development.296 It identifies ‘the formulation and implementation of
workable [resource-based] industrialisation strategies’ as the central issue.297
Looking at the respective success stories from Nordic countries, the AMV recog-
nises that, instead of relying on ‘foreign inputs’, ‘proactive and deliberate actions
from key stakeholders, particularly governments’ are an important prerequisite for
achieving this aim.298 With its ambition ‘to transform mineral sectors in an inclusive,
sustainable way’, the AMV correlates with ‘other Pan-African development initia-
tives, such as the AU Agenda 2063.’299 It is based on seven tenets300 and six major
intervention areas.301
Recalling the example of the Lagos Plan of Action, which is said to have
remained ‘part of the rhetoric of official declarations, dissociated from real policy’,
the 2011 International Study Group Report on Africa’s Mineral Regimes called for
concrete instruments for the implementation of the AMV.302 Against this backdrop,
the AU’s 2011 Draft Action Plan for Implementing the AMV grouped respective
measures and activities into nine ‘clusters’: mining revenues and mineral rents
management; geological and mining information systems; building human and
institutional capacities; artisanal and small-scale mining; mineral sector governance;
research and development; environmental and social issues; linkages and diversifi-
cation; mobilising mining and infrastructure investment.303 In December 2013, the
AU established the African Minerals Development Centre (AMDC), which has the
mandate ‘to provide strategic operational support for the [AMV] and i.a. to elaborate
so-called ‘Country Mining Visions’.304
(ICSG). On these and other so-called International Commodity Bodies (ICBs), as well as their
classification according to the CFC agreement, cf. Sect. 5.2.1 below.
296AU (2009), p. 2; on the regional policy initiatives the AMV has been inspired by, cf. the list at
Oxfam (2017), p. 8.
297The AMV explicitly recognises that ‘[r]esource-based development and industrialization strat-
egies are not a new mantra’, but had already been envisaged in various strategic plans, such as the
Lagos Plan of Action, the SADC Mineral Sector Programme, the Mining Chapter of the New
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) as well as the Africa Mining Partnership’, AU
(2009), p. 3.
298AU (2009), p. 3.
299Oxfam (2017), p. 8; within the AU Agenda 2063, formulating ‘a commodities strategy’, i.e. ‘[e]
nabling African countries add value, extract higher rents from their commodities, integrate into the
Global Value chains, and promote vertical and horizontal diversification anchored in value addition
and local content development’, constitutes one of the ‘flagship programmes’, AU (2015), p. 17.
300UN ECA (2017), pp. 1–2.
301Oxfam (2017), p. 8.
302UN ECA (2011), p. 154.
303AU (2011), p. 9.
304UN ECA (2019) About AMDC, https://www.uneca.org/pages/about-amdc (last accessed
14 May 2021); AMDC (2014), p. 8.
118 4 The Effectiveness of TCL
4.2.2.2.1.2 Fiscal Framework
Within the guidance regarding the fiscal framework for commodity activities,
examples of soft, direct TCL include the UN Handbook on Extractive Industries
Taxation, which is providing guidance on how extractive industry activities should
be taxed.305 The handbook provides elaborate commodity-directed guidance on tax
treaty issues; permanent establishment issues; transfer pricing issues; tax treatment
of decommissioning; the overall government’s fiscal take; tax aspects of negotiating
and renegotiating contracts; and value added tax.
Furthermore, the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) process under action
10 has brought about specific guidance on the analysis of transfer pricing in ‘cross-
border commodity transactions between associated enterprises’ (commodity trans-
actions). Particularly relevant to commodity transactions is also the new guidance on
applying the arm’s length principle, which was developed under action 9, as well as
the new standards for transfer pricing documentation, which have been developed as
part of action 13.306 The joint IGF-OECD Program on Tax Base Erosion and Profit
Shifting in the Mining Sector is providing further commodity-specific guidance
i.a. on issues such as the undervaluation of mineral exports, indirect transfer of
mining assets, and a practice called metals streaming.307
Besides, the IMF has developed a draft Natural Resources Fiscal Transparency
Code (NRFTC),308 which builds on its general Fiscal Transparency Code.309 It
requires states to establish a comprehensive legal framework and fiscal regime and
to maintain ‘open and transparent procedures for granting rights for resource extrac-
tion, and clear rules governing resource revenue collection and verification.’310
305In the case of inconsistencies between the handbook and the UNDTC, the latter explicitly
prevails, UN (2017a), pp. iv–v.
306OECD (2015), pp. 51–52.
307IGF (2017), p. 2. ‘Metals streaming involves mining companies selling a certain percentage of
their production at a fixed cost to a financier in return for funds for partial or complete mine
development and construction. Since the amount of financing provided is linked to the discounted
mineral price, companies have strong incentives to agree to lower fixed prices to increase the
up-front finance available. Streaming reduces the tax base of resource-producing countries, where
royalties and income tax use sales revenue as part of calculations. There is virtually no guidance on
these arrangements in the mining tax literature’, IGF (2017), p. 8.
308IMF (2016) Release of the IMF’s Natural Resource Fiscal Transparency Code, May 2016, http://
www.imf.org/external/np/exr/consult/2016/ftc/ (last accessed 14 May 2021).
309Cf. IMF (2019), which ‘integrates into the Fiscal Transparency Code (FTC) a new fourth pillar
(Pillar IV) on natural resource revenue management’, p. 1. The FTC is available at IMF, https://
blog-pfm.imf.org/files/ft-code.pdf (last accessed 14 May 2021).
310IMF (2016), p. 5.
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4.2.2.2.2 Incidents of Private, Direct TCL
Incidents of private, direct TCL concern corporate responsibility (Sect. 4.2.2.2.2.2).
These rules need to be understood in the context of the general international
standards applicable to corporations (Sect. 4.2.2.2.2.1).
4.2.2.2.2.1 General System of Corporate Responsibility
The general system of corporate responsibility naturally largely qualifies as indirect
TCL. The UN Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights (UN GP) cur-
rently constitute one of its pivotal instruments.311 Principles #11–15 specify busi-
nesses’ responsibility to respect (R2R).312 According to UN GP #11, business
enterprises should not infringe HR themselves and address HR violations ‘with
which they are involved’.313 R2R requires businesses first to ‘[a]void causing or
contributing to adverse [HR] impacts through their own activities, and address such
impacts when they occur’;314 secondly, they need to ‘[s]eek to prevent or mitigate
adverse [HR] impacts that are directly linked to their operations, products or services
by their business relationships.’315 This obligation applies also where they did not
contribute to those impacts.
The UN GP also touch upon remediation and set forth that corporations should
provide legitimate remediation processes wherever ‘they have caused or contributed
to’ HR violations, according to UN GP #22.316 Such shall be done ideally through
‘operational-level grievance mechanisms’, according to UN GP #29.317 These
mechanisms should be legitimate, accessible, predictable, equitable, transparent,
rights-compatible, ‘[a] source of continuous learning’, and ‘[b]ased on engagement
and dialogue’, according to UN GP #31.318
Apart from the fact that commodity corporations often operate in conflict-
affected areas,319 what makes them particularly prone to be concerned with negative
HR impacts, is the complexity of their supply chains, respective local content
311Cf. Lindsay et al. (2013), p. 65; Sanders (2014), p. 2.
312UN (2011), pp. 13–16.
313UN (2011), p. 13.
314UN (2011), p. 14.
315UN (2011), p. 14.
316UN (2011), p. 24.
317UN (2011), p. 31.
318UN (2011), pp. 33–34.
319Cf. already above, Business and Human Rights Resource Centre (2010) The UN Protect,
Respect and Remedy Framework for Business and Human Rights, https://www.business-
humanrights.org/sites/default/files/reports-and-materials/Ruggie-protect-respect-remedy-frame
work.pdf (last accessed 14May 2021), p. 1; Lindsay et al. (2013), p. 5. In such scenarios, the OECD
Risk Awareness Tool for Multinational Enterprises in Weak Governance Zones provides additional
guidance, cf. TCL outline in the annex.
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requirements and thus the need to enter numerous contractual relations with third
parties.320 Where local capacities are underdeveloped, businesses aiming to uphold
HR standards may even be required to proactively implement educational and other
capacity-building measures.321 The framework of the UN GP suggests that these
challenges can best be met by the concept of leverage.322 The latter in this context is
being defined as the ‘ability to effect change in the wrongful practices of an entity
that causes a harm.’323 In general, wherever a corporation is able to control the
outcome of an activity potentially infringing upon HR, ‘it should seek to prevent or
mitigate [this] impact.’324 Wherever it does not dispose of direct control, the
company ‘should seek to use leverage to secure outcomes which avoid or mitigate
any adverse human rights impacts.’325 One way to create leverage would be to
‘secure significant and substantive commitments from a counterparty with respect to
human rights’, which, however, again may require the corporation to provide
support to the contractual partner in order for it to meet its HR commitments,
e.g. through capacity-building.326
Apart from using leverage in their contractual relations in order to ensure HR
compliance within their supply chain, commodity companies may also ‘be on the
receiving end of leverage from external sources.’327 Especially the IFC Performance
Standards on Environmental and Social Sustainability (IFCPS)—as well as the
banks abiding by the so-called Equator principles –, are said to be ‘a key driver
for improvements in the performance of [commodity companies] in relation to
[environmental and social] issues.’328
The IFC Performance Standards on Environmental and Social Sustainability
(IFCPS)
are directed towards clients, providing guidance on how to identify risks and impacts, and
are designed to help avoid, mitigate, and manage risks and impacts as a way of doing
business in a sustainable way, including stakeholder engagement and disclosure obligations
of the client in relation to project-level activities.329
Wherever IFC provides direct investments, it requires its clients to implement the
eight individual standards that make up the IFCPS in order to foster the development
benefits of the respective operation.330
The Equator principles (EP) are
320Lindsay et al. (2013), p. 42.
321Lindsay et al. (2013), p. 45.
322Lindsay et al. (2013), p. 43.
323UN (2011), p. 21; Lindsay et al. (2013), p. 43.
324Lindsay et al. (2013), p. 42; UN (2011), p. 14.
325Lindsay et al. (2013), p. 43.
326Lindsay et al. (2013), p. 44.
327Lindsay et al. (2013), p. 46.
328Lindsay et al. (2013), p. 46.
329IFC (2012), p. i.
330IFC (2012), p. i.
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a risk management framework, adopted by financial institutions, for determining, assessing
and managing environmental and social risk in projects and is primarily intended to provide
a minimum standard for due diligence and monitoring to support responsible risk decision-
making.331
The general idea is that the 94 so-called Equator Principles Financial Institutions
(EPFIs) financing or advising business operations are responsible to ensure that these
operations are being conducted in a socially responsible way and in a manner, which
respects ‘sound environmental management practices’.332
Another prominent ‘indirect’ standard, which addresses issues of corporate
governance, are the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (OECDG).333
The OECDG are said to be ‘recommendations addressed by governments to multi-
national enterprises’, which
aim to ensure that the operations of these enterprises are in harmony with government
policies, to strengthen the basis of mutual confidence between enterprises and the societies in
which they operate, to help improve the foreign investment climate and to enhance the
contribution to sustainable development made by multinational enterprises.334
The OECDG generally provide voluntary good practice standards, which are
consistent with international standards and typically also domestic laws.335
According to their general policies, enterprises should i.a. contribute to SD; respect
Human Rights (HR); ‘encourage local capacity building’ and ‘human capital for-
mation’; refrain from accepting exemptions, which are not provided for in the
applicable regulatory framework; ‘uphold good corporate governance principles’;
‘[a]void causing or contributing to adverse impacts’, as well as seek to prevent
impacts ‘directly linked to their operations, products or services’; encourage busi-
ness partners and suppliers ‘to apply principles of responsible business conduct’;
engage with local stakeholders; and abstain from ‘improper involvement’ in local
politics.336 The HR chapter of the OECDG draws upon the UN GP and largely
reflects the core responsibilities of enterprises contained therein.337 Regarding the
objective of environmental protection, the OECDG draw largely on the principles
and objectives provided for by the Rio Declaration, as well as the Aarhus Conven-
tion and such standards as the ISO Standard on Environmental Management
Systems.338
In addition to these substantive responsibilities, the OECDG also provide specific
implementation procedures, most notably so-called National Contact Points
331Equator principles (2019) The Equator principles, https://equator-principles.com/about/ (last
accessed 14 May 2021).
332Equator principles (2013), p. 2.
333OECD (2011). On the 2011 amendments of the OECDG, Liberti (2012).
334OECD (2011), p. 13.
335Cf. OECD (2011), p. 3.
336All of the above, OECD (2011), pp. 19–20.
337OECD (2011), p. 31.
338OECD (2011), p. 44.
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(NCPs). Countries adhering to the OECDG are obliged to establish these NCPs,
which shall ‘operate in accordance with core criteria of visibility, accessibility,
transparency and accountability.’339 Moreover, NCPs are supposed to operate in
an impartial manner, yet to still maintain an ‘adequate level of accountability to the
adhering government.’340
The UN Global Compact (UN GC) provides further general guidance on respon-
sible business conduct in line with accepted international standards.341 It constitutes
‘both a policy platform and a practical framework for companies that are committed
to sustainability and responsible business practices.’342 The latter is composed of
i.a. ten principles stemming from four different issue areas: HR; labour; environ-
ment; and anti-corruption.343 Accordingly, companies should for instance support
and respect the protection of HR (principle #1); make sure not to become complicit
in HR abuses (principle #2); uphold the freedom of association as well as the right to
collective bargaining (principle #3), the elimination of all forms of forced or
compulsory labour (principle #4), the effective abolition of child labour (principle
#5), and the elimination of employment- or occupation-related discrimination (prin-
ciple #6); and promote greater environmental sustainability (principle #8).344 The
UNGC i.a. aims to mainstream its ten principles into business operations worldwide,
as well as catalyse actions, particularly through public-private partnerships in sup-
port of broader UN targets, especially the SDGs.345 In this context, it is also
providing elaborate guidance on how to effectively embed SDGs into Corporate
Reporting, thus seeking to further ‘operationalise’ SDGs in business contexts.346
The same holds true for the so-called action platforms the UN GC has created, which
expressly relate to specific SDGs.347
339OECD (2011), p. 71. On the normative, potentially binding, effects of the OECDG Procedural
Guidance, Ochoa Sanchez (2015), pp. 94–95 with reference to ICJ (1996) Legality of the Threat or
Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996, para. 70.
340OECD (2011), p. 71; on the requirement of functional equivalence, Ochoa Sanchez (2015),
pp. 94–95, 114–115.
341At the time of writing, 9946 companies from 162 countries had committed to the UN GC and
issued 65,808 (sustainability) reports on their progress to implement the ten principles, UN GC
(2019) https://www.unglobalcompact.org/ (last accessed 14 May 2021).
342UN GC (2008), p. 2.
343UN GC (2014), p. 6.
344All of the above, UN GC (2014), p. 6.
345UN GC (2008), p. 2. On the SDGs and their relevance in the commodity sector, see already Sect.
2.2.5 above.
346UN GC (2018).
347UN GC (2017a), p. 21. Regarding the relationship between the UN GC and the UN GP, it shall
be noted that the latter provide ‘conceptual and operational clarity for the two human rights
principles championed by the [UN GC]’ and thus reinforce the UN GC (2011a), p. 2. However,
the UN GC also goes beyond the HR respect required by the UN GP in that its participants ‘have
committed to support the promotion of human rights, that is, to make a positive contribution to the
realization of human rights especially in ways that are relevant for their business. Such efforts can
be through core business activities, social investment and philanthropy, public policy engagement
and advocacy, and partnerships and collective action’, UN GC (2011a), p. 2.
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A variety of standards elaborated i.a. by chambers of commerce, NGOs, and
standard-setting organisations provide further ‘indirect’ guidance on corporate best
practices. They include the ICC Business Charter for Sustainable Development,
which provides further guidelines seeking to streamline sustainability in global
business conduct;348 the CERES roadmap for sustainability, which formulates
20 expectations for companies ‘in order to transform into truly sustainable enter-
prises’;349 the Business Principles for Countering Bribery, which are meant ‘to assist
companies in the design and implementation of effective anti-bribery policies’;350
the ICC Rules of Conduct and Recommendations on Combating Extortion and
Bribery, which ‘are intended as a method of self-regulation by business against the
background of applicable national laws’;351 and the OECD Transfer Pricing Guide-
lines for Multinational Corporations and Tax Administration, which provide specific
guidance on how to avoid transfer-pricing disputes and i.a. guide the implementation
of the arm’s length principle.352
4.2.2.2.2.2 Private, Direct TCL
Incidents of private, direct TCL are mostly embedded in this general system of
corporate responsibility.
One field, which poses a particular issue for companies operating in the com-
modity sector, is the one of security. Mines, refineries or farms generally need to be
protected from trespassers. Where commodity operations have elicited opposition
from local communities or indigenous peoples, violent clashes between security
personnel acting on behalf of the private corporation and protesters may cause
serious HR violations—the situation being even more intricate when public security
forces or military intervenes on behalf of the private company.353
The latter for instance were the facts that gave rise to the proceedings in the
notorious Kiobel case, which even reached the US Supreme Court in 2013.354 In
Kiobel, the petitioners alleged that Royal Dutch Petroleum aided and abetted the
Nigerian government in stopping protests against its oil operations in the Ogoni
delta.355 They claimed that Nigerian military forces committed a series of HR
violations against the Ogoni people, including rape, torture, and extrajudicial killings
and that Royal Dutch Petroleum provided them ‘with food, transportation, and
348Cf. ICC (2015), p. 5.
349CERES (2010), p. 1. The CERES roadmap defines natural resources as one of three ‘priority
areas’, CERES (2010), p. 3.
350Transparency International (2013), p. 2.
351ICC (2005), p. 5.
352OECD (2017b).
353UN OHCHR (2015), p. 23.
354US Supreme Court (2013) Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Judgment of 17 April 2013.
355US Supreme Court (2013) Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Judgment of 17 April 2013, p. 2.
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compensation, as well as [. . .] allowing the Nigerian military to use respondents’
property as a staging ground for attacks.’356
‘Direct’ guidelines on how to handle these situations for corporations are pro-
vided particularly by the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights for the
Extractive and Energy Sectors (VPSHR), which allegedly constitute ‘the only
human rights guidelines designed specifically for extractive sector companies.’357
Having been elaborated based on a multi-stakeholder approach involving
i.a. governments and commodity companies, some of the largest commodity TNCs
number among its participants.358 The VPSHR are divided up into three categories:
risk assessment, as well as relations with public security and relations with private
security.359
Not least in order to prevent violent clashes in tense environments, the Conflict–
Sensitive Business Practice: Guidance for Extractive Industries provides compre-
hensive guidance and best practices on how to adopt ‘conflict-sensitive’ approaches
in commodity operations.360 For that purpose, the publication provides operational
guidance charts, as well as screening tools for both macro- and project level conflict
risk and impact assessment.361
Regarding transparency, we have seen that the EITI constitutes a standard, which
is primarily aimed at governments. The latter are the ones signing up to the EITI and
consequently charged with implementing it.362 As a consequence, corporations are
concerned by the EITI standard rather indirectly—for instance whenever a state, in
which a company is active or domiciled, decides to incorporate disclosure require-
ments under the EITI in its domestic legal system. However, companies can acquire
356US Supreme Court (2013) Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Judgment of 17 April 2013, p. 2.
Apart from Kiobel, commodity TNCs were confronted with allegations of HR breaches in several
different proceedings before domestic courts. In the US, many of these proceedings were—like
Kiobel—based on the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), see the list of cases provided by Dederer (2012),
p. 45, n 47. However, in its 2013 judgment, the US Supreme Court interpreted the ATS restrictively,
introducing the so-called ‘touch and concern’ test and ultimately denying jurisdiction to hear the
claim brought by Esther Kiobel, US Supreme Court (2013) Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum,
Judgment of 17 April 2013, p. 14; see also Sanger (2014). As a consequence, the likelihood that
ATS cases are going to lead to the redress sought by claimants has decreased substantially, as
argued by Sanger (2014), p. e-24: ‘The lower courts have already relied on the Kiobel decision to
quickly dismiss pending cases, suggesting that, even if the Supreme Court did not close the door to
transnational tort litigation, the decision may well prove to be the end of transnational ATS
litigation.’ Cf. in this respect also Grosswald Curran and Sloss (2013), pp. 858–863 who are
proposing legislative action in order to preserve the benefits of ATS litigation.
357VPSHR (2019) Pillars, http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org/ (last accessed 14 May 2021).
358This is the case for instance with regard to BP, ExxonMobil, Glencore, Rio Tinto and Shell,
VPSHR (2019) For companies, http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org/ (last accessed 14 May 2021).
359VPSHR (2000), pp. 2–7.
360International Alert (2005), foreword, p. 1.
361International Alert (2005), section 2.
362Cf. Sect. 4.2.2.2.1.1 above.
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the status of so-called EITI supporting companies,363 which requires corporations to
officially sign up to the EITI, issue a public statement of their support for the EITI,
including its ten principles.364 In addition, the status also entails disclosure obliga-
tions regarding payments to EITI implementing countries, taxes, and beneficial
ownership.365 Also, supporting companies are held to support the disclosure of
commodity contracts, including licenses, by governments and to ‘deliver natural
resources in a manner that benefits societies and communities.’366 Today, various
commodity TNCs are listed as EITI supporting companies.367
Moreover, private, direct TCL often approaches commodity activities from a
‘shared value’ perspective. Employing the latter, the UN GC for instance compiled
the SDG Natural Resource industry matrix, which sets forth ‘industry specific ideas
for action and industry specific practical examples for each relevant SDG.’368 As
such, it for instance spells out detailed measures on how to foster ‘sustainable
production’ through the elimination of routine flaring during oil production, the
reduction of methane emissions in the gas value chain, waste minimisation, and the
developing and sharing of scalable sustainability systems.369 An OECD Framework
for Extractive Projects titled Collaborative Strategies for In-Country Shared Value
Creation provides guidance on how extractive corporations can work together with
other stakeholders of GCG to foster shared value creation.370
Also for investors seeking to become active in the commodity sector, specific
guidelines have been elaborated, i.a. by the UN Principles for Responsible
363EITI (2019) Company support of the EITI, https://eiti.org/company-support-of-eiti (last accessed
14 May 2021).
364EITI (2019) Company support of the EITI, https://eiti.org/company-support-of-eiti (last accessed
14 May 2021).
365EITI (2019) Company support of the EITI, https://eiti.org/company-support-of-eiti; on the
beneficial ownership requirement, requirement 2.5 of the 2019 EITI standard, EITI (2019) Bene-
ficial ownership, https://eiti.org/beneficial-ownership (both last accessed 14 May 2021).
366EITI (2019) Company support of the EITI, https://eiti.org/company-support-of-eiti; cf. also
principle #1, EITI (2019) EITI principles, https://eiti.org/document/eiti-principles (both last
accessed 14 May 2021); further guidance on how corporations can support EITI has been produced
in a corresponding business guide, EITI (2013). Generally, commodity companies can shape
process of EITI implementation by participating in the respective EITI multi-stakeholder group,
EITI (2013), pp. 9–10.
367This includes e.g. BP, ExxonMobil and Glencore, EITI (2019) Companies, https://eiti.org/
supporters/companies (last accessed 14 May 2021).
368UN GC (2017b), p. 5.
369UN GC (2017b), p. 9.
370OECD (2016a), p. 4. Notably, the OECD authors somewhat en passant provide a list of what
may be identified as stakeholders of commodity governance: ‘central government agencies, regions,
municipalities, upstream, midstream and downstream industry, chambers of commerce and industry
associations, workers (including local and migrant workers) and trade unions, entities related
through a business relationship (suppliers, contractors, shareholders), research institutes and uni-
versities, centres of excellence, training institutions, trade unions, local and affected communities
(e.g. communities living downstream from a river near the site, or along a transport route), civil
society, and vulnerable groups, such as indigenous peoples and women’, OECD (2016a), p. 12.
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Investment (UN PRI) initiative as well as the UN GC.371 In its publication ‘Human
Rights and the Extractive Industry’, the UN PRI identified six ‘areas of engagement’
for investors in the extractive sector to engage their investee companies regarding
their HR performance.372 Moreover, the UN GC, in collaboration with the Swiss
government, the UN PRI, and an NGO, has developed ‘The Responsible Investor’s
Guide to Commodities’.373
4.2.2.2.3 Interim Conclusion
In view of the rather sparse hard law instruments in direct TCL, it is not surprising
that most of those policy responses, which are specifically designed to address issues
in the commodity sector, are often the result of initiatives driven by NGOs, interna-
tional organisations or the private sector. These policies frequently correspond with
soft standards that have been elaborated by multi-stakeholder institutions or fora.
Where, for instance, systemic mapping of licenses, concessions, and customary land
rights in protected areas constitutes a specific response to corruption that has
occurred due to opaque land tenure systems, such policies are on the transnational
level rarely accompanied by a binding legal framework—but rather left to voluntary
commitments on the part of IOs, private actors and host governments.
The interaction of binding hard law frameworks and voluntary, e.g. certification
schemes is displayed by FAO for aquaculture products as follows:374
There is an extensive national and international legal framework in place for various aspects
of aquaculture and its value chain, covering such issues as aquatic animal disease control,
food safety and conservation of biodiversity. Legislation is particularly strong for
processing, export and import of aquatic products. Recognized competent authorities are
normally empowered to verify compliance with mandatory national and international legis-
lation. Other issues such as environmental sustainability and socio-economic aspects may
not be covered in such a binding manner and open the opportunity for voluntary certification
as a means to demonstrate that a particular aquaculture system is managed responsibly.375
While FAO puts this status quo in a positive light and speaks of an ‘opportunity
for voluntary’ standards that it may leave behind, one risk that corresponds with this
371UN PRI (2019) About the PRI, https://www.unpri.org/pri/what-are-the-principles-for-responsi
ble-investment (last accessed 14 May 2021).
372UN GC (2015), p. 4.
373UN GC (2011b), p. 6.
374While aquaculture does not constitute commodity activity per se, given its similarities to
especially fishing and farming—in view of the cultivation of sea—and freshwater, the handling
of living species, as well as the particular form of ‘removal’, which occurs, when aquatic organisms
are being farmed, cf. the definition provided by FAO (2019) Global aquaculture production, http://
www.fao.org/fishery/statistics/global-aquaculture-production/en (last accessed 14 May 2021)—it
constitutes a ‘normative commodity’ for the purposes of this book, see on this definitional basis
Sect. 2.1.1.4 above.
375FAO (2011) Technical guidelines for aquaculture certification, http://www.fao.org/3/a-i2296t.
pdf (last accessed 14 May 2021), para. 9.
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kind of guidance, particularly those instruments that have been elaborated under the
stewardship of businesses and their associations, is that they may be driven by
corporate self-interest rather than a sense for the common good.376 Indeed, CSR
measures—which frequently include pursuit of or adherence to standard-setting
initiatives—may in the most extreme case be used as a means to mitigate the ‘threat’
of government regulation.377
Another observation insofar is noteworthy. During those times of regulatory
action in the commodity sector, which were dominated by the doctrine of state
intervention—that sought to obtain regulatory control over commodity subsectors,
which were deemed to play key roles in the development of especially CDDCs—
direct TCL in the form of hard law was a lot more proliferate, especially in the form
of ICAs.378 Evidently, with the advent of the neoliberal doctrine in global trade law
certain regulatory endeavours were cut back or even entirely abandoned. Insofar, the
emergence of more and more standard-setting initiatives led by private sector
organizations could be seen as not simply the filling of a regulatory gap through
alternative means, but rather as a somewhat causal effect: In a domain where the
public institutions have decided to abandon their regulatory task, the influence of
well-resourced private actors increased. As a consequence, a large share of direct
TCL today consists of private standards that have been elaborated by corporates and
their associations.
4.2.2.3 Specific, Direct TCL Is Largely Private
This is also reflected in our analysis when we are approaching TCL from yet another
angle: the one of specificity. Whereas we have already discussed the distinction
between direct and indirect TCL, specificity here refers to the nature of individual
norms regulating commodity activities—whether they provide guidance of a rather
abstract, general nature or spell out detailed, concrete imperatives, which the
addressee must follow. Direct TCL, which reflects a conscious consideration of
commodity activities and related stakeholder interests, can be both: rather abstract or
rather specific in nature. The same holds true for indirect TCL. As will become clear
subsequently, most of direct, specific TCL addresses private actors.
An example for an abstract rule of direct TCL is the one of sustainable use. The
norm requires states to balance socio-economic development and environmental
protection when exploiting natural resources yet does not provide strict guidance on
how this balancing exercise should be performed.
376Cf. Bloom and Rhodes (2018b).
377Bloom and Rhodes (2018b). [a]gain, here we see how corporations engage in seemingly
responsible practices in order to increase their own political power, and to diminish the power of
nation states over their own operations.’ [. . .] Not ‘being good’, but ‘looking good’ is the objective’,
ibid. Cf. also the book by the same authors, Bloom and Rhodes (2018a).
378See Sect. 2.2 above. ICAs will be discussed in greater detail in Sect. 5.2 below.
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A specific example of direct TCL, to the contrary, is clause 4.6.4.4.b of the
Initiative for Responsible Mining Assurance (IRMA) Standard for Responsible
Mining IRMA-STD-001, which obliges the operating company of a mine site
when implementing and developing a biodiversity management plan to outline
i.a. measurable conservation outcomes, timelines and locations.
Further examples are provided i.a. by the ISO Standards 73, which address
specific technical issues of mining activity, such as the method of determining
coalbed methane content (ISO 18871:2015) or creating structures for mine shafts
(ISO 19426-5:2018).379 They also provide specific guidance regarding different
ores, such as iron, manganese, chromium or aluminium,380 and e.g. set the standard
for determining the total iron content of iron ore (ISO 2597-1:2006) or for sampling
and sample preparation procedures (ISO 3082:2017).381 The same holds true for
other commodity sectors, such as farming and forestry,382 as well as fisheries.383
With regard to the oil and gas sector, the standards maintained by the Interna-
tional Association of Oil and Gas Producers (IOGP) and the International Petroleum
Industry Environmental Conservation Association (IPIECA) exhibit a comparable
degree of specificity.384 In fact, many examples of specific, direct TCL are provided
by standards addressing technical matters of commodity operations carried out by
corporations. The ‘direct’ norms, which presumably are most specific, target either
individual commodities or commodity-subsectors, such as mining, oil and gas,
forestry, farming, or fisheries. While it lies beyond the scope of this book to portray
these subsector- and commodity-specific standards in greater detail, the TCL outline
contained in the annex provides a respective overview.
These observations demonstrate that while international commodity law will
typically be of quite abstract nature, the more specific rules addressing commodity
activities usually feature in those standards and guidelines of transnational com-
modity law, which have been elaborated by multi-stakeholder or private sector
organisations.385
379ISO (2019) Standards catalogue: mining and minerals, https://www.iso.org/ics/73/x/ (last
accessed 14 May 2021).
380ISO (2019) Standards catalogue: metalliferous minerals and their concentrates, https://www.iso.
org/ics/73.060/x/ (last accessed 14 May 2021).
381ISO (2019) Standards catalogue: iron ores, https://www.iso.org/ics/73.060.10/x/ (last accessed
14 May 2021).
382ISO (2019) Standards catalogue: agriculture, https://www.iso.org/ics/65/x/ (last accessed
14 May 2021).
383ISO (2019) Standards catalogue: fishing and fish breeding, https://www.iso.org/ics/65.150/x/;
ISO (2019) Standards catalogue: fish and fishery products, https://www.iso.org/ics/67.120.30/x/
(both last accessed 14 May 2021).
384IOGP (2017); IPIECA (2019) Resources, http://www.ipieca.org/resources/ (last accessed
14 May 2021).
385Cf. Sect. 4.2.2.2 as well as the TCL outline in the annex, especially with regard to the (sub)-
sector- as well as commodity-specific standards, which tend to exhibit a particularly specific nature.
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Evidently, it lies in the nature of international law that it will often provide rather
broad legal concepts, which will then have to be interpreted and concretised by states
and/or courts and tribunals implementing them. This generally ensures that sufficient
policy space remains with states—and respective discretion for the courts and
tribunals whose jurisdiction they have subjected themselves to—in translating the
content of the rather general concept into concrete rules for the case at hand.
Whereas the imperative of generally respecting this policy space of national legis-
lators is clear,386 the question arises to what degree international rules can serve to
provide more concrete guidelines on how states—and potentially other stake-
holders—should apply and interpret the principle of sustainable use, i.a. in their
domestic legal acts. Chapter 5 is going to reflect on this question and will, moreover,
discuss other potential avenues for rendering TCL more effective.
4.2.2.4 Interim Conclusion
Our analysis has brought about that direct TCL is limited in its effectiveness. This is
due, first, to the fact that where it constitutes ‘hard’ law, it mostly serves to balance a
maximum of two commodity interests with one another; to address issues of inter-
state balance alone; or to ultimately be ‘declaratory’ rather than requiring concrete
actions.
Second, direct TCL is largely of ‘soft’ normative character and therefore already
exhibits no formal binding force for states. Moreover, these incidents of soft, direct
TCL rarely exhibit balancing elements. By way of example, the Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative (EITI) is focused on transparency, the FAO Voluntary
Guidelines on the Responsible Governance on Tenure of Land Fisheries and Forests
(VGGT) cover land tenure, and the base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) initiative
as well as the fiscal transparency handbook both tackle specific fiscal challenges.
Where soft, direct TCL is more comprehensive and seeks to address commodity
policy trade-offs, it does so mostly in sector-specific contexts, as reflected for
instance in the Berlin II Guidelines, the Intergovernmental Forum on Mining,
Minerals, Metals and Sustainable Development (IGF), or the regional Africa Mining
Vision (AMV). These standards and fora, however, constitute rather minor fora
compared to the central global governance mechanisms maintained by e.g., the UN
or WTO. Insofar, it is quite paradigmatic that the most comprehensive, coherent
guidance for states in their decision to extract appears to the Natural Resource
386This obligation originates from the sovereign equality of states, as well as the principle of PSNR
as its commodity-related concretisation. Accordingly, all (commodity-related) competences gener-
ally lie with the state, cf. however Sect. 4.1 on how these competences have been qualified by
PSNR.Wherever self-imposed qualifications under international law exist, cf. Sect. 3.3.2 above, the
state thus also bears the competence to concretise and implement these limitations. Regardless of
whether states act accordingly, however, transnational regulation through e.g., multi-stakeholder
processes may wear on, therefore potentially ‘hardening’ voluntary commitments into generally
accepted standards.
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Charter, which notably constitutes an NGO publication. Thus, despite its wide
recognition among the stakeholders of GCG its reach is likewise very limited
when it comes to disciplining states’ actions.
Third, apart from the incidents of hard as well as soft direct TCL addressing
states, the probably greatest volume of commodity-directed standards is intended to
provide guidance for corporations operating in the commodity sector. Examples
include a diverse range of instruments, such as the Voluntary Principles on Security
and Human Rights for the Extractive and Energy Sectors (VPSHR), the International
Responsible Mining Assurance (IRMA) Standard for Responsible Mining, various
ISO standards, as well as the guidance elaborated by the International Association of
Oil and Gas Producers (IOGP) and the International Petroleum Industry Environ-
mental Conservation Association (IPIECA) for the oil and gas sector. An overview
of further private commodity standards can be found in the TCL outline in the annex.
These instruments addressing private actors at times provide highly detailed, specific
guidance.
To conclude, under the current framework states, to the contrary, are largely left
without specific guidance on how to take a decision to extract, i.e. how to balance
commodity interests and what governance scheme to establish for that purpose. The
most obvious obligation they are faced with in this context as of now is to make
sustainable use of their commodity deposits.387
4.2.3 The Standards of TCL Are Hardly Integrated
Achieving equilibrium between the interests associated with commodity activity
requires not only commodity-directed, specific norms, but also an overall coherent
framework. What prevents TCL from being more coherent—and thus effective—is
the limited degree of integration it displays.
Throughout the substance of TCL, one can witness international agreements,
standards and other guidance documents cross-referencing one another. For
instance, the OECD Guidelines for MNEs (OECDG) refer to several international
standards, which can roughly be grouped according to their issuing organisations as
UN, OECD and private instruments.388 The OECD recognizes that ‘[m]any inter-
national instruments provide useful guidance for evaluating risks and identifying
appropriate business conduct’, and in this connection for instance in their OECD
Risk Awareness Tool for MNEs in Weak Governance Zones allude to the example
that the Convention on Combating Bribery requires states to ‘mak[e] bribery a
criminal offence for companies and individuals.’389
387Therefore, a potential pathway towards a coherent commodity policy, which we shall discuss in
Chap. 5 below, lies in detailing what sustainable use requires.
388OECD (2006), pp. 39–40.
389OECD (2006), p. 39.
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Also the International Responsible Mining Assurance (IRMA) explicitly
acknowledges the existence of a ‘number of standards and schemes’ that address
specific materials, processes, product sectors, or supply chains.390 As reflected in the
glossary of terms annexed to the IRMA Standard, it has been developed based on
many different transnational guidelines and international conventions, including the
UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UN GP), OECD Due
Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains (DDG), IFC Performance Stan-
dards, Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and others.391
When it comes to the integration of one regulatory instrument with another, one
can distinguish between two techniques: Either the integrated standard is merely
referred to in the integrating instrument in the sense that its addressees are held to
also comply with it (formal integration); or the integrated standard is being fully
integrated in the sense that it is defined as a benchmark, (non-)compliance with
which will entail concrete legal consequences within the integrating instrument (full
integration).
4.2.3.1 Formal Integration
The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (OECDG) largely integrate a
variety of international standards and best practices. While some of these standards
were already originally intended to govern corporate behaviour, such as the UN GP,
other standards like the International Bill of HR or the Rio Principles are being
translated from an intergovernmental into a private sector context.392 The latter is
also reflected in the environmental chapter of the OECDG, which i.a. draws on the
Rio Principles and the Aarhus convention. For instance, it particularly emphasises
the precautionary principle and translates it into a corporate context.393 This corre-
sponds to the express nature of the OECDG as ‘recommendations addressed by
governments to [MNEs]’, which consist of ‘voluntary principles and standards for
responsible business conduct consistent with applicable laws and internationally
recognised standards.’394
The OECDG therefore represent an example of formal integration in interna-
tional standard-setting: by reconciling norms from different ‘branches’ of
390IRMA (2018), p. 15. Some of these standards will feature below. On product sector initiatives,
cf. e.g. the Responsible Minerals Assurance Process (RMAP), formerly Conflict-Free Smelter
Program, RMI (2019) RMAP, http://www.responsiblemineralsinitiative.org/responsible-minerals-
assurance-process/ (last accessed 14 May 2021), developed by the Responsible Business Alliance,
formerly Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition (EICC), and Global e-Sustainability Initiative
(GeSI).
391IRMA (2018), pp. 180–203; see also pp. 10–11.
392Cf. OECD (2011), p. 32, para. 39.
393Cf. OECD (2011), p. 44, para. 60.
394OECD (2011), p. 3.
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international law in one instrument, they contribute to cohering the (voluntary)
norms that corporations should respect during their business activities.
Another example for this type of integrative function is provided by the Volun-
tary Principles on Security and Human Rights for the Extractive and Energy Sectors
(VPSHR). Accordingly, companies are held to promote several principles regarding
public security, including the principle that
(c) the rights of individuals should not be violated while exercising the right to exercise
freedom of association and peaceful assembly, the right to engage in collective bargaining,
or other related rights of Company employees as recognized by the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.395
In addition, they spell out that companies should promote ‘applicable interna-
tional law enforcement principles’, especially the ones provided for in the UN Code
of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials as well as the UN Basic Principles on the
Use of Force and Firearms.396 The VPSHR for their part are being integrated by the
OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains (DDG). According
to their model supply chain policy, the respective corporation needs to commit
neither to benefit from nor to get involved in any way in serious abuses of HR.397
In that connection, companies should i.a. commit to engagement of public or private
security forces exclusively in accordance with the VPSHR.398
Further formal integration can be observed in the environmental protection
clauses of recent joint development agreements already touched upon above.399
4.2.3.2 The Normative Deficits of Formal Integration
What makes the regulatory picture so complex, however, is the fact that several
instruments of TCL have been designed based on the same principle. They choose
from the ‘menu’—presented in those international agreements and standards that are
most established—what appears suitable for the given context, potentially modify-
ing the norms in a way that they fit the concrete scenarios and addressees for which
they are henceforth being employed. Consequently, several standards have emerged
that each present a different, yet similar ‘order of courses’. What is more, also the
‘restaurants’, i.e. the regulatory environment in which these courses are offered,
likewise greatly resemble one another, often simply diverging in terms of the
regulatory angle that the instrument at hand employs—e.g. from a corporate respon-
sibility, anti-corruption, sustainable development, transparency, or security and
Human Rights (HR) angle.
395VPSHR (2000), p. 4.
396VPSHR (2000), p. 4; cf. UN OHCHR (2015), p. 24.
397OECD (2013), p. 20.
398All of the above, OECD (2013), pp. 20–24.
399Ong (2003), p. 140; also, Ong (2011), para. 17.
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This paints a regulatory picture, in which several ‘neighbouring’ international
instruments contain similar provisions for a similar purpose. Typically, they are
being drafted and administered by different organisations and are accompanied by
separate implementation mechanisms. From the perspective of a stakeholder, par-
ticularly from the private sector, trying to navigate through this regulatory field is
quite challenging to say the least. From a dogmatic point of view, identifying
overlaps between the different instruments frequently only leads back to the original,
usually highly authoritative, established text—such as the International Bill of HR or
the Rio Principles. This raises the question what the benefit is of drafting such
instruments then in the first place? Instead of merely translating existing established
international agreements into domestic law, which is also binding for private actors?
Evidently, the objective here is to specify the (voluntary) principles that
addressees should observe for a concrete factual scenario, which again can differ
in terms of the degree of its specificity—e.g. Multinational Enterprises (MNEs)
operating in weak governance zones, or sustainability reporting of oil and gas
producers. Against that backdrop, it appears natural that only instruments, which
successfully deduce from rather abstract, general rules originating from internation-
ally accepted instruments sufficiently specific guidance for the respective scenario,
contribute to the development of the legal framework. Those instruments, to the
contrary, which simply repeat already existing norms and portray them in a (slightly)
different setting and context, may serve to further underline how coherent a field of
law has already become.
Yet, if they fail to emerge to a proper field of law, they will simply ‘co-exist’ in a
relationship that resembles a form of ‘splendid isolation’. As such, the references in
various instruments to those agreements and standards, which had been utilised
during the elaboration of the instrument often appears as the expression of a
‘struggle’ to understand what exactly one should do with these similar texts. Simply
citing or referring to these ‘other’ standards has no real integrative or cohering
effect.400 In that connection, the ICC’s Commission on Anti-Corruption for instance
is held to urge international organisations responsible for individual anti-corruption
conventions, such as the OECD convention prohibiting bribery of foreign public
officials and the UNCAC,401 to coordinate their anti-corruption efforts.402 It stresses
that from a ‘business standpoint’ the proliferation of such conventions raises con-
cerns about inconsistencies and overall about an incoherent approach to battling
corruption.403
400Instead, if one intends to leverage the regulatory potential of standards, which relate to similar
topics and which in the end are pursuing the same objective—raising the contribution of commodity
activity to SD—one needs to perceive these standards as belonging to one field of law and create
dogmatic interlinkages between them. Cf. Chap. 3 above.
401See Sect. 4.2.2.2.1.1 above.
402ICC (2005), p. 11.
403ICC (2005), p. 11. The ICC even spells out concrete aspects that individual conventions should
focus on: 1) ‘The OECD Convention should remain the principal instrument focusing on the supply
side of international corruption’; 2) ‘Regional conventions – the instruments adopted by OAS,
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4.2.3.3 Full Integration
One example to the contrary, where full integration between two legal instruments
occurs, is for instance provided by section 10.2 of the Model Mine Development
Agreement (MMDA), which reads as follows:
Where Applicable Law and regulations on environmental and social impact assessment and
management, and pollution prevention are less stringent than the IFC Performance Stan-
dards, the Company shall undertake its activities in a manner consistent with the IFC
Performance Standards.404
In this case, the IFC Performance Standards serve as the minimum benchmark for
environmental and social impact assessment (ESIA) and pollution prevention under
the MMDA. The MMDA here fully integrates the standard set by the IFC Perfor-
mance Standard. Similarly, section 19.1 MMDA integrates the ‘arm’s length prin-
ciple’ contained in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for MNEs and Tax
Administrations. Instead of merely referring to e.g. companies’ duty to respect HR
as in chapter IV, para. 1 of the OECDG, sections 10.2 and 19.1 MMDA explicitly
integrate the specific standard contained in the IFC Performance Standards and
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines respectively. Consequently, the instrument
from which the norm/benchmark is ‘borrowed’ does not serve as simply one of
the means of interpreting the clause under the newly created standard, but instead
when applying the said provision, the user is referred to the original standard. In
other words, the instrument from which the norm/benchmark has been seized,
instead of serving as a mere tool in interpreting the respective provision, becomes
an integral part of the application of the norm.405
Council of Europe, African Union – should give priority to issues on which progress can be made
by cooperation among their participating parties  such as technical assistance, preventive mea-
sures, criminalization and law enforcement, including combating extortion by public officials;’ 3)
‘UNCAC should give priority to issues requiring worldwide cooperation, particularly strengthening
mutual legal assistance procedures for investigating and prosecuting foreign bribery cases and
improving arrangements for repatriating the proceeds of corruption. UNCAC should also serve as
the principal source for anti-corruption rules in areas which are not covered by regional conven-
tions;’ 4) ‘Monitoring programs at OECD and at regional and UNCAC levels should be coordinated
to avoid duplication, to share information and to utilize limited resources to best advantage.’ Apart
from OECD and UN, the ICC aims to cooperate with IFIs, the World Bank, the WTO, as well as UN
GC. It also seeks to encourage national governments to implement specific policies in the fight
against bribery and extortion, including capacity building, the strengthening of enforcement efforts,
minimizing the issuance of individual permits, as well as transparent public procurement standards,
ICC (2005), p. 12.
404Emphasis added.
405According to German legal dogmatics, such an approach is referred to as
‘Rechtsgrundverweisung’, which describes the technique of integrating the application of an
external norm, including its normative requirements (‘Tatbestandsmerkmale’), into the application
of the rule at hand, cf. e.g. Wörlen and Leinhas (2006). Another example of full integration, which
has already featured in Sect. 4.2.2.1.5 above, is provided by the UN HRC (2018), para. 62.
Accordingly, states in order to fulfil their duties under Article 6(1) ICCPR need to act in conformity
with applicable IEL.
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Full integration has also been suggested with a view to filling the lacunae of the
law applicable to commodities in situations of armed conflict by interpreting the
terms ‘destruction’ in Article 23(g) Hague Regulations and Article 8 Rome Statute as
well as ‘widespread, long-term and severe damage’ in Articles 35(3) and 55 AP-I, in
a manner that ‘take[s] into account definitions from international environmental law
as well as the obligations of states under relevant treaties, such as those under the
CBD.’406
The technique of full integration can be observed in the current framework of
TCL less frequently than those numerous incidents of cross-references and formal
integration. The so-called ‘Rechtsgrundverweisungen’ can be interpreted as an
indicator of a higher degree of sophistication of the legal field at hand. Simply
restating existing obligations, yet in a different setting, to the contrary can be seen as
a sign for a less developed, incoherent framework. In such frameworks, the drafters
of new instruments may be aware of other ‘relevant’ standards in the field yet feel
unable to more intensively intertwine their work with already existing instruments.
Perceiving these co-existing instruments as one field of law pursuing the same
overall regulatory objective may help to induce drafters to create legal instruments
with a greater degree of integration—thus contributing to gradually cohering the
field.407
4.2.4 Interim Conclusion
Our analysis of the current TCL framework has revealed that it provides little to no
guidance on how commodity interests should be balanced with one another.
This is due first to the largely indirect nature of the norms it is composed
of. Whereas norm subsets addressing for instance Human Rights, environmental
protection or armed conflict are creating ‘regulatory islands’within the field of GCG,
there is no coherent system, which addresses the central issues of commodity
governance—namely remedying its trade-offs.
Second, where direct TCL exists, it is rarely of ‘hard’ legal character, but rather
consists of soft law or private standards. Where hard, direct TCL exists, it mostly
only serves either to balance two commodity interests with one another, to address
issues of inter-state balance alone, or to ultimately be ‘declaratory’ rather than
requiring concrete actions. Those incidents of direct, soft TCL that exhibit a coherent
approach are mostly confined to individual commodity sectors and establish rather
minor fora. Most of direct, specific TCL addresses private actors and is concerned
with technical aspects of commodity activities in particular subsectors or industries.
As a result, in their task of balancing commodity interests, states are, apart from
notably the sustainable use principle, largely left without authoritative guidance.
406Dam-de Jong (2010), p. 56.
407See Chap. 5.
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Third, what despite these deficits further impedes TCL from being more effective
is the lack of full integration between its respective rules and standards—and thus
coherence—it exhibits. As a result, GCG stakeholders are faced with a broad net of
guidance documents, which creates lacunae, may be difficult to comprehend, and
thus complicates implementation.
4.3 The Imbalance of TCL in Favour of Economic
Objectives
These configurations are both illustrated and intensified by the imbalance in favour
of economic objectives, which the current TCL framework exhibits. The rules of
international investment law (Sect. 4.3.1) as well as the law of trade liberalisation
(Sect. 4.3.2) currently feature the most clear-cut, ‘hard’ obligations. In addition, they
display the most vigorous implementation mechanisms. As a consequence, other
rules of TCL, including environmental protection norms and Human Rights can be
marginalised—thus fostering the resolution of commodity policy trade-offs in
favour of the interest of economic gain.
4.3.1 System, Shifting Paradigms and Unbalancing Effects
of International Investment Law
Many states have entered into binding obligations to accord transnational trans-
actions specific protections, which are contained primarily in Bilateral Investment
Treaties (BITs) as well as investment chapters of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs).
These international investment agreements (IIAs) spell out various requirements that
need to be met in order for a transaction to be protected.408 Moreover, also investor-
state contracts can provide such protections.409 First and foremost, a transaction
needs to constitute an ‘investment’. Absent a generally accepted definition in
international investment law (IIL), most BITs introduce their own definition of an
‘investment’.410 These definitions typically exhibit a broad perception of the term.411
While natural resource exploitation has been described as the ‘paradigmatic
408On the foundations of international investment law, see comprehensively Bungenberg et al.
(2015); Dolzer and Schreuer (2012), pp. 1–27; Pauwelyn (2014).
409Cf. Schreuer (2013), paras. 24–30.
410Schreuer (2013), paras. 37–40.
411Schreuer (2013), paras. 37, 39. On the definition of an investment according to Article
25(1) ICSID, e.g. the debate whether or not an ‘investment’ needs to contribute to the host state’s
development in order to qualify as such, see extensively de Figueiredo (2012); Muchlinski
(2016), p. 44.
4.3 The Imbalance of TCL in Favour of Economic Objectives 137
example’ of foreign direct investment,412 other activities include e.g. large infra-
structure projects.413 Moreover, the investment needs to be ‘made’ by a ‘foreign
investor’—additional terms that are typically equally spelled out in the applicable
IIA.414
What makes the investment regime particularly efficacious is the fact that it gives
investors the possibility to directly institute arbitral proceedings against the host state
before an international ad hoc tribunal.415 Ever since the award in AAPL v. Sri
Lanka, this possibility does not necessarily have to arise from a contractual relation-
ship between investor and host state—the type of claims ICSID had originally been
established for –,416 but can also be based on arbitration clauses contained in an
IIA.417 Since the 1990s the number of investment arbitration claims rose exponen-
tially from six ICSID proceedings initiated in 1996 to 16 in 2001, 42 in 2009 and
finally the record number of 80 in 2015.418
4.3.1.1 Expansion of Investment Protection
From a public interest perspective, the rationale behind the investment protection
regime lies in the expected development benefits that foreign investment entails. It
has historically been intended to be reserved for exceptional scenarios, in which
granting particular protections may be necessary in order to attract the inflow of
foreign assets, which in turn foster development.419 It is in such scenarios that states
412Viñuales (2016), p. 30.
413Schreuer (2013), para. 37; Viñuales (2016), p. 30. However, also the mere purchase of shares in a
company by a foreign investor or the granting of loans has been qualified as an (portfolio)
investment, Viñuales (2016), p. 30.
414Cf. Viñuales (2016), p. 27.
415Cf. Viñuales (2016), p. 44. Some arbitral clauses may however require the investor to first
exhaust local remedies, cf. Viñuales (2016), p. 44.
416Cf. Bottini (2008), p. 565.
417ICSID (1990) Asian Agricultural Products LTD (AAPL) v. Republic of Sri Lanka, Final Award,
27 June 1990; Viñuales (2016), p. 29. As such, filing for arbitration is said to sufficiently reflect the
implicit acceptance of the arbitration clause by the investor, Viñuales (2016), p. 29; Asiedu-
Akrofi (1992).
418UNCTAD (2019) Investment dispute settlement navigator, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.
org/ISDS/FilterByYear (last accessed 14 May 2021).
419Viñuales (2016), p. 30; UN GA (1962) Resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962, https://
www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol¼A/RES/1803%28XVII%29 (last accessed 14 May
2021), paras. 1–3, 6, and 8; whether or not IIAs foster development depends on two factors: for one,
whether IIAs have a positive effect on FDI inflows, and, for the other, whether FDI actually fosters
development. As Pohl (2018), pp. 28–30 summarises, there is little empirical evidence with regard
to both questions. While the most sound studies seem to suggest slightly positive effects of IIAs on
FDI inflows, Pohl (2018), p. 31 with reference to Egger and Merlo (2012), p. 1240 as well as Kerner
and Lawrence (2012), p. 107, positive development effects of FDI according to ‘a growing
consensus [. . .] are contingent on multiple parameters in the host country – e.g. varying levels of
indigenous human resources, private-sector sophistication, competition, and host-country policies
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were willing to accept the qualifications of their permanent sovereignty over natural
resources (PSNR) that follow from their obligations under the investment regime.
However, as the numbers of arbitral proceedings above indicate, over time
investment protection evolved to be more than just an exceptional safeguard.420
Viñuales claims that this has been due largely to two processes: for one, states
continuously expanded the definitions of ‘investment’ and ‘foreign investor’ that
they included in IIAs; for the other, investment tribunals gradually extended their
interpretations of the term, increasingly also including portfolio investments, such as
commercial loans or other financial instruments.421 The same phenomenon of
expansive interpretation can be observed with regard to many of the core obligations
that states typically confer upon investors under international investment law.422
These primarily include protection against expropriation; fair and equitable treat-
ment; full protection and security; and most-favoured nation as well as national
treatment.423
Originally, international investment law was intended to particularly protect
investors against hardships resulting from expropriation or nationalisation.424
While direct, i.e. formal, expropriations occurred primarily in the direct aftermath
of decolonisation,425 particularly the interpretation of what constitutes an indirect,
i.e. non-targeted, expropriation was subject to much discussion especially during the
first decade of the new millennium.426 Yet, ever since expansive tendencies in the
interpretation of the term ‘indirect’ have been contained, other standards, especially
the fair and equitable treatment (FET) standard, have inherited the central role in the
protection of foreign investments.427
The FET standard is generally not shaped by domestic laws, but constitutes a
standard of international law.428 It represents a very flexible principle, which needs
to be concretised by the respective tribunal for the case at hand.429 While there is no
including trade- and investment policies’, Pohl (2018), p. 15. Bringing new conceptual clarity to the
issue, see Bonnitcha et al. (2017).
420Viñuales (2016), p. 30.
421Viñuales (2016), pp. 30–31.
422Cf. Viñuales (2016), pp. 31–32.
423Schreuer (2013), paras. 49–75; 85–90; Viñuales (2016), p. 29; extensively Bungenberg et al.
(2015), pp. 7001030.
424Viñuales (2016), p. 31.
425Cf. e.g. how investment law is mentioned explicitly in the context of nationalisations in UN GA
(1962) Resolution 1803, 14 December 1962, paras. 1, 4 and 8; Viñuales (2016), p. 31.
426Schreuer (2013), paras. 85–88; with a profound discussion of i.a. the relevant case law Kriebaum
(2015), pp. 971981.
427Schreuer (2013), para. 90.
428Angelet (2011), para. 3; extensively on FET, and particularly the distinction between ‘autono-
mous’ FET clauses and ‘MST-FET’ clauses, which define FET by reference to customary interna-
tional law, Gaukrodger (2017).
429Angelet (2011), para. 4; in the case of autonomous FET clauses, the room for interpretation for
arbitral tribunals is naturally greater, Gaukrodger (2017), p. 13.
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general definition of what constitutes FET or a breach thereof, the principle is
typically described as a reflection of the good faith principle.430 It thus is concerned
particularly with upholding the rule of law with regard to every aspect of the
investment process and therefore has brought about several related principles, such
as transparency, consistency, stability or due process.431 Moreover, arbitral tribunals
have tended to describe FET by referring to the legitimate expectations of the
investor.432
Further trends in investment arbitration that led to a significant expansion of the
regime and therefore the surge in the number of proceedings included the
expansive interpretation of the MFN clause for jurisdictional purposes or the dismissal of the
rule – widely acknowledged in inter-State dispute settlement – that consent to jurisdiction
cannot be presumed and is to be interpreted restrictively.433
These expansive tendencies in state as well as arbitral practice have led to
investment protection constituting a particularly dominant paradigm in global gov-
ernance. Apart from the broad scope of investment safeguards, especially the
possibility for investors to depart from conventional judicial avenues and institute
arbitral proceedings against the host state creates what has been perceived as an
‘imbalance’ between investment protection and states’ duty to protect the environ-
ment as well as Human Rights (HR).434 For instance, the right to freely dispose over
natural resources (RFD) ‘has been largely forgotten in the development of areas of
international law that have had a direct impact on the issue of control over natural
resources.’435 This observation is being alluded to also in the ‘warnings’
e.g. included in principle #9 of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights (UN GP), which calls upon states to reserve sufficient domestic
430Angelet (2011), para. 5.
431Angelet (2011), para. 5; Schreuer (2013), para. 52; on the interpretation of e.g. the NAFTA
governments of these principles originating from FET, Gaukrodger (2017), pp. 40–51.
432Angelet (2011), para. 6. However, several tribunals have pointed out that FET cannot be
understood as solely protecting investors’ interests. Rather, also this standard needs to be interpreted
against the backdrop of the object and purpose of the individual IIA, which lies not exclusively in
the protection of investments, but rather in the promotion of foreign direct investment and
(sustainable) development. Consequently, also the FET standard needs to be subjected to a
‘balanced approach’ in its interpretation, which takes the public interest dimension into account,
PCA (2006) Saluka Investments BV v. Czech Republic, Partial Award, 17 March 2006, paras.
300, 305; Angelet (2011), para. 6.
433Viñuales (2016), p. 32; moreover, also umbrella clauses have contributed their bit to this trend.
These clauses have the effect of ‘elevating’ contractual obligations to the international level,
i.e. breaches of contract automatically constitute a breach also of the international obligation of
the host state. In Schreuer’s words, ‘[c]ontracts and other obligations are put under the treaty’s
protective umbrella’, Schreuer (2013), para. 80. Viñuales (2016), p. 31.
434UN HRC (2008) Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of
Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, John Ruggie,
7 April 2008, UN Doc. A/HRC/8/55, available at http://www.reports-and-materials.org/Ruggie-
report-7-Apr-2008.pdf (last accessed 14 May 2021), paras 34–35; Lindsay et al. (2013), p. 49.
435Gilbert (2013), p. 333.
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policy space for the implementation of HR in spite of IIAs or investment contracts.
Ruggie has described this trend as being ‘particularly problematic’ for developing
countries—given their limited resources and development needs.436 Especially these
states run the risk of allocating too much attention and resources to according
safeguards to foreign investors at the expense of other policy fields.
4.3.1.2 Turn to SD
As a consequence, several important stakeholders of international investment gov-
ernance have initiated steps to strengthen states’ right to regulate in the public
interest in spite of their obligations under IIL. This ‘alliance’ for the ‘recalibration’
of the investor-state dispute settlement system includes i.a. the EU and UNCTAD, as
well as NGOs such as the World Economic Forum or the International Institute for
Sustainable Development.437 These ‘shifting paradigms’ in IIL in many ways
describe a turn of the international investment regime towards SD.438 This is
reflected i.a. in the UNCTAD’s Investment Policy Framework for SD, which pro-
vides guidance on how to better integrate investment protection and SD policies.439
Moreover, international legal scholarship in the recent years has produced both
comprehensive analysis and guidance regarding innovative legal instruments that
foster SD effects of foreign investment.440 Sacerdoti in this respect however first
alludes to the fact that BITs should not be misunderstood as ‘development cooper-
ation instruments’.441 Their ultimate object and purpose is to protect investments.
Nevertheless, investment protection provisions should be interpreted in light of SD
and corresponding international standards, which are being respected by both
parties, including HR, environmental and health agreements.442 This may also
open avenues towards an evolutionary interpretation of older treaties and guide the
reconciliation of investment protection with other objectives of economic
436UN HRC (2008) Report of the Special Representative, John Ruggie, para. 36; Lindsay et al.
(2013), p. 49.
437Viñuales (2016), p. 43; Muchlinski (2016), p. 41.
438Krajewski and Hindelang (2016); see also Cordonier Segger et al. (2011).
439UNCTAD (2015). See also VanDuzer et al. (2012); Muchlinski (2016), p. 41.
440The fact that—generally speaking—investments can constitute important drivers of develop-
ment has been acknowledged repeatedly, cf. then-UN SG Ban Ki-Moon, UNCTAD (2014), p. iii;
Sacerdoti (2016), p. 20; Muchlinski (2016), p. 43. For more critical accounts of the matter, Center
for International Environmental Law et al (2018) Reform options for ISDS, http://www.uncitral.
org/pdf/english/workinggroups/wg_3/UNCITRAL_recs_and_justification_final.pdf (last accessed
14 May 2021), p. 1 i.a. referring to the summary by Pohl (2018), pp. 14–36; Johnson et al.
(2018). See also fundamentally De Schutter et al. (2013); Bonnitcha et al. (2017).
441Sacerdoti (2016), p. 39.
442Sacerdoti (2016), p. 39; on this effect of SD, which operates as a regulatory objective, see
Chap. 5 below.
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regulation.443 In general, BITs and investment chapters in FTAs should make use of
innovative drafting in order to make
BITs more respectful of the policy space of host States in the pursuit of legitimate general
interest, balancing these values while maintaining the essential protection from arbitrary,
discriminatory conduct and outright expropriation without compensation of foreign inves-
tors by host countries.444
Concrete provisions fostering this objective are provided i.a. by UNCTAD in its
Investment Policy Framework as well as by the Commonwealth Secretariat. For
instance, BITs could set out a general exception modelled on Article XX GATT,445
which could also apply to measures ‘designed and applied’ to protect e.g. HR or
labour rights.446 Moreover, Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) could include
investor responsibilities and obligations. Investment protection could be made
dependent upon an investor fulfilling these duties, including respecting HR and
domestic host state law.447
Also, parties to an IIA could agree not to lower especially social and environ-
mental standards in order to attract investment.448 The home state could be required
to assist its less-developed contracting partner with the implementation of its obli-
gations under the IIA.449 In addition, the parties could establish an institutional
mechanism to discuss the interpretation of investment provisions on a regular basis
with a view to ensuring more consistency in arbitral awards and fostering the
contributions of investments to the SDGs.450 Further suggestions include special
treatment provisions for Least Developed Countries (LDCs), such as replacing
binding obligations with ‘best-endeavour’ clauses, or requiring sustainability assess-
ments from the investor.451 In addition, also changes to investor-state dispute
settlement (ISDS) are being advised. For instance, certain claims could be excluded
from ISDS, such as ones that relate to measures, which have been taken in the pursuit
of key objectives of SD.452 Also, investors could be required to first exhaust
443Sacerdoti (2016), p. 39.
444Sacerdoti (2016), p. 39; in the same vein, Chi (2017), chapter 8 on ‘[f]illing the compatibility gap
between IIAs and sustainable development’.
445Cf. e.g. Article 10 2004 Canadian model agreement, Italaw (2019) Canada model FIPA, https://
www.italaw.com/documents/Canadian2004-FIPA-model-en.pdf (last accessed 14 May 2021);
VanDuzer et al. (2012), p. 225; Muchlinski (2016), p. 56.
446Cf. COMESA Investment Agreement; VanDuzer et al. (2012), pp. 249–250; Muchlinski
(2016), p. 57.
447Muchlinski (2016), p. 57; the UN GP, cf. Sect. 4.2.2.2.2.1, as well as commodity-directed
guidance as discussed in Sect. 4.2.2.2.2.2 above, could serve as benchmarks in this respect.
448Muchlinski (2016), p. 59.
449Cf. Muchlinski (2016), p. 59.
450Cf. Moreira (2018); see also the 2015 Norwegian draft model BIT; Muchlinski (2016), p. 59.
451Muchlinski (2016), pp. 60–61; with more suggestions, see also Gehring et al. (2018). On the
design of future innovative tools that are rebalancing investment protection as well as the overall
framework of TCL in favour of SD, cf. in more detail Chap. 5 below.
452Muchlinski (2016), p. 62.
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domestic remedies.453 Moreover, alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, as well
as an appellate instance could be introduced.454
The recalibration of international investment law is now increasingly reflected
also in state practice.455 Examples include the COMESA Investment Agreement,
which for instance according to its Article 14.3 requires tribunals to consider the
state’s level of development when examining a breach of fair and equitable treatment
(FET), or the SADC Model Bilateral Investment Treaty Template, which requires
investors to maintain an environmental management system according to its Article
14.1.456 Recent EU FTAs explicitly promote trade and sustainable development. For
instance, according to Article 13.10 EU-Vietnam FTA,
[e]ach [p]arty affirms its commitment to enhance the contribution of trade and investment to
the goal of sustainable development in its economic, social and environmental
dimensions.457
As such, they i.a. seek to promote investment in environmental goods and
services (EGS), as provided for e.g. in Articles 12.11 EU-Singapore FTA and
13.10.2(b) EU-Vietnam FTA.458 Also, according to Article 3(4) of the 2018 Neth-
erlands model BIT (NLBIT) parties shall promote sustainable investments. In
general, according to Article 6(1) NLBIT parties commit to promote international
investment in a way conducive to SD. Moreover, recent EU FTAs generally call for
‘full implementation of MEAs as well as multilateral labour agreements.’459 Article
7(1) NLBIT explicitly requires
453Muchlinski (2016), p. 62.
454Muchlinski (2016), p. 62. Instructively on the general dynamic debate about the future of ISDS,
Bungenberg and Reinisch (2018). On the ongoing discussions within working group III of
UNCITRAL tasked with ISDS reform, see UNCITRAL (2018) Possible reform of ISDS,
5 September 2018, UN Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.149, http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/
workinggroups/wg_3/WGIII-36th-session/149_main_paper_7_September_DRAFT.pdf (last
accessed 14 May 2021).
455Gehring et al. (2018); sceptical however as regards the development of IIL into a global standard,
which fails to adequately consider the specific characteristics of domestic law, Stoll and Holterhus
(2016), who instead advocate for strengthening the human rights approach to property protection.
456Gehring et al. (2018) with numerous further examples. With regard to ICAs de lege ferenda, see
Sect. 5.2 below in more detail.
457Chapter 13 of the EU-Vietnam FTA is dedicated to Trade and SD and i.a. emphasises the need to
uphold environmental and labour protection levels (Article 13.3), multilateral labour standards and
agreements (Article 13.4), and MEAs (Article 13.5). It moreover explicitly recognises the impor-
tance of the CBD (Article 13.7), sustainable forest management (Article 13.8), as well as of
sustainable management of living marine resources and aquaculture products (Article 13.9). In
order to review the implementation of this chapter, it establishes a specific Committee on Trade and
SD, according to Articles 13.5, 17.2 EU-Vietnam FTA. Likewise, Article 16.13 EU-Japan FTA;
Articles 22.4, 26.2.1(g) CETA. See also—the trade and SD—chapter 12 of the EU-Singapore FTA.
458Gehring et al. (2018), p. 21.
459Gehring et al. (2018), p. 21; cf. also Article 6(2) NLBIT.
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[i]nvestors and their investments [to] comply with domestic laws and regulations of the host
state, including laws and regulations on human rights, environmental protection and labor
laws.460
The Brazilian Cooperation and Facilitation Investment Agreements (CFIA) argu-
ably stand for the most far-reaching departure from the ‘old’ investment protection
system, i.a. exclusively protecting direct expropriations, introducing clauses on
CSR, and particularly entirely abandoning ISDS.461
4.3.1.3 Economic Imbalance: Investment Protection as a Matter
of Conflict Between Host States and Foreign Investors
As mentioned above, commodity activities have been described as ‘paradigmatic
example’ of an investment. Often, TNCs domiciled in industrialised states are
conducting commodity operations in less developed, yet resource-rich countries.462
The investment case law is rich in precedents, which originated from conflicts over
state measures affecting investors’ control or title over commodity investments or
their profitability.463 In fact, more than 28 % of all arbitral proceedings under the
ICSID Convention to date concerned commodity operations, which is by far the
largest overall share by sector.464
Correspondingly, some signature cases of international investment law, such as
the arbitrations between BP, TEXACO, LIAMCO and Libya,465 the Kuwait
460The CSR provision contained in Article 7 NLBIT moreover makes express mention of due
diligence (Article 7(3)); liability of investors in home state jurisdiction where their ‘acts or decisions
lead to significant damage, personal injuries or loss of life in the host state’ (Article 7(4)); and
parties’ commitment to the UN GP as well as the OECDG (Article 7(5)).
461Articles 17–24 Brazil-Ethiopia CFIA, UNCTAD (2019) https://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.
org/Download/TreatyFile/5717; Articles 18–25 Brazil-Suriname CFIA, UNCTAD (2019) https://
investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/5715; Moreira (2018).
462See already Sect. 2.1.2 above.
463Eljuri and Trevino (2015), p. 313; Childs (2011). On inter-state disputes over the commercial
terms of commodity extraction see also already the early case law of both the PCIJ and the ICJ as
summarised by Higgins (1999): PCIJ (1924–1927) Mavrommatis Concessions Case, Judgments of
30 August 1924, 26 March 1925, 10 October 1927, available at https://www.icj-cij.org/en/pcij-
series-a; PCIJ (1928) Phosphates in Morocco Case, Judgment of 14 June 1938, https://www.icj-cij.
org/files/permanent-court-of-international-justice/serie_AB/AB_74/01_Phosphates_du_Maroc_
Arret.pdf; ICJ (1952) Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Case, Judgment of 22 July 1952, https://www.
icj-cij.org/files/case-related/16/016-19520722-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf (all last accessed 14 May 2021).
464ICSID (2018) Caseload statistics, issue 2018-2, https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/
resources/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%202018-2%20(English).pdf (last accessed 14 May 2021),
p. 12. Disputes arising from oil, gas and mining accounted for 24%, agriculture, fishing and forestry
for an additional 4% of all disputes. Out of the 17% of cases concerning electric power and other
energy disputes, it is quite likely that a considerable part likewise more or less directly concerns
commodity operations, such as the sourcing or trade of energy commodities.
465Sole arbitrator (1973) BP Exploration v. Libya, Award of 10 October 1973, 53 ILR 297, available
at https://kupdf.net/download/bp-exploration-v-libyan-arab-republic-53-ilr-297-1973_
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v. Aminoil,466 or the Occidental v. Ecuador proceedings, arose in connection with
commodity activities.467 These cases share that they typically represent conflicts
between host state and investor over the economic benefits of a commodity opera-
tion.468 Paradigmatically, many of the historic commodity investment arbitrations
originated from the termination of concessions or PSAs, direct as well as indirect
expropriations, and nationalisations.469
While direct expropriations and nationalisations concerned international arbitra-
tors especially during the NIEO era in the 1970s and 80s, they still constitute a
current topic. This is particularly due to measures taken by Venezuela in 2007,
which sought to nationalise oil production in the so-called Orinoco belt.470 This step
impacted projects maintained by large transnational oil companies, such as Chevron,
ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips; several affected corporations initiated arbitral
proceedings.471 Further specific state measures that gave rise to commodity invest-
ment arbitrations and were raised as especially forms of indirect expropriations or
breach of the FET standard respectively, included windfall profit taxes, export taxes,
denial of the right to reimbursement of VAT, export restrictions, price regulations,
and domestic market obligations (DMOs).472
The subject at issue in several proceedings involving Ecuador for instance was a
tax that the state introduced in order to capture a share of ‘extraordinary incomes’
5a1aec14e2b6f5f95564e0e1_pdf; sole arbitrator (1977) TEXACO v. Libya, Award of 19 January
1977, available at https://www.trans-lex.org/261700; sole arbitrator (1977) Liamco v. Libya, Award
of 12 April 1977, available at https://www.trans-lex.org/261400 (all last accessed 14 May 2021).
466AMINOIL tribunal (1982)Kuwait v. AMINOIL, Award of 24March 1982, 21 ILM 976, available
at https://www.trans-lex.org/261900 (last accessed 14 May 2021).
467LCIA (2004) Occidental v. Republic of Ecuador, LCIA Case No UN 3467, Final Award, 1 July
2004; see also the ‘Vivendi saga’, Italaw (2019) Vivendi v. Argentina, https://www.italaw.com/
cases/309, Italaw (2019) Suez, Vivendi v. Argentina https://www.italaw.com/cases/1057 (both last
accessed 14 May 2021), which concerned water, a product, which is explicitly not classified as a
commodity for the purposes of this book. The dispute, however, arose over the privatisation of
water supply in an Argentinian province—and is thus paradigmatic for the ‘commoditisation of
nature’, cf. Chap. 1 above. For more lead cases, see i.a. Bernasconi-Osterwalder and Johnson
(2011); Weiler (2005).
468Cf. Viñuales (2016), p. 33.
469Ruzza (2017), paras. 7, 12–14; for a recent example of nationalisation, ICSID (2010) Mobil
Corporation v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Decision on Jurisdiction, 10 June 2010, paras.
16–25, 30–36, 145–146; Childs (2011), pp. 251–252.
470Eljuri and Trevino (2015), pp. 314–315.
471ICSID (2013) ConocoPhillips v. Venezuela, Decision on Jurisdiction and the Merits,
3 September 2013; Italaw (2019) Mobil Corp., Venezuela Holdings et al. [ExxonMobil]
v. Venezuela, https://www.italaw.com/cases/713; ICSID (2013) OPIC Karimum Corporation
v. Venezuela, Award, 22 May 2013; Eljuri and Trevino (2015), pp. 314–315 with further references.
See too the proceedings between Repsol and Argentina, which ended in settlement, Italaw (2019)
Repsol. v. Argentina, https://www.italaw.com/cases/2046 (both last accessed 14 May 2021); Eljuri
and Trevino (2015), p. 315.
472For cases concerning DMOs, see e.g. PCA (2010) Chevron Corporation v. Republic of Ecuador,
Partial Award on the Merits, 30 March 2010; Childs (2011), pp. 241–243 with further references.
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generated by oil corporations.473 The tax was set first at 50 %, later at 99 %.474 Both
the Burlington and Perenco tribunals, which had to assess the identical operative
facts, held that the windfall profits tax did not constitute an indirect expropriation.475
The Perenco tribunal noted that
. . .it would be unsurprising to an experienced oil company that given its access to the State’s
exhaustible natural resources, with the substantial increase in world oil prices, there was a
chance that the State would wish to revisit the economic bargain underlying the contracts.476
In 2002, 2004 and 2007 respectively, Argentina introduced export taxes on
hydrocarbons, which had been ‘designed to prevent producers from receiving
more than forty-two U.S. dollars per barrel of oil produced.’477 In reaction to these
taxes, at least five corporations initiated arbitral proceedings against Argentina,
including the French TNC Total.478 Total claimed that the export tax would consti-
tute a breach of the FET standard. The tribunal, however, considered that the tax
constituted an ordinary fiscal measure as part of the general fiscal framework
therefore dismissing Total’s claim.479
Another measure taken by Ecuador involved changes in the right to be reim-
bursed of the value-added tax (VAT) paid when purchasing goods and services
that were needed for commodity activities.480 This gave rise to two arbitrations,
one involving the US corporation Occidental Exploration and Production Com-
pany (Occidental).481 The tribunal in Occidental held that the changes in the VAT
reimbursement scheme constituted a breach of the FET standard given that it
473‘Extraordinary income’ constituted ‘the difference between the market price of Ecuadorian oil
actually sold and the average market price of oil at the time the contracts were executed, multiplied
by the number of barrels produced’, Eljuri and Trevino (2015), p. 321; Italaw (2019) City Oriente
v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No ARB/06/21, https://www.italaw.com/cases/3432; Italaw (2019)
Perenco v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No ARB/08/6, https://www.italaw.com/cases/819; Italaw
(2019) Burlington v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No ARB/08/5, https://www.italaw.com/cases/181;
Italaw (2019) Murphy Exploration v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No ARB/08/4, https://www.italaw.
com/cases/723 (all last accessed 14 May 2021); Childs (2011), p. 233; Eljuri and Trevino (2015),
pp. 321–3.
474Eljuri and Trevino (2015), p. 321.
475Eljuri and Trevino (2015), p. 322.
476ICSID (2014) Perenco v. Ecuador, Decision on Remaining Issues of Jurisdiction and on
Liability, 12 September 2014, para. 588; the tribunal held, however, that the introduction of the
windfall profit tax i.a. constituted a breach of contract, Eljuri and Trevino (2015), p. 322.
477Eljuri and Trevino (2015), p. 323; Childs (2011), pp. 235–237.
478ICSID (2011) El Paso v. Argentina, Award of 31 October 2011; ICSID (2006) Pan
Am. v. Argentina, Decision on Preliminary Objections, 27 July 2006; ICSID (2008) Wintershall
v. Argentina, Award of 8 December 2008; ICSID (2010) Total v. Argentina, Decision on Liability,
27 December 2010; Eljuri and Trevino (2015), p. 323; Childs (2011), p. 235.
479Eljuri and Trevino (2015), p. 324.
480Eljuri and Trevino (2015), p. 324.
481LCIA (2004) Occidental v. Ecuador, Final Award of 1 July 2004; and LCIA (2006) EnCana
v. Ecuador, Award, 3 February 2006; Eljuri and Trevino (2015), p. 325.
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‘significantly changed the framework under which its investment had been
made.’482
4.3.1.4 Societal and Environmental Imbalance
Things become even more intricate when activities associated with investments are
causing negative externalities, e.g. for local populations or the environment.
Recalling the organisational framework of TCL, corresponding interests are the
one of development, preservation, and participation.483 Viñuales describes this
situation, which is paradigmatic for GCG, as the ‘State–Investor–Population (SIP)
triangle’.484
Within this triangle, separate bodies of international law are regulating the
relationships between the different stakeholders: HR and IEL apply between host
state and the population; between the latter and investors only domestic law is
applicable; and the relation between host state and investors is covered by interna-
tional investment law.485 This isolation of the different relationships and norm
subsets that are applicable to them is particularly problematic:
Understanding international investment law as a mere “protective” framework has a partic-
ularly significant unbalancing effect if its operation is “detached” from the broader body of
domestic and international law governing negative externalities, such as the adverse impact
on human rights and the environment.486
Perceiving international investment law in this isolated manner has led to a
situation in which—out of all the different policy fields that a state needs to cover
in order to pursue and maintain good commodity governance—investment protec-
tion has been put centre stage, not least in view of the financial ramifications that
may ensue from infringements upon the investment law framework. The severe
consequences of this imbalanced legal framework are prominently portrayed in the
arbitral proceedings that arose after the Argentinian economic depression at the
beginning of the new millennium.487 Moreover, this imbalance can be particularly
482Eljuri and Trevino (2015), p. 325. Moreover, the tribunal also held that the measures also
violated the national treatment clause under the BIT, Eljuri and Trevino (2015), p. 325.
483Cf. Sect. 2.1.3 above.
484Viñuales (2016), pp. 32–34.
485Viñuales (2016), p. 34.
486Viñuales (2016), p. 36. Emphasis added.
487Viñuales (2016), p. 38 alludes to the fact that the respective awards in CMS v. Argentina as well
as LG&E v. Argentina ‘wrongly concluded [. . .] that the customary requirement for necessity
governed the application of a treaty-based emergency clause.’ As a result, Argentina—although
in an economic emergency—was faced with significant impending compensation duties; ICSID
(2005) CMS v. Argentina, Award of 12 May 2005; see also ICSID (2007) Enron and Ponderosa
v. Argentina, Award of 22 May 2007; ICSID (2007) Sempra Energy v. Argentina, Award of
28 September 2007; ICSID (2006) LG&E v. Argentina, Decision on Liability, 3 October 2006;
ICSID (2008) Continental Casualty v. Argentina, Award of 5 September 2008; Viñuales (2016),
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problematic where the interests of investors and local populations collide.488 For
instance, in the Ominayak v. Canada case before the Human Rights Committee, the
UN HRC considered that Canada’s authorisations of oil and gas exploration on
ancestral lands could potentially constitute a breach of the community’s right to
enjoy one’s culture according to Article 27 ICCPR.489 Even though no foreign
investor was involved in this case, it illustrates how differently facts that from one
angle may be determined to constitute a breach of investment protection provisions,
may represent a violation of HR norms from the ‘prism’ of communities affected by
commodity activities.490 Similarly, in the Länsman cases, mining and logging
activities respectively were raised as potential violations of Article 27 ICCPR.491
In the case before the IACtHR between the Sawhoyamaxa community and
Paraguay, the applicants claimed that the state had breached their right to property
due to failure to guarantee the community their rights over ancestral lands.492 When
the state claimed that the owner of the respective lands—a German investor—was
protected under an IIA, the ‘different legal frameworks applicable to different sides
of the SIP triangle were thus laid bare.’493 Moreover, it exhibits how the (economic)
interests of host states and investors may often coincide.494
How detrimental the current configuration of investment protection may be in
these situations where public and governmental interests diverge, is furthermore
reflected in the Ogoni case before the African Commission on Human and Peoples’
pp. 37–39. With a contrasting view on the ‘paradoxical’ Argentina cases Alvarez and
Topalian (2012).
488Viñuales (2016), p. 40.
489UN HRC (1990) Bernard Ominayak and the Lubicon Band v. Canada, Views of the committee,
26 March 1990, HRC Communication No. 167/1984, http://juris.ohchr.org/Search/Details/665 (last
accessed 14 May 2021), paras. 13.4, 14; Viñuales (2016), p. 40.
490Viñuales (2016), p. 40.
491Both complaints were ultimately rejected, UN HRC (1994) Ilmari Länsman and others
v. Finland, Views of the committee, 26 October 1994, HRC Communication No. 511/1992,
https://www.escr-net.org/sites/default/files/HR%27s_Committee_Decision_0.html; UN HRC
(1996) Jouni E. Länsman et al v. Finland, Views of the committee, 30 October 1996, HRC
Communication No. 671/1995, available at http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/undocs/html/VWS67158.htm
(both last accessed 14 May 2021); Viñuales (2015), p. 9.
492IACtHR (2006) Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Judgment, 29 March 2006,
ICtHR Series C No 146, http://www.cidh.org/ninez/sawhoyamaxa%20(80)/sentencia%20fondo,%
20reparaciones%20marzo%2029%202006eng.doc (last accessed 14 May 2021), paras. 113–115;
Viñuales (2016), p. 40.
493Viñuales (2016), p. 41.
494Viñuales (2016), p. 42. ‘Moreover, the Court considers that the enforcement of bilateral
commercial treaties negates vindication of non-compliance with state obligations under the Amer-
ican Convention; on the contrary, their enforcement should always be compatible with the Amer-
ican Convention, which is a multilateral treaty on human rights that stands in a class of its own and
that generates rights for individual human beings and does not depend entirely on reciprocity among
States’, IACtHR (2006) Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Judgment, 29 March
2006, para. 140; Viñuales (2016), p. 41.
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Rights, in which the commission i.a. held that Nigeria had violated the Ogoni
people’s right to freely dispose over natural resources (RFD) according to Article 21:
The Commission notes that in the present case, despite its obligation to protect persons
against interferences in the enjoyment of their rights, the Government of Nigeria facilitated
the destruction of the Ogoniland. Contrary to its Charter obligations and despite such
internationally established principles, the Nigerian Government has given the green light
to private actors, and the oil Companies in particular, to devastatingly affect the well-being
of the Ogonis. By any measure of standards, its practice falls short of the minimum conduct
expected of governments, and therefore, is in violation of Article 21 of the African
Charter.495
These cases illustrate how substantially other legal positions than investments
may be concerned by commodity activity. Once one changes the perspective on
these activities—and for instance assumes the one of the affected communities or
local populations—the transnational legal framework appears to be imbalanced in
favour not only of investors, but in general of economic over other public interests,
including HR and environmental protection.496
4.3.1.5 Integrating Investment Protection into the TCL Framework
The structure of TCL demonstrates that the norm subset addressing investment
protection constitutes but one qualification of a state’s PSNR. This one objective,
however, is being pursued with the most vigorous normative as well as implemen-
tation means. What can remedy this situation is a more integrated understanding of
the entire field covering commodity activities. As such, investment protection could
be made exclusively available to investors that comply with HR, environmental
protection and other domestic laws.497 Moreover, ISDS could be turned into a
reciprocal mechanism, which allows especially developing states to initiate claims
against commodity corporations.498
Apart from the reform discussions within UNCITRAL as well as international
legal scholarship, also investment case law exhibits signs for a greater integration of
495ACHPR (2002) Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and
Social Rights v. Nigeria, Communication No. 155/96, 27 May 2002, ACHPR/COMM/A044/1,
https://www.escr-net.org/sites/default/files/serac.pdf (last accessed 14 May 2021), para. 58;
Viñuales (2016), p. 42.
496Viñuales (2016), p. 42.
497See already Sect. 4.3.1.2 above; Center for International Environmental Law et al (2018) Reform
options for ISDS, http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/workinggroups/wg_3/UNCITRAL_recs_
and_justification_final.pdf, pp. 7–8 on the so-called ‘clean hands clause’. In the same vein, Hauert
(2016), pp. 136–144; on carve-outs, legality clauses or standing commissions, see also Viñuales
(2016), p. 45.
498Cf. Viñuales (2016), p. 45; counterclaims are an ‘additional concern’ still being deliberated as
part of the UNCITRAL reform process, UNCITRAL (2019) Possible reform of investor-State
dispute settlement, 30 July 2019, UN Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.166, https://undocs.org/A/CN.9/
WG.III/WP.166 (last accessed 14 May 2021).
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the investment discipline with other fields of international law. For instance, in the
Al-Warraq case, the tribunal largely relied on international HR law to determine the
scope of the FET standard, which describes ‘a major departure in the
conceptualisation of the relationship between [international investment law] and
[international Human Rights law].’499 Moreover, the tribunal applied the ‘clean
hands’ approach and ultimately dismissed the investor’s claim on these grounds.500
However, as Cotula rightly points out, greater integration of investment law and HR
as displayed in Al-Warraq may also bring about risks by e.g. opening up the
opportunity for investors to claim breaches of HR law in front of arbitral tribu-
nals—thus bypassing the domestic remedies requirements, which apply in HR
law.501
4.3.2 The Law of Liberalised Trade
As this book has already briefly touched upon, states’ PSNR is qualified by extensive
obligations to liberalise trade.502 Commodity trade is largely covered by WTO
discipline.503 Whereas the GATT unlike the Havana Charter does not entail a
separate chapter on commodities, it still contains some commodity-directed pro-
visions, particularly in the trade and development context. While these provisions
address many issues that appear crucial to the sustainable development of CDDCs,
such as market access, price stabilisation and stable growth in export earnings, their
effect has proven to be limited in the past due to their rather ‘declaratory’ nature as
well as to a lack of enforcement mechanisms.504
As a result, the most contentious aspects in commodity trade, e.g. export restric-
tions and subsidies, were decided not on the basis of these commodity-directed, but
rather based on the general rules of WTO law. Therefore, commodity-directed
provisions seeking to protect the interests of commodity-dependent states can be
said to have remained largely dead letters in the past. While thus the general
liberalisation scheme of world trade is quite clearly spelled out in international
law, many issues that arise with regard to the at times opposed interests of
499Cotula (2016), p. 154, commenting on Warraq tribunal (2014) Hesham Talaat M. Al-Warraq
v. The Republic of Indonesia, UNCITRAL Arbitration, Final Award of 15 December 2014, https://
www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw4164.pdf (last accessed 14 May 2021).
500Cotula (2016), p. 149. The respective provision was contained in Article 9 of the applicable OIC
Agreement: ‘The investor shall be bound by the laws and regulations in force in the host state and
shall refrain from all acts that may disturb public order or morals or that may be prejudicial to the
public interest. He is also to refrain from exercising restrictive practices and from trying to achieve
gains through unlawful means’, Cotula (2016), p. 151.
501Cotula (2016), p. 156.
502Cf. Sects. 3.3.2, 3.3.3 and 4.2.2.1.4.2 above.
503Cf. Pitschas (2011), p. 60.
504Lee (2011), p. 114; cf. Sect. 3.3.3 above.
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producers—typically seeking to raise their export earnings and maintain price
stability—and consumers—generally longing for market access and corresponding
supply security—are being left largely unacknowledged. This lack of effective
norms addressing the balance between these interests, is what describes the internal
imbalance, which the trade regime brings about.
In addition, the law of liberalised trade also contributes to an external imbalance,
that is—similarly to the effects of international investment law—in relation to the
other components of TCL. The dominance that WTO disciplines may unfold within
the commodity sector, is displayed in the cases involving China.505 Export tariffs are
only peripherally covered by the MFN rule of Article I:1 GATT.506 Article II GATT
exclusively applies to import tariffs.507 The general prohibition envisaged in
Article XI:1 GATT is limited to quantitative measures. Consequently, the China
cases were based significantly on the Chinese Accession Protocol.
The dispute in China – Raw Materials concerned measures that China had
imposed on different forms of bauxite, coke, fluorspar, magnesium, manganese,
silicon metal, yellow phosphorous and zinc.508 In China – Rare Earths export
restrictions had been introduced with regard to rare earth elements, tungsten and
molybdenum.509 The currently pending third dispute China – Raw Materials II
challenges the Chinese export duties imposed on different forms of antimony,
chromium, cobalt, copper, ferro-nickel, graphite, lead, magnesia, talc, tantalum
and tin, as well as the export quotas applied to antimony, indium, magnesia, talc
and tin.510
505WTO DSB (2014a) China – Rare Earths, Panel Reports, 26 March 2014; modified by WTO
DSB (2014b) China – Rare Earths, Appellate Body Reports, 7 August 2014; WTO DSB (2011)
China – Raw Materials, Panel Reports, 5 July 2011; modified by WTO DSB (2012) China – Raw
Materials, Appellate Body Reports, 30 January 2012; cf. also the pending dispute China – Raw
Materials II, WTO. China – Export Duties on Certain Raw Materials, WT/DS508, https://www.
wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds508_e.htm and WTO. China – Duties and other Mea-
sures concerning the Exportation of Certain Raw Materials, WT/DS509, https://www.wto.org/
english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds509_e.htm (both last accessed 14 May 2021). On the entire
topic, cf. expertly Espa (2015); succinctly Espa and Oehl (2018), pp. 9–10; cf. also Pitschas
(2011), p. 79.
506Pitschas (2011), p. 79.
507Cf. Pitschas (2011), p. 62.
508WTO DSB (2011) China – Raw Materials, Panel Reports, 5 July 2011; modified by WTO DSB
(2012) China – Raw Materials, Appellate Body Reports, 30 January 2012; cf. Espa and Oehl
(2018), p. 9, n 45.
509WTO DSB (2014a) China – Rare Earths, Panel Reports, 26 March 2014; modified by WTO
DSB (2014b) China – Rare Earths, Appellate Body Reports, 7 August 2014; cf. Espa and Oehl
(2018), p. 9, n 45.
510See WTO (2019) China – Export Duties on Certain Raw Materials, WT/DS508, https://www.
wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds508_e.htm and WTO (2019) China – Duties and other
Measures concerning the Exportation of Certain Raw Materials, WT/DS509, https://www.wto.org/
english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds509_e.htm (both last accessed 14May 2021); cf. Espa and Oehl
(2018), p. 9.
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The export duties that China had applied were deemed to be a breach of paragraph
11.3 of China’s Accession Protocol.511 According to the Appellate Body’s decision,
paragraph 11.3 sets forth a standalone provision, which does not exhibit an ‘objec-
tive link’ to the GATT.512 As a consequence, it held that Article XX GATT
exceptions were not applicable.513 The export quotas China had introduced consti-
tuted a violation of Article XI:1 GATT.514 The Appellate Body (AB) held that they
could not be justified according to the exception of Article XI:2:a GATT.515 Such an
exception essentially requires that two conditions are met: for one, there needs to be
a ‘critical shortage’ of the commodity in question; for the other, the respective
commodity needs to constitute a ‘product essential to the exporting party’.516 A
critical shortage needs to be ascertained based on objective parameters, i.e. the actual
current need of the exporting country. The AB held that only such commodities,
which are absolutely indispensable or necessary commodities could constitute
‘essential products’.517 However, Article XI:2:a GATT applies exclusively to tem-
511The provision reads: ‘China shall eliminate all taxes and charges applied to exports unless
specifically provided for in Annex 6 of this Protocol or applied in conformity with the provisions of
Article VIII of the GATT 1994.’
512WTODSB (2012) China – RawMaterials, Appellate Body Reports, 30 January 2012, para. 293;
WTO DSB (2014b) China – Rare Earths, Appellate Body Reports, 7 August 2014, para. 5.65.
Cf. also Espa (2015), pp. 145–163.
513WTODSB (2012) China – RawMaterials, Appellate Body Reports, 30 January 2012, para. 293;
WTO DSB (2014b) China – Rare Earths, Appellate Body Reports, 7 August 2014, para. 5.65.
Cf. also Espa (2015), pp. 145–163; this decision elicited strong criticism given that Articles XX
(b) and (g) GATT are typically considered to be the only ‘gateways’ for SD considerations within
the GATT framework, cf. also Birnie et al. (2009), pp. 759–761. Due to its obligations under the
Accession Protocol, China is now permanently impeded from introducing export tariffs as an
instrument of environmental conservation, cf. Espa and Oehl (2018), p. 10.
514WTO DSB (2011) China – Raw Materials, Panel Reports, 5 July 2011, paras. 7.218–24;
cf. WTO DSB (2014b) China – Rare Earths, Appellate Body Reports, 7 August 2014, para.
5.76; cf. Pitschas (2011), pp. 65–66.
515WTO DSB (2012) China – Raw Materials, Appellate Body Reports, 30 January 2012, paras.
329–344; cf. WTO DSB (2011) China – Raw Materials, Panel Reports, 5 July 2011, paras.
7.238–355; the export quotas discussed here concerned refractory-grade bauxite; cf. Pitschas
(2011), pp. 69–73.
516Cf. Pitschas (2011), pp. 69–72.
517WTODSB (2012) China – RawMaterials, Appellate Body Reports, 30 January 2012, para. 326;
Pitschas (2011), p. 72. Beforehand, the panel, WTO DSB (2011) China – Raw Materials, Panel
Reports, 5 July 2011, para. 7.276, had clarified that the concrete circumstances, which the exporting
country is facing at the time of introduction of the restrictive measures are the decisive parameters in
determining whether or not a product can be held to be ‘essential’. Pitschas (2011), pp. 71–72
criticises that against this backdrop it would not be understandable, why the developmental stage of
an exporting country shall, according to the panel’s opinion, not be taken into account when making
this determination. This can be relevant in particular with regard to the situation of CDDCs.
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porary restrictions.518 For permanent restrictions that seek to protect exhaustible
natural resources, Article XX:g GATT is applicable.519
With regard to China’s Article XX GATT defences, the AB pointed to the fact
that typically environmental risks do not arise from exportation, but from produc-
tion—which is naturally domestic.520 It thus warned not to use SD and PSNR as
‘pretexts’ to justify export restrictions.521 According to the WTO adjudicators,
export restrictions cannot be justified as environmental conservation measures in
the sense that they ‘allow aWTOMember to allocate the available stock of a product
between foreign and domestic consumers because, once extracted and in commerce,
natural resources are subject to WTO law.’522 While states remain free to design
environmental conservation measures according to their own policy considerations,
the notion of ‘conservation’ cannot be unduly expanded so as to include objectives
of supply chain management or other industrial policy goals.523 As Espa and I have
put it elsewhere with regard to mineral commodities,
under WTO law Members are free to decide to which extent they want to authorize mineral
exploitation (e.g. through the granting of mining concessions) within their territories but,
once reserves are mined, mineral commodities (i.e. tradable mine output) are treated just like
any other goods for the purpose of WTO law application.524
As a consequence, the Appellate Body held the Chinese measures to be illegal in
both cases.
Primarily commodity exporting developing countries have criticised the AB’s
decision. They consider the stance taken by the AB an undue restriction of their
PSNR and of corresponding policy space when it comes to implementing resource
conservation measures.525 Yet, the panel in China–Rare Earths emphasised that,
518WTO DSB (2011) China – Raw Materials, Panel Reports, 5 July 2011, paras. 7.255, 7.257–8;
WTO DSB (2012) China – Raw Materials, Appellate Body Reports, 30 January 2012, para. 323;
Pitschas (2011), p. 72.
519Still the AB held that the two provisions are not mutually exclusive, WTO DSB (2012) China –
Raw Materials, Appellate Body Reports, 30 January 2012, para. 337; cf. Pitschas (2011), p. 71.
520Cf. Espa and Oehl (2018), p. 10.
521Cf. Espa and Oehl (2018), p. 10.
522Espa and Oehl (2018), p. 10; cf. WTO DSB (2014a) China – Rare Earths, Panel Reports,
26 March 2014, para. 7.462. Cf. already above.
523WTO DSB (2014a) China – Rare Earths, Panel Reports, 26 March 2014, paras. 7.451–2 and
7.459–60; cf. Espa and Oehl (2018), p. 10.
524Espa and Oehl (2018), p. 10. As such, the panel did not address issues of ownership more
generally, thus apparently reflecting a ‘general consensus’ that WTO disciplines are not applicable
to natural resources in their natural state, Yanovich (2011), p. 3. Consequently, ‘internationally
traded natural resources are treated as any other goods in WTO law’, Espa and Oehl (2018), p. 10, n
51. Nevertheless, as reflected in WTO DSB (2004) US – Softwood Lumber IV, Report of the
Appellate Body, 19 January 2004, para. 67, governmental decisions to subject resources in their
natural state to contractual arrangements may have the effect to expose them also to WTO
discipline; Yanovich (2011), p. 3.
525See Espa (2016). http://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2016/09/guest-post-new-raw-mate
rials-dispute-revives-trade-tensions-between-china-and-the-useu.html (last accessed 14 May 2021);
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like any other trade restriction, export quotas could well be justified as conservation
measures under Article XX:g GATT. GATT conformity of export quotas for such
purposes thus needs to be assessed on a case-by-case basis.526
From the systemic perspective approaching the overall legal framework of GCG,
the decisions raise questions regarding the scope of PSNR and the policy space that
should remain with states when implementing objectives of SD. If the dispute
settlement mechanism of an organisation aiming to liberalise global trade is compe-
tent to adjudicate whether or not an export restriction or other limitations on
domestic production actually constitutes a conservation measure or not, it at least
seems questionable whether this mechanism will bring about results that appear
well-founded also from the perspective of SD as the overall global agenda. Put
differently, what mechanism ensures the SD of the global economy? Is it sufficient to
have several mechanisms in place, which each on their own seek to implement the
primary objectives that they have been implemented for? Or is it time to seek more
clarity regarding how states need to balance their various obligations with regard to
socio-economic development and environmental protection? Without such clarity,
the imbalance between the three—economic, social and environmental—pillars of
SD may persist and could in fact thwart the entire SD agenda. In order to avoid SD to
become a mere scheme of ‘Mickey Mouse sustainability’527—and thus a ‘pretext’
for ever more economic growth—socio-environmental objectives need to be effec-
tively integrated into the functioning of the economy.528
What further complicates things and what so far does not seem to have been
addressed by any tribunal, court or—be it international or national—legislator, is the
relationship between domestic and global dimensions of SD. What if, for instance,
national SD policies, such as limitations on the extraction of Rare Earths, conflict
the panel in China–Rare Earths seems to have somewhat anticipated this critique and points to the
line of argument already put forward by the panel in China–Raw Materials that ‘a State’s
sovereignty is also expressed in its decision to ratify an international treaty and accept the benefits
and obligations that such ratification entails. In becoming a WTO Member, China has of course not
forfeited permanent sovereignty over its natural resources, which it enjoys as a natural corollary of
its statehood. Nor, (. . .) has China or any other WTO Member “given up” its right to adopt export
quotas or any other measure in pursuit of conservation. China has, however, agreed to exercise its
rights in conformity with WTO rules, and to respect WTO provisions when developing and
implementing policies to conserve exhaustible natural resources. . .’, WTO DSB (2014a) China –
Rare Earths, Panel Reports, 26 March 2014, para. 7.270; cf. Espa and Oehl (2018), p. 10.
526WTO DSB (2014a) China – Rare Earths, Panel Reports, 26 March 2014, para. 7.293; Espa and
Oehl (2018), p. 10. The debate points to pertinent systemic questions regarding the scope of PSNR
and the policy space, which objectives of SD allow for—an aspect, which we shall revisit in our
discussion of ICAs de lege ferenda in Sect. 5.2.2 below.
527The notion relates to the usual way to illustrate the three pillars of SD as three overlapping
circles, which turn into what looks like a ‘Mickey Mouse’ when the economic pillar is being
enlarged as the mouse’s ‘face’ and the social as well as environmental pillars are being reduced to
depict the small ‘ears’ of the mouse no longer overlapping with its ‘face’, thus depicting the
imbalance of the concept in favour of economic objectives, cf. Mulia et al. (2016).
528Mastering this challenge will require concrete legal guidelines—which could be established for
the commodity sector through ICAs de lege ferenda, cf. Sect. 5.2.2 below.
154 4 The Effectiveness of TCL
with global initiatives that push for the production of more renewable energies,
which require these commodities? As Espa has elaborated elsewhere, export restric-
tions and other limitations on commodity production can indeed constitute effective
instruments in mitigating resource exhaustion.529 However, the answer that one
gives regarding their legality may very well depend on the perspective that one
employs—of liberalising trade, protecting the environment, or perhaps fostering
SD. This raises questions regarding the relationship between national and global
SD objectives: Does international law give any sort of preference to one to the
disadvantage of the other? Should there be scenarios, in which a state may be
mandated by international law to extract and market specific resources globally?
4.3.3 Interim Conclusion
The structure of TCL provides a clear display of the qualifications of states’ PSNR.
While one could assume that each of these qualifications is held of at least equal
value,530 the degree to which it actually succeeds in disciplining a state’s action
depends on the design of the specific subset of norms pursuing that purpose. The
layout of TCL thus neatly illustrates the incongruences in effectiveness between the
separate sets of norms fostering the various objectives of GCG. The picture that this
layout creates is one of a regulatory landscape of GCG, which is imbalanced in
favour of economic objectives.
Without balancing mechanisms that remedy this status quo, states may continue
what many of them have done in the past: demonstrate the greatest respect for those
disciplines, which ‘bite’ the most—which dispose of the most clear-cut, compulsory
rules as well as the most rigorous, effective implementation mechanisms. Such is the
case for the obligation to protect investments in view of the ‘threat’ of binding
arbitral awards, and for WTO proceedings due to the ‘threat’ of economic backlashes
in the case of non-compliance with decisions rendered by the WTO DSB. What
fights for respecting their HR obligations, in contrast, is largely a ‘naming and
shaming’ mechanism based on the decisions issued by Human Rights bodies.531
529Espa and Oehl (2018), p. 9; extensively Espa (2015).
530In a Humanitarian tradition, and in view of the origins of the current international legal order in
the aftermath of WWII, safeguarding HR should clearly constitute the primary objective of
international law. Given that human beings require an environment to live in, the objective of
environmental protection likewise constitutes a fundamental objective of global governance.
Economic development, to the contrary, substantially relates to issues of wealth redistribution
between different groups—as long as no one disputes that it in general also constitutes an integral
part of sustaining human life, the question to what degree an economy should develop and what
instruments need to be put in place, cf. e.g. the ‘degrowth’ movement and its relationship to ‘post-
extractivism’ as summarised by Brand (2015), is a rather relative one in comparison to the more
absolute imperatives of protecting Human dignity, life and the Human habitat, i.e. our planet.
531The situation is similar regarding environmental obligations as illustrated for instance by the
system of ‘nationally determined contributions’ according to Article 4(2) Paris Agreement.
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Even where HR court systems have been established, non-compliance with such
judgments typically comes without greater—at least economic—repercussions.532
Overcoming this imbalance in favour of economic objectives—for instance by
implementing a sophisticated regime aiming to ensure sustainable commodity use—
therefore is a key challenge in fostering the effectiveness of TCL.
4.4 Regulatory Gaps Within the TCL Framework
Apart from the normative patterns of TCL discussed above, the effectiveness of TCL
is also limited in view of the regulatory gaps it exhibits. In this connection, we shall
distinguish between two kinds of regulatory gaps. For one, we can ascertain the fact
that to date there has been no multilateral undertaking to comprehensively regulate
the commodity sector on the global level.533 This could per se be seen as a regulatory
gap, especially given the great economic and developmental significance of the
sector. However, as this book has demonstrated, the international community has
already elaborated several sets of norms, which regulate the sector—despite the fact
that many of them do not reflect a conscious consideration of commodity activities.
This thus brings us back to the distinction between direct and indirect TCL. These
rules that are already in existence fill the gap, which originates from the inactivity of
global legislators in this respect.
They do so more or less effectively. One of the underlying hypotheses of this
book relates to direct TCL being the more effective tool in regulating the commodity
sector as opposed to indirect norms that are somewhat ‘accidentally’ also applicable
to commodity activities. What seems to confirm this hypothesis are the recent
developments in the field of GCG, which exhibit intensified activities by states,
IOs, NGOs, and the private sector that consciously reflect the specifics of commodity
governance and introduce corresponding initiatives, such as the EITI, the Kimberley
process, the EU Raw Materials Initiative or the like. All these initiatives appear to
bear within them the conviction that this particular topic requires to be dealt with
specifically and not simply as a subcategory to already existing transparency or
development frameworks and policies. The ‘drive’ towards specifically dealing with
commodity activities can therefore already be witnessed in various instances.
Against this backdrop, the conceptualisation of TCL shall pave the way for a gradual
evolution of the existing framework towards a more sophisticated, commodity-
directed legal regime.
Based on the conceptualisation of TCL, which we have provided in Chap. 3
above, we can now turn to the second kind of regulatory gaps—those subject-
matters, which are neither being addressed by rules of direct nor indirect TCL.
532However, as the example of the ECtHR demonstrates, HR court systems can lead to a remarkable
degree of compliance of member states. On respective challenges, however, Voeten (2017), p. 121.
533On respective attempts through ICAs, see Sect. 5.2.1 below.
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Evidently, given the complex nature of the sets of norms that the legal framework of
GCG is made up of, it would go beyond the scope of this book to claim that there
would be an absolute regulatory gap, i.e. that the subject-matter is not being
addressed by any rule or standard anywhere. For instance, domestic rules somewhere
may very well govern a certain subject-matter, yet without this rule thus far having
evolved to be of transnational scope.534 The claim to a regulatory gap here is thus
meant to be a relative one in the sense that transnational instruments so far do not
appear to cover the very subject matter. Also, the scope of this book allows covering
only a selection of regulatory issues that thus far are not addressed by TCL.
Given the finding that much of TCL qualifies as indirect TCL, it is little surprising
that many regulatory gaps occur where commodity activity is distinct from other
activities. For instance, there is no rule in Human Rights (HR) law, which provides
guidance on how responsibility chains in commodity-related HR violations should
be dealt with, i.e. which of the actors involved can and should be held account-
able.535 Given the MNE structures behind many commodity operations, as well as
complex supply/value chains, it can be particularly intricate to identify what actor is
accountable for what action. Commodity-directed HR law could impose specific
duties in this respect onto specific actors. Likewise, TCL so far does not provide
concrete guidance on how typical power asymmetries with regard to land tenure
between e.g. indigenous peoples, small- and large-scale landowners or also between
ethnic groups should be remedied.536
Generally speaking, the transnational legal framework appears to lack effective
remedies against harmful conduct of transnational corporations (TNCs).537 Given
the corporate structure especially of commodity companies, which often spans
considerable parts of the entire globe,538 holding corporations accountable for
violations of HR or environmental laws through national enforcement mechanisms
has proved difficult in the past.539 Especially ‘lifting the corporate veil’, can
constitute a significant legal obstacle in holding corporate parents accountable for
rights violations committed by or attributable to their subsidiary entities.540 One
534On what domestic rules have been considered to constitute significant transnational norms and
thus feature in our conceptualisation of TCL, see Sect. 3.3 above.
535Bürgi Bonanomi et al. (2015), p. 31.
536Bürgi Bonanomi et al. (2015), p. 35.
537Skinner (2014), pp. 171–173.
538The highly capital-intensive extractive industries are particularly subject to domination by
MNEs, Neelankavil and Rai (2015), p. 135.
539Skinner (2014), p. 171.
540Lindsay et al. (2013), p. 58; Skinner (2014) in this respect has identified eight barriers, mostly in
a US context, which impede plaintiffs from successfully litigating against TNCs. They include
i.a. lack of access to judicial remedies for extraterritorial harms in general; the forum non conveniens
doctrine; limited liability and limited personal jurisdiction; the unsettled standard for proving
vicarious liability; as well as practical hurdles, such as costs of litigation and evidentiary matters,
Skinner (2014), pp. 196–247. She moreover alludes to the fact that the ICJ (1970) Barcelona
Traction, Judgment of 5 February 1970, paras. 56–58 has not only recognised the limited liability of
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prominent example of this difficulty in international case law is the Kiobel case,
which involved a Nigerian applicant, who sought remedy for HR violations, and
Royal Dutch Petroleum as respondent.541
It appears evident that in scenarios, in which a commodity TNC headquartered in
the economic ‘centre’ of the globe commits or contributes to HR violations in a host
state, which is unable or unwilling to offer the respective victims effective access to
justice, the home state courts of this corporation will have a role to play.542 In this
connection, it is worthy to note various incidents of case law in the EU, in which
courts have assumed jurisdiction over extraterritorial claims, therefore providing
victims with effective remedies.543
Moreover, the question may arise whether SD requires states to refrain from
granting companies aiming to pursue ‘high-input agro-industrial agriculture’ respec-
tive licenses given their potential effects on agrobiodiversity.544 Again, TCL cur-
rently here may simply require the state to conduct an EIA and to balance the three
pillars of SD, yet does not provide any guidance on how this balancing exercise
should be carried out. The same holds true regarding best practices for government
support of local SD impacts—and the overall regulation of global commodity
markets for that purpose.545 Another topic may be clashes between global, national,
and local SD interests.546
Furthermore, TCL provides little to no guidance on how foreign investments as
well as trade need to be designed in order to foster a sustainable commodity
sector.547 The UNCTAD Sustainable Investment Framework for instance, while
a parent company for rights violations of its subsidiaries, but also the concept of ‘lifting the
corporate veil’, Skinner (2014), pp. 215–216.
541US Supreme Court (2013) Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Judgment of 17 April 2013;
cf. Skinner (2014), pp. 159–162.
542See Skinner (2014), p. 183, who, based on the ‘respect, protect, remedy’ framework of the UN
GP, recognises a duty for states ‘to ensure that there are no barriers preventing victims from seeking
remedies against transnational businesses, especially where victims cannot access legal remedies in
their host countries.’
543Holly (2017); the facts of the Vedanta case concern alleged harmful releases from a Zambian
copper mine into local waterways, ibid. The UK Supreme Court (2019) in its Judgment of 10 April
2019, UKSC 2017/0185, https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/uksc-2017-0185.html (both last
accessed 14 May 2021) confirmed the jurisdiction of English courts. Holly, ibid, also points to
the decision in Arrondissementsrechtbank Den Haag (2013) Akpan v. Royal Dutch Shell, Case No
C/09/337050/HA ZA 09-1580, Judgment of 30 January 2013, in which a Dutch district court
awarded damages to a Nigerian farmer due to harm suffered in connection with an oil spill caused
by negligence of one of Shell’s subsidiary companies. Especially in light of the restrictive
interpretation of the ATS by the US Supreme Court in Kiobel, Sanders (2014), p. 4 contends that
henceforth UK courts may represent the more promising forum for enforcing HR obligations
of TNCs.
544Bürgi Bonanomi et al. (2015), p. 35, who claim that even scientific studies on the effects of such
undertakings are still ‘largely lacking’.
545Bürgi Bonanomi et al. (2015), p. 35.
546Bürgi Bonanomi et al. (2015), p. 37; cf. already Sect. 4.3.2 above.
547Bürgi Bonanomi et al. (2015), p. 50.
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somewhat consciously reflecting a consideration for commodity activities and thus
constituting direct TCL, provides rather abstract guidance. Direct TCL could define
those areas, in which respecting domestic policy space is particularly important and
simultaneously spell out how such policy space should be used. It could moreover
define parameters for commodity investments fostering SD—and as a result confine
investment protection exclusively to those investments that meet these criteria.548
When it comes to commodity trade, similar questions ensue, such as adequate
policy space for SD measures, integrating market incentives that foster sustainability
in trade disciplines, or how to support states in achieving an ‘optimal degree of
commodity export dependence’.549 Current trade rules largely consist of indirect
TCL and therefore do not exhibit an adequate balance of trade liberalisation with the
imperatives of SD, which is based on commodity trade. Given that these imperatives
may differ according to the type of commodity that is being traded, a sector-specific
approach to rebalancing these rules might have to be sought.550
In terms of the fight against corruption, drafting a comprehensive, multilateral
civil law convention dealing with corporate liability in the commodity sector could
help further narrow down loopholes in the existing transnational framework.551
Moreover, a duty to cooperate exists in environmental law as an international
obligation between states; however, there is no transnational norm that regulates
how the stakeholders involved in commodity activities should collaborate.
In situations of armed conflict, commodity deposits can be protected as part of the
environment, civilian objects or property,552 yet there is no commodity-directed
provision in place. The existing framework insofar creates several lacunae: there is
no prohibition to damage the environment in a non-international armed conflict
(NIAC); the prohibition to damage indispensable civilian objects only applies to
natural resources, which are needed for the survival of the population; the ‘prohibi-
tion against pillage only applies to the plundering of natural resources for personal
gain, thereby excluding the exploitation of natural resources by or under the author-
ity of the government for the purpose of financing the armed conflict’;553 and the
prohibition to cause widespread, long-term, and severe damage sets such a high
threshold that it excludes most forms of damage to the environment from its
scope.554
548Bürgi Bonanomi et al. (2015), p. 50; cf. already Sect. 4.3.1.5 above.
549Bürgi Bonanomi et al. (2015), p. 51.
550Bürgi Bonanomi et al. (2015), p. 52.
551Cf. the CoE Civil Law Convention on Corruption (ECLC) as mentioned in Sect. 4.2.1.5 above as
well as the TCL outline in the annex below.
552Cf. Sect. 4.2.1.4 above.
553Dam-de Jong (2010), p. 54; with a summary of all the lacunae mentioned above, pp. 53–54.
554For instance, the setting on fire of Iraqi oil fields as well as NATO bombardments in Yugoslavia
were not considered to reach that threshold, Dam-de Jong (2010), p. 54; with a similar result:
Vöneky and Wolfrum (2016), para. 49.
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4.5 Interim Conclusion
As we have seen, TCL is effective where it fosters sustainable use. This requires
specific, commodity-directed rules, which form a coherent framework and detail
how equilibrium between the interests associated with commodity activity can be
achieved. Our analysis has brought about that the effectiveness of TCL is limited in
view of the following normative patterns:
Most of TCL is ‘indirect’, i.e. it has not been created for the purpose of regulating
commodity activity. As such, it is not designed to balance commodity interests, but
rather pursues distinct regulatory objectives.
The rather scarce incidents of hard, direct TCL are neither balancing commodity
interests comprehensively. Instead, they typically balance a maximum of two com-
modity interests with one another; at times three where for instance environmental
protection norms are being integrated with those protecting Human Rights. Besides,
as the examples of the law applicable to shared resources as well as the norms
covering trade and development within the GATT have demonstrated, those hard
rules of direct TCL that address states tend to contribute little to remedying com-
modity policy trade-offs. They will either be aimed at achieving a mere inter-state
balance or, where they could remedy for instance a trade-off between economic and
development interests, are ‘declaratory’ rather than of substantial legal effect.
Moreover, direct TCL is largely of soft or private legal nature, thus unfolding
little legal effect on states’ actions. The latter, however, are naturally the central
actors regarding decisions to extract. Also, we noted that rules addressing private
actors, especially those that are intended to cover particular commodity sectors, tend
to be more specific than the rather abstract rules addressing states. Another pattern,
which hinders coherence and thus limits balancing effects of TCL, are the few
incidents of full integration between its rules and standards.
Apart from that, what both contributes to the limited effectiveness of TCL and
illustrates this status quo, is the imbalance of the current framework in favour of
economic objectives—primarily investment protection and trade liberalisation.
Overcoming this imbalance constitutes a major challenge in rendering TCL more
effective.
Lastly, the TCL framework exhibits regulatory gaps especially with regard to
aspects of commodity activity that are distinct from other activities. It particularly
lacks effective remedies against harmful conduct of transnational corporations. Also,
it does not address potential clashes between global, national, and local SD objec-
tives; provides little to no guidance on how foreign investments as well as trade need
to be designed in order to foster a functional commodity sector; and does not spell
out what constitutes adequate policy space for SD measures.
All in all, the current TCL framework barely contours what sustainable commod-
ity use legally requires. It is thus little effective in ensuring a functional commodity
sector.
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Fostering the Effectiveness of TCL
What fosters the effectiveness of Transnational Commodity Law (TCL) is to render
the sustainable use principle as effective as possible. For that purpose, we shall first
turn to some reflections on how the normative potential of sustainable development
(SD) as a legal concept can be unfolded (Sect. 5.1). Secondly, we will turn to
International Commodity Agreements (ICAs) as potential instruments codifying
what sustainable commodity use requires (Sect. 5.2).
5.1 Unfolding the Normative Potential of SD
To my mind, there are two ways to unfold the normative potential of SD: By defining
it as the object and purpose of TCL (Sect. 5.1.1) and by employing the technique of
full integration in order to more concretely delineate what ‘sustainable use’ means
(Sect. 5.1.2). Both will lead to a more coherent—and thus more effective—TCL
framework.
5.1.1 Defining SD as the Object and Purpose of TCL
This section is ultimately dedicated to displaying the ramifications of defining
sustainable development (SD) as the object and purpose of TCL (Sect. 5.1.1.3). In
order to arrive at these observations, I, shall first, however, exhibit the origins, core
conceptual contents, and general legal effects of SD (Sect. 5.1.1.1). Moreover, I will
provide an aperçu of the discussion on the legal nature of SD as well as a series of
© The Author(s) 2022
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arguments to support my claim that it constitutes a regulatory objective (Sect.
5.1.1.2).1
5.1.1.1 Conceptual and Normative Characteristics of SD
Subsequently, we shall revisit the origins (Sect. 5.1.1.1.1), core conceptual contents
(Sect. 5.1.1.1.2) as well as general legal effects (Sect. 5.1.1.1.3) of SD.
5.1.1.1.1 The Origins of SD as a Political Objective
The concept of SD has evolved remarkably over the past decades. While the origins
of the notion of sustainability lie in theories on sustainable forest management from
the eighteenth century, it had increasingly been referenced in the context of whole-
some economic growth since the 1970s.2
SD as a concept made its appearance on the stage of international politics in 1980
through the publication of the International Union for Conservation of Nature
(IUCN) World Conservation Strategy, which carried the subtitle Living Resource
Conservation for Sustainable Development.3 When the Brundtland report was
released in 1987, the SD gained significant popularity. According to the report, SD
was defined as a ‘development that meets the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.’4
In the following, ‘SD featured prominently in the 1992 Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, which in its Principle #1 puts human beings at the
centre of concerns for SD.’5 As another result of the Rio conference, a far-reaching
process regarding a ‘new global partnership for sustainable development’ was set in
1The following section essentially summarises the core arguments I have put forward in
Oehl (2019).
2Proelß (2017), para. 50; Gehne (2011), pp. 11, 21 with reference to the UN GA (1970) Interna-
tional development strategy for the second United Nations development decade, 24 October 1970,
UN Doc. A/RES/2626(XXV), http://www.un-documents.net/a25r2626.htm (last accessed 14 May
2021); cf. Oehl (2019), p. 7.
3Cf. Oehl (2019), p. 7 pointing also to the prior UN GA International Development Strategy for the
Third United Nations Development Decade, 5 December 1980, UN Doc. A/RES/35/56; cf. Beyerlin
(2013), para. 3.
4World Commission on Environment and Development (1987) Report: our common future,
4 August 1987, UN Doc. A/42/427, http://www.un-documents.net/our-common-future.pdf (last
accessed 14 May 2021), chapter 1, para. 49; Oehl (2019), p. 7.
5Oehl (2019), p. 7. Moreover, it is expressly referred to in principles 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 12, 20, 21, 22, 24
and 27 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 12 August 1992, UN Doc.
A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I), http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1annex1.htm
(last accessed 14 May 2021); cf. ibid.
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motion by the so-called Agenda 216—a process, which eventually led to the central
status of SD within international relations today.
The 2000 Millennium Development Goals featured environmental sustainability
as Goal #7. In 2002, the Johannesburg World Summit was dedicated entirely to
SD. The World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) Plan of Implementa-
tion, which resulted from it, ‘explicitly built on the achievements since the 1992 Rio
conference and covered a broad range of SD-related issues from poverty eradication,
consumption and production patterns, natural resource management as base of
economic and social development, health and SD to the institutional framework
for SD.’7 In 2005, the UN General Assembly in its World Summit Outcome
Resolution reaffirmed SD as a ‘key element of the overarching framework of United
Nations activities.’8
The international community reiterated its commitment to SD at the so-called
Rio + 20 conference in 2012. Henceforth, SD was particularly being summarised by
referring to ‘three constituent elements’: economic as well as social development and
environmental protection.9 As a means to concentrate the common efforts on
concrete objectives, the outcome document demanded the compilation of sustainable
development goals (SDGs).10
The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which carries the title
Transforming Our World, spells out these SDGs. The UN General Assembly, in
its 2015 Resolution, describes the introduction of this agenda as an ‘historic decision
on a comprehensive, far-reaching and people-centred set of universal and transfor-
mative Goals and targets.’11 As I have put it elsewhere,
[t]he SD Agenda marks the end point of the evolution of SD from a notion originating in
forest management and later gaining relevance in environmental protection policy to the
universal political agenda of our time. Mindful of the great weight this agenda carries, the
UN General Assembly describes it as: “. . .an Agenda of unprecedented scope and signifi-
cance. It is accepted by all countries and is applicable to all, taking into account different
national realities, capacities and levels of development and respecting national policies and
6Cf. Beyerlin (2013), para. 5; Oehl (2019), p. 8.
7Oehl (2019), p. 8 referring to the Plan of implementation of the world summit on sustainable
development, 4 September 2002, UN Doc. A/CONF.199/20, http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/
documents/WSSD_POI_PD/English/WSSD_PlanImpl.pdf (last accessed 14 May 2021).
8UN GA (2005) World summit outcome, 24 October 2015, UN Doc. A/RES60/1, http://www.un.
org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol¼A/RES/60/1 (last accessed 14 May 2021), para. 10;
cf. Oehl (2019), p. 8.
9UN GA (2012) The future we want, 11 September 2012, UN Doc. A/RES/66/288, http://www.un.
org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol¼A/RES/66/288&Lang¼E (last accessed 14 May 2021), para.
1; Oehl (2019), p. 8.
10UN GA (2012) The future we want, 11 September 2012, UN Doc. A/RES/66/288, http://www.un.
org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol¼A/RES/66/288&Lang¼E (last accessed 14 May 2021), para.
246; Oehl (2019), p. 8.
11UN GA (2015) Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, Reso-
lution A/RES/70/1, 25 September 2015, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol¼A/
RES/70/1&Lang¼E (last accessed 14 May 2021), para. 2; Oehl (2019), p. 8.
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priorities. These are universal goals and targets which involve the entire world, developed
and developing countries alike. They are integrated and indivisible and balance the three
dimensions of sustainable development.”12
5.1.1.1.2 The Core Conceptual Contents of SD
Over the past decade, the core conceptual contents of SD have emerged quite clearly.
While the Brundtland report was initially based on especially an intergenerational
understanding of SD, thus emphasising planetary conservation for the sake of future
generations, SD gradually evolved ‘to a concept that puts human beings and their
need for sufficient socio-economic development at the centre’, therefore integrating
intragenerational elements, ‘yet without fully abandoning the intergenerational
perspective.’13
When it comes to legal terms, principle 4 of the non-binding 1992 Rio Declara-
tion first put the concept of SD into the operational language of what resembles a
legal norm by stating that
[i]n order to achieve sustainable development, environmental protection shall constitute an
integral part of the development process and cannot be considered in isolation from it.14
As Barral points out, the synthesis of the various international documents featur-
ing SD exhibits a remarkable degree of consistency with regard to the core concept
of SD.15 Since the adoption of the 1997 Programme for the Further Implementation
of Agenda 21, SD is generally being referred to as requiring ‘the integration of its
economic, environmental and social components.’16 The 2002 WSSD Plan of
Implementation describes SD as consisting of the ‘interdependent and mutually
reinforcing pillars’ of ‘economic development, social development and environmen-
tal protection.’17 This definition of SD has, worded only slightly differently, been
used repetitively in numerous international documents, including the 2005 World
12UN GA (2015) Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, Reso-
lution A/RES/70/1, 25 September 2015, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol¼A/
RES/70/1&Lang¼E (last accessed 14 May 2021), para. 5; Oehl (2019), pp. 89.
13Oehl (2019), pp. 910, referring to Barral (2012), pp. 380–381 who ‘defines the element of
socio-economic growth as a matter of the intragenerational, the element of environmental protec-
tion as the intergenerational equity that SD postulates’.
14Oehl (2019), p. 10.
15Barral (2012), p. 380; cf. Oehl (2019), pp. 1011 with an overview of relevant documents.
16UN GA (1997) Programme for the further implementation of agenda 21, 28 June 1997, UN Doc.
A/RES/S-19/2, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/244113 (last accessed 14 May 2021), annex,
para. 3; Oehl (2019), p. 12.
17UN (2002) Plan of implementation of the world summit on sustainable development, 4 September
2002, UN Doc. A/CONF.199/20, http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/WSSD_POI_PD/
English/WSSD_PlanImpl.pdf (last accessed 14 May 2021), para. 2; Oehl (2019), p. 12.
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Summit Outcome,18 the Rio+20 outcome document ‘The Future We Want’19 or the
SD Agenda.20
These definitions of SD, as well as the ones employed by international legal
scholars,21 convey the ‘three constituent elements of SD: environmental protection,
social and economic development.’22 Consequently, the core conceptual content of
SD ‘can be defined as the consolidation of socio-economic development and envi-
ronmental protection.’23
Around these conceptual contents of SD, international legal scholarship has
conceptualised what it defines as International SD Law—the corpus of international
law, which addresses the relevant intersections of international environmental,
economic and social law, towards SD.24 This body of law has been further
characterised by the 2002 New Delhi Principles Relating to SD, which have been
elaborated by the International Law Association. The non-exhaustive seven princi-
ples include the duty of States to ensure sustainable use of natural resources; the
principle of equity and the eradication of poverty; the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities; the principle of the precautionary approach to human
health, natural resources and ecosystems; the principle of public participation and
access to information and justice; the principle of good governance; and the principle
of integration and interrelationship, in particular in relation to human rights and
social, economic and environmental objectives.25
5.1.1.1.3 The General Legal Effects of SD
Apart from these characterisations of SD, naturally its legal effects are particularly
pertinent to our further discussion. They can generally be said to be twofold.
18UN GA (2005) World summit outcome, 24 October 2015, UN Doc. A/RES60/1, http://www.un.
org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol¼A/RES/60/1 (last accessed 14 May 2021), para. 10.
19UN GA (2012) The future we want, 11 September 2012, UN Doc. A/RES/66/288, http://www.un.
org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol¼A/RES/66/288&Lang¼E (last accessed 14 May 2021),
para. 3.
20UN GA (2015) Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, Reso-
lution A/RES/70/1, 25 September 2015, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol¼A/
RES/70/1&Lang¼E (last accessed 14 May 2021), para. 2; cf. Oehl (2019), p. 12.
21Oehl (2019), p. 12 pointing to the characterisation of ‘SD as the “conceptual bridge” between
right to social and economic development and the imperative to protect the environment’ by
Cordonier Segger and Weeramantry (2017), p. 6.
22Oehl (2019), p. 12.
23Oehl (2019), p. 12.
24CISDL (2005) What is sustainable development law, CISDL concept paper, Montreal, 2005,
http://cisdl.org/public/docs/What%20is%20Sustainable%20Development.pdf (last accessed
14 May 2021), p. 1; Oehl (2019), p. 13.
25ILA (2002); Oehl (2019), p. 13.
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For one, it constitutes a primary norm that obliges states to ‘act sustainably’,
i.e. to carry out a balancing exercise between the social, economic and environmen-
tal pillars of SD before taking (regulatory, e.g. legislative, or other) action. This
effect is for instance reflected in the cases Gabcikovo-Nagymaros and Pulp Mills.26
Barral insofar describes an ‘obligation of means’, which states need to abide
by. They only need to make the necessary efforts of carrying out the balancing
exercise and are not required to arrive at a specific result.27
For the other, SD also exhibits a methodical dimension in that it serves as a
guideline how legal obligations shall be interpreted.28 This is naturally the effect,
where SD forms part of a specific treaty, such as the WTO agreement that was
subject to the WTO Appellate Body’s decision in US-Shrimp.29 Accordingly, SD
has been said to add ‘colour, texture and shading’ to the challenge of interpreting the
term ‘exhaustible natural resources’ according to Article XX(g) GATT, thus being
employed as an interpretation guideline.30
5.1.1.2 The Legal Nature of SD
To date, there has been much debate regarding the legal status of SD as for instance,
a principle of international law, an ‘interstitial’ norm or a primary rule (Sect.
5.1.1.2.1). To my mind, it can best be classified as regulatory objective
(Sect. 5.1.1.2.2).
5.1.1.2.1 The General Debate
There has generally for long been a wide spectrum of opinions on the legal nature of
SD. While some authors have argued that SD merely constitutes a political ideal that
is void of any normative force,31 others have categorised SD as a ‘meta principle’ or
26ICJ (1997) Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, Judgment of 25 September 1997; ICJ (2010a) Pulp
Mills on the River Uruguay, Judgment of 20 April 2010.
27Barral (2012), p. 388; Oehl (2019), p. 14. However, as we will discuss in detail in Sect. 5.1.2
below, not only the SDGs and their targets and sub-targets respectively are specifying what exactly
is required from states, but potentially all norms that are being fully integrated into the ‘sustainable
use’ rule.
28Oehl (2019), pp. 14–15; the operation of SD as a primary norm can be observed e.g. in ICJ (1997)
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, Judgment of 25 September 1997; ICJ (2010a) Pulp Mills on the
River Uruguay, Judgment of 20 April 2010; as well as PCA (2005) Iron Rhine arbitration, Award
of 24 May 2005. Its application as a methodical norm is demonstrated e.g. in WTO DSB (1998)
US – Shrimps, Report of the Appellate Body, 12 October 1998, para. 153; Gehne (2011), p. 294.
29WTO DSB (1998) US – Shrimps, Report of the Appellate Body, 12 October 1998, para. 153;
cf. Gehne (2011), p. 294.
30Cf. Barral (2012), p. 392; Oehl (2019), p. 15.
31Beyerlin (2007), pp. 444–445; cf. Proelß (2017) para. 53; also Beyerlin (2013), para. 19; cf. Oehl
(2019), p. 16.
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‘constitutional guiding concept’.32 These meta principles have been said to ‘set the
bounds for the types of proposals and arguments that can be made’ during interna-
tional negotiations. They thus ‘establish the context’ for codifications of concrete
norms, for instance in international treaties.33 Insofar, Lowe described SD as
forming part of the category of ‘modifying’ or ‘interstitial’ norms that ‘are pushing
and pulling the boundaries of true primary norms’ where they interfere.34 These
norms do ‘not seek to regulate the conduct of legal persons directly.’35 Instead, they
particularly apply when it comes to interpreting the law.36
Whereas this viewpoint was quite dominant within international legal scholarship
for some time, authors appear to have increasingly abandoned it in the more recent
past.37 For instance, Proelß argues that categorizing SD as a ‘modifying’—and
therefore secondary—norm of international law allows moving beyond discussions
about its customary status as a primary norm.38 Also other authors identify a clear
rule, which SD is setting forth—one that obliges states to ‘act sustainably’ or, more
precisely, ‘to balance social, economic and ecological interests.’39
Still, what classical international law would now require from legal scholarship,
would be a categorisation of SD according to the types of sources spelled out in
Article 38 ICJ Statute. In fact, there has been quite some debate whether SD could be
qualified as a principle of international law.40 Koskenniemi in this context points to
the constructivist exercise, which needs to be performed for a new principle to
emerge. Yet, according to Virally ‘. . .the existence or non-existence of common
principles is a question of fact to be solved by examination rather than a priori
opinion.’41 This view may perhaps be the one of most international lawyers today,
who perceive principles as ‘generalizing descriptions of certain regularities in State
behaviour’42—a view that may have been responsible for the ‘continued and
genuine reluctance to formalise a distinctive legal status’ of SD that the ILA scholars
witnessed.43
32Scheyli (2008), pp. 296–298, 352–353; cf. Proelß (2017), para. 53; cf. Oehl (2019), p. 16.
33Bodansky (2009), p. 203; cf. Proelß (2017), para. 53; cf. Oehl (2019), p. 16.
34Lowe (1999), pp. 31, 33; cf. Proelß (2017), para. 53; Beyerlin (2013), para. 17.
35Lowe (1999), p. 33; cf. Barral (2012), p. 387; cf. Oehl (2019), p. 16.
36Gehne (2011), pp. 32–322; Lowe (1999), p. 34; cf. Barral (2012), p. 387; cf. Oehl (2019), p. 16.
37Oehl (2019), p. 16.
38Proelß (2017), para. 54; cf. Oehl (2019), p. 17.
39Cf. Oehl (2019), p. 17 pointing to Barral (2012), p. 378, who ‘refers to SD as a primary norm of
international law, which “purports to directly regulate conduct and has properly material and direct
legal implications”’; also Barral (2012), p. 388; Gehne (2011), p. 314; Proelß (2017), paras. 54–55.
Proelß (2017), para. 56 views this rule as part of customary international law.
40Oehl (2019), pp. 1719.
41Virally (1968), p. 147; cf. Koskenniemi (2000), p. 385; cf. Oehl (2019), p. 19.
42Koskenniemi (2000), p. 385; cf. Oehl (2019), p. 19.
43ILA (2012), p. 36; Oehl (2019), p. 19.
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Proceeding further down this path, we would now have to examine the large
volume of international treaties, guidance documents and jurisprudence in order to
assess whether SD can be said to constitute a principle of international law. This
approach essentially limits legal analysis with regard to an emerging principle or rule
to a ‘matter of relative numbers’.44 While some would deem the results it would
bring about to be sufficient for ascertaining the existence of a legal principle or rule
of SD, others would presumably disagree.45
In this context, allow me to point to the problems that rigid approaches to
identifying emerging norms of international law can create for the international
legal order.46 As Jennings, referring to customary international law, wrote in 1981,
the international community needs to
face squarely the fact that the orthodox tests of custom – practice and opinio juris – are often
not only inadequate but even irrelevant for the identification of much new law today. And the
reason is not far to seek: much of this new law is not custom at all, and does not even
resemble custom. It is recent, it is innovatory, it involves topical policy decisions and it is
often the focus of contention.47
According to Jennings, we need to apply Article 38 ICJ Statute as well as the
respective methodologies applicable to identifying sources of international law in a
way that is mindful of the fact that they originate from the 1920s—and could thus be
somewhat out-dated. He argues that ‘mould[ing]’ the more recent phenomena of
emerging new law ‘into one or the other compartments [of Article 38 ICJ Statute]’
would constitute a mistake.48 In his view, new modes of how rules of international
law emerge, necessitate more flexible methodological approaches to examining
them.49 This relates to his additional observation that jurisprudence as well as
international legal scholarship may be of greater significance than ever before with
regard
to bring[ing] certainty and clarity in the places where the mass of material evidences is so
large and confused, as to obscure the basic distinction between law and proposal.50
44ICJ (2012) Jurisdictional Immunities, dissenting opinion of Judge Yusuf, p. 297; cf. Oehl
(2019), p. 21.
45Oehl (2019), p. 20 i.a. pointing to the separate opinion of Vice-President Weeramantry to ICJ
(1997) Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, Judgment of 25 September 1997, p. 104 ‘who already in
1997 saw “plentiful indications”, which justify giving “the principle of sustainable development the
nature of customary law”.’ In favour also Proelß (2017), para. 56; Barral (2012), p. 386; arguably
Sands (2012), p. 217 as well. Cautious Cordonier Segger (2017), p. 92. Against Beyerlin (2013),
para. 18; Lowe (1999), p. 33.
46In lieu of many Jennings (1998), p. 737 indicating the challenges in elaborating or modifying
customary international law during the interwar period; cf. Oehl (2019), p. 20.
47Jennings (1998), p. 738; cf. Oehl (2019), p. 20.
48Jennings (1998), p. 742; cf. Oehl (2019), p. 20.
49Cf. ILA (2012), p. 6; Oehl (2019), p. 20.
50Jennings (1998), p. 749; Oehl (2019), p. 21.
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Also with regard to SD, a substantial volume of international documents and
proof of state practice exists, yet hitherto these materials have brought about rather
confusion than clarity. This may well be perceived as a call for international legal
scholars to contribute more clarity, be it through their respective functions as
international judges or publicists.51
However, it appears unlikely that judges and publicists will be able to provide the
former President of the ICJ with satisfying responses—that is if they continue to
adhere to an analysis of the law that resembles a ‘matter of relative numbers.’
Koskenniemi pointed out that the idea that a judge would be finding a principle—
or, for that matter, any other emerging rule—by carrying out some sort of empirical
exercise describes an ideal, but generally not reality.52 Rather, judges are
constructing principles or rules based on their perceptions of what are the funda-
mental goals and values of the international legal order.53
Yet, what the empirical approach may entail, is the benefit of providing interna-
tional law making with some sort of reliable, objective parameters, which may thus
help convince many of the legitimacy and objectivity of the law itself. In contrast,
the constructivist approach,
decreases the reliability of the law making exercise since the constructions of the funda-
mental goals and values that serve as the testing ground for new rules may differ from,
particularly, judge to judge that is performing the task.54
When it comes to SD, however, the constructivist approach does not appear to
face these kinds of challenges. In view of the international community’s acceptance
of SD as its universal agenda—which is even specified by respective goals, targets
and sub-targets—the ‘normative testing ground’ is exposed quite concretely and
unambiguously. This scenario constitutes an opportunity for international jurispru-
dence and international publicists respectively to elaborate norms that find vast
support within the international community. Naturally, balancing the diverging
interests and understandings between (state) actors becomes more intricate the
more concrete the rules that are being elaborated are required to be. Yet, given the
widely anticipated need to establish more specific legal guidance for SD, there may
well be still sufficient room for ascertaining new norms even before one enters these
challenging realms.55
To conclude, however, I would like to point out that whether or not SD has
acquired the status of a principle of international to my mind is of rather secondary
importance—if not even a ‘sterile’ question as the ILA scholars expressed in 2008.56
Whereas also the judges at the ICJ—as reflected in their decision in the Gabcikovo-
51Oehl (2019), p. 21.
52Koskenniemi (2000), p. 389; Oehl (2019), p. 21.
53Cf. also Shaw (2017), p. 52. On the ‘myth of (in)determinacy’ in international law, Bianchi
(2010); Oehl (2019), p. 21.
54Oehl (2019), p. 21; cf. Koskenniemi (2000), p. 396.
55Oehl (2019), p. 22.
56ILA (2008), p. 7; cf. ILA (2012), p. 6; Oehl (2019), p. 22.
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Nagymaros case and Judge Weeramantry’s separate opinion respectively—were
divided on this issue, we should rather bear in mind the guidance received from
President Jennings. SD indeed appears to be a ‘perfect example for a legal concept
that deserves to “be released from the shackles of legal formalism in order to be
given operational meaning”, because in the end, what really counts are the practical,
legal effects it elicits.’57 The subsequent section will display how abandoning the
classical ‘boxes’ of the sources of international law allows to not only fittingly
categorize SD, but also ‘to conflate its legal effects as a primary rule and a
methodical norm.’58
5.1.1.2.2 SD as Regulatory Objective
To my mind, SD constitutes a fundamental regulatory objective of the international
legal order. In the following, I shall provide a series of arguments to support this
claim.
5.1.1.2.2.1 Political Objectives Typically Evolve to Regulatory Objectives
The first argument relates to the observation that political objectives typically sooner
or later evolve to become regulatory objectives. They are normally being formulated
as the outcome of corresponding decision-making processes within governments. As
soon as a political objective has been established, the government generally moves
to the implementation phase. Presumably all states, yet certainly their majority, take
legalmeasures whenever they are pursuing an objective.59 Therefore, on the national
level, an openly articulated political objective typically evolves to a regulatory
objective of those legal instruments, which are being introduced to attain it.
The situation on the international level is quite similar. Once the respective
decision-making process within for instance a UN institution, such as the UN
General Assembly or the Security Council, has brought about a shared political
objective, members typically adopt a resolution in its pursuit. Routinely, the political
objective is being included in a preambulatory paragraph—thus henceforth consti-
tuting the regulatory objective of the respective resolution, which its operative
paragraphs are intended to fulfil.60 Even in incidents, in which the international
community first articulates the objective exclusively in a declaratory, non-legal
manner, this is typically followed by the introduction of international or national
57Oehl (2019), p. 22, i.a. pointing to Sands (2012), p. 217 ‘who states in a nonchalant manner that
SD “is recognized as principle (or concept) of international law”’; ILA (2012), p. 6.
58Oehl (2019), p. 22.
59Oehl (2019), p. 23 pointing to the fact that even repressive regimes and dictatorships ‘tend to
carry out their actions in legal form. cf. only the disastrous example of Nazi Germany, which
exhibited a rule of law that served the most unlawful purposes, including war crimes and the
Holocaust.’
60Oehl (2019), p. 23.
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legal instruments later on.61 In this context, the ‘aspirational’ nature of the SDGs
referenced in e.g. the Rio+20 outcome document or the SD agenda does not rebut the
claim that SD is a regulatory objective: Whereas its specific goals and targets may
be aspirational, the measures introduced by governments, as actors tasked with
driving the implementation of the SD agenda,62 will generally be of a legal
nature—and thus pursue SD as regulatory objective.63
Furthermore, while it can naturally not be ruled out that in some exceptional
cases, a political objective is never being included in any legal instrument and
therefore never evolves to a regulatory objective, there are no indications that SD
is one of these rare exceptions. While we have seen above that there had been
substantial debate among international legal scholars about the normative nature of
SD, the discussants did not examine the quality of SD as a regulatory objective and
consequently also did not provide a statement to the contrary.64 Instead, the ICJ
referred to it as a ‘concept’ of international law, thereby avoiding any more explicit
remark about its legal nature. In fact, the WTO Appellate Body stated in its decision
in US-Shrimps that the WTO Agreement ‘explicitly acknowledges “the objective of
sustainable development”.’65 Therefore, by interpreting individual provisions in its
light, i.e. employing the technique of teleological interpretation, the Appellate Body
essentially applied SD as a regulatory objective.66 As we will see subsequently, there
are several further examples of international agreements, including the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) or the Convention
on Biological Diversity (CBD), which feature SD as a regulatory objective.67
5.1.1.2.2.2 Law Fosters the Development of Society
What moreover supports the claim that SD constitutes a regulatory objective, is its
conceptual content. This argument relates to the observation that in general,
61Oehl (2019), p. 23 referring to the example of the 2002 WSSD Plan of Implementation, UN Doc.
A/CONF.199/20, http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/WSSD_POI_PD/English/WSSD_
PlanImpl.pdf (last accessed 14 May 2021), para. 162(a).
62UN GA (2015) Resolution A/RES/70/1, 25 September 2015, Transforming our world: the 2030
Agenda for Sustainable Development. http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol¼A/
RES/70/1&Lang¼E (last accessed 14 May 2021), paras. 39–47; Oehl (2019), p. 24.
63Oehl (2019), p. 23 pointing to ‘the catalogue of measures that states shall implement in order to
foster SD in UN GA (2015), para. 41: “We recognize that these will include the mobilization of
financial resources as well as capacity building and the transfer of environmentally sound technol-
ogies to developing countries on favourable terms, including on concessional and preferential
terms, as mutually agreed. Public finance, both domestic and international, will play a vital role
in providing essential services and public goods and in catalysing other sources of finance.”
Naturally the implementation of such measures requires legal instruments.’
64Oehl (2019), p. 24; Cordonier Segger (2017), p. 72 refers to a ‘search in the wrong direction’.
65Oehl (2019), p. 24; WTO DSB (1998) US – Shrimps, Report of the Appellate Body, 12 October
1998, WT/DS58/AB/R, para. 129.
66On the ‘teleological school of thought’ briefly Shaw (2017), p. 707; cf. Oehl (2019), p. 25.
67Cf. Sect. 5.1.1.2.2.3 below.
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law is conceptually meant to ultimately foster the development of the respective society it
applies for. Every individual instrument, in fact every rule, contributes its modest or greater
part to the functioning of a greater whole, which is at least intended to or portrayed as
advancing the development of its constituents.68
With regard to the international legal order, in this connection even rather
‘remote’ fields, such as the law of consular relations can be interpreted as ultimately
serving the objective of development: By disciplining international relations, it adds
to stable diplomacy and therefore ideally peace—which constitutes a major precon-
dition for a society’s development.69 We can make the same claim in regard to any
rule of international law, however with naturally varying lengths of the ‘causal
chain’ between the norm’s individual command and the ultimate objective of
development.70
Therefore, one can quite easily argue that law, as a general concept, ultimately
serves the objective of development of society; in spite of naturally remaining
debates on the right approaches in pursuing development between the various
stakeholders, the law is generally ‘at least intended to’ or, in states ruled by a
rogue government, ‘portrayed as’ promoting development.71
5.1.1.2.2.3 SD as Regulatory Objective in International Treaties
The various international agreements, which reference SD, typically include it as
regulatory objective.72 This holds true i.a. with regard to Articles 2 and 3-
(4) UNFCCC; Articles 1 and 8(e) CBD; Articles 2 and 4(2)(b) of the 1994 UN
Convention to Combat Desertification and Drought; Article 1(c) of the 1994 Inter-
national Tropical Timber Agreement; Article 1(3) of the 2007 International Coffee
Agreement; Article 1(2) of the 2015 International Agreement on Olive Oil and
Table Olives; Article 1 of the 2010 International Cocoa Agreement;73 Article 2 of
the 1995 Straddling Stocks Convention; the preamble of the 1994 WTO agreement;
as well as Article 2(1) of the 2015 Paris Agreement.74
Moreover, SD also features in the preamble of the 1991 (Espoo) Convention on
Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context; the preamble of the
68Oehl (2019), p. 25.
69Oehl (2019), p. 25; ibid., n 131 more extensively on how the international legal order regulates
war as well as its characterisation by Sen (1999), pp. 34 as an ‘unfreedom’, which needs to be
removed for societies to prosper.
70Oehl (2019), p. 25; ibid., n 132 discussing further examples, including International Humanitarian
Law and procedural rules of international courts and tribunals.
71Oehl (2019), p. 26; ibid., n 133 referring to the relationship between this observation and the
important contributions of the TWAIL movement, as i.a. expressed by Mutua and Anghie (2000);
cf. also Oehl (2019), pp. 2628 on the evolution of the development objective from a purely
economic understanding to the integrated model of SD.
72Oehl (2019), p. 29; UN GA (2015), para. 5.
73More extensively on International Commodity Agreements, see Sect. 5.2 below.
74Oehl (2019), p. 29.
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1992 (Ospar) Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-
East Atlantic; Articles 2, 10 and 12 of the 1998 UNFCCC Kyoto Protocol; Article
4(3) of the 2004 Barcelona Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean;
Article 2(3) of the 1998 Danube River Protection Convention; Articles 1.1 and 6.2
lit. f) of the 2009 FAO International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and
Agriculture (‘Seed Treaty’);75 Article 1(2)(a) of the Energy Charter Treaty; the
preamble as well as Article 915(c) of the NAFTA; Article 1(2) of the 2001
EU-ACP Cotonou Agreement; Article 1(a) of the 2008 EU-CARIFORUM Eco-
nomic Partnership Agreement (EPA); Article 1(a) of the 2016 EU-SADC-EPA; the
preamble, Articles 22.1 and 24.2 of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade
Agreement (CETA); Article 3 of the 2014 EU-Ukraine Association Agreement; as
well as Articles 3(3) and (5), 21(2)(d) and (f) of the EU-treaty and Article 11 of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the EU.76 Likewise, the German commodity partner-
ship agreements with Kazakhstan, Mongolia and Peru feature the objective of SD.77
These provisions attest that SD in numerous instances has been codified as a
regulatory objective within international agreements. As we shall learn subse-
quently, SD can also operate as a regulatory objective outside of these treaty
regimes.78
5.1.1.2.2.4 SD as Regulatory Objective Beyond Treaty Regimes
As the ILA scholars have emphasised in their 2012 Guiding Statement #2,
treaties and rules of customary international law should, as far as possible, be interpreted in
the light of principles of sustainable development and interpretations which might seem to
undermine the goal of sustainable development should only take precedence where to do
otherwise would be to undermine territorial boundaries and other fundamental aspects of the
global legal order, would otherwise infringe the express wording of a treaty or would breach
a rule of jus cogens[.]79
The ILA scholars here are essentially advocating to apply SD in a way, which ‘is
tantamount to the teleological interpretation of all treaties and custom in the light of
SD and its related principles respectively.’80 Within domestic legal systems, these
effects are typically caused by constitutional objectives—all law generally needs to
be interpreted in their light. Only where they interfere with other norms or
75Cf. Cordonier Segger (2017), p. 81; Oehl (2019), p. 30.
76Oehl (2019), p. 2930; cf. also the catalogues provided by Schrijver (2017), p. 100 and Barral
(2012), p. 388, Fn. 59. On the EU-CARIFORUM-EPA and SD as an objective Grosse Ruse-Kahn
(2010).
77Oehl (2019), p. 30; on the German commodity partnership agreements, cf. also Sect. 5.2.1.2.3.1
below.
78Oehl (2019), p. 29.
79ILA (2012), p. 36; Oehl (2019), p. 31.
80Oehl (2019), p. 31.
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objectives, which are equally of constitutional value, a balance needs to be struck
between them and the latter.
Moreover, as expressed by the ICJ in its Gabcikovo-Nagymaros and Pulp Mills
decisions, the award in Iron Rhine, and the ILA scholars in their Guiding Statement
#3 states are held to ‘act sustainably’, that is to perform the necessary balancing
exercise whenever they take action. Therefore, ‘not only existing law needs to be
interpreted in light of SD, but also new law that is being created—or any measures
that are being taken—needs to be designed mindful of the objectives of SD.’81
These twofold effects of SD, as a methodical norm on the one hand and a primary
norm on the other, are characteristic for the operation of an object and purpose of, for
instance, a field of law or constitution.82
Turning to deliberations on legal doctrine, the question arises how such effects of
SD within the international legal order can be explicated and legitimised.83 One
approach would lie in classifying the primary rule of SD as a rule of customary
international law.84 In that context, the methodical norm, which SD entails, could be
perceived as a principle of international law, which is likewise derived from custom.
Yet, as a consequence, the typical challenges related to the identification of new
custom would occur. Paradigmatically, while some authors ascertained a customary
status of SD—others have not.85
An alternative approach would consist of categorising SD as a general principle,
which is derived from domestic law and applies to international relations. However,
such endeavour would confront similar challenges as the ones of identifying custom.
A sort of comparative exercise between different legal orders would need be carried
out, which would presumably bring about equally ambiguous results.86
Therefore, it appears to be purposive as well as simpler ‘to leave the classical
“boxes” of Article 38 of the ICJ Statute and recognize the fact that SD may constitute
a source of international law in its own right—as a fundamental object and purpose
of international law.’87
What can be said to follow from this categorization regarding the normative force
of SD beyond the treaties in which it features? One initial step could lie in examining
whether SD can be qualified as a sort of ‘customary object and purpose’. In order to
81Oehl (2019), p. 31.
82Oehl (2019), p. 31.
83Barral (2012), p. 391 appears to see such effects of SD as an “extraneous conventional rule” and
thus regardless of its status as international custom; cf. Oehl (2019), p. 31.
84Proelß (2017), para. 56; Barral (2012), p. 386; cf. Oehl (2019), p. 31.
85Cf. already above, Sect. 5.1.1.2.1; Oehl (2019), p. 32.
86Oehl (2019), p. 32.
87Oehl (2019), p. 32, pointing to Cordonier Segger (2017), p. 93 as well as Schrijver (2017), p. 101;
referencing SD as an ‘objective’ also ICJ (2010a) Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, Judgment of
20 April 2010, p. 74, para. 177; on the need to leave the ‘boxes’ of Article 38 ICJ Statute cf. Sect.
5.1.1.2.1 above on the remarks by Jennings (1998).
188 5 Fostering the Effectiveness of TCL
do so, ‘one would have to conduct the usual “two factor test” and analyse relevant
state practice as well as corresponding opinio juris.’88
Yet, in view of the special nature of SD, this approach does not appear to be
appropriate, as it does not adequately capture the legal value, which states have
assigned to SD:
While the element of state practice can be held to maintain its relevance also when
examining the normative force of a regulatory objective, the subjective element of opinio
juris needs to be modified given that we are dealing with a different type of norm. Instead of
asking whether states considered SD to entail a legal obligation, we shall ask – more
precisely – whether they wanted to set SD as a regulatory objective, thus expressing their
consent to the typical legal effects it brings about. Given the natural “kinship” between
political and regulatory objectives, the proliferation of SD as a regulatory objective in
international treaty law, the fact that law generally seeks to foster development and the
universal nature of the SD Agenda I believe that there are good reasons to answer this
question in the positive.89
Therefore, SD can unfold its normative effects beyond the treaty regimes, in
which it expressly features.90
5.1.1.3 The Legal Impact of SD as the Object and Purpose of TCL
As I have demonstrated, there are good reasons to qualify SD as the regulatory
objective of fields of international law.
When it comes to Natural Resources Law (NRL), as ‘the field of law, which
regulates all [natural resources]-related activities, especially exploration, exploita-
tion or other commercial usage, and preservation’,91 I arrived at this conclusion, after
having observed the manifold factual interrelations between the SD agenda and
natural resources, as well as particularly after having studied the applicable juris-
prudence and legal instruments. When it comes to international jurisprudence,
‘nearly all prominent cases dealing with SD as a legal concept [. . .] relate to natural
resources.’92 Moreover, most international agreements that refer to SD are part of
88Oehl (2019), p. 32. In addition, one could examine the ‘fundamental norm creating character’ of
SD, cf. Cordonier Segger (2017), pp. 69–72.
89Oehl (2019), p. 32.
90Oehl (2019), p. 33; ibid., n 156 pointing to the line of argument by Barral (2012), p. 394 with
reference to the Iron Rhine decision. Accordingly, ‘this external normative force can be of such
intensity as to even “revise” an individual treaty norm. According to Article XII of the 1839 Treaty,
Belgium would have had to bear the costs for the construction of the railway, while in the end the
tribunal, interpreting the provision i.a. in light of SD, ruled that costs would have to be shared
between the Parties, i.a. in order to factor in the obligation carried by the Netherlands to construct
the railway in conformity with contemporary environmental standards’ (original emphasis);
cf. PCA (2005) Iron Rhine arbitration, award of 24 May 2005, pp. 115–121.
91Oehl (2019), p. 6.
92Oehl (2019), p. 33.
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NRL; also international legal scholarship on NRL is vocal in relying on SD as a
‘foundational reference.’93
Furthermore, the principles of international law relating to SD are of great
importance in NRL:94
Such is evident regarding the duty of States to ensure sustainable use of natural resources
(principle #1) and the precautionary approach to human health, natural resources and
ecosystems (principle #4). The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities
(principle #3) must be borne in mind in NR protection efforts, particularly with regard to
shared resources. Evidently, good governance (principle #6) is key when it comes to
sustainably managing NR (and thus fulfilling the duty of principle #1), including the need
to ensure adequate public participation and access to information and justice (principle #5)
for all stakeholders concerned by a particular NR activity and pursuing integrated
approaches in particular in relation to human rights and social, economic and environmental
objectives (principle #7). Correctly managed, NR activities contribute to both inter- and
intragenerational equity and to the eradication of poverty (principle #2).95
Now what follows from these observations regarding NRL for our appraisal
of TCL? Both fields significantly overlap, with TCL exhibiting the narrower
scope. Recalling our statement from above, the focus on commodities, instead of
natural resources alludes to the ‘stronger economic connotation’ of TCL.96 It
focuses exclusively on those items originating from natural resources [. . .] that are typically
being traded and/or refined/processed for specific end uses as e.g. foodstuffs or industrial
goods.97
TCL provides the more suitable framework and terminology
whenever one is seeking to address this specific economic use of natural resources—or, for
that matter more precisely, commodities. In this sense, the broader field of NRL appears to
be the more favourable concept whenever, beyond their use as commodities also other
economic usages of natural resources, such as navigation, or energy generation and their
related governance challenges are concerned.98
Given that TCL thus constitutes a subcategory of NRL, we can infer that SD also
constitutes the regulatory objective of this field of law focusing on commodities. This
is all the more so, in view of the interrelations between commodity operations and
SD objectives, which may be even greater—at least in terms of the economic
93Wälde (2004), p. 119; Oehl (2019), p. 34.
94The ILA principles consist of the following seven principles: (1) The duty of States to ensure
sustainable use of natural resources; (2) The principle of equity and the eradication of poverty;
(3) The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities; (4) The principle of the precau-
tionary approach to human health, natural resources and ecosystems, (5) The principle of public
participation and access to information and justice; (6) The principle of good governance; (7) The
principle of integration and interrelationship, in particular in relation to human rights and social,
economic and environmental objectives, ILA (2002).
95Oehl (2019), pp. 34–35.
96Oehl (2019), p. 6.
97Oehl (2019), p. 6, n 20.
98Oehl (2019), p. 6, n 20.
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significance of commodity trade as compared to other uses of natural resources.99
The sustainable use principle constitutes the concretisation of the broader principle
of SD in a natural resource or commodity context100—fostering SD in connection
with commodity activity means using resources sustainably.
Consequently, SD guides the elaboration, application and interpretation of all
norms of TCL. Sustainable use not only constitutes a balancing norm of TCL.
Through TCL, all stakeholders are held to ‘act sustainably’;101 the norms of TCL
need to be interpreted in a way so as to give the greatest possible effect to SD.
Through this mode of operation, SD constitutes the pattern cohering the
fragmented body of TCL. By defining SD as the object and purpose of TCL, it
provides a guideline for balancing conflicts between individual rules, interests and
respective norms, as well as entire norm subsets (or ‘branches’). As a consequence,
over time those norms, which appear to rather impede respective aspects of SD will
either—within the boundaries set by the wording of the rule—be (re-)interpreted so
as to reinforce its effect in the interest of SD or be replaced by more conducive rules.
These developments will gradually cohere TCL—towards the sub-branch of Sus-
tainable Development Law (SDL), which regulates commodity activity.102
The fact that SD has this effect, is most instructively illustrated by the example of
permanent sovereignty over natural resources (PSNR). As we have seen above, the
principle of PSNR has evolved gradually from a mere competence norm to a
principle, which requires states to use natural resources sustainably.103 In light of
our observations above, it seems natural that this is the consequence of SD having
become accepted not only as the universal political agenda of the current era, but also
as the fundamental object and purpose of TCL.104
99In view of the great economic interrelations of the globalised economy and the fact that
commodities constitute a major precondition for any industrial value creation, it relates intensively
to matters of international economic equity, cf. Sect. 2.1.2 above.
100Oehl (2019), p. 35.
101Cf. Gehne (2011), p. 314.
102See already Oehl (2019), p. 35: NRL as a sub-branch of SDL. SDL has been defined as the
‘intersection of social, ecological and economic subject-matters of international law’, Oehl (2019),
p. 13; Gehne (2011), p. 54; CISDL (2005), p. 1. Yet, as I have already indicated elsewhere, in view
of the universal nature of SD and against the backdrop of its dogmatic understanding as a
fundamental regulatory objective of international law, it would not seem to be entirely abstruse to
classify SD as the ultimate object and purpose of all of international law—which would therefore in
its aggregate become SDL, Oehl (2019), p. 35.
103Beyond that, Cabrera Medaglia and Perron-Welch (2018a, b) see the PSNR principle as
increasingly intertwined with an obligation to share the benefits from commodity operations
equitably.
104See already Oehl (2019), pp. 8–9, 36 with regard to NRL.
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5.1.2 Operationalising SD Through Full Integration
Yet, evidently the normative content of SD is still rather broad. While it may require
norm addressees to carry out a balancing exercise between its three pillars, there
have for long existed little to no guidelines on how this balancing exercise should be
performed.105 The same holds true with regard to the sustainable use principle as its
commodity-directed emanation. What currently prevents the sustainable use princi-
ple from more regulatory vigour, are its broad terms. If we are to take sustainability
seriously, we need to be more specific. The full integration technique to my mind is a
promising way to proceed.
The terms, which define the sustainable use principle, such as ‘rational’, ‘devel-
opment’, ‘rights of indigenous peoples’, or the ‘needs of future generations’, need to
gradually be determined by using concrete benchmarks. As has become clear
throughout our analysis of the substance of TCL, this body of law provides a vast
volume of material in this respect. As a consequence, ‘sustainable use’ could require
states not only to comply with the principle themselves, but also to take legislative
and regulatory measures, which ensure that commodity activities performed by their
state-owned enterprises (SOEs), corporate, and natural citizens, or on their territory
respectively be carried out in accordance with these benchmarks.106 In addition to
legislators, this finding is also addressed to the judiciary, which appears to be quite
well suited to develop more specific guidelines, which detail the legal obligations
that ‘flow’ from SD in a commodity context.107
However, given the complexity of the task, the enterprise of elaborating such a
sophisticated TCL framework will be challenging. It will require to identify the ‘best
rules’, which shall serve as benchmarks. In this regard, the new possibilities pro-
vided by computational text analysis may be part of the solution.108 Moreover, the
interaction of the instruments used needs to be properly coordinated and especially
integrated in a quest for coherence.
One of the challenges in detailing the obligations that stem from SD quite
naturally lies in the imperative to confer sufficient regulatory space to actors
operating below the global, i.e. on regional, but especially national and local levels.
Evidently, what constitutes sustainable practice needs to be determined to a signif-
icant degree on a case-by-case basis. However, there also is a certain grey area
between the individual case-level on the one hand and the guidance currently
provided by—in this ascending order in terms of level of detail—SD, the SDGs,
and corresponding publications on the other.
105Oehl (2019), p. 17, n 90 pointing to Proelß (2017), para. 56.
106On the potential to codify this obligation in International Commodity Agreements (ICAs) de lege
ferenda, see Sect. 5.2.2.1.4 below.
107Cf. Cordonier Segger and Weeramantry (2017), pp. 5–6.
108It is hoped that the TCL outline provided in the annex in that respect may be a useful starting
point.
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The 17 goals, as well as their targets and sub-targets considerably specify what
exactly SD means. However, they do so—in accordance with their name—primarily
by laying out benchmarks that need to be met by a certain date. When it comes to the
measures that might lead the global community to reach these benchmarks, the
SDGs generally do not specify what practices are in effect sustainable and which
ones are not. Such, however, could of course still rather easily be done through
programmes or initiatives complementing the respective SDGs, targets and
sub-targets.109 In this grey area, what needs to be done more intensively on the
global level is to establish a selection of best practices, from which national and local
regulators as well as other stakeholders could then choose.110 This is arguably also
the intention of the substantial volume of so-called SDG maps, atlases and matrices
issued by international organisations, NGOs and research institutes.111
The UN Global Compact’s SDG Industry Matrix on Energy, Natural Resources
and Chemicals provides one example in this connection. With regard to SDG 12, for
instance, it i.a. recommends to ‘[w]henever possible, collect previously used mate-
rials and repurpose them instead of extracting new raw materials.’112 Specifying in
what scenarios such repurposing is in fact ‘possible’—e.g. by providing a list of
circumstances or previous uses that typically require repurposing—could further
sharpen this best practice. International standard setting bodies that dispose of
sophisticated technical expertise, such as ISO, could play an important role in further
breaking down what sustainable practices mean in the commodity sector and its
various subsectors respectively.
Apart from these ‘legal design’ challenges, also corresponding implementation
mechanisms need to be elaborated, which would effectively be tasked with ensuring
the SD of the global commodity sector. It appears natural that parts of the answer in
that respect will lie in decentralised multistakeholder formats, which are being
combined with legally binding enforcement mechanisms.
109See e.g. High Level Political Forum on SD (2014) 10-Year Framework of Programmes on
Sustainable Consumption and Production Patterns, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/
documents/1444HLPF_10YFP2.pdf (last accessed 14 May 2021), which was launched formally
before the introduction of the SDGs and appears to be little specific itself.
110For instance, through binding ICAs de lege ferenda, see Sect. 5.2.2 below.
111UNDP (2016); UN GC (2017); IPIECA (2017). What SD means with regard to investment
policy, has been detailed e.g. by UNCTAD (2015). Cf. also the ICC Business Charter for
Sustainable Development as well as the CERES roadmap, which both seek to enhance sustainability
in business operations; for more examples cf. the TCL outline in the annex.
112UN GC (2017), p. 42.
5.1 Unfolding the Normative Potential of SD 193
5.1.3 Learning from International Labour Law
When analysing the substance of TCL, one area—or norm subset—exhibits a
remarkable degree of coherence: the one of international labour law. Core Interna-
tional Labour Organisation (ILO) conventions not only apply to states, but also
feature in many standards addressing private actors, particularly enterprises. Not
surprisingly, a study on the state of sustainability initiatives found that ‘virtually all
initiatives requir[e] compliance with core ILO conventions. . .’.113
While the International Bill of Human Rights (HR) likewise constitutes a widely
accepted set of norms, TCL standards addressing private actors refer to it less
frequently than to transnational labour norms. This may be due not least to the
very nature of labour law. Employers can generally organise work according to their
will. Thus, they are assuming a pivotal role in protecting the labour rights of their
‘subordinate’ employees.114 Consequently, labour norms quite naturally need to
address businesses as private actors directly.
As we have seen above, business respect for HR is ensured by the UN Guiding
Principles for Business and Human Rights (UN GP), which then in turn are pointing
to the International Bill of HR, according to UN GP #12. Through this latter
‘technique’, obligations designed primarily for state-citizen relationships are being
translated into voluntary commitments for business actors to do their part to respect
these obligations.
ILO conventions, to the contrary, are from the outset being drafted based on a
tripartite approach, which involves states, as well as employer and employee repre-
sentatives. As research has found, the involvement of the so-called Governance
Triangle consisting of states, businesses, and NGOs in regulatory endeavours is a
key factor for building sufficient regulatory capacity in tackling transnational chal-
lenges.115 The wide proliferation and acceptance of labour norms in both classical
international law as well as private standards appears to confirm the research on the
importance of the Governance Triangle being involved in transnational regulation.
This wide acceptance has also led to the relatively higher degree of coherence that
one can observe with regard to these norms as opposed to other norms of TCL: The
more accepted a certain norm set is, the more readily drafters of new agreements and
standards may include it in their works—therefore contributing to a coherent overall
framework as regards this particular field of labour regulation. As a result, these
tripartite approaches involving the Governance Triangle in creating transnational
regulatory frameworks may be another ingredient towards producing a coherent,
effective legal field.
Yet, apart from the tripartite approach, another element of international labour
regulation may be relevant in the ‘quest for coherence’.116 Instead of relying on
113IISD (2010), p. vii.
114Cf. Preis and Temming (2020), pp. 1, 30; in this connection speaking of an ‘imbalance of
power’, Bercusson (2009), p. 336.
115Abbott and Snidal (2009); Beinisch (2017), p. 3.
116Aagaard (2010), p. 229; cf. Sect. 3.1 above.
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purely voluntary standards, ILO conventions are legally binding upon member
states. As a consequence, states are held to implement the labour rules in their
domestic legal systems. When doing so, the tripartite, multi-stakeholder origins of
these rules may foster compliance by businesses and therefore lead to a further
consolidation of these norms. A lesson learned from transnational labour regulation
for cohering legal fields may therefore be to combine tripartite approaches with
binding international agreements.
This lesson relates to the more abstract question on what level of multilevel
governance duties of corporations should be regulated to what extent. Currently, on
the global level typically merely some voluntary benchmarks are being set, whereas
the actual legally binding regulation occurs primarily on the national level. This
i.a. corresponds to the discussion within the international legal community whether
or not to introduce a legally binding convention on corporate accountability.117 As
for instance the International Finance Corporation (IFC) Standards and the Equator
Principles, which are said to be ‘key driver[s] for improvements’ regarding the
environmental and social impact of commodity companies,118 show, global
standard-setting may prove to be particularly useful when it comes to creating a
coherent regulatory environment conducive to SD. If corporate accountability, as
well as other issues of SD for that matter, continue to be specified largely on the
national level, there is a high risk that national approaches will conflict with one
another,119 thus leaving behind an incoherent regulatory framework, which does not
effectively foster a functional commodity sector.
5.1.4 Interim Conclusion
The aim of fostering the effectiveness of TCL corresponds with the objective of
creating a coherent field of law—and vice versa. ‘Taxonomy inevitably and inher-
ently is a quest for coherence’.120 As such, ‘legal taxonomy may advocate for
particular norms to draw aspects of the field together, as well as create paradigms
117UN (2003) Norms on the responsibilities of transnational corporations and other business
enterprises with regard to human rights, UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection
of HR, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2, https://undocs.org/en/E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/
Rev.2; UN HRC (2014) Elaboration of an international legally binding instrument on transnational
corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights, Resolution 26/9 of 26 June
2014, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G14/082/52/PDF/G1408252.pdf?
OpenElement; OHCHR (2019) Revised draft of 16 July 2019, https://www.ohchr.org/
Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/WGTransCorp/OEIGWG_RevisedDraft_LBI.pdf (all last
accessed 14 May 2021).
118Lindsay et al. (2013), p. 46.
119On potential conflicts between global, regional and national SD objectives and measures,
cf. already Sects. 4.3.2 and 4.4 above.
120Aagaard (2010), p. 229.
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under which a particular field is understood.’121 Coherence is ‘the strength, simplic-
ity, and predominance of the field’s patterns’.122
This chapter illustrated how SD can serve as the ‘cohering pattern’ of TCL. In
accordance with the methodological foundations we have cast in Chap. 3 above,
coherence here is understood as the ‘flexible’ concept advocated for by Ruger.123
Yet, even from the perspective of more narrow understandings of the concept, which
i.a. require ‘linear historical development’ and ‘a high level of institutional specifi-
cation and centralization’,124 TCL can claim to exhibit at least indications of
coherence in view of its historical normative bases of i.a. the Havana Charter and
International Commodity Agreements (ICAs), as well as the institutionalisation
which ensued in the form of international commodity organisations (ICOs), the
Common Fund for Commodities (CFC) and—to a certain degree—UNCTAD over-
all. Thus, our understanding—in line with Ruger—is more ‘flexible’ especially with
regard to the remaining two requirements of ‘internal logic’ and ‘essential legal
form’, which ultimately corresponds with the concepts of ‘governance’ and ‘trans-
nationalism’, as introduced and discussed in Chaps. 2 and 3 respectively that this
treatise is based on.
SD constitutes the object and purpose of this field of law. It draws the various
objectives and norm subsets together, constitutes the paradigm under which the field
of TCL is understood,125 and therefore opens avenues towards cohering the legal
framework of GCG. By fully integrating benchmarks from the vast body of TCL into
the terms, which define the sustainable use principle, the entire field gains simplicity,
and therefore regulatory vigour. Involving the governance triangle in this process
may serve to enhance its acceptance as a legal concept, thus further reinforcing the
field’s coherence and effectiveness.
5.2 ICAs as Instruments Specifying Sustainable
Commodity Use
Beyond this challenge of coherence, our analysis of the current TCL framework has
revealed several parameters, which limit its effectiveness. We have seen that it
consists of too many indirect, soft, and private norms, many of which lack sufficient
specificity, particularly where they address states. Therefore, what would remedy
121Tai (2015), p. 120. She moreover points out that ‘[c]oherence [. . .] comes with a number of
benefits’, which include ‘ease of learning, practicing, and theorising within that defined field. They
also include more pragmatic concerns, such as more legitimacy within the legal academy, where
coherence is regarded as important for academic legitimacy’, Tai (2015), p. 120.
122Aagaard (2010), p. 231; cf. Sect. 3.1 above.
123Ruger (2008), p. 648, cf. Sect. 3.1 above.
124Ruger (2008), p. 629, cf. Sect. 3.1 above.
125Cf. Tai (2015), p. 120.
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these deficits would be instruments codifying direct, hard, specific, state-oriented
law, which balances all five commodity interest comprehensively. Instruments that
appear suitable in this respect are international agreements regulating commodity
activity—International Commodity Agreements. They can foster the effectiveness of
TCL where they codify balancing norms—and thus spell out more precisely what
sustainable use means.
Subsequently, we shall first analyse current types of ICAs, whereby we will focus
particularly on whether they provide balancing norms, or at least guidance that
addresses some of the commodity policy trade-offs (Sect. 5.2.1). Second, we will,
based on these findings, reflect on how ICAs de lege ferenda could be designed to
foster the effectiveness of TCL (Sect. 5.2.2).
5.2.1 Analysis of Current ICAs
This section assesses the relevance of current International Commodity Agreements
(ICAs) for GCG.126 The chapter first outlines and categorises the types of ICAs,
which currently feature in the international legal order (Sect. 5.2.1.1). Second, it
analyses ICAs sensu originali and a selection of central ICAs sensu stricto, partic-
ularly their object and purpose, substantive provisions and dispute settlement mech-
anisms (Sect. 5.2.1.2). Third, some reflections on the role of ICAs sensu lato in GCG
will be shared (Sect. 5.2.1.3). Lastly, an interim conclusion will be drawn regarding
the current relevance of the different types of ICAs in GCG (Sect. 5.2.1.4).
5.2.1.1 Types of ICAs
We shall distinguish between ICAs sensu originali (Sect. 5.2.1.1.1), sensu stricto
(Sect. 5.2.1.1.2) and sensu lato (Sect. 5.2.1.1.3).
5.2.1.1.1 ICAs sensu originali
The category of ICAs sensu originali stands for those commodity agreements that
were paradigmatic for the market-interventionist approach of the 1970s and 80s.127
ICAs ‘in the original sense’ were instruments seeking to rebalance the economic
126This chapter is exclusively confined to ‘international agreements’ in the sense of ‘treaties’
according to Article 2(1)(a) VCLT, which are concluded between states, can dispose of any possible
designation and be of bi-, pluri-, or multilateral nature. Private standards, working groups and other
initiatives, which are not of inter-state or treaty character, are thus being excluded here. See however
Sect. 5.2.2 on how ICAs de lege ferenda and these non-inter-state and/or non-treaty instruments
may intertwine in the future.
127Cf. Sect. 2.2.3 above on the NIEO-UNCTAD phase of global commodity policy.
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equilibrium between consumers and producers by maintaining stable commodity
prices. The Havana Charter explicitly addressed ICAs (using the term ‘Inter-Gov-
ernmental Commodity Agreements’) and established a series of principles applicable
to them, but refrained from giving an abstract definition.128 The term ‘ICA’ has
become most commonly known in connection with the agreements negotiated under
the auspices of UNCTAD as an element of establishing the New International
Economic Order (NIEO). Article 1(2) of the Agreement Establishing the Common
Fund for Commodities (CFC), which builds on Articles 60(d) and 63(b) Havana
Charter,129 provides the authoritative definition of this type of ICAs. Accordingly,
ICAs sensu originali were defined as
[a]ny intergovernmental agreement or arrangement to promote international cooperation in a
commodity, the parties to which include producers and consumers covering the bulk of
world trade in the commodity concerned.130
The definition’s qualification ‘covering the bulk of world trade in the commodity
concerned’ demonstrates that UNCTAD’s approach was explicitly targeting multi-
lateral commodity agreements (since bilateral relations will generally not cover the
‘bulk of world trade’ in a specific commodity). Likewise excluded are development,
free trade, partnership, environmental, and diplomatic agreements, which are gen-
erally not intended ‘to promote international cooperation in a commodity’. Also,
these agreements will ordinarily not cover the bulk of world trade in a specific
commodity.
‘Original’ ICAs therefore constitute commodity-specific instruments and thus
belong to the category of ‘direct TCL’ delineated above. Their scope, legal nature
and effectiveness were subject to several comprehensive studies within international
legal scholarship between the 1960s and mid-1990s.131
However, as has been outlined above, all of the market-interventionist devices of
these ICAs had been abandoned by the mid-1990s in view of the emerging doctrine
of liberalised markets, which has been prevailing since. While some agreements
were vacated entirely,132 many others have been transformed into cooperation
128Cf. Articles 55–70 HC.
129Desta (2010), paras. 17–19.
130Article 1(2) CFC Agreement, UN treaty collection (2019) Agreement establishing the CFC,
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1989/06/19890619%2004-23%20AM/Ch_XIX_21p.pdf (last
accessed 14 May 2021); Chimni (1987), p. 33.
131The most pertinent treatises were elaborated by Johnston (1976); Khan (1982); Chimni (1987);
Weberpals (1989); and Pelikahn (1990), summary of the monograph available at Pelikahn (1988).
Other works, in chronological order, are the ones provided by Wenzel (1961); Greve (1961); Knote
(1964); Bohrisch (1965); Thees (1967); Krappel (1975); Rudolph (1983); Habermayer (1984);
Hoffmeyer et al. (1988); Michaelowa and Naini (1994); Raffaelli (1995); see also the comprehen-
sive study—the only one of its kind thus far—on international commodity law in general by
Jaenicke et al. (1977–1986), summarised by Mertens and Spindler (1989).
132Historical treaties that have been abandoned e.g. include the International Wheat Agreement
(replaced by the International Grains Agreement in 1995); the International Natural Rubber
Agreement (terminated on 30 September 1999, effective 13 October 1999, Resolution
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agreements, such as the International Coffee Agreement, the International Tropical
Timber Agreement, or the International Cocoa Agreement. A full list of these
transformed ICAs sensu originali as well as an analysis of their objectives and
substantive provisions will be provided in Sect. 5.2.1.2.2 below.
5.2.1.1.2 ICAs sensu stricto
The second category of ICAs consists of those agreements that do not constitute
ICAs in the original sense, i.e. do not fit the definition of Article 1(2) of the CFC
Agreement, yet still are explicitly directed at the regulation of commodity activities.
Explicitness here implies that these agreements exhibit an express, ‘conscious
consideration for the specificities of commodity activities.’133 Like ICAs sensu
originali, these ICAs sensu stricto therefore form part of direct TCL. This is what
distinguishes them from indirect TCL and ICAs sensu lato. ICAs sensu stricto shall
be defined as
international agreements, which, in whole or in part, are explicitly directed at the regulation
of commodity activity or particular aspects of the latter.
Thus, examples of ICAs sensu stricto include diverse forms of treaties, such as
the OPEC statute, the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource
Activities (CRAMRA), Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS), Bilateral Commodity Agreements (BCAs), including German
commodity partnerships, as well as the ASEAN Agreement on the Conservation
of Nature and Natural Resources and ILO Convention 176 concerning Safety and
Health in Mines. As reflected for instance in the case of Part XI of UNCLOS,
agreements, which are not themselves commodity-directed, may nevertheless con-
tain entire chapters dedicated to commodity activities.134
212 (XXXXI) International Rubber Council); in reaction to the termination of the agreement,
Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand initiated the International Rubber Consortium in 2001, https://
ircorubber.com/about-us/ (last accessed 14May 2021); the International Tin Agreement (terminated
on 31 June 1989); the International Agreement on Jute and Jute Products (terminated on 11 April
2000); the International Bovine Meat Agreement (terminated on 30 September 1997, effective
31 December 1997); cf. Desta (2010), paras. 26–27; Gilbert (2011), pp. 21–22; on the geopolitical
backdrop see already Sect. 1.2.3 above. On erstwhile commodity cartels—which do not constitute
ICAs sensu originali–, cf. e.g. the 1935 World Copper Agreement or the 1972 International
Uranium Cartel, Desta (2010), para. 15.
133Aagaard (2010), p. 262 as well as already Chap. 4 above.
134Given that these norms constitute a commodity-directed normative subsystem, regardless of their
inclusion in an agreement of broader or a different overall scope, the UNCLOS for our purposes
shall be studied as part of our analysis of ICA sensu stricto. Those international agreements,
which—from the perspective of GCG—operate in even more remote spheres, could therefore be
described as ICAs sensu latissimo. These agreements may have some sort of impact on commodity
activities, but one that will only be discernible when one closely analyses the corresponding
normative ‘causal chain’. Evidently, there is little to gain from an analysis of these ‘remote’ legal
instruments for the purposes of our investigation, which seeks to identify those international
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5.2.1.1.3 ICAs sensu lato
The third and last category of ICAs consists of those agreements, which significantly
impact commodity activities, yet without explicitly pursuing a commodity-directed
object and purpose or exhibiting a ‘conscious consideration’ of commodity activi-
ties. These ICAs sensu lato therefore fall under the category of indirect TCL. In the
broadest sense, this type of ICA could be defined as
any international agreement that exhibits a substantial regulatory impact on commodity
activity, yet without having been explicitly directed at or designed for that purpose.
Consequently, ICAs sensu lato can stem from any original background and be
aimed at any purpose that factually corresponds to GCG. As such, for instance Free
Trade Agreements (FTAs), Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs), the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the International Bill of Human Rights,
as well as international environmental agreements can constitute ICAs sensu lato.
This category will thus largely coincide with the (self-imposed) qualifications of a
state’s permanent sovereignty over natural resources (PSNR) under international law
that have been briefly touched upon in Chap. 3 above.
5.2.1.2 Analysis of ICAs sensu originali and sensu stricto
This section aims to provide an account of the central normative contents of current
ICAs. For that purpose, it analyses objectives, substantive provisions and institu-
tional arrangements of both ICAs sensu originali (Sect. 5.2.1.2.2) and sensu stricto
(Sect. 5.2.1.2.3). In order to better understand the role and status of ICAs sensu
originali, we shall first, however, turn to so-called International Commodity Bodies
(ICBs) as a category, which somewhat ‘frames’ ICAs sensu originali and elucidates
their current role and functioning (Sect. 5.2.1.2.1).
5.2.1.2.1 International Commodity Bodies
ICBs are organisations or institutions, which have been recognised by the Common
Fund for Commodities (CFC) in accordance with Schedule C ‘Eligibility Criteria for
ICBs’ of the CFC Agreement.135 Accordingly, ICBs are intergovernmental bodies
that all member states of the UN, its specialised agencies or the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) can join. Regarding its objectives and activities, the CFC
agreements that actually have a bearing on commodity activities today. This category thus rather
serves the purpose of theoretical completeness than to contribute substantially to the knowledge we
are seeking to gain from this analysis. It appears to be appropriate to limit an analysis of ICAs—as
well as a conceptualisation of TCL—to the boundaries, which are represented by ICAs sensu lato.
Beyond these boundaries, assuming a ‘commodity perspective’ on the normative landscape of, for
instance, the law of consular and diplomatic relations, appears more and more absurd.
135UNCTAD (2016), p. 1.
200 5 Fostering the Effectiveness of TCL
Agreement sets forth that ‘[i]t shall be concerned on a continuing basis with trade,
production and consumption of the commodity in question.’ Moreover, ‘[i]ts mem-
bership shall comprise producers and consumers which shall represent an adequate
share of exports and of imports of the commodity concerned.’ Also, it needs to
dispose of ‘an effective decision making process that reflects the interests of its
participants.’ ICBs are eligible for projects financed by the CFC.136
Given that they meet all criteria under Schedule C of the CFC Agreement,
UNCTAD has designated all international commodity organisations (ICOs)
corresponding with an International Commodity Agreement (ICA) as ICBs.137
ICAs sensu originali thus need to be perceived in the context of other arrangements,
which likewise qualify as ICBs. Apart from ICOs, several so-called International
Study Groups (ISGs) qualify as ICBs and perform similar duties. These ISGs include
the International Rubber Study Group (established 1934); the International Lead and
Zinc Study Group (ILZSG; established 1959); the International Nickel Study Group
(INSG; established 1990); the International Copper Study Group (ICSG; established
1992); the International Network for Bamboo and Rattan (INBAR; established in
1997); as well as the International Jute Study Group (IJSG; established in 2002).138
Similar to the international commodity organisations (ICOs), the international
study groups are intergovernmental organisations, which are being governed and
financed primarily by states. They usually function based on an intergovernmental
agreement, typically either termed ‘constitution’ or ‘terms of reference’ and accom-
panied by some sort of procedural rules.139 The various study groups tend to be quite
similar regarding their organisational design and objectives.140 Their main goals
generally lie in ensuring transparency of the respective sector and correspondingly
providing accurate production, trade, and consumption data, e.g. through monthly
136UNCTAD (2016), p. 1. In these projects, study groups typically ‘prioritize[], formulate[] and[/
or] supervise[] CFC-financed projects’, ICSG (2019) Current work and activities, https://www.icsg.
org/index.php/who-we-are/current-work-and-activities (last accessed 14 May 2021). While the
CFC agreement provides the definition of ICAs sensu originali, it does not fall under this category
itself. Instead, it constitutes an ICA sensu stricto, yet without significant balancing norms.
137UNCTAD (2016), p. 1. This appears to include the International Cotton Advisory Committee
(ICAC), UNCTAD (2016), p. 2; UNCTAD (2019) ICBs, https://unctad.org/en/Pages/SUC/
Commodities/International-Commodity-Bodies.aspx (last accessed 14 May 2021).
138IJSG (2003) About, http://www.jute.org/index1.htm; cf. UNCTAD (2016), p. 1; UNCTAD
(2019) ICBs, https://unctad.org/en/Pages/SUC/Commodities/International-Commodity-Bodies.
aspx (both last accessed 14 May 2021); cf. Espa and Oehl (2018), p. 8, n 34.
139Not all appear to have been published. IRSG (2011) Constitution, http://www.rubberstudy.com/
documents/IRSG%20Constitution%20-Effective%201%20July%202011.pdf; IRSG (2011) Rules
of procedure, http://www.rubberstudy.com/documents/IRSG%20ROP%20-Effective%201%
20July%202011%20Rvsd%201%20Jul%2012.pdf; INSG (2015) Terms of reference, http://insg.
org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/doc_INSG_TERMS_OF_REFERENCE_Jan2015.pdf; INSG
(2015) Rules of procedure, http://insg.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/doc_INSG_RULES_OF_
PROCEDURE_May2015.pdf (all last accessed 14 May 2021).
140The INSG and the ICSG for instance have been explicitly modelled after the ILZSG (2019) Who
we are, http://www.ilzsg.org/static/howwebegan.aspx?from¼1 (last accessed 14 May 2021).
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newsletters, annual reports and market forecasts.141 Moreover, they usually imple-
ment a forum for exchange, often on an annual basis, such as the World Rubber
Summit. While study groups are typically being controlled through member state
delegates and respective standing or executive committees, they also dispose of
so-called industry advisory panels and allow NGOs or other international organisa-
tions to participate in their meetings as observers. This opens their exchange fora for
multi-stakeholder debates. Consequently, the respective study group is frequently
described as the premier forum for sector-specific exchange.142
While study groups are typically comparatively small organisations, the most
recent study group, INBAR, not only disposes of a Secretariat with over
35 employees, but also seeks to ‘promote[] environmentally sustainable develop-
ment using bamboo and rattan.’143 Thus going beyond the objectives of the other
study groups, INBAR aligns its activities with the SDGs144 and according to its own
‘Strategic Plan 2015–2030’ engages in i.a. lobbying, advocacy, knowledge sharing,
and country-level capacity building.145
Further entities that have been recognised as ICBs are various institutions at
FAO.146 This includes so-called FAO Intergovernmental Groups (IGGs) on indi-
vidual agricultural commodities, including Bananas and Tropical Fruits;147 Citrus
Fruit;148 Grains;149 Hard Fibres;150 Meat and Dairy Products;151 Oilseeds, Oils and
141See already Espa and Oehl (2018), p. 8, n 34.
142See e.g. IRSG (2019) Mission statement, http://www.rubberstudy.com/mission-statement.aspx
(last accessed 14 May 2021): ‘The IRSG shall be THE FORUM for the discussion of matters
affecting the supply and demand for natural as well as synthetic rubber.’
143INBAR (2019) Promoting the use of bamboo and rattan for SD, https://www.inbar.int/about-
inbar/#2 (last accessed 14 May 2021).
144Notably SDGs #1, #7, #11, #12, #13 and #15, INBAR (2019) Mission & strategy, https://www.
inbar.int/about-inbar/mission-strategy/#1 (last accessed 14 May 2021).
145INBAR (2019) Mission & strategy, https://www.inbar.int/about-inbar/mission-strategy/#1 (last
accessed 14 May 2021).
146UNCTAD (2019) ICBs, https://unctad.org/en/Pages/SUC/Commodities/International-Commod
ity-Bodies.aspx (last accessed 14 May 2021).
147‘Established by the Committee on Commodity Problems (CCP) at is Sixty-second Session
(1999). It replaced the former Intergovernmental Group on Bananas’, FAO (2019) Governing
and statutory bodies, http://www.fao.org/unfao/govbodies/gsb-subject-matter/statutory-bodies-
details/en/c/162/?no_cache¼1 (last accessed 14 May 2021); FAO (2019) IGG on bananas and
tropical fruits, http://www.fao.org/economic/est/est-commodities/bananas/meetings-on-bananas-
and-tropical-fruits/en/ (last accessed 14 May 2021).
148‘Established by the Committee on Commodity Problems (CCP) at its Thirty-second Session
(1959)’, FAO (2019) Governing and statutory bodies, http://www.fao.org/unfao/govbodies/gsb-
subject-matter/statutory-bodies-details/en/c/140/ (last accessed 14 May 2021); FAO (2019) IGG on
citrus fruit, http://www.fao.org/economic/est/est-commodities/citrus-fruit/citrus-fruit-meetings/en/
(last accessed 14 May 2021).
149FAO (2019) IGG on grains, http://www.fao.org/unfao/govbodies/gsb-subject-matter/statutory-
bodies-details/en/c/135/ (last accessed 14 May 2021).
150FAO (2019) IGG on hard fibres, http://www.fao.org/unfao/govbodies/gsb-subject-matter/
statutory-bodies-details/en/c/173/ (last accessed 14 May 2021).
151FAO (2019) IGG on meat and dairy products, http://www.fao.org/unfao/govbodies/gsb-subject-
matter/statutory-bodies-details/en/c/210/ (last accessed 14 May 2021).
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Fats;152 Rice;153 and Tea.154 These IGGs were established as subsidiary entities to
the FAO Committee on Commodity Problems and are focussing on trade issues
regarding individual commodities.155 While their coverage is constantly shifting
depending on current challenges in the respective sector at hand, they are—quite
similarly to the ISGs—seeking to provide forums
for intergovernmental consultation and exchange on trends in production, consumption,
trade and prices of key commodities, including regular appraisal of the global market
situation and short-term outlook. The IGGs consider changes in policies and examine their
effects relating to the current and prospective market situation.156
In addition, ‘technical side events’ are intended to engage other stakeholders in
the conversation on the individual sectors at hand.157 Further recognised ICBs
include the FAO Sub-Group on Hides and Skins, which operates as a subsidiary
of the IGG on Meat and Dairy Products, as well as the FAO Intergovernmental
Sub-Committee on Fish Trade.158 The latter constitutes a sub-entity of the FAO
Committee on Fisheries (COFI).159
5.2.1.2.2 ICAs sensu originali
Given that we aim to sketch the normative contents of International Commodity
Agreements (ICAs) as they are applicable to commodity activities today, our
analysis is focused on ICAs that are still in existence. With regard to ICAs sensu
originali, our evaluation is thus exclusively concerned with those transformed, post-
market-interventionist ICAs that have not been eliminated entirely.160 ICAs that
152FAO (2019) IGG on oilseeds, oils and fats, http://www.fao.org/unfao/govbodies/gsb-subject-
matter/statutory-bodies-details/en/c/158/ (last accessed 14 May 2021).
153FAO (2019) IGG on rice, http://www.fao.org/unfao/govbodies/gsb-subject-matter/statutory-
bodies-details/en/c/127/ (last accessed 14 May 2021).
154FAO (2019) IGG on tea, http://www.fao.org/unfao/govbodies/gsb-subject-matter/statutory-
bodies-details/en/c/205/ (last accessed 14 May 2021); FAO (2019) IGGs, http://www.fao.org/ccp/
igg/en/ (last accessed 14 May 2021).
155FAO (2019) IGGs, http://www.fao.org/ccp/igg/en/ (last accessed 14 May 2021).
156FAO (2019) IGGs, http://www.fao.org/ccp/igg/en/ (last accessed 14 May 2021).
157FAO (2019) IGGs, http://www.fao.org/ccp/igg/en/ (last accessed 14 May 2021).
158UNCTAD (2019) ICBs, https://unctad.org/en/Pages/SUC/Commodities/International-Commod
ity-Bodies.aspx (last accessed 14 May 2021).
159UNCTAD (2019) ICBs, https://unctad.org/en/Pages/SUC/Commodities/International-Commod
ity-Bodies.aspx; ‘Established by the Committee on Fisheries (COFI) at its Sixteenth Session (1985)
in accordance with Rule XXX-10 of the General Rules of the Organization and Rule VII of the
COFI Rules of Procedure’, FAO (2019) Sub-committee on fish trade, http://www.fao.org/fishery/
about/cofi/trade/en (both last accessed 14 May 2021).
160On historical ICAs—especially sensu originali—that have been vacated or terminated, see Sect.
5.2.1.1.1 above. See also for instance Article 22 GTC, which still—perhaps somewhat hopeful—
refers to potentially adopting a new agreement that includes ‘economic provisions’ in the future.
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qualify as such, include the International Grains Agreement, more precisely the
Grains Trade Convention (GTC);161 the International Sugar Agreement (ISA);162 the
International Tropical Timber Agreement (ITTA);163 the International Cocoa Agree-
ment (ICocA);164 the International Coffee Agreement (ICofA);165 as well as the
International Agreement on Olive Oil and Table Olives (IAO).166 These ICAs
generally correspond with respective international commodity organisations
(ICOs) administering the individual agreement, such as the International Olive
Council (IOC), International Cocoa Organisation (ICCO), or the International Cof-
fee Organisation (ICofO).167
In the following, we will analyse the provisions of these ICAs sensu originali in
more detail. For that purpose, we are comparing and clustering their respective
objectives (Sect. 5.2.1.2.2.1), substantive obligations (Sect. 5.2.1.2.2.2), institutional
arrangements (Sect. 5.2.1.2.2.3) and dispute settlement mechanisms
(Sect. 5.2.1.2.2.4).
5.2.1.2.2.1 Objectives
Arguably the central objective of ICAs sensu originali is fostering international
cooperation with regard to the respective commodity sectors, as reflected in Articles
1(a) ICocA, 1(a) ITTA, 1(a) ISA, 1(1) ICofA,1(a) GTC, as well as Article 1
(c) ICACRR. In some cases, the mode of international cooperation is further
specified so as to include particularly technology and technical cooperation, for
instance according to Articles 1(2) IAO and 1(p) ITTA. This may involve training
161IGC (1995) International Grains Agreement, http://igc.int/en/downloads/brochure/iga1995.pdf
(last accessed 14 May 2021).
162ISO (1992) International Sugar Agreement, https://www.isosugar.org/membership/isa-agree
ment (last accessed 14 May 2021).
163ITTO (2006) International Tropical Timber Agreement, https://www.itto.int/direct/topics/
topics_pdf_download/topics_id¼3363&no¼1&disp¼inline (last accessed 14 May 2021); entered
into force on 7 December 2011, superseding the 1994 ITTA.
164ICCO (2010) International Cocoa Agreement, https://www.icco.org/about-us/international-
cocoa-agreements/doc_download/6-english-2010-international-cocoa-agreement.html (last
accessed 14 May 2021).
165ICO (2007) International Coffee Agreement, http://www.ico.org/ica2007.asp (last accessed
14 May 2021).
166UN treaty collection (2015) International Agreement on Olive Oil and Table Olives, https://
treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/2015/10/20151009%2010-35%20AM/Ch_XIX-49.pdf (last accessed
14 May 2021).
167While the International Cotton Advisory Committee (ICAC) has been founded already in 1939,
and designated as a public international organisation by means of the US presidential executive
order no. 9911 of 19 December 1947, what is more pertinent for its operation today, are its Rules
and Regulations (ICACRR), ICAC (2015) ICACRR, https://icac.org/Content/Pdf%
20Files910ff222_e6a9_4d39_939b_7cf3663d6b52/E_Rules-Regs_dec2015_FINAL.pdf.pdf (last
accessed 14 May 2021), which consequently also feature in our analysis below. In line with
UNCTAD, it thus appears fair to speak of seven ICAs sensu originali, which are in existence
today, UNCTAD (2016), p. 2.
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programmes to promote technology transfer according to Articles 1(f) ICocA and
1(11) ICofA; capacity building for poverty alleviation as set forth in Articles 1
(j) ICocA and 1(12) ICofA; capacity building for sustainable forest management, as
provided for in Article 1(d) ITTA; encouraging members to develop food safety
standards according to Articles 1(i) ICocA and 1(10) ICofA; as well as generally the
objective to promote the quality of the commodity at hand, such as coffee according
to Article 1(9) ICofA.
Another central objective of ICAs sensu originali lies in providing an intergov-
ernmental discussion forum, as reflected in Articles 1(b) ITTA, 1(d) GTC, 1(b) ISA,
as well as Article 1(d) ICACRR. In some cases, also exchanges with the private
sector or other non-governmental stakeholders are already mentioned explicitly as an
objective of the respective agreement, for instance according to Articles 1(b) ICocA
and 1(2) ICofA.168 These fora are not least intended to foster the exchange of all sorts
of commodity-relevant information. In this respect, one can largely distinguish two
types of information dissemination. The first type relates to the objective of achiev-
ing the greatest possible degree of market transparency between members and thus
involves the dissemination of statistics, studies, reports, and other trade-related data,
as e.g. provided for according to Articles 1(g) ICocA, 1(h) and 1(l) ITTA, as well as
Article 1(6) ICofA. The second type concerns the dissemination and exchange of
information, which serves to promote the consumption of the respective commodity
or corresponding secondary products, such as scientific information on nutritional,
health or other properties of the commodity in question, as set forth in i.a. Articles
1(3) IAO, 1(h) ICocA, 1(d) ISA, and 1(7) ICofA.169
Exchange of information is one of the instruments raised when it comes to the
objective of facilitating, expanding or promoting trade in the respective commodity,
as provided for in e.g. Articles 1(c) ISA and 1(5) ICofA. For this purpose, also the
elimination of trade barriers and discriminatory practices is being aimed for, as
reflected e.g. in Article 1(b) GTC. Besides, what constitutes an objective of various
ICAs sensu originali is specifically strengthening the respective national commodity
sectors, as for instance set forth in Article 1 ICocA. More precisely, objectives
include the seeking of finance for projects strengthening the respective sector,
according to Articles 1(c) ICocA as well as 1(8) ICofA; improving marketing and
distribution of timber, according to Article 1(k) ITTA; and fostering the availability
of information on financial tools for coffee producers, according to Article
1(13) ICofA.
Apart from purely economic objectives, remarkably most ICAs sensu originali—
and all which have been adopted in the past decade—also explicitly refer to
SD. Fostering the SD of the respective sector is the objective of various agreements
according to Articles 1, 1(e) ICocA, 1, 1(c) ITTA, 1(3) ICofA, and 1(2) IAO. Some
agreements specify this commitment by including the objectives of promoting
sustainable utilisation, according to Article 1(m) ITTA; encouraging members to
168On the institutional arrangements for involving non-state actors, see Sect. 5.2.1.2.2.3 below.
169On respective substantive obligations of members, see Sect. 5.2.1.2.2.2 below.
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recognise the role of indigenous and local communities for sustainable forest
management, according to Article 1(r) ITTA; encouraging information sharing on
certification mechanisms in order to foster sustainable forest management, Article 1
(o) ITTA; or particularly calling upon members to develop a sustainable coffee
sector, according to Article 1(3) ICofA. Article 2 of the ICocA even provides a
detailed definition of what constitutes a ‘sustainable cocoa economy’. Accordingly,
the latter
implies an integrated value chain in which all stakeholders develop and promote appropriate
policies to achieve levels of production, processing and consumption that are economically
viable, environmentally sound and socially responsible for the benefit of present and future
generations, with the aim of improving productivity and profitability in the cocoa value
chain for all stakeholders concerned, in particular for the smallholder producers[.]170
Four out of seven ICAs analysed also refer to objectives that relate to creating a
long-term economic equilibrium between producers and consumers and ultimately a
balanced world trade system with regard to the commodity at hand. Respective
provisions include Articles 1(d) ICocA, 1(4) ICofA, 1(i) ITTA, and 1(c) GTC.
5.2.1.2.2.2 Substantive Obligations
Member states are generally held to cooperate and take measures, which foster the
objectives of the agreement, as set forth in Articles 28 ISA and 3(1) ICofA. In some
agreements, this obligation is formulated in the negative, i.e. as an obligation not to
take measures that conflict with the objectives of the agreement, for instance
according to Articles 22 IAO, 29(1) ITTA.
Again remarkably, members have widely obliged themselves to foster the SD of
the respective sectors. According to Article 24 IAO, members commit to promote the
‘development of sustainable olive growing’, which relates ‘to the improvement of
practices at all stages of olive and olive oil production’. The ICocA even dedicates a
separate chapter to SD. According to Article 42 ICocA, members ‘shall give
consideration’ to improving living and working conditions of people engaged in
cocoa production in line with ILO standards and internationally recognised princi-
ples. Moreover, according to Article 43(1) ICocA,
Members shall make all necessary efforts to accomplish a sustainable cocoa economy,
taking into account the sustainable development principles and objectives contained, inter
alia, in the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development and in Agenda 21 adopted
in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, the United Nations Millennium Declaration adopted in New York
in 2000, the Report of the World Summit on Sustainable Development held in Johannesburg
in 2002, the 2002 Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development, and the 2001
Ministerial Declaration on the Doha Development Agenda.
The ICCO shall support members in the pursuit of this objective, and as such
provide a forum for ‘permanent dialogue’, encourage cooperation between
170Likewise, the ITTA touches upon the definition of sustainable forest management, for this
purposes however refers to the ITTO’s internal guidelines, Article 2(2) ITTA.
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members, adopt and periodically review work programmes and projects fostering a
sustainable cocoa economy, and seek corresponding finance from multi—and bilat-
eral donors, according to Article 43(2)–(6) ICocA.
Also, according to Article 36 ICofA, ‘[m]embers shall give due consideration to
sustainable management of coffee resources and processing’, again in line with the
principles contained in Agenda 21 and formulated at the World Summit on Sustain-
able Development (WSSD) in 2002. Individual ‘pillars’ of SD are furthermore being
addressed i.a. in Articles 29 ISA and 37 ICofA, according to which members shall
ensure that fair labour standards are being maintained in the respective industries and
be committed to improving living conditions for farmers and workers. According to
Article 30 ISA, ‘[m]embers shall give due consideration to environmental aspects in
all stages of sugar production.’ Further specifications of what the duty to foster the
SD of the respective sector entails, is generally not included in the agreements.
Furthermore, members commit to promoting markets and consumption of the
respective commodity, according to Articles 37(1) ICocA and 25(1) ICofA. For this
purpose, they i.a. oblige themselves to ‘remove or reduce substantially domestic
obstacles to the expansion of cocoa consumption’ according to Article 37(2) ICocA;
task the respective ICOs to conduct thorough market analyses along the entire
commodity value chain, according to Articles 36(1), 38(1) ICocA; or to improve
product quality according to Article 25(1) ICofA. According to Article 25(2) ICofA,
such market promotion may furthermore be pursued for example through informa-
tion campaigns, research, and capacity building.
Perhaps the most far-reaching, ‘biting’ obligations provided for in ICAs sensu
originali concern the collection and dissemination of data. Not least for the purpose
of ensuring the greatest possible degree of market transparency, members are tasking
the respective ICOs to act as ‘global information centres’ for the commodity in
question, as reflected in Articles 30(1) ICocA, 32, 33 ISA, 32 ICofA, as well as 1
(b) ICACRR. This entails the duty, for one, to collect relevant data from members
and other international organisations, according to Articles 25 IAO, 27 ITTA, 30(2),
(3) ICocA. Data to be made available includes information on commodity stocks
(Article 31(1) ICocA), supply, demand and market conditions (Article 3(a) GTC),
trade statistics and national commodity policies (Article 25 IAO, 3(b) GTC), accu-
rate data on re-exports by importers (Article 3(3) ICofA), geographical indications
and their legal protections (Article 20(6) IAO), as well as annual reports on all
commercial and special transactions in the commodity at hand (Article
7(1) GTC).171 However, where a member does not comply with this obligation,
the agreements typically do not provide the option of introducing specific sanctions
beyond the offering of assistance in compiling and transmitting the data as well as
asking for an explanation for non-compliance, as set forth e.g. in Article
30(4) ICocA. Yet, Article 32(5) ICofA goes further in this respect, allowing the
171Article IX(1) ICACRR in this respect refers to ‘available information as may be required to carry
out the work program’.
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Council to ‘take initiatives likely to lead such a Member to furnish the required
information.’
For the other, ICOs are required to publish their own studies, surveys and reports
on the respective commodity sectors (Articles 34 ICofA, 32(1) ISA, 7(1)(d) IAO, 1
(b) ICACRR), promote scientific research (Article 35 ICocA) or calculate commod-
ity indicator prices (Articles 33(1) ICocA, 32(3) ICofA).172 This naturally requires a
continuous review of the market (Articles 4(1), 16 GTC, 33(2) ISA, 7(2)
(c) ICACRR, 36(3) ICocA, 28 ITTA).
Apart from that, members may be required to remove obstacles from trade and to
commit to non-discrimination. According to Article 34 ITTA for instance,
[n]othing in this Agreement authorizes the use of measures to restrict or ban international
trade in, and in particular as they concern imports of, and utilization of, timber and timber
products.
According to Article 24(1) ICofA, members ‘recognize’ the importance of
removing obstacles to trade, yet at the same time recognise their right to regulate,
particularly mentioning ‘national health and environmental policy objectives’ and
respective commitments under international agreements, including ones addressing
trade.
While thus generally ICAs sensu originali exhibit quite similar, at times identical,
provisions, they also entail some specific obligations, which typically correspond
with specific traits of the commodity in question. For instance, the IAO especially
emphasises its definition of olive products according to Articles 19, 20 IAO as well
as annexes B, C. According to Article 20(1) IAO, members ‘undertake to apply’
these designations in international trade. Moreover, according to Article 27(1) ICofA
members commit to prohibit the sale of products as coffee that ‘contain less than the
equivalent of 95% green coffee as the basic raw material’, a term equally defined by
the agreement in its Article 2(1)(a). According to Article 32(1) ICocA, members
recognise that it may be generally advisable to renounce substitutes and observe
corresponding recommendations of competent international bodies as well as the
provisions of the Codex Alimentarius. Article 21 IAO refers to the international
guarantee label of the IOC,173 the ICofA according to its Articles 3(2), 33 ICofA
establishes a scheme for certificates of origin, and Article 21 ITTA establishes the
Bali Partnership Fund for sustainable tropical timber management.
Lastly, one should note that obligations that relate to the ‘big picture’ of com-
modity governance, such as the challenge of balancing the global trading system
172In addition, ICOs typically publish annual reports on their activities (Articles 18 ICocA,
28(1) ITTA), policy works or action plans (Article 24 ITTA) as well as draft forward work programs
(Article 33(4) ISA, IV(3)(a)(3) ICACRR), which usually besides issues of market transparency also
touch upon a variety of other topics, see for instance ITTO (2018) Annual report 2017, https://www.
itto.int/direct/topics/topics_pdf_download/topics_id¼5734&no¼1 (last accessed 14 May 2021).
173On the standard- and certification-related work of the IOC (2019) Standards, http://www.
internationaloliveoil.org/estaticos/view/222-standards (last accessed 14 May 2021).
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between consumer and producer interests, are only reflected in one provision.
According to Article 26 ICofA,
[m]embers recognize the need of developing countries to broaden the base of their econo-
mies through, inter alia, industrialization and the export of manufactured products, including
the processing of coffee and the export of processed coffee. . .174
To summarise, ‘big picture’ perspectives on commodity governance still played a
considerably greater role in the objectives of the various agreements. The fact that
the operative section of only one ICA sensu originali features a clause addressing
this perspective, and notably a clause, which merely ‘recognize[s]’ the needs of
developing countries, is quite paradigmatic. It demonstrates how these agreements
have largely lost their ‘bite’. While they primarily implement fora for exchange and
cooperation and task ICOs as well as member states with compiling and dissemi-
nating data, tools to effectively address challenges of development, participation, or
environmental protection, are missing almost entirely.175 As such, ICAs sensu
originali are not suited to remedy imbalances in the current design of the TCL
framework.
5.2.1.2.2.3 Institutional Arrangements
When it comes to institutional arrangements, ICAs sensu originali exhibit quite a
straightforward, typical design for international treaties. All of them explicitly
establish or confirm their corresponding international organisations, which are
responsible for implementing the provisions of the agreement. They include the
International Olive Council (IOC), according to Article 3 IAO; the International
Cocoa Organisation (ICCO), according to Article 3(1) ICocA; the International
Tropical Timber Organisation (ITTO), according to Article 3(1) ITTA; the Interna-
tional Sugar Organisation (ISugO), according to Article 3(1) ISA; the International
Coffee Organisation (ICofO), according to Article 6(1) ICofA; and the International
Grains Council (IGC), according to Article 9(1) GTC.176
174Article 6(1) GTC merely states that ‘[m]embers undertake to conduct any concessional trans-
actions in grains in such a way as to avoid harmful interference with normal patterns of production
and international commercial trade.’
175This is especially reflected in the ICocA, which in Article 1(d) states that it is one of the
objectives of the agreement to ‘strive towards obtaining fair prices leading to equitable economic
returns to both producers and consumers in the cocoa value chain, and to contribute to a balanced
development of the world cocoa economy in the interest of all Members’, cf. Sect. 5.2.1.2.2.1
above. Yet, in terms of concrete measures it merely refers to an option for the Council, which ‘may
also promote studies likely to contribute to greater market transparency and facilitate the develop-
ment of a balanced and sustainable world cocoa economy’, according to Article 38(2) ICocA.
Articles 42 and 43 ICocA, which have been discussed above, do not appear to refer to matters of
global equity, but to instead be concerned primarily with efforts to implement sustainable cocoa
industries on the national level. In any case, they do not mention the need for a ‘balanced’ economy
or other matters of ISI as referred to in Article 26 ICofA.
176On the special case of ICAC, see already n 167 above. The organisations are typically being
granted legal personality under the individual agreement.
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In terms of the organs that are competent to carry out respective tasks and duties
of the international commodity organisations (ICOs), one can discern a typical
governing structure of an international organisation consisting of an executive
council or standing committee, in which representatives from member states decide
on strategy and work programme of the organisation; potentially topic-specific
sub-committees to the council; as well as a secretariat tasked with daily operations
of the ICO.177 Moreover, all ICOs are explicitly encouraged to enter co-operations
with other IOs, particularly UNCTAD or FAO, according to the respective pro-
visions (Articles 12 IAO, 13 ICocA, 15 ITTA, 14 ISA, 15 ICofA, 19 GTC, XII
ICACRR). Often, non-member states as well as IOs are invited to join annual
meetings as observes, as for instance provided for in Articles 13, 14 ICocA, 15, 16
ITTA, 16(2) ISA.
Additional institutional arrangements can turn the ICOs into full-fledged multi-
stakeholder fora,178 for instance through advisory committees, or consultative
boards, which comprise experts especially from the private sector.179 Some clauses
in this respect are very wide, such as Article 14(3) ISA, which allows the ISugO to
enter into ‘whatever arrangements’ for effective contacts with sugar producers,
traders and manufacturers. Likewise, Article 16 ICofA generally opens the ICofO
for co-operations with NGOs and other experts.
5.2.1.2.2.4 Dispute Settlement
Five out of the seven agreements analysed contain dispute settlement clauses.180
These clauses exclusively apply to cases of disputes between members regarding the
functioning of the respective ICA. Typically, the council is declared competent to
decide disputes. Arguably the most comprehensive dispute settlement clause is
provided in Article 26 IAO, which i.a. grants a member that is to be excluded
from the agreement the right to recourse to the ICJ, according to Article
26(4) IAO. Article 32 ITTA provides a special provision for remedies in favour of
developing countries and LDCs respectively that have been affected adversely by
measures taken under the agreement.
177See the respective provisions: Article 7 IAO; Article 3(4) ICocA; Articles 3(2), 26 ITTA;
Articles 7, 18, 23 ISA; Article 6(3) ICofA; Articles 9, 15–17 GTC; Articles IV, VII ICACRR.
178For example, the ICofA explicitly mentions the World Coffee Conference, according to Article
30 ICofA, as well as the Consultative Forum on Coffee Sector Finance, according to Article
31 ICofA, both of which are designed as multi-stakeholder fora.
179See for instance Article 44 ICocA as well as the Private Sector Consultative Board, according to
Article 29 ICofA. On the advisory board of the IOC, which serves scientific purposes, see IOC
(2019) Scientific research, http://www.internationaloliveoil.org/estaticos/view/239-scientific-
research (last accessed 14 May 2021). According to Article XII ICACRR, non-members, including
private organisations may also be invited to meetings of the Advisory Committee.
180See Article 26 IAO; Article 50 ICocA; Article 31 ITTA; Article 39 ICofA, which merely states
that dispute settlement procedures shall be determined by the Council as well as Article 8 GTC.
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5.2.1.2.2.5 Interim Conclusion
To conclude, International Commodity Agreements (ICAs) sensu originali primarily
serve commodity-specific cooperative purposes. While most agreements refer to SD,
it is typically defined as a mere objective, yet does not translate into significant
commitments or measures in the operative parts of the agreements.181 Also when it
comes to the challenge of creating a balance in world commodity trade between
consumer and producer interests, particularly with regard to the producers’ need to
diversify their often commodity-dependent economies, ICAs sensu originali do not
provide for any specific commitments. Instead, they have been said to be ‘similar to
existing [International Study Groups]’ in many respects.182
Moreover, it shall be noted that ICAs sensu originali currently only exist for
seven commodities—namely cocoa, coffee, cotton, grains, olives and olive oil,
sugar, and tropical timber. They are thus not only limited regarding their substantive
obligations, but also in their number. Naturally, this status quo needs to be perceived
against the backdrop of the ‘ideological shift’ away from market-interventionist
agreements to the current form of agreements in the 1980s and 1990s.183 This is
not likely to change, as UNCTAD notes:
At present, Governments do not appear to be prepared for discussions concerning the
producer-consumer schemes for price stabilization through market intervention in the
framework of existing ICAs.184
However, regardless of these little promising prospects for market-interventionist
tools and the limited number of ICAs sensu originali, the design especially of the
more recent agreements alludes to what constitutes Global Commodity Governance
(GCG) today. For one, their multi-stakeholder, open, and transparent fora illustrate
the mode of collaboration in this respect. For the other, they demonstrate how
distinct and complex governance challenges are already with regard to individual
commodity sectors, and how important it is to build and exchange specific expertise
between all stakeholders.185 What is more, however, by definition these ICAs are
designed to address both consumer as well as producer interests.186 While focusing
primarily on cooperation and information exchange, they thus still are intended to
employ a comprehensive perspective on an entire commodity sector as well as to
foster a thorough understanding of its functioning. As such, some agreements at least
181This is, to some degree, with the exception of Article 43 ICocA.
182UNCTAD (2016), p. 2.
183See Sect. 2.2.4 above. However, also during the ‘high time’ of market-interventionist ICAs, only
a comparatively small number of commodities was covered by such instruments; cf. on the slow
progress in the conclusion of the treaties in the 1980s, Kirthisingha (1983).
184UNCTAD (2016), p. 2.
185Cf. UNCTAD (2016), p. 2. In this respect see also the IGF, which is convened in the framework
of UNCTAD, cf. already Sect. 4.2.2.2.1.1 above.
186Cf. Sect. 5.2.1.1.1 above.
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refer to the challenge of diversifying commodity-dependent economies, and building
an equitable, sustainable world trade system.
5.2.1.2.3 ICAs sensu stricto
With regard to ICAs sensu stricto—the object of examination in this section—, this
comprehensive perspective constitutes the exception rather than the general rule.
5.2.1.2.3.1 Agreements with a Narrow Scope
Most ICAs sensu stricto exhibit a rather narrow scope in the sense that they are
regulating specific, clearly delimited factual scenarios. They are frequently intended
to serve a clear-cut, somewhat ‘singular’ purpose—as opposed to other ‘compre-
hensive’ instruments, which are seeking to reconcile and balance multiple competing
interests.187 Instead of addressing a sector in aggregate, many ICAs sensu stricto are
regulating a specific element of commodity activity, often exclusively in a particular
geographic location, or particular uses or effects of a specific commodity. In other
words, they typically cover some aspects of GCG, but are not intended to remedy its
various policy trade-offs.
For instance, the OPEC statute essentially serves to establish a producer cartel for
petroleum. According to its Article 2(a), its ‘principle aim’ lies in
the coordination and unification of the petroleum policies of Member Countries and the
determination of the best means for safeguarding their interests, individually and
collectively.
While it also mentions the interest of consuming nations to obtain ‘an efficient,
economic and regular supply of petroleum’, according to Article 2(c) OPEC statute,
membership is generally only open to countries ‘with a substantial net export of
crude petroleum, which ha[ve] fundamentally similar interests to those of [the other
members]’, according to Article 7(c) OPEC statute. The OPEC statute does not
dispose of mechanisms for balancing competing consumer and producer interests or
promoting international cooperation beyond the membership of the cartel and thus
exhibits a rather narrow focus.
Another field, which has already been discussed in our account of the substance
of TCL above and is dominated by ICAs sensu stricto, is the one of joint develop-
ment of commodity deposits, particularly hydrocarbon fields.188 Corresponding joint
development agreements seek to regulate the conditions under which the exploita-
tion of the respective areas takes place. They generally serve the purpose of
balancing the interests of two producers, which both dispose of sovereign rights
187Often, one will perceive the latter kind of instruments as assuming somewhat more of a ‘big
picture’ perspective, whereas the former kind is occupied with one detail of the overall picture—
which in our case, of course, is GCG.
188See Sect. 4.2.2.1.4.1 above.
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over the deposit in question. Their function thus lies in establishing an equitable
exploitation scheme between those stakeholders, only rarely and if so, peripherally
touching upon other interests at stake, such as environmental protection. However,
especially more recent ‘model III’-type agreements tend to also address environ-
mental concerns. With increased awareness of the need to balance commodity policy
trade-offs, i.e. further proliferation of the objectives and concepts associated with
Global Commodity Governance (GCG), the negotiation and conclusion of such
agreements will provide opportunities to include commodity-directed standards
and therefore develop the TCL framework further.189
Furthermore, three ICAs sensu stricto are providing the regulatory framework for
the civil liability of ship owners in the case of oil pollution.190 According to Article
3(1) of the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage
(CPC), as a general rule
the owner of a ship at the time of an incident [. . .] shall be liable for any pollution damage
caused by oil which has escaped or been discharged from the ship as a result of the incident.
The rest of the convention is essentially dedicated to the implementation of this
general rule, including i.a. respective exceptions. The 1992 Fund Convention sup-
plements the compensation scheme provided by the CPC.191 The International
Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation (OPRC)
according to its Article 1(1) requires members ‘to take all appropriate measures
[. . .] to prepare for and respond to an oil pollution incident.’ The function of these
agreements therefore lies in implementing a compensation mechanism for oil spill
incidents.
Moreover, the Minamata Convention on Mercury puts in place a legal framework
for the protection of ‘human health and the environment from anthropogenic emis-
sions and releases of mercury and mercury compounds’, according to its Article
1, and for that purpose addresses i.a. both mining of mercury ores, such as cinnabar,
as well as particularly the usage of mercury in artisanal and small-scale gold
mining.192 According to its Article 3(3), the convention implements an effective
ban on all new primary mercury mining projects that had not been commenced prior
to the date of entry into force of the agreement. Similarly to ICAs sensu originali, it
therefore addresses several mercury-related aspects. However, it does not touch
upon potentially opposing interests of e.g. consumers and producers, but instead
gives effect to measures intended to contain harmful consequences of mercury use,
thus balancing environmental protection and economic objectives.
189Cf. Ong (2003), p. 141; Sect. 4.2.2.1.4.1 above.
190Given that the conventions apply to shipping, one could also argue that they rather constitute
indirect TCL, and thus ICAs sensu lato rather than stricto. However, since they are particularly
addressing oil pollution, it appears valid to classify them as ICAs sensu stricto.
191IOPC Funds (2019) 1992 Fund convention, https://www.iopcfunds.org/about-us/legal-
framework/1992-fund-convention-and-supplementary-fund-protocol/ (last accessed 14 May 2021).
192Cf. Espa and Oehl (2018), p. 9.
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In addition, ICAs sensu stricto regulate working conditions in several commodity
sectors. While naturally ILO conventions are concerned with regulating labour,
some of them are explicitly directed at commodity activities. This is the case
i.a. for ILO Convention 110 concerning Conditions of Employment of Plantation
Workers; ILO Convention 176 concerning Safety and Health in Mines; ILO Con-
vention 184 concerning Safety and Health in Agriculture; and ILO Convention
188 concerning Work in the Fishing Sector.193 All of the agreements are addressing
specific risks associated with the respective activities, including e.g. preventive and
protective measures at mine sites; engagement and recruitment of migrant workers in
the plantation sector; machinery safety and ergonomics in agriculture; and minimum
requirements for work on board fishing vessels.
Further examples of ICAs sensu stricto with a ‘narrow’ scope include the
presumably great number of bilateral commodity agreements (BCAs).194 BCAs
can for instance regulate trade, investment, or other cooperation parameters between
two countries with regard to a specific commodity or sector.195 One particular kind
are the commodity partnership agreements, which Germany concluded with
Kazakhstan, Mongolia, and Peru.196 These agreements are intended to foster
193Also several other ILO Conventions appear to qualify as ICAs sensu stricto, e.g. ILO (1965)
Convention 124—Medical Examination of Young Persons (Underground Work); ILO (1969)
Convention 129—Labour Inspection (Agriculture), ILO (2019) List of instruments, https://www.
ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p¼1000:12030:::NO (last accessed 14 May 2021); yet, it would go
beyond the scope of this monograph to address all of them in more detail.
194Examples for BCAs include so-called voluntary partnership agreements, which the EU con-
cludes with timber exporting developing countries, EUFLEGT (2019) What is a VPA, http://www.
euflegt.efi.int/what-is-a-vpa; cf. also e.g. the 2006 Softwood Lumber Agreement between the US
and Canada, which expired on 12 October 2015, Global Affairs Canada (2019) Softwood Lumber,
https://www.international.gc.ca/controls-controles/softwood-bois_oeuvre/index.aspx?lang¼eng.
On the numerous agreements that China has concluded with particularly resource-rich African
countries Shi (2016), pp. 271273; cf. e.g. the 2008 ‘Convention de Collaboration’, which was
concluded between China and the DRC in implementation of the ‘Sicomines’ deal, Landry (2018),
p. 10; full text available at http://congomines.org/system/attachments/assets/000/000/276/original/
B5bis-Sicomines-Convention-Incl-Anx-2008-Consortium-Entreprises-Chinoises-RDC.pdf?
1430928308 (all last accessed 14 May 2021).
195Also the joint development agreements mentioned above qualify as such, provided they are
being concluded between two state parties.
196BMWi (2012) Abkommen zwischen der Regierung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der
Regierung der Republik Kasachstan über Partnerschaft im Rohstoff-, Industrie- und
Technologiebereich https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Downloads/A/abkommen-zwischenbrd-
und-kasachstan-par tnerschaft - rohstoff - indust r ie-und- technologiebereich.pdf?__
blob¼publicationFile&v¼1; BMWi (2011) Abkommen zwischen der Regierung der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Regierung der Mongolei über Zusammenarbeit im
Rohstoff-, Industrie- und Technologiebereich, https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Downloads/
A/abkommen-zwischen-brd-und-mongolei-zusammenarbeit-rohstoff-industrie-technologie.pdf?__
blob¼publicationFile&v¼1; BMWi (2014) Abkommen zwischen der Regierung der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Regierung der Republik Peru über Zusammenarbeit im
Rohstoff-, Industrie- und Technologiebereich, https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Downloads/
A/abkommen-zwischen-brd-und-peru-partnerschaft-rohstoff-industrie-und-technologiebereich.
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technical cooperation between Germany and its partners and to particularly facilitate
investments and the overall conduct of commodity projects, which involve German
businesses.197 While applicable to commodities in general, these German commod-
ity partnership agreements were concluded not least under the impression of Chinese
export restrictions on i.a. Rare Earths.198 Similarly to ICAs sensu originali, these
agreements are emphasising both consumer interests, i.a. supply security, as well as
producer interests, i.a. diversifying the national economy; yet they do entail very
broad and ‘soft’ substantive obligations.199
5.2.1.2.3.2 Broader Scope
Naturally, the degree to which ICAs sensu stricto exhibit a ‘narrow scope’ in the
sense delineated above differs.
For example, the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource
Activities (CRAMRA) aims to ensure that mineral resource activities are conducted
in a manner that does not significantly harm the environment, according to Article
4(2) CRAMRA.200 In that interest, and ‘to ensure that Antarctica shall continue
forever to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not become the scene
or object of international discord’, according to Article 2(1) CRAMRA, the conven-
tion implements a procedure for adopting so-called Management Schemes, which
are applicable to respective ‘blocks’ in which mineral commodity deposits are
detected.201 With its focus on especially environmental protection, CRAMRA thus
exhibits a focus, which is broader than e.g. the one of the OPEC statute or typical
joint development agreements. Yet, it still exhibits a narrow scope in the sense that it
provides a tailor-made exploitation scheme for specific commodities in a delimited
geographic location.202
Similarly to CRAMRA, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) ‘provides a specific regime for the sourcing of mineral commodities that
pdf?__blob¼publicationFile&v¼6. Additional arrangements, i.a. based on memoranda of under-
standing and mail correspondence, exist with Chile, Australia and Canada, BMWi (2019) Rohstoffe
und Ressourcen, https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Dossier/rohstoffe-und-ressourcen.html (all
last accessed 14 May 2021).
197Nowrot (2013), p. 11.
198See Nowrot (2013), pp. 7–8.
199Preamble, Germany-Kazakhstan commodity partnership agreement; Nowrot (2013), p. 22.
Rüttinger and Scholl (2017), p. 31 suggest that the German commodity partnership agreements
could serve as an effective basis to actively promote environmental and social standards in the
mining sector.
200See already Espa and Oehl (2018), p. 8.
201Cf. Espa and Oehl (2018), p. 8. Moreover, see CRAMRA’s institutional structure as set forth in
Articles 18–36, as well as its norms covering the exploration regime, Articles 39–52.
202Yet, since none of the 19 states that signed the CRAMRA eventually ratified the agreement, it
has never entered into force. Instead, the states concerned adopted the Protocol on Environmental
Protection to the Antarctic Treaty in 1998, Espa and Oehl (2018), p. 8, n 30.
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occur on the seabed.’203 Yet, as reflected in Articles 150 UNCLOS, it differs from
CRAMRA in that requires that all activities
be carried out in such a manner as to foster healthy development of the world economy and
balanced growth of international trade, and to promote international cooperation for the
over-all development of all countries. . .
Subsequently, it overtly seeks ‘to strike a balance between onshore producers and
consumers of the minerals sourced in the Area.’204 While serving the clear-cut
purpose of regulating commodity exploitation in the Area, Part XI thus explicitly
addresses potential policy trade-offs not only between different producers, but also
between producers and consumers. This perspective resembles the comprehensive
one of ICAs sensu originali. However, PART XI of the UNCLOS is of rather
historical significance for legal analysis today since it has been replaced by
Section 6 of the corresponding Implementation Agreement.205 The latter bases
commodity exploitation in the Area on principles of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and other WTO disciplines,206 thus subjecting it mostly to
rules stemming from indirect TCL.
5.2.1.2.3.3 Comprehensive Scope
However, some ICAs sensu stricto also exhibit a more comprehensive approach to
tackling commodity governance. Where they do, they often provide guidance on
how to balance at least some of the five major interests associated with commodity
activity.207
The perhaps most elaborate guidance on what constitutes sustainable use to date
has emerged in the context of biodiversity conservation with regard to genetic
resources. The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) is intended to foster
the sustainable use of such resources, as well as ‘the fair and equitable sharing of
the benefits out of [their] utilization’, according to Article 1 CBD. In this connection,
the CBD seeks to strike a balance between developing and industrialised states by
203Espa and Oehl (2018), p. 8.
204Espa and Oehl (2018), who also point to Article 151(1)(a) UNCLOS in this context, which reads:
‘Without prejudice to the objectives set forth in article 150 and for the purpose of implementing
subparagraph (h) of that article, the Authority, acting through existing forums or such new
arrangements or agreements as may be appropriate, in which all interested parties, including both
producers and consumers, participate, shall take measures necessary to promote the growth,
efficiency and stability of markets for those commodities produced from the minerals derived
from the Area, at prices remunerative to producers and fair to consumers. All States Parties shall
cooperate to this end.’
205UN treaty collection (1982) Agreement relating to the implementation of Part XI of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, https://treaties.un.org/doc/
Treaties/1994/11/19941116%2006-01%20AM/Ch_XXI_06a_p.pdf (last accessed 14 May 2021).
206Espa and Oehl (2018), p. 8; Desta (2010), para. 39.
207On the latter, see Sect. 2.1.3 above.
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addressing issues of technology transfer; right to access; national conservation;
cooperation; and financing.208
More detailed guidance on how to enhance sustainable use of biodiversity is
provided by the 2004 Addis Ababa Principles and Guidelines for the Sustainable
Use of Biodiversity (AAPG). According to its 14 practical principles, the AAPG
i.a. guide states to maintain and link supportive laws, institutions, and policies at all
governance levels (principle #1);209 practice adaptive management based on science
as well as traditional and local knowledge (principle #4(a));210 and that, as a general
rule,
costs of management and conservation of biological diversity should be internalized within
the area of management and reflected in the distribution of the benefits from the use
(principle #13).211
Specific guidance on how benefit sharing shall be implemented, is provided by
the Bonn Guidelines as well as the Nagoya Protocol.212 Regarding plant genetic
resources for food and agriculture, the FAO has i.a. put in place a multilateral system
of access and benefit sharing, according to Article 10 of its International Treaty on
Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGR).213 According to Article
12.4 ITPGR, ‘facilitated access’ to resources shall be provided on the basis of a
‘standard material transfer agreement’. According to Article 13.2 ITPGR, benefits
from the use of plant genetic resources shall be shared through the ‘mechanisms’ of
information exchange, technology transfer, capacity building, and the ‘sharing of
benefits arising from commercialization’. The latter generally shall be paid to a
respective ‘Trust Account’, according to Articles 13.2(d)(ii), 19.3(f) ITPGR.
Moreover, particularly two regional conventions aimed at the conservation of
nature and natural resources are touching upon rules on how to remedy potential use
conflicts and corresponding commodity policy trade-offs.
While the ASEAN Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Natural
Resources (ACNR) naturally focuses on conservation, it nevertheless exhibits a
comprehensive scope as well as a ‘balanced’ design in view of the broad scope of
measures it addresses.214 According to its Article 1(1), members shall i.a.
208Cf. Beyerlin and Grote Stoutenberg (2012), para. 45.
209Secretariat of the CBD (2004), p. 8.
210Secretariat of the CBD (2004), p. 11.
211Secretariat of the CBD (2004), p. 20.
212Secretariat of the CBD (2002); Secretariat of the CBD (2011); on the current status of the benefit-
sharing principle, cf. Cabrera Medaglia and Perron-Welch (2018a, b).
213FAO (2009).
214ASEAN (1985) ACNR, http://environment.asean.org/agreement-on-the-conservation-of-nature-
and-natural-resources/ (last accessed 14 May 2021). The ACNR i.a. sets forth specific requirements
for endangered and endemic species (Article 5 ACNR); vegetation cover and forest resources
(Article 6 ACNR); soil (Article 7 ACNR); water (Article 8 ACNR); and air (Article 9 ACNR).
According to Article 10 ACNR, states shall ‘wherever possible [. . .] prevent, reduce and control
degradation of the natural environment’, i.a. by controlling the use of chemicals in agriculture
(Article 10(a) ACNR); promoting pollution control (Article 10(b) ACNR); and by considering ‘the
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ensure the sustainable utilization of harvested natural resources under their jurisdiction in
accordance with scientific principles and with a view to attaining the goal of sustainable
development.
For this purpose, the parties shall develop and coordinate their national conser-
vation strategies, according to Article 1(2) ACNR. Moreover, according to Article
2(1) ACNR, the conservation and management of NR shall be ‘treated as an integral
part of development planning’, which relates to social, ecological and economic
factors, according to Article 2(2) ACNR. According to Article 3(1) ACNR, members
are held to ‘maintain maximum genetic diversity’.
In addition, members ‘shall endeavour to’ develop and implement resource
management plans fostering the sustainable use of the resources in question,
according to Article 4(1) ACNR. This requirement is being spelled out in further
detail, i.a. demanding states to prevent decrease of the harvested species below
levels, which are required for its ‘stable recruitment’, according to Article 4(1)
(a) ACNR; maintain ‘the ecological relationship between harvested, dependent and
related populations of living resources of the ecosystem considered’, according to
Article 4(1)(b) ACNR; and to prevent alterations to the ecosystem, which are ‘not
reversible over a reasonable period of time’, according to Article 4(1)(d) ACNR.
Moreover, activities causing ‘local distinction’ or ‘serious disturbance’ of species
prohibited, according to Article 4(2)(c) ACNR.
Exhibiting several similar provisions to the ACNR, also the African Convention
on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (AfCNR; ‘Maputo conven-
tion’) comprehensively tackles the challenges of sustainably developing NR,
e.g. expressly according to its Article XIV.215 Going beyond the scope of the
ACNR, the AfCNR also addresses challenges related to commodity activity with
regard to military activities (Article XV AfCNR); procedural rights, i.a. with regard
to dissemination of and access to environmental information (Article XVI AfCNR);
traditional rights of local communities and indigenous knowledge (Article XVII
AfCNR); technology transfer (Article XIX AfCNR); and capacity building (Article
XX AfCNR).
originator of the activity which may lead to environmental degradation responsible for its preven-
tion, reduction and control as well as [. . .] rehabilitation and remedial measures required’ (Article
10(d) ACNR). The Convention also addresses i.a. the prevention of pollution discharges (Article
11 ACNR); land use planning (Article 12 ACNR); protected areas (Article 13 ACNR); shared
resources (Article 19 ACNR); and transfrontier environmental effects (Article 20 ACNR). It shall
be noted, however, that the ACNR has not yet entered into force, Beyerlin and Grote Stoutenberg
(2013), para. 42; Ecolex (2019) ACNR, https://www.ecolex.org/details/asean-agreement-on-the-
conservation-of-nature-and-natural-resources-tre-000820/participants/? (last accessed
14 May 2021).
215AU (2014) Revised AfCNR, https://au.int/en/treaties/african-convention-conservation-nature-
and-natural-resources-revised-version (last accessed 14 May 2021). At the time of writing, the
convention had been ratified by 17 member states of the AU (2019) List of countries, https://au.int/
sites/default/files/treaties/7782-sl-revised_african_convention_on_the_conservation_of_nature_
and_natural_resources.pdf (last accessed 14 May 2021).
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The Southern African Development Community (SADC) has elaborated further
regional guidance on how to balance commodity interests in individual sectors,
namely mining and forestry. The SADC Protocol on Mining (SADCPM) seeks to
generally foster ‘a thriving mining sector’ as a means to promote economic devel-
opment, alleviate poverty and generally raise the living standard in the region,
according to Article 2(1).216 For that purpose, member states i.a. engage in infor-
mation sharing (Article 3 SADCPM), enhancing their technological capacities
(Article 4 SADCPM), developing common standards (Article 5 SADCPM), pro-
moting private sector participation (Article 6 SADCPM), as well as promoting
small-scale mining (Article 7 SADCPM) and occupational health and safety (Article
9 SADCPM). Moreover, according to Article 8(1) SADCPM members
shall promote sustainable development by ensuring that a balance between mineral devel-
opment and environmental protection is attained.217
With regard to the forestry sector, the SADC Protocol on Forestry (SADCPF)
shall ‘promote the development, conservation, sustainable management and
utilisation of all types of forests and trees’, according to its Article 3(1)(a). Article
4 SADCPF sets forth various ‘guiding principles’, which reflect core norms of TCL,
i.a. the duty to cooperate, PSNR, the no harm rule, public participation, as well as the
benefit sharing principle. Further issues and commodity governance challenges
include tenure and ownership (Article 5 SADCPF); the establishment of a regional
database (Article 10 SADCPF); community-based forest management (Article
12 SADCPF); participation of women in forest management (Article 13 SADCPF);
traditional forest-related knowledge (Article 16 SADCPF); industry, trade and
investment (Article 18 SADCPF); and capacity-building as well as public awareness
(Article 19 SADCPF).
Moreover, describing a rather recent development, several EU Free Trade Agree-
ments (FTAs) that have been concluded since 2016 provide commodity-directed
contents. Besides the fact that these agreements now routinely appear to include
so-called ‘trade and SD’ chapters,218 especially agreements, which have been
concluded or negotiated in 2018 and 2019, moreover address issues of biodiversity,
as well as sustainable forest and fisheries management.219 In addition, these recent
agreements seek to promote the integration of various norm subsets of TCL, i.a. by
explicitly confirming commitments under multilateral labour as well as
216The 1997 SADCPM arguably constitutes one of the normative foundations of the 2009 AMV,
which has already featured in Sect. 4.2.2.2.1.1 above. See also ZIMCODD (2017), p. 6, which
recommends ‘SADC countries to fully domesticate the AMV and SADC Mining Protocol through
policy and legislative reforms’.
217In that connection, member states are also called upon to encourage regional approaches to EIAs,
especially when it comes to potential cross-border environmental harm, according to Article
8(2) SADCPM.
218Cf. Sect. 4.3.1.2 above, n 457.
219See Articles 12.7, 12.8 EU-Singapore FTA; Articles 16.6, 16.7, and 16.8 EU-Japan FTA;
Articles 13.7, 13.8, 13.9 EU-Vietnam FTA.
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environmental agreements in the context of trade.220 Furthermore, several recent EU
FTAs establish so-called committees on trade and SD, which are i.a. tasked with
reviewing the implementation of the agreement’s corresponding chapter.221 The
respective reports that these ‘sustainability committees’ are going to produce, may
over time bring about further guidance on how to integrate the three pillars of SD in
the context of commodity activity.222
5.2.1.2.3.4 Interim Conclusion
As this brief survey has demonstrated, many ICAs sensu stricto do not address
commodity policy trade-offs or questions of how to foster the SD of commodity
sectors. Instead, they are frequently designed for clear-cut purposes, such as the joint
development of commodity deposits, the civil liability of corporations for oil
pollution, or establishing fair and safe working conditions in specific commodity
sectors. While some areas exhibit quite a concentrated form of regulation through
ICAs sensu stricto, other agreements are ‘scattered’ across a variety of factual
scenarios, such as the bilateral German commodity partnerships, or CRAMRA.
However, a number of instruments also seek to address challenges related to
commodity governance more comprehensively. Examples include the Convention
on Biological Diversity (CBD) and related guidance, the ASEAN Agreement on the
Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (ACNR) and African Convention on
the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (AfCNR), as well as the Southern
African Development Community (SADC) protocols. The ACNR for instance
reconciles various aspects of commodity governance in one agreement, including
biodiversity, sustainable use, and shared resources. Yet, being especially concerned
with conservation, it does neither touch upon Human Rights nor aspects of trade or
international investment.223 While the AfCNR expands further, i.a. touching upon
traditional and indigenous peoples’ as well as procedural rights, it likewise does not
integrate said elements of TCL. Nevertheless, these regional examples describe
potential avenues towards creating more comprehensive legal instruments regulating
commodity activities. In fact, it is this approach that recent EU FTAs, which now
increasingly include commodity-directed contents in their respective trade and SD
chapters, i.a. touching upon sustainable forest and fisheries management, mirror to a
certain degree.
220See i.a. Articles 12.4, 12.6 EU-Singapore FTA; 16.3, 16.4 EU-Japan FTA; Articles 13.4, 13.5,
13.6 EU-Vietnam FTA; cf. also Gehring et al. (2018), p. 21.
221Cf. Sect. 4.3.1.2 above, n 457.
222As such, the committees on trade and SD appear to be considerably well-suited to develop
parameters for the continuous elaboration of the TCL framework.
223The same appears to be true for the current draft of the ‘Agreement under the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological
diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction’ (BBNJ agreement), UN (2019) Draft text of the
agreement, https://undocs.org/a/conf.232/2019/6 (last accessed 14 May 2021).
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5.2.1.3 Some Reflections on ICAs sensu lato
ICAs sensu lato constitute indirect Transnational Commodity Law (TCL), i.e. they
are not commodity-directed. This category of commodity agreements includes a
wide spectrum of multilateral conventions on the environment, trade, HR, and other
subjects. Concrete examples are those, which we have analysed in more detail
above, as for instance the International Bill of Human Rights, or the GATT, to
name but a few prominent instruments. Also Regional and Bilateral Trade Agree-
ments, such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific
Partnership (CPTPP) or the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement
(CETA), Preferential Trade Agreements, such as the Cotonou Agreement, Bilateral
Investment Treaties, or technical cooperation agreements substantially impact com-
modity governance and therefore constitute ICAs sensu lato.224 Recalling our broad
definition of ICAs sensu lato as ‘any international agreement that exhibits a sub-
stantial regulatory impact on commodity activity, yet without having been explicitly
directed at or designed for that purpose’, it becomes clear that most of these
agreements already featured in our account of TCL in Chaps. 3 and 4 above.
Therefore, only a few reflections on the relationship between these agreements and
ICAs sensu originali and stricto respectively shall be shared in brief.
First, ICAs sensu originali, stricto and lato exist largely in parallel, meaning that
there is typically no or only limited normative interaction between the different
instruments. While some agreements may be referring to others, no concrete legal
effects usually accompany these references.225 Despite the fact that many ICAs
sensu lato are pursuing similar, if not identical objectives, especially fostering the
sustainable development (SD) of a specific region, country, or sector,226 their
primary non-commodity-directed purpose is what distinguishes them from ICAs
sensu stricto. As we have discussed above, this creates an incoherent framework,
which, however, may be effectively tied together under SD as the overall regulatory
objective of TCL.
Second, while the body of ICAs sensu lato is certainly considerably large, one
can still identify instruments, which are of greater importance for the framework of
TCL than others. First and foremost, one in this connection of course has to refer to
224Given that some of these agreements contain commodity-directed provisions, such as the
Bilateral Dialogue on Raw Materials, which is being established according to Article 25.4 CETA,
or the sustainable forest management provisions contained in Articles 13.8 EU-Vietnam FTA and
12.7 EU-Singapore FTA respectively, it is not always evident to qualify them as either ICAs sensu
lato or sensu stricto. In fact, examples of commodity-directed provisions can be found here and
there in various ICAs sensu lato, which are thus delineating a sort of ‘commodity-directed
patchwork’, as e.g. reflected in the respective GATT provisions, cf. Sects. 4.2.2.1.4.2 and 4.3.2
above as well as shortly below.
225On the few incidents in which they do, see already Sect. 4.2.3 above.
226In this respect, see especially the EU-ACP agreements, cf. Weiss (2009), para. 25; on SD
provisions in recent EU FTAs, see already Sect. 4.3.1.2 above; generally, on EU development
cooperation, Oehl (2018a).
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the International Bill of HR. One field, however, which exhibits the greatest degree
of consistency is international labour law. Particularly the eight ‘fundamental con-
ventions’ are being referred to in international agreements, standards, and guidelines
across the entire field of TCL, be they of intergovernmental or private nature.
Naturally also the multilateral environmental conventions and the established prin-
ciples of international environmental law, which they embody, are playing a key
role. The same holds true for the GATT. Integrating these standards with one another
under the ‘roof’ of the regulatory objective of SD certainly remains a central
challenge.227
Third, apart from the question what instruments currently are of the greatest
significance for TCL and the regulation of commodity activity, one can also distin-
guish between different ICAs sensu lato according to how close they are to com-
modity activity. Closeness in this connection can arise either from the factual
scenarios the agreements are designed to govern or their normative contents.
Naturally, in many cases both will coincide.
For instance, the Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of
International Watercourses (New York Convention) in view of the many
commodity-related uses of watercourses as well as potential corresponding damage
will regularly be concerned with commodity activity. Non-navigational uses of
watercourses are factually close to commodity activities. Given that commodities
represent a share of roughly 25% of international goods trade,228 the same holds true
for the GATT. Yet, the latter also contains several commodity-directed provisions as
we have seen above. Therefore, the GATT is also normatively close to commodity
activity, albeit not qualifying as an ICA sensu stricto.229 Likewise, also the Interna-
tional Bill of Human Rights in the form of the right to freely dispose over natural
resources (RFD) contains a central commodity-directed provision. Given the many
forms and dimensions of commodity activity that Human Rights cover, it also
appears fair to speak of ‘closeness’ in this respect.
The Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), and the emerging field of international energy
law in general,230 exhibit significant overlaps with TCL in both respects. This is
mostly due to the fact that most energy worldwide is still being produced through
so-called combustibles, especially oil, gas, coal, or fuel wood, which of course are
commodities; also nuclear energy relies on the commodities uranium or plutonium,
renewable energy technologies require i.a. Rare Earth Elements and several other
minerals, including lithium and cobalt.231 How closely related these emerging legal
227On this challenge, see already Sect. 5.1.2 above. See Chi (2017) with regard to international
investment law; also, Hilpold (2011) and Bartels (2013) with regard to HR and WTO law; on the
related—or perhaps rather preceding—debate on the general fragmentation of international law,
Koskenniemi and Leino (2002).
228WTO (2018), p. 42. According toWTO estimates, fuels and mining products accounted for 15%,
agricultural products for 10% of world merchandise exports in 2017, ibid.
229On the blurred boundaries between these categories, see already n 224 above.
230Viñuales (2013).
231Cf. Espa and Oehl (2018), p. 6.
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fields are also with regard to their normative frameworks, is i.a. reflected in Article
1(4) and the corresponding annex EM of the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), which
define ‘Energy Materials and Products’. The list almost exclusively includes com-
modities, notably except i.a. electrical energy itself. Article 18(1) ECT reaffirms the
permanent sovereignty of member states over energy resources. According to Article
18(3) ECT, each state shall
continue[] to hold [. . .] rights to decide the geographical areas within its Area to be made
available for exploration and development of its energy resources, the optimalization of their
recovery and the rate at which they may be depleted or otherwise exploited, to specify and
enjoy any taxes, royalties or other financial payments payable by virtue of such exploration
and exploitation, and to regulate the environmental and safety aspects of such exploration,
development and reclamation within its Area, and to participate in such exploration and
exploitation, inter alia, through direct participation by the government or through state
enterprises.
Furthermore, according to Article 18(4) ECT, the parties
undertake to facilitate access to energy resources, inter alia, by allocating in a
non-discriminatory manner on the basis of published criteria authorizations, licences, con-
cessions and contracts to prospect and explore for or to exploit or extract energy resources.
Both provisions essentially cover issues of commodity governance. For what end
uses commodities are being exploited, whether it is used for energy or non-energy
purposes, naturally does not impact challenges that are associated with the removal
of an item from earth.232 Thus, from the perspective of international legal scholar-
ship, it would make little sense to conceptualise a field of international energy law
without doing the same for commodity activity. Whereas the latter should be
confined to the ‘removal activity’ and associated activities along the commodity
value chain, international energy law would cover all uses of commodities, which
serve the purpose of energy generation.
Nevertheless, according to the parameters we have established above, the ECT
does not constitute an ICA sensu stricto, but an ICA sensu lato. This is because—
apart from a few provisions—it is not explicitly directed at commodities. Instead,
commodity activity here is being observed from the prism of energy activity—
commodity extraction as the necessary precondition of the generation, trade and
sale of electrical energy. While one may read the provisions in Article 18 ECT as
reflecting a ‘conscious consideration’ of the specificities of commodity activity, it
more precisely rather appears to be an expression of the great overlap of energy and
commodity activity. This distinction is important, since from the ‘energy perspec-
tive’ one may arrive at different normative judgments than from the ‘commodity
perspective’. The focus on the end use of energy generation could for instance lead
to the extraction aspect being seen as rather a ‘prefix’. Therefore, one may e.g. overly
emphasise the perspective of energy consumers over the one of energy commodity
producers. However, naturally the differences here may prove to be nuances. Yet,
the example of the ECT and emerging international energy law ultimately
232Cf. Sect. 3.2.2.1 above.
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demonstrates that conceptualising TCL is an obvious step towards elaborating an
effective legal framework for GCG.
Examples of agreements exhibiting a lesser degree of closeness to commodity
activity are Additional Protocols I and II to the Geneva Convention, despite their
commodity-directed provisions. This is due to the fact that—at least ideally—armed
conflict constitutes an abnormal situation for commodity activity to occur. Conse-
quently, they also constitute ICAs sensu lato. The more ‘remotely’ agreements
operate from commodity activities, the more likely they will constitute ICAs sensu
latissimo.
5.2.1.4 Interim Conclusion: Relevance of Current ICAs for GCG
To conclude, we can ascertain that the relevance of International Commodity
Agreements (ICAs) sensu originali for Global Commodity Governance (GCG)
today is very limited. Albeit displaying a comprehensive approach, tackling an
entire sector and seeking to foster sustainable development (SD), their objectives
are not being pursued with significant ‘bite’ due to a lack of corresponding substan-
tive obligations. ICAs sensu stricto, to the contrary, often exhibit a narrow scope,
which is focused on a clear-cut, somewhat ‘singular’ objective. As such, they may
quite intensively regulate some specific activities associated with commodity oper-
ations in some specific sectors, such as oil spill incidents or timber trade between two
parties. While some regional instruments, such as the ASEAN Agreement on the
Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (ACNR), African Convention on the
Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (AfCNR) and the Southern African
Development Community (SADC) protocols, address challenges of GCG more
comprehensively and recent EU Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) demonstrate a
trend to consciously consider specificities of commodity activity, there are only
considerably few ICAs sensu stricto that provide guidance on how to balance
commodity interests. Where they do, these provisions are often rather aspirational
or soft and rarely entail concrete obligations.
This status quo basically describes a scenario, in which commodity activities are
only in few instances covered by law reflecting a ‘conscious consideration’ for
corresponding regulatory challenges, i.e. by direct Transnational Commodity Law
(TCL). Consequently, at present ICAs sensu lato clearly are of the greatest signif-
icance for GCG. As repeatedly discussed throughout this book, the fact that these
agreements have been designed for regulatory objectives, which are not explicitly
targeting commodities, leaves behind an incoherent transnational legal frame-
work.233 As a result, there is close to no guidance with legally binding value,
which addresses states’ decision to extract and concretises, what sustainable use
requires.
233Cf. i.a. Sects. 4.2.1 and 5.1 above.
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5.2.2 ICAs De Lege Ferenda
To the close of this book, the following section shall provide an outlook on potential
future ICAs, which could help remedy the current deficits of the legal framework of
TCL.234 Generally speaking, ICAs de lege ferenda shall serve to transform the
obligations that apply to commodity activities under the various legal instruments
into commodity-directed tools. ICAs de lege ferenda extract those provisions, which
are relevant in a commodity context, from ICAs sensu lato and incorporate them in a
comprehensive ICA sensu stricto. In addition, they include those best practices,
which have emerged from transnational standard setting.
This leads to the following central functions of ICAs de lege ferenda: First, they
codify balancing norms and thus specify what sustainable use means (Sect. 5.2.2.1).
Second, they define SD as their object and purpose (Sect. 5.2.2.2). Third, they
reinforce the rule of law in the commodity sector and promote international equity
(Sect. 5.2.2.3). The section closes with some reflections on formal questions regard-
ing the design of ICAs de lege ferenda (Sect. 5.2.2.4), before illustrating how all of
these functions ultimately promote a functional, sustainable commodity sector and
therefore SD in general (Sect. 5.2.2.5).
5.2.2.1 ICAs as Instruments Codifying Balancing Norms
ICAs de lege ferenda can serve to specify what the sustainable use principle, as the
central balancing norm of TCL requires. Fundamentally, it obliges states to balance
commodity policy trade-offs in the way, which is most conducive to SD.
5.2.2.1.1 General Idea: Qualifying the Policy Space Available to States
In view of their permanent sovereignty over natural resources (PSNR), states
generally dispose of the competence to set the parameters on how they balance the
five interests that make up the organisational framework of TCL.235 However, under
an ICA de lege ferenda states could establish self-imposed qualifications of their
PSNR, which require them to prioritise certain interests in specific scenarios. ICAs
de lege ferenda could introduce legal rules that effectively coordinate the various
234On this approach of ‘updating’ existing ICAs, see already Krajewski (2012); also, Nowrot
(2013) on the German commodity partnership agreements as ‘new regulatory instruments’
(my translation). Wilts and Bleischwitz (2012) propose an International Commodity Covenant,
which addresses incomplete global material cycles, i.a. by promoting recycling.
235However, from the perspective of commodity policy trade-offs, defining commodity deposits as
‘common heritage of humankind’ in fact appears to be an approach worth considering. Regardless
of such enterprise being politically far from realistic, it could help resolve potential conflicts
between global, national, and local SD policies. States are of course at all times free to define all
or certain types of commodities as ‘common heritage’. On the concept cf. Wolfrum (2009).
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interests, which characterise commodity activity, in a way that is most conducive to
SD. Thus, states would commit themselves to effectively foster a functional com-
modity sector.
Balancing the five interests associated with commodity activity requires defining
in which scenarios which one of them antecedes the other. Proceeding in this way,
the global community could, little by little, define concrete parameters for sustain-
able commodity activity. These parameters would effectively constitute conflict
rules, which could either apply to the ‘big picture’ of sustainable commodity activity
or to individual subsectors alone. Moreover, corresponding parameters could serve
to identify those commodity subsectors, which are most critical for SD. They could
establish different parameters for different sectors. Yet, ultimately, they would all
reflect the ultimate objective of SD.
5.2.2.1.2 Principle of Proportionality
Without unduly restricting the policy space of states, ICAs de lege ferenda could
specify the balancing requirements, which sustainable commodity use entails, by
introducing a principle of proportionality. According to its general rule, all five
commodity interests would need to be observed in all decisions of a state, which
affect commodity activities, thus particularly its decision(s) to extract as well as the
overall design of its legal framework applicable to commodity operations.
Contouring its normative content further, the principle of proportionality would
require that the degree to which one or more commodity interests are being neglected
in a respective state measure needs to be proportionate to the significance of the other
interests, which that very measure is intended to foster. For example, where an
individual commodity project requires extensive environmental destruction as well
as the relocation of several villages, including an indigenous community, it would
only be lawful, where these phenomena are proportionate to the economic gain
and/or development benefits it promises.
This obligation to carry out a sophisticated balancing exercise between the five
interests associated with commodity activity, would go hand in hand with a trans-
parency obligation: the respective state or government would be required to disclose
its concrete considerations, balancing method, as well as reasons for its weighting of
the different factors.
Moreover, to further specify what constitutes proportionality, ICAs de lege
ferenda could define that purely economic objectives constitute subordinate aims
to the objective of development.236 As a consequence, they would carry less weight
within the balancing exercise to be performed and would generally only be consid-
ered where they serve the social advancement of the respective state’s society. This
236Cf. in this respect also Krajewski (2017), pp. 2526 who is suggesting a clause, which
establishes ‘supremacy’ of human rights over trade and investment treaties.
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step would enhance the dogmatic significance of socio-ecological development in
relation to the economic pillar of SD.237
5.2.2.1.3 Prevention of Irreversible Effects
The principle of proportionality could be further qualified by a rule, according to
which irreversible effects caused by commodity activity—e.g. for the natural envi-
ronment or human livelihoods—should generally be prevented. Weighting results,
which violate this rule, would not be proportionate. The rule would thus set a
boundary to a state’s margin of discretion in weighing the five commodity interests.
For example, this rule could require states to assess whether or not by means of
mine closure measures, a certain area can be sufficiently reinstated after commodity
extraction has taken place. Where such is unlikely, the objectives of environmental
protection and participation would prevail over economic interests. The same prin-
ciple could also guide decisions to extract with regard to the threat of climate change.
Where overall CO2 emissions already threaten to cause irreversible effects for planet
and human species, a decision to extract a large volume of combustibles may be
deemed to be a violation of this rule emanating from SD.
However, irreversible effects—in this case particularly for the human species—
may of course also impend with regard to the socio-economic pillars of SD. Where
for instance economic turmoil or a famine would result from a decision not to extract
(or plant), commodity activity may in fact be required under such kind of rule.238
5.2.2.1.4 Obligation for States to Detail Terms of Sustainable Use
in National Regimes
These rules and principles concretise rather abstractly how the balancing exercise
required by the sustainable use principle needs to be performed. Another avenue to
specifying what is required to achieve commodity equilibrium lies in detailing the
terms of the sustainable use principle. An ICA de lege ferenda could fully integrate
concrete sustainability guidelines and best practices, which states would be obligated
to implement within commodity-directed legal regimes of their national frameworks.
Generally speaking, the twelve precepts of the Natural Resource Charter can
serve as a signpost regarding what aspects the commodity-directed national regime
237On ‘Mickey Mouse’ sustainability, cf. already Sect. 4.3.2 above.
238Naturally, a significant share of the effects conducive to SD that this kind of provision would
bring about will depend on the respective norm addressee’s readiness to take their decisions based
on reason and available facts. Wherever they seek to obscure their actual intentions behind
pretended reasoning, it will regularly be difficult to ‘convict’ them of their doing. Nevertheless,
what the provision and SD as a regulatory objective generally achieve, is to set SD as the point of
reference for really any political decision that one may be deliberating to take. See already Oehl
(2019), p. 28.
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should address, including rights allocation, tax regime, and the offsetting of envi-
ronmental and social costs of extraction.239
Taking up incidents of balancing norms, which can be found in ICAs sensu
stricto, the national framework could establish the principle of adaptive manage-
ment, which is based on science as well as traditional and local knowledge (principle
#4(a) of the Addis Ababa Principles and Guidelines for the Sustainable Use of
Biodiversity (AAPG)).240 Moreover, it could provide for the internalisation of the
social and ecological costs of commodity activity ‘within the area of management’
and the reflection of these costs in the ‘distribution of the benefits from the use’
(principle #13 AAPG).241 Measures to be reflected in this instance could relate to the
pricing in of negative externalities caused by commodity activities, including CO2
emissions.242 In line with Article 2(1) of the ASEAN Agreement on the Conserva-
tion of Nature and Natural Resources (ACNR), states could be required to treat the
conservation and management of NR ‘as an integral part of development planning’.
Furthermore, the national system could necessitate the elaboration of resource
management plans applicable to individual commodities, as provided for in Article
4(1) ACNR. Going beyond the obligation to prevent irreversible effects of com-
modity activity, the national framework could require the prevention of alterations to
the ecosystem, which are ‘not reversible over a reasonable period of time’ in line
with Article 4(1)(d) ACNR. In addition, an ICA de lege ferenda could require states
to implement within their national regimes a system of community-based resource
development, as suggested by Article 12 of the Southern African Development
Community Protocol on Forestry (SADCPF); as well as measures fostering the
active participation of women in commodity management (Article 13 SADCPF).
Apart from these general principles, ICAs de lege ferenda could obligate states to
detail the terms of sustainable use also in the context of individual commodity
sectors. For example, with regard to the mining sector, states could be required to
demonstrate that they are implementing the IGF Mining Policy Framework and to
subject themselves to regular review under the World Bank MInGov tool. In
addition, they could be obliged to envisage the mandatory use of the Model Mine
Development Agreement (MMDA) in all mining-related investor-state contracts. A
respective rule could be designed as follows:
Article x: States shall take all measures necessary to ensure a sustainable mining sector. For
that purpose, they shall implement all standards referred to in annex A in their own acts and
policies. With regard to stakeholders referred to in annex B, they shall require by law that
their commodity activities be conducted in conformity with the following standards: . . .
It shall be noted here that commodity-directed, comprehensive instruments
addressing the mining sector, such as the Berlin II Guidelines, the Intergovernmental
Forum on Mining, Minerals, Metals and Sustainable Development (IGF) Mining
239NRGI (2014), pp. 4, 7–35; on the NRC, cf. already Sect. 2.2.5 above.
240Secretariat of the CBD (2004), p. 11.
241Secretariat of the CBD (2004), p. 20.
242Cf. Nordhaus (2007).
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Policy Framework, the Initiative for Responsible Mining Assurance (IRMA) Stan-
dard for Responsible Mining IRMA-STD-001, or the MMDA exhibit a remarkable
degree of content coherence, i.e. coherence with regard to what contents need to be
covered in order to sufficiently regulate commodity activities.243 The Berlin II
Guidelines as well as the IGF Mining Policy Framework as instruments addressing
states for instance both provide guidance on the domestic regulatory framework,
including mining and environmental legislation as well as licensing, environmental
management, policy coherence, mine closure, and artisanal and small-scale mining.
The IRMA standard and the MMDA share contents such as environmental and
social impact assessment, local community development and health, labour stan-
dards, and mine closure.
With regard to the oil and gas industry, the national framework could require the
elimination of routine flaring during oil production, the identification and reduction
of methane emissions in the gas value chain, waste minimisation, and the developing
and sharing of scalable sustainability systems.244 Corporations could be obligated to
collaborate with the public and non-profit sector in order to foster the socio-
economic development of local communities i.a., through building local workforce
capacity, sharing health and safety innovations and fostering healthcare provision by
means of developing new applications of e.g. renewable energy technologies.245
Further best practices have been elaborated in the guidance documents issued by the
International Association of Oil and Gas Producers (IOGP) as well as the Interna-
tional Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation Association (IPIECA).246
While portraying sector-specific best practices in more detail lies beyond the
scope of this book, an overview of relevant standards is provided in the TCL outline
in the annex.
As a side benefit of this obligation for states to detail the terms of sustainable use
in their national frameworks, ICAs de lege ferenda would help aligning regulation
on the global, national, and local levels. They would be setting the standards on the
global level, which would subsequently be influencing legislation and regulation on
national as well as local levels, ideally leading to harmonisation and coherence. As
such, the standards set by ICAs de lege ferenda would ‘trickle down’ to the
individual commodity activity at hand. Commodity contracts detailing the terms of
the respective activity would be embedded in this aligned framework.247 Thus,
potential power asymmetries between corporate and government actors would
have less influence on the negotiated terms given the applicable binding national
framework.248
243What they are exhibiting to a considerable lesser extent is norm coherence—a quality, which SD
defined as the object and purpose of TCL would foster.
244Cf. UN GC (2017), p. 9.
245UN GC (2017), p. 9.
246IOGP (2017); IPIECA (2017).
247Cf. NRGI (2014), p. 13.
248Cf. AU (2009), pp. 17–18.
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For example, states could be required to legally oblige companies under national
law to fully integrate the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights for the
Extractive and Energy Sectors (VPSHR) in their contracts with private security
providers.249 Moreover, states could be held to collect sufficient technical data in
order to gain ‘a good understanding of the resource base’.250 Also, the licensing
regime applicable to extractive industries should allow for post-exploration reduc-
tions of particular licenses in size in order to ensure that not too large of a share of the
resource base falls under one license; and that the state can benefit from potential
land value increases following respective commodity discoveries.251 In terms of the
procedure of allocating rights to third parties, the Natural Resource Charter advises
states to rely on ‘well-designed auctions’ rather than ‘direct negotiations on a
license-by-license basis’.252
5.2.2.2 ICAs as Instruments Incorporating SD as Their Object
and Purpose
ICAs de lege ferenda can contribute significantly to the coherence of the framework
of TCL. They can do so especially by incorporating SD as their regulatory objec-
tive—and therefore confirming its respective status under the TCL framework
overall.
As described above, this would have a twofold effect:253 For one, all rules
contained in the ICA would have to be interpreted in light of SD. For the other,
SD would guide international, regional, supranational, and national legislators
whenever they are designing rules intended to balance commodity policy trade-
offs as part of their commitment to give effect to their obligations under the ICA.
Reconciling the various standards, which serve as benchmarks specifying the nor-
mative contents of the sustainable use principle, under the ‘roof’ of the ICA and
therefore its regulatory objective of SD would over time foster the coherence of all of
TCL. In applying the various obligations, addressees, legislators, and international
judges would gradually elaborate an arrangement of the applicable norms, which is
most conducive to SD—thus balancing its three (social, environmental and eco-
nomic) pillars in a commodity context.
249VPSHR (2000), p. 6.
250NRGI (2014), p. 13.
251NRGI (2014), p. 13.
252NRGI (2014), p. 14. Competitive bidding as part of an auction is however only advised
whenever there are more than three competitors; otherwise ‘a licensing round with strict minimum
technical criteria’ should be the procedure of choice, NRGI (2014), p. 14. For further guidance on
the design of commodity contracts, see Elaw (2013); Cotula (2010); Mandelbaum et al. (2016);
Kienzler et al. (2015); Smaller (2014); CCSI (2019) Guides to land contracts, http://ccsi.columbia.
edu/work/projects/guides-to-land-contracts/ (last accessed 14 May 2021); Wilson and Kuszewski
(2011); and Gathii (2014).
253See already Oehl (2019), pp. 14–15.
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5.2.2.3 ICAs as Instruments Reinforcing the Rule of Law
in the Commodity Sector
ICAs de lege ferenda can reinforce the rule of law in the commodity sector by
clarifying, expanding, and aligning it. The first function is as simple as essential.
ICAs de lege ferenda serve to summarise and confirm commitments of states under
TCL. As such, they illustrate that the international community is aware of the vital
importance of the commodity sector and the need to establish a coherent legal
framework for GCG. In view of the many instruments of TCL, ICAs de lege ferenda
serve as the ‘normative scaffolding’, which provides clarity regarding the interplay
and application of the TCL framework.
Moreover, ICAs de lege ferenda can fill gaps in the regulatory framework. Gaps
are being created whenever a subset of norms regulates a certain aspect of commod-
ity activity yet fails to provide guidance with regard to a facet of the latter. As we
have seen in Chap. 4 above, TCL exhibits several gaps, e.g. when it comes to
addressing potential clashes between global, national, and local SD objectives, or
protecting natural resources against unsustainable uses during an international armed
conflict or non-international armed conflict.254 ICAs de lege ferenda can build on
these observations and address gaps in the current framework in a targeted manner.
Besides, ICAs de lege ferenda can also serve as instruments for expanding the
current framework of TCL by covering additional topics. For instance, concrete
guidance could be elaborated with regard to local procurement,255 antitrust law
particularly dealing with commodity TNCs, or licensing and certification of various
commodity sub-activities, including exploration, exploitation, and processing. Also,
an ICA de lege ferenda could set specific parameters for the admission and protec-
tion of commodity investments.256
In general, ICAs de lege ferenda could constitute important tools for fostering
international equitywith regard to the commodity sector. Given the great dominance
of TNCs, they could develop rules of a commodity-directed transnational corporate
civil liability law.257 Moreover, with regard to imbalances in the global trade system,
they could help specify the rights of Commodity Dependent Developing Countries
(CDDCs) under the GATT. They could serve to expand the current infant-industry
promotion and trade and development provisions e.g., by requiring more concrete
254Cf. Sect. 4.4 above.
255The guidance could thus detail the requirements set forth in Article 9(1) CAC, cf. Sect. 4.2.1.5
above, for a local context; cf. moreover already the so-called Local Procurement Reporting
Mechanism (LPRM), Mining Shared Value (2019) LPRM http://miningsharedvalue.org/
mininglprm/ (last accessed 14 May 2021), which could provide a basis for future regulatory
approaches in the mining sector.
256Guidance on how these parameters could serve to foster SD is provided i.a. by UNCTAD (2015).
See also VanDuzer et al. (2012); cf. Sect. 4.3.1.2 above.
257Cf. Muchlinski (2016), pp. 58–59. As such, for instance, the provision of Article 3(1) ECLC,
cf. Sect. 4.2.1.5 above, could be adapted to a commodity context and spell out concrete guidelines
of what constitutes an action giving rise to liability as well as regarding the damages to be awarded.
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concessions from developed country members as well as allowing more deviations
from WTO disciplines for these commodity-dependent countries—thus
counteracting detrimental effects arising from the strict liberalisation approach
contained therein.258 In addition, taking up the global multilateral benefit-sharing
mechanism mentioned in Article 10 of the Nagoya Protocol, ICAs de lege ferenda
could consider the elaboration of a benefit-sharing mechanism applicable to
non-genetic resources.259
Also, with regard to dispute settlement mechanisms, ICAs de lege ferenda could
implement rules, which are particularly conducive to fostering international equity in
the commodity sector. This may for one include implementing those reforms of
investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), which have been suggested by various
institutions and scholars, such as: limiting ISDS to particular claims (excluding
those against measures that were taken to protect the environment or Human Rights);
requiring the exhaustion of local remedies; incorporating a ‘u-turn’ and ‘fork in the
road’ clause; setting forth strict limitation periods; encouraging alternative dispute
resolution mechanisms; or allowing counterclaims for the host state when the
investor breaches domestic law or other obligations.260
258Naturally, under the current political reality, this approach would presumably not exactly meet
the agreement fromWTO members and/or institutions. However, on the long run, it may contribute
to a world trade system, which is concerned primarily with contributing to SD and not particularly
promoting liberalisation. The latter should always be understood as a subsidiary aim, which is
intended to foster SD. Where it is deemed to not have this effect, it should be abandoned. See in this
respect, a policy paper i.a. co-authored by former WTO Director General Pascal Lamy, Global
Progressive Forum (2018), which reads on p. 6: ‘The traditional approach, which argues that “trade
is good, but we need to work on the side effects,” is out-dated. In today’s changing world, “business
as usual” does not work. Progressives must guarantee that global trade and investment benefit the
many and not the few. Progressives must ensure they promote sustainable development, reduce
global poverty, neutralise structural inequalities that exclude certain genders and populations from
the global economy, and raise living and welfare standards. Between the faithful and unconditional
promoters of free trade and the populist critiques defending protectionist and nationalist visions of
the world, there is a critical political space for progressive forces to defend a regulated vision of
globalisation. There is political responsibility in safeguarding an even distribution of trade’s
positive effects both within our societies and between developed and developing countries. It no
longer suffices to wait to realise long-promised trickle-down effects or to offer paltry compensation
to those disadvantaged by global trade. [. . .] Trade and investment must be embedded in a broader
economic development strategy in order to create added value for our economies. At the same time,
trade should be complemented by a new social contract, one that ensures equitable distribution of
trade’s benefits through adequate and extensive social policies and redistribution mechanisms.’
259The provision reads: ‘Parties shall consider the need for and modalities of a global multilateral
benefitsharing mechanism to address the fair and equitable sharing of benefits derived from the
utilization of genetic resources and traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources that
occur in transboundary situations or for which it is not possible to grant or obtain prior informed
consent. The benefits shared by users of genetic resources and traditional knowledge associated
with genetic resources through this mechanism shall be used to support the conservation of
biological diversity and the sustainable use of its components globally’, CBD (2011) Nagoya
protocol, https://www.cbd.int/abs/doc/protocol/nagoya-protocol-en.pdf (last accessed
14 May 2021).
260All of the above, see also Muchlinski (2016), pp. 61–2; cf. Sect. 4.3.1 above.
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Moreover, with regard to procedural and institutional questions, ICAs de lege
ferenda could incorporate an ISDS appellate mechanism, e.g. as the one envisaged
by the EU Investment Court System (ICS),261 open proceedings to amicus curiae
and other stakeholders, including potential victims of corporate activity,262 or joint
interpretation mechanisms between the parties to the international investment agree-
ment.263 In addition, remedies could be limited to monetary compensation, thus
henceforth excluding modification or removal of the regulation in question. Also, the
calculation of what constitutes an ‘equitable’ compensation could take into account
the host state’s level of development.264
Apart from that, ICAs de lege ferenda could also implement the mechanism
suggested above, according to which in general only investors that comply with HR,
environmental, and other applicable standards, which are relevant for commodity
activity, shall benefit from investment protection.265 ICAs de lege ferenda could step
up home state obligations for corporations investing abroad e.g., with regard to
transparency standards.266 As such, they could incorporate for example the bench-
marks for responsible commodity investments elaborated by the UN Principles for
Responsible Investment (UN PRI).267
What would furthermore foster international equity in the commodity sector
would be granting victims of corporate activities access to home state courts. This
could help remedy situations in which harm caused by corporations remains effec-
tively uncompensated in judicial proceedings as prominently reflected in the Kiobel
case. ICAs de lege ferenda could envisage concrete commitments of states to assume
jurisdiction over extraterritorial claims arising from commodity activities.268 This
would allow the claimant to bring her case before the courts of those countries,
where typically considerable volumes of the commodities that have been sourced in
her country are being consumed and often processed. It would add an important
element to the mosaic of a globalised society, which addresses violations across
borders and beyond potential capacity boundaries when it comes to the implemen-
tation of the rule of law.269
261Muchlinski (2016), p. 62; fundamentally Bungenberg and Reinisch (2018), p. 25.
262With a similar suggestion with regard to Bilateral Arbitration Treaties (BATs), Gaffney J (2018)
Could BITs and BATs be combined to ensure access to human rights remedies? Columbia FDI
Perspectives, 2 July 2018, http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2016/10/No-229-Gaffney-FINAL.pdf (last
accessed 14 May 2021); Muchlinski (2016), p. 62.
263Muchlinski (2016), pp. 62–63.
264Muchlinski (2016), pp. 62–63.
265Cf. Sect. 4.3.1.5 above.
266Bürgi Bonanomi et al. (2015), p. 51.
267Bürgi Bonanomi et al. (2015), p. 51; cf. also the Responsible Investor’s Guide to Commodities,
UN GC (2011).
268Cf. Sect. 4.4 above.
269See in this respect the excerpt from the Nobel Lecture given by Nobel Peace Prize Laureate 2018
Denis Mukwege, 10 December 2018, Oslo, which features as the prelude to this book above. The
full speech is available at The Nobel Prize (2021) Denis Mukwege—Nobel lecture, https://www.
5.2 ICAs as Instruments Specifying Sustainable Commodity Use 233
5.2.2.4 Reflections on Formal Questions
Having discussed potential normative contents of ICAs de lege ferenda, we shall
briefly also touch upon some rather ‘formal’ questions regarding their design.
As has been suggested by other authors before, one option would lie in introduc-
ing a multilateral commodity convention.270 Such a ‘classical’ international instru-
ment would typically be of legally binding nature and seek to reconcile the greatest
number of member states possible. While such an approach is certainly appealing
with regard to the desired outcome of reinforcing the regulation of the commodity
sector so as to foster its SD, it appears highly unlikely to be successful in view of the
state of play in international relations at the time of writing.
This is especially due to the continued, intense antagonism between Global North
and Global South, which significantly coincides with the antagonism between
commodity consumers and producers.271 In view of this pervasive conflict, which
appears to stretch across manifold areas of global trade and economic coopera-
tion,272 also non-binding, voluntary multilateral ‘accords’ or ‘compacts’ on com-
modities appear to stand little chance of finding the support of a majority of states.
An alternative would be an ‘open’ bilateral approach towards introducing ICAs
de lege ferenda. Two—or more—states could negotiate and conclude a commodity-
directed international agreement and explicitly provide that other states could join
the treaty at their will at all times.273 This would allow for an evolution of




270See especially Wilts and Bleischwitz (2012); arguably, with her call for a Commodity Organi-
sation, also Feichtner (2014), p. 284.
271The intensity of this opponency is most prominently reflected in the ‘deadlock’ of the Doha
Development Agenda, which until today has not been successfully adopted. On the reasons why it is
in fact far from it, cf. i.a. Sects. 2.2.4 and 2.2.5.
272It appears to be ultimately also reflected in the attempts of especially developing countries to
push for the introduction of international instruments on corporate liability, UN (2003) Norms on
the responsibilities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises with regard to
human rights, UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of HR, UN Doc. E/CN.4/
Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2, https://undocs.org/en/E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2; UN HRC (2014) Elab-
oration of an international legally binding instrument on transnational corporations and other
business enterprises with respect to human rights, Resolution 26/9 of 26 June 2014, https://
documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G14/082/52/PDF/G1408252.pdf?OpenElement; the
revised draft of 16 July 2019 is provided by OHCHR (2019) Legally binding instrument, https://
www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/WGTransCorp/OEIGWG_RevisedDraft_LBI.
pdf (all last accessed 14 May 2021); cf. Sect. 5.1.3 above.
273Cf. on the ‘open treaty’ approach especially Griebel (2009) as well as Griebel (2010), who
advocated for a ‘Europe Based Open Investment Treaty’; Bungenberg (2011), p. 237; cf. moreover
e.g. the option for non-UNECE states to accede to the Aarhus Convention as provided for in its
Article 19(3).
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The actor, which would be somewhat ‘predestined’ to be the driving force behind
such an open treaty approach, is the EU. Apart from the fact that it constitutes the
largest trading bloc worldwide and therefore disposes of substantial standard setting
power in international economic relations,274 it according to Article 21(2)(f) TEU
has also committed to
help develop international measures to preserve and improve the quality of the environment
and the sustainable management of global natural resources, in order to ensure sustainable
development[.]
According to Article 207(1) TFEU, this obligation applies particularly also to its
Common Commercial Policy. Introducing ICAs de lege ferenda, which clarify,
reinforce, and cohere the current framework of TCL would allow the EU to live
up to these commitments it has made under its own constitutional framework. The
fact that the EU according to Article 21(1) TEU has also committed to ‘promot[ing]
multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the framework of the
United Nations’, does not prevent it from seeking alternative approaches whenever a
multilateral solution does not appear to be viable. Given that the ‘open treaty’
approach is intended to ultimately result in a de facto multilateral instrument,
pursuing the latter, would explicitly not constitute a departure from seeking multi-
lateral solutions, but rather constitute a way of circumventing respective
‘roadblocks’.275
Instead of introducing ICAs de lege ferenda as stand-alone agreements, one
option would also be to incorporate their normative contents as a commodity-
directed chapter in other agreements, such as Free Trade Agreements (FTAs),
Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs), or Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs).
Particularly PTAs, including the Economic Partnership Agreements with the Afri-
can, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states, appear to be well suited in terms of content
and telos for the inclusion of a commodity-directed chapter.276 These chapters could
274European Commission (2018) Celebrating the Customs Union: the world’s largest trading bloc
turns 50, 30 June 2018, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-4265_en.htm (last accessed
14 May 2021); on the competition of economic law systems, fundamentally Meessen (2005); on
implications that this power has had on EU policy choices, cf. already Oehl M (2016) The
regulatory dimension of TTIP and the global competition of economic systems. Reflections on
the on-going dispute over Europe’s external trade policy, Völkerrechtsblog, 24 February 2016,
https://voelkerrechtsblog.org/the-regulatory-dimension-of-ttip-and-the-global-competition-of-eco
nomic-systems/ (last accessed 14 May 2021).
275In this respect, see also the current EU practice of concluding various bilateral FTAs, EU (2019)
Negotiations and agreements, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/negotiations-
and-agreements/ (last accessed 14 May 2021).
276For a list of the current EU preferential trade arrangements in place, European Commission
(2019) Arrangements list, https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/calculation-customs-
duties/rules-origin/general-aspects-preferential-origin/arrangements-list_en#preferential (last
accessed 14 May 2021); on the different types of agreements, cf. Oehl (2018b), p. 325.
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build particularly on the trade and SD chapters, which have been provided for in
recent EU FTAs.277
Lastly, when it comes to the mode of how ICAs de lege ferenda should be
elaborated, it seems natural that such endeavour should be pursued based on a
multi-stakeholder approach. Being paradigmatic for the concept of governance,278
a large share of the commodity standards, which we have analysed in this book, has
been developed in this vein. Since, as we have discussed with regard to the ILO
tripartite approach above, the involvement of the Governance Triangle, consisting of
states, businesses, and civil society, may well constitute an important ingredient for
successful transnational regulation,279 the same procedure appears to be advisable
when it comes to the elaboration of ICAs de lege ferenda.
5.2.2.5 Interim Conclusion: ICAs as Tools Fostering a Functional
Commodity Sector
To conclude, ICAs de lege ferenda constitute tools, which foster a functional
commodity sector. They do so by specifying what sustainable use means, defining
SD as their object and purpose, and reinforcing the rule of law in the global
commodity sector. As a result, they clarify, confirm, cohere, and align the TCL
framework.
The codification of TCL through a multilateral commodity convention appears to
be appealing in an ‘academic utopia’ yet is currently a little realistic option in view of
the Realpolitik in times of nationalist rhetoric from powerful political blocs. What
appears to be more functional under the current geopolitical conditions, however, is
the incorporation of gradually more commodity-directed rules—and eventually
chapters—in the FTAs and PTAs particularly of the EU. Moreover, also an ‘open
treaty’ approach to the elaboration of commodity-directed or -specific bi- or
plurilateral agreements may be worth considering.
277See chapter 16 EU-Japan FTA; chapter 12 EU-Singapore FTA; chapter 13 EU-Vietnam FTA; as
well as chapter 22 CETA; cf. Sect. 3.3.1.2 above. See also Article 25.4 CETA, which introduces the
Bilateral Dialogue on Raw Materials—a discussion forum for ‘cooperation in the field of raw
materials’, for the exchange of respective best practices and regulatory policies.
278Cf. Sects. 2.1.4, 2.2.5, and 3.3.1 above.
279Cf. Sect. 5.1.3 above. What may moreover bear inspiration in the ILO approach for future
regulatory endeavours regarding the commodity sector is the great number of specific instruments,
which detail labour rules in the contexts of individual (sub-)sectors or even activities. Starting with a
‘commodity framework convention’, which clarifies, confirms and amends the fundamental rules
and principles of TCL, subsequent instruments could tackle more specific aspects of commodity
activity in a more detailed manner.
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In this treatise, we set out to answer the following question: How effective is the
current legal framework in ensuring a functional commodity sector? In approaching
this task, we first provided conceptual clarity regarding its different components
before entering a qualitative assessment.
Conceptualising GCG
In a first step, we conceptualised Global Commodity Governance (GCG) as the
governing mode of the global commodity sector—which is naturally tasked with
ensuring its functionality. Secondly, we clarified the scope of the term ‘commodity’,
which constitutes the historically and dogmatically consistent notion that should be
employed for legal purposes. Based on Article 56(1) of the Havana Charter, we
defined the term as ‘any product of agriculture, forest, fishery or mining and any
mineral product in its natural (¼raw) form and in such forms that are customarily
required for its international trade, especially shipment, in substantial volumes.’
Thirdly, we characterised a functional commodity sector as one, in which the
commodity governance matrix exhibits a balance between the five commodity
interests it is composed of: economic gain, development, preservation, control,
and participation.
As our appraisal of historical approaches to governing the global commodity
sector revealed, the disruptive feature of GCG lies in the fact that it perceives
commodity activity not exclusively as an economic issue, but as a comprehensive
regulatory challenge, which requires the consideration of its social and ecological
prerequisites as well as effects. Therefore, it constitutes a commodity-directed
emanation of the global sustainable development (SD) agenda and is ultimately
faced with the task of achieving and maintaining equilibrium between the interests
associated with commodity activity.
Conceptualising TCL as the Legal Framework of GCG
Law can be a catalyst in this quest, where it contributes to the balancing of these
interests. It is effective, where it provides guidelines for states—as the central actors
of GCG—in their decision to extract.
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In order to be able to assess the effectiveness of the current legal framework
underpinning GCG, we first conceptualised Transnational Commodity Law (TCL).
We started by outlining the methodological foundations of conceptualising fields of
law. Accordingly, we elaborated the organisational framework of TCL based on, for
one, the definition of commodity law as ‘all law that regulates commodity-related
human activity and its impacts’; and, for the other, the factual context, in which
commodity-related human activity typically occurs: the removal of an item from
earth for a specific purpose that relates to the removed item. It is this factual context,
which constitutes the pertinent social behaviour that needs to be regulated in order to
address the commodity policy trade-offs arising in the commodity matrix.
Addressing these trade-offs reflects the ‘analytical and instrumental aims’ of the
conceptualisation of TCL.1
The TCL framework has been further qualified by the nature of its sources, which
can be largely ascribed to the four different categories of the classical inter-national
framework; private standards; the domestic legal framework; as well as transnational
contract law.
Also, the structure of TCL has been sketched pointing to its ‘qualified sover-
eignty’ outline. Accordingly, various fields of transnational, especially international
law, such as i.a. Human Rights (HR) and environmental protection norms, have
qualified how states shall exercise their permanent sovereignty over natural
resources (PSNR). Moreover, PSNR comprises the right to transfer commodity
rights. Both, the transfers themselves, as well as the responsibilities of rights trans-
ferees, are governed by a variety of international standards, most of which are of
private nature. Once these transfers have been effectuated, states are under the
obligation to protect these rights under international investment law, which is thus
further qualifying PSNR. In addition, ‘secondary qualifications’, which can stem
from various norm subsets of TCL, set forth the procedures to regulate externalities,
including dispute settlement mechanisms.
Our conceptualisation of TCL has been conducted based on the hypothesis that
the effectiveness of a legal framework results at least partly from the degree to which
it reflects a conscious consideration of the policy trade-offs it is intended to govern.
Therefore, it has been deemed to be effective where it provides ‘balancing norms’
that balance the five interests associated with commodity activity and thus answers
to questions such as: How much to extract? Where to extract? How to extract? How
to process or trade? How to make a decision to extract? How much to trade? How
much and what to tax? What resources to protect? What land rights to protect?
Where it cannot provide these answers, for instance since the privilege of ultimately
answering them falls within the political domain, it has been deemed to be effective
where it provides guidelines on how these questions should be answered.2
1Feinman (1989), p. 680, cf. Sect. 3.2.2.2 above.
2Section 2.3.2 above.
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The Limited Effectiveness of TCL
Our assessment revealed that TCL provides only little guidance on how commodity
equilibrium shall be achieved or maintained.
We ascertained that the sustainable use principle constitutes one of the few
balancing norms. Its normative content, as defined by the International Law Asso-
ciation (ILA), reconciles all five commodity interests. Therefore, the sustainable use
principle exhibits the normative contents needed in order to effectuate a functional
sector. Thus, the TCL framework would be effective where it concretises what
sustainable use requires. This would involve providing balancing norms, which
further detail how the commodity interests need to be balanced in respective
commodity scenarios, e.g. depending on the subsector, actors, or individual com-
modity concerned.
However, the current normative patterns of TCL prevent the field from spelling
out more concretely what constitutes sustainable commodity use:
First, most of TCL is ‘indirect’, i.e. it has not been created for the purpose of
regulating commodity activity. As such, it is not designed to balance commodity
interests, but pursues distinct regulatory objectives.
Second, the rather scarce incidents of direct TCL are neither balancing commod-
ity interests comprehensively. Instead, they typically balance a maximum of two
commodity interests with one another; at times three where for instance environ-
mental protection norms are being integrated with ones protecting Human Rights.
Besides, as the examples of the law applicable to shared resources as well as the
norms covering trade and development within the GATT have demonstrated, those
hard rules of direct TCL that address states tend to contribute little to remedying
commodity policy trade-offs. They will either be aimed at achieving a mere inter-
state balance or, where they could remedy for instance a trade-off between economic
and development interests, are ‘declaratory’ rather than of substantial legal effect.
Moreover, direct TCL is largely of soft or private legal nature, thus typically
unfolding limited or no legal effects for states. The latter, however, are naturally
the central actors when it comes to decisions to extract. Also, direct TCL is generally
little specific, i.e. it does not spell out in great detail what is required from the
stakeholders of commodity governance. Rules addressing private actors, especially
those that are intended to cover particular commodity sectors, tend to be more
specific than the abstract norms addressing states.
Third, what, too, hinders coherence and thus limits balancing effects of TCL, are
the few incidents of full integration between its rules and standards.
Fourth, what both contributes to the limited effectiveness of TCL and illustrates
this status quo, is the imbalance of the current framework in favour of economic
objectives—primarily investment protection and trade liberalisation. Overcoming
this imbalance constitutes a major challenge in rendering TCL more effective.
Moreover, fifth, the TCL framework exhibits regulatory gaps especially with
regard to aspects that are specific to commodity activity. It particularly lacks
effective remedies against harmful conduct of transnational commodity corpora-
tions. Also, it does not address potential clashes between global, national, and local
SD objectives; provides little to no guidance on how foreign investments as well as
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trade need to be designed in order to foster a functional commodity sector; and does
not spell out what constitutes adequate policy space for SD measures.
All in all, the current TCL framework barely contours what sustainable commod-
ity use legally requires. It is thus little effective in ensuring a functional commodity
sector.
Fostering the Effectiveness of TCL
To my mind, particularly two approaches can serve to foster the effectiveness of the
sustainable use principle and thus of TCL: defining SD as the object and purpose of
TCL and specifying the normative content of SD by fully integrating benchmarks
from the substance of TCL.
Regarding the former approach, we first noted that the sustainable use principle
constitutes the concretisation of SD for the commodity context. We then demon-
strated that given the universal nature of the SD agenda, the specific normative
quality of SD as a legal concept, and its status within a sizable series of international
treaties, sustainable use can be defined as a regulatory objective. In addition, we
pointed to the fact that—as I have argued elsewhere—SD already holds this status
with regard to Natural Resources Law (NRL). Subsequently, we illustrated that TCL
constitutes a sub-category of NRL, which is more suitable when it comes to this
specific economic use of natural resources related to its removal from the natural
environment. Consequently, sustainable use can be defined as the object and
purpose also of Transnational Commodity Law (TCL). The effects of doing so are
generally twofold: For one, it constitutes a primary norm that obliges states to ‘act
sustainably’; for the other, it constitutes a methodical norm, which serves as a
guideline how legal obligations shall be interpreted. As a consequence, it coheres
and integrates the field and thus fosters its effectiveness.
The second approach advocated for relates to the full integration of benchmarks
from other instruments of TCL into the sustainable use principle, thus rendering it
more specific and ultimately effective. Benchmarks in this respect can stem partic-
ularly from the many detailed standards regulating technical matters of commodity
activity. The SDGs and corresponding industry ‘maps’ or ‘atlases’ may be useful in
guiding the efforts to identify the most suitable rules and parameters in this respect.
Given the complexity of the task and the vast substance of TCL, computational text
analysis may constitute a helpful tool.
Apart from these suggestions aimed at the sustainable use principle, developing
rules by involving the ‘governance triangle’, consisting of states, businesses, and
NGOs, could foster TCL’s acceptance, coherence and ultimately effectiveness. An
example insofar is provided by ILO conventions, which are reflected coherently in a
large number of TCL instruments. Given their example, what may be particularly
effective, could be to combine tripartite approaches with binding international
agreements.
ICAs de lege ferenda as Instruments Specifying Sustainable Commodity Use
International Commodity Agreements (ICAs) de lege ferenda could serve to remedy
the current deficits of the TCL framework. They could codify direct, hard, specific,
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state-oriented law, which balances all five commodity interests comprehensively—
and thus spell out more precisely what sustainable commodity use requires.
This would significantly contrast the status quo, in which the legal relevance of
ICAs is limited. We insofar distinguished between three types of ICAs: ICAs sensu
originali, albeit pursuing a comprehensive approach tackling an entire sector and
seeking to foster SD, remain without ‘bite’ due to a lack of corresponding substan-
tive obligations. ICAs sensu stricto, to the contrary, often exhibit a narrow scope,
which is focused on a clear-cut, somewhat ‘singular’ objective. As such,
commodity-directed law may quite intensively regulate some specific activities
associated with commodity operations in some specific sectors. While some regional
instruments address challenges of GCG more comprehensively and recent EU Free
Trade Agreements (FTAs) exhibit a trend to consciously consider specificities of
commodity activity, most ICAs sensu stricto still provide no guidance on how to
balance the five commodity interests. Where they do, these provisions are often
rather aspirational or soft and generally do not entail concrete obligations. As a
consequence, ICAs sensu lato currently clearly are of the greatest significance for
GCG—a paradigm which once again underlines the lack of a coherent, targeted legal
regime underpinning GCG.
Principle of Proportionality
In order to concretise the sustainable use principle, we have suggested that ICAs de
lege ferenda could implement a principle of proportionality. Accordingly, the degree
to which one or more commodity interests are being emphasised in a concrete
balancing decision needs to be proportionate to the degree to which other interests
are being neglected. In addition, a rule that requires states to prevent irreversible
effects of commodity activities could limit states’ scope of discretion when carrying
out a balancing exercise. Moreover, the principle could correspond to a transparency
obligation for states to disclose their balancing method as well as the line of
reasoning that led to the respective weighing of the interests associated with the
commodity decision.
Obligation to Detail Terms of Sustainable Use in National Legal Frameworks
Apart from these rather abstract rules, ICAs de lege ferenda could obligate states to
transform certain best practices into national law. In general, they could be required
to elaborate commodity-directed national frameworks, which comprehensively reg-
ulate challenges associated with commodity activity, including rights allocation,
establishing a robust tax regime, and the offsetting of environmental and social
costs of extraction. In line with principle #13 of the Addis Ababa Principles and
Guidelines for the Sustainable Use of Biodiversity (AAPG), states could be required
to establish the internalisation of the social and ecological costs of commodity
activity ‘within the area of management’ and the reflection of these costs in the
‘distribution of the benefits from the use’. Moreover, the conservation and manage-
ment of NR could be implemented ‘as an integral part of development planning’,
i.a. through resource management plans applicable to individual commodities.
Going beyond the obligation to prevent irreversible effects of commodity activity,
the national framework could require the prevention of alterations to the ecosystem,
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which are ‘not reversible over a reasonable period of time’ in line with Article 4(1)
(d) of the ASEAN Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources
(ACNR). In addition to these general principles, ICAs de lege ferenda could obligate
states to detail the terms of sustainable use also in the context of individual
commodity sectors.
As a side benefit of this obligation, ICAs de lege ferenda would help aligning
regulation on the global, national, and local levels. Public–private contracts should
be embedded in this coherent, effective regulatory framework, thus isolating poten-
tial power asymmetries between states and transnational corporations.
Further Effects of ICAs de lege ferenda Conducive of SD
Furthermore, ICAs can incorporate SD as their regulatory objective, thus contribut-
ing to gradually cohering TCL and fostering its effectiveness. Also, ICAs can
reinforce the rule of law in the commodity sector by clarifying the applicable legal
framework, closing regulatory gaps, and expanding TCL.
Formal Reflections on ICAs de lege ferenda
Given the continued, intense antagonism between Global North and Global South, a
multilateral ICA—despite being highly desirable—appears to be little realistic. What
seems more actionable instead, not least in view of the commitments the EU has
made according to Articles 21(2)(f) TEU, 207(1) TFEU, is the incorporation of
gradually more commodity-directed rules—and eventually chapters—in the EU
FTAs and Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs). In this respect, an ‘open treaty’
approach to the elaboration of commodity-directed or -specific bi- or plurilateral
agreements appears worthy of consideration.
Outlook: If We Are to Take SD Seriously, We Need To Be More Specific
Commodity activity, i.e. removing (economically) useful items from the natural
environment, potentially processing them as required, and then trading, and/or
shipping them, constitutes one of the core economic activities of our globalised
economic system. It is high time for us international lawyers to accord this sector the
attention it deserves.
What our examination has brought about in essence comes down to the under-
standing that the global commodity sector is functional, where it is sustainably
managed. The sustainable use principle constitutes the core balancing norm—within
the vast body of TCL, it is the only concept, which reconciles all five commodity
interests. This again points to the extensive regulatory potential, which is associated
with SD as a legal concept. It is our task to further operationalise it and to thus
deliver guidelines to states and other stakeholders what sustainable commodity
activity means. If we are to take SD seriously, we need to be more specific.
Therefore, the international community is now faced with the challenge to create
concrete rules on what constitutes sustainable resource use. We shall distinguish
between the roles that state governments, academics, and international as well as
national jurisprudence should assume in this endeavour.
State governments are now tasked with initiating political processes that lead to
the codification of TCL. Elaborating ICAs de lege ferenda of the type described
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above, be they of bi-, pluri- or multilateral character, would be the most direct,
clearest way to do so. During their negotiation, it will be crucial to strike the right
balance between sufficient specificity of the rules codified and policy space that
remains with national governments. This balance can only result from political
processes—ideally, they will bring about a robust legal framework ensuring sus-
tainable commodity activity.
Academics worldwide can contribute to this process by perceiving TCL as a
proper discipline of international law. The legal rules covering the commodity sector
should be researched and discussed in light of their quality to balance the commodity
interests at stake. Legal analysis should measure their effectiveness by interrelating
the individual rules with TCL’s object and purpose of sustainable use. As the
normative suggestions made above demonstrate, advancing the legal underpinnings
of GCG may require legal scholarship to abandon beaten paths and make innovative
propositions—whilst mastering the challenge of adequately tying them to the dog-
matic foundations of inter- and transnational law.
Lastly, courts and tribunals worldwide are assuming a key role in the normative
evolution necessary for humankind to master the transformation of our economies
and societies towards sustainability. They are tasked with interpreting the rules
applicable to commodity activities in the light of SD as the object and purpose of
TCL—and thus with translating the substantial normative weight of the regulatory
objective of sustainable use into specific normative instructions. Particularly where
political processes are blocked, judges may be responsible for providing the legal
impulses necessary to advance SD.
All in all, we cannot overestimate what bold actions will be needed in order to
achieve a functional commodity sector as one of the key requirements of SD.3 It will
depend on lawyers worldwide whether or not this process will be based on a reliable
legal framework. In view of the great many challenges and policy trade-offs at stake,
we should waste no time to get to work.
The Implementation Challenge Remains
Recalling the words of Dr Denis Mukwege, which have set the tone at the very outset
of this treatise, a sentiment of humility shall accompany our efforts. The challenge of
fostering good GCG rather than constituting an issue that could be solved by legal or
academic approaches alone, to a significant degree is one of implementation. As
Cotula puts it, ‘. . .law is only a part of the story.’4
3Paradigmatically, UNCTAD’s 2019 Trade and Development Report is dedicated to the financing
of ‘a global green new deal’—an endeavour, which is said to require investments of 2.5 trillion
US-$ in developing countries alone, UNCTAD (2019), pp. iii, 83.
4Cotula (2016), p. 13. He goes on to state: ‘Policy instruments outside the legal sphere can also
influence investment patterns and outcomes [. . .]. Laws are often not properly enforced due to
vested interests, power imbalances or resource constraints. Legislation may nominally protect
human rights, land rights or labour rights, but often remains a dead letter. Tax laws may be
circumvented, and tax payments are not always easy to collect.’
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In this story—the great implementation challenge for the many stakeholders,
public and private, global and local—I hope that my work can contribute to an
intensified understanding of the transnational regulatory environment, in which
commodity activity is taking place. And perhaps it may be understood as an act of
encouragement for the many persons and institutions striving to implement a
functional—a sustainable—commodity sector. An act, which visualises that their
contributions ultimately relate to a greater framework, a shared objective: our
universal agenda of sustainable development.
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